okie-carbine
Veteran Member
here comes that dark winter.
WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN
- Thread starter danielboon
- Start date
November Sierra......
jward
passin' thru
O now, no shooting the messenger; the attitude's one o' the few things that doesn't look good on ya : P
It was meant for the "several U.S. defense leaders", no you Jward.
jward
passin' thru
Trump-era hawk wants US to ‘prepare for limited war’ with China
Kinling Lo in Beijing + FOLLOW
5-6 minutes
Colby was the main crafter of Trump’s 2018 national defence strategy, which decisively shifted the US from concerns about terrorism and towards great power competition, naming China a “strategic competitor”.
In Colby’s view, China is seeking to become a regional hegemony and will do so, if not actively stopped by the US. “The best strategy” that China has, he writes, is to capture a vulnerable US ally or quasi-ally, which he identifies as Taiwan.
Unification with Taiwan has been a stated goal of China’s ruling Communist Party since 1949, with Chinese President Xi Jinping vowing to take the island back “by force” if necessary.
For decades, Washington has pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity, refusing to state whether it would defend the island against an attack from the mainland, to deter unilateral moves from both Beijing and Taipei, which might declare independence.
But in October, a month after Colby’s book was published, US President Joe Biden twice appeared to walk back the policy when he declared “yes” in response to questions on whether the US would come to Taipei’s aid. The White House later clarified that the policy was unchanged.
The confusion coincided with record-breaking numbers of PLA military jets flying towards Taiwan’s air defence identification zone.
During their virtual summit in November, Xi warned Biden against encouraging Taiwan independence, calling it “extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire”.
While both leaders have explicitly said they want to avoid conflict, questions raised regarding an escalation of conflict over Taiwan have not been settled.
Is an armed conflict between the two powers unavoidable? What might a war look like if it did break out? What are the chances of winning for each side?
In Colby’s view, the US and its allies need to prepare for military conflict. Known as a hawk among Republicans, he recommends a “limited war” that would seek to cause the least upheaval to the region.
“America’s best military strategy is a denial defence, or a strategy that seeks to deny China’s ability to use military force to achieve its political objectives,” he writes. According to Colby, Beijing’s objectives include seeking hegemony over the world’s most important region – Asia.
“A defence strategy must prepare the US and its allies and partners to fight and achieve their aims in a limited war against China.”
He calls for an “anti-hegemonic coalition” made up of alliances and other partnerships, listing potential parties as Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan.
If the coalition failed to “deny” China’s seizure of Taiwan, China could potentially take over the Philippines and Vietnam, Colby writes. In his view, an attack on the island would meet a “limited war” response, with no motivation on either side to escalate.
Colby calls for the US to reduce its military commitments in both Europe and the Middle East, and for stronger military backing from Japan and Britain. He also says it is time to abandon strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, to boost Washington’s “differentiated credibility”.
“Half-hearted commitments are therefore ill-advised in the face of an aspirant like China,” he writes. “But ambiguity is ill-advised because it implicates the quasi-guarantor’s credibility.”
Colby ends the book by saying it was written “in very high respect” for China and that the US would not challenge its way of governance, its ideology or try to dominate it – as long as it did not become a regional hegemon.
Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy in Beijing, said China would hardly perceive Colby’s strategy as one of defence – it would be likely to cause misjudgments on both sides, increasing the likelihood of pre-emptive war.
“This, I am afraid, is a serious misread of Chinese policy that would also cause serious misreading from the Chinese side,” Zhao said.
“If Washington adopts what Colby is proposing, such as strengthening the alliance system in the region, and be more clear in their backing in defending Taiwan, all these would surely be understood as direct and targeted attacks at China,” he said.
“This could even risk a pre-emptive war.”
But some of Colby’s playbook appears to be making its way into Washington’s policymaking.
The US has been boosting relations with its allies, and forming or reviving new ones in the region – including the Aukus security pact with Australia and Britain, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan and Australia.
But Colby’s suggestions about bringing other countries on board a military coalition seem less likely, with Beijing upgrading its ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations last month to “comprehensive strategic partnership”.
Seoul and Beijing are also in regular talks over a formal declaration to finally end the Korean war, an issue of vital strategic significance. And this week China announced its first joint medical support military exercise with neighbouring Vietnam.
Please see source for video
Posted for fair use
www.scmp.com
Kinling Lo in Beijing + FOLLOW
5-6 minutes
Colby was the main crafter of Trump’s 2018 national defence strategy, which decisively shifted the US from concerns about terrorism and towards great power competition, naming China a “strategic competitor”.
In Colby’s view, China is seeking to become a regional hegemony and will do so, if not actively stopped by the US. “The best strategy” that China has, he writes, is to capture a vulnerable US ally or quasi-ally, which he identifies as Taiwan.
Unification with Taiwan has been a stated goal of China’s ruling Communist Party since 1949, with Chinese President Xi Jinping vowing to take the island back “by force” if necessary.
For decades, Washington has pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity, refusing to state whether it would defend the island against an attack from the mainland, to deter unilateral moves from both Beijing and Taipei, which might declare independence.
But in October, a month after Colby’s book was published, US President Joe Biden twice appeared to walk back the policy when he declared “yes” in response to questions on whether the US would come to Taipei’s aid. The White House later clarified that the policy was unchanged.
The confusion coincided with record-breaking numbers of PLA military jets flying towards Taiwan’s air defence identification zone.
During their virtual summit in November, Xi warned Biden against encouraging Taiwan independence, calling it “extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire”.
While both leaders have explicitly said they want to avoid conflict, questions raised regarding an escalation of conflict over Taiwan have not been settled.
Is an armed conflict between the two powers unavoidable? What might a war look like if it did break out? What are the chances of winning for each side?
In Colby’s view, the US and its allies need to prepare for military conflict. Known as a hawk among Republicans, he recommends a “limited war” that would seek to cause the least upheaval to the region.
“America’s best military strategy is a denial defence, or a strategy that seeks to deny China’s ability to use military force to achieve its political objectives,” he writes. According to Colby, Beijing’s objectives include seeking hegemony over the world’s most important region – Asia.
“A defence strategy must prepare the US and its allies and partners to fight and achieve their aims in a limited war against China.”
He calls for an “anti-hegemonic coalition” made up of alliances and other partnerships, listing potential parties as Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan.
If the coalition failed to “deny” China’s seizure of Taiwan, China could potentially take over the Philippines and Vietnam, Colby writes. In his view, an attack on the island would meet a “limited war” response, with no motivation on either side to escalate.
Colby calls for the US to reduce its military commitments in both Europe and the Middle East, and for stronger military backing from Japan and Britain. He also says it is time to abandon strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, to boost Washington’s “differentiated credibility”.
“Half-hearted commitments are therefore ill-advised in the face of an aspirant like China,” he writes. “But ambiguity is ill-advised because it implicates the quasi-guarantor’s credibility.”
Colby ends the book by saying it was written “in very high respect” for China and that the US would not challenge its way of governance, its ideology or try to dominate it – as long as it did not become a regional hegemon.
Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy in Beijing, said China would hardly perceive Colby’s strategy as one of defence – it would be likely to cause misjudgments on both sides, increasing the likelihood of pre-emptive war.
“This, I am afraid, is a serious misread of Chinese policy that would also cause serious misreading from the Chinese side,” Zhao said.
“If Washington adopts what Colby is proposing, such as strengthening the alliance system in the region, and be more clear in their backing in defending Taiwan, all these would surely be understood as direct and targeted attacks at China,” he said.
“This could even risk a pre-emptive war.”
But some of Colby’s playbook appears to be making its way into Washington’s policymaking.
The US has been boosting relations with its allies, and forming or reviving new ones in the region – including the Aukus security pact with Australia and Britain, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan and Australia.
But Colby’s suggestions about bringing other countries on board a military coalition seem less likely, with Beijing upgrading its ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations last month to “comprehensive strategic partnership”.
Seoul and Beijing are also in regular talks over a formal declaration to finally end the Korean war, an issue of vital strategic significance. And this week China announced its first joint medical support military exercise with neighbouring Vietnam.
Please see source for video
Posted for fair use
Trump-era hawk wants US to ‘prepare for limited war’ with China
Former assistant defence secretary Elbridge Colby outlines his prescription for how to win a conflict in book which calls for ‘Asian Nato’.
www.scmp.com
jward
passin' thru
Could Taiwan’s Political Left Reconsider Nuclear Power?
By Seaver Wang and Daniel Chen for The Diplomat
10-13 minutes
The Debate | Opinion
Past politics have tainted nuclear power in Taiwan, but a positive, forward-looking, and socially responsible platform is possible.
Credit: Flickr/ Nisa Yeh
Modern Taiwan is reinventing itself. From shifts in electoral politics to recognition of complicated historical legacies to reconsideration of the country’s climate future, Taiwanese are reimagining many aspects of society with a bold vision for what the country should look like tomorrow.
That same fearlessness doesn’t currently apply to how progressive Taiwanese think about the role of nuclear power. Nuclear attitudes have returned to center stage amidst an imminent referendum vote on whether to resume construction of the Longmen Nuclear Power Plant (often referred to as NPP4), a measure which left-wing politicians are rallying voters to oppose.
Rather than considering how to reform or improve Taiwan’s nuclear sector, the left and “pan-Green” political platforms have generally called for the complete phase-out of nuclear energy. Given that so many other domestic institutions in Taiwan are being transformed to better align with today’s world and values, why haven’t left-wing, pro-Taiwan politicians and activists also considered alternative approaches that would seek to reform nuclear energy production in Taiwan to better match their societal aspirations?
The answer is that nuclear politics in Taiwan today remain tied to decades of social and political history, with attitudes about nuclear power closely associated with political identity. Many of the core points of political contention surrounding nuclear issues in Taiwan are related to ideas about government accountability, Indigenous rights, and democratic community engagement.
During Taiwan’s period of authoritarian rule, the right-wing Kuomintang (KMT) administered nuclear power projects in the same way it conducted much of domestic policy – with disregard for local opposition and dissent. During the 1970s and ‘80s, left-wing activists joined forces with Taiwanese nationalists and anti-nuclear environmentalists to resist government oppression. The shared vision of a pristine Taiwan untainted by repressive dictators from the Chinese mainland united this seemingly rag-tag bunch into a coherent “pan-Green” political movement. In the decades since, a younger generation of progressive Taiwanese found their political awakening during the 2014 Sunflower Movement, in which a student occupation of the Legislative Yuan in rejection of the policies of the then-majority KMT took place contemporaneously with domestic anti-nuclear protests.
These political dynamics continue to mark nuclear politics in Taiwan today, as evidenced by intense recent debates over the upcoming December 18 referendum. Both the left-leaning and pan-Green groups continue to point out the problematic non-consultative, anti-democratic history of Taiwan’s nuclear facilities, especially long-standing disputes specifically related to NPP4. Meanwhile, KMT politicians and allied pro-nuclear advocates have only reinforced the association of nuclear power with forceful, callous institutions, bluntly dismissing public concerns regarding waste storage, mocking an Indigenous counterpart during a televised debate, and even making physical threats against political rivals.
It goes without saying that such offensive right-wing rhetorical theatrics have no place in civil political discourse. At the same time, this invective also has little to do with the fundamental technical matters inherent to nuclear technology or power plant management. The referendum process has rather highlighted how debates on nuclear power in Taiwan have become entrenched and narrowly focused, with attention revolving around polarizing statements and partisan politics.
This is problematic because the question of Taiwan’s energy future is ultimately much larger than made-for-TV politics or even than the upcoming referendum vote on NPP4. In pursuing both greater energy security and a greener energy landscape, Taiwan faces a difficult path ahead. If the Democratic Progressive Party’s nuclear phase-out policy becomes a reality as planned, removing nuclear power as an option, that path will only become more challenging.
Nuclear energy remains Taiwan’s largest source of clean electricity by a factor of two, producing 11 percent of Taiwan’s national power generation. While national policies call for the replacement of existing generation with additional wind and solar capacity, Taiwan is not currently on track to meet its renewable energy deployment targets. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Bureau of Energy had estimated in 2018 that renewable electricity might provide 9 percent of national generation in 2020, and current goals aim to have renewables support 20 percent of power production by 2025. In reality, renewable sources produced just 5.4 percent of Taiwan’s electricity in 2020, actually declining relative to 2019 generation. Granted, 2020 will be remembered as an anomalous year in history, but Taiwan must nearly quadruple its renewable generation in four years to meet the 2025 target. Meanwhile, 2025 capacity deployment goals envision only a two to threefold increase in renewable generation capacity relative to 2020 levels.
Should Taipei’s efforts to expand wind and solar energy fail to meet expectations, phasing out nuclear power in Taiwan would merely represent “treadmill decarbonization,” where new renewable capacity largely only replaces existing nuclear generation, without significantly changing the amount of Taiwan’s energy provided by import-dependent fossil fuels. At the same time, Taiwan’s demand for electricity is continuing to grow and may spike further as new energy-intensive semiconductor plants for 3 nanometer chips commence production. This combination of factors may thus leave Taiwan’s economy vulnerable to the unpredictability of fossil energy markets and global supply chains, with commensurate risks for Taiwan’s regional economic competitiveness. While the world will undoubtedly pay top dollar for 3 nm chips, other export commodities like electronics, appliances, or metals that become more expensive due to production hurdles may lose ground in the global marketplace.
One wonders whether such practical concerns might eventually prompt the political left in Taiwan to develop its own vision for nuclear energy – a positive, forward-looking, and socially responsible platform that is fully compatible with its progressive agenda, while outflanking and presenting a vibrant alternative to heavy-handed KMT politics. For instance, such a reform-focused strategy might direct Taipower and government regulators to better manage earthquake or disaster risks, or devise benefits-sharing policies to help reach consensus around new proposals. Current initiatives compensating communities for past, non-consultative projects could be expanded to include productive investments in local infrastructure and services that leave more lasting, long-term value for nearby inhabitants than financial payments. A new pan-Green nuclear strategy might consider how keeping nuclear capacity in order to retire more coal plants provides environmental justice benefits by reducing air pollution and hazardous coal ash production, as well as global benefits via greenhouse gas reductions that help fulfill Taiwan’s climate obligations to the wider world.
Such a shift in attitude might be assisted by corresponding shifts in nuclear technology that can even more sharply separate the future of nuclear power in Taiwan from its past. Looking ahead, new advanced nuclear technologies could address many concerns that feature prominently in public nuclear discourse. Emerging designs offer vast improvements in safety, such as reactors that are incapable of losing cooling capacity or that can be sited underground for high protection. Such new technologies represent a far better future investment than new fossil gas infrastructure that will only impede Taiwan’s energy security and climate ambitions for the foreseeable future.
When it comes to advanced nuclear concepts, however, it is key to acknowledge that important obstacles stand in the way of plans to deploy such new nuclear projects in Taiwan. Despite no formal diplomatic recognition by the United States, Taiwan is one of only two nations in the world that the U.S. has imposed a Gold Standard 123 agreement upon, forfeiting Taiwan’s rights to fabricate nuclear fuel and recycle waste. Similarly, though Taiwan’s nuclear facilities are under intense surveillance under the IAEA Additional Protocols, exclusion from the United Nations means that Taiwan is not recognized by the IAEA, let alone able to participate in its decision making. This level of meddling by foreign entities that are otherwise hesitant to so much as publicly acknowledge Taiwan raises many practical obstacles to pursuing advanced nuclear development, on top of being deeply humiliating to the Taiwanese people.
However, such convoluted international dynamics also present useful progressive opportunities. In keeping with broader efforts to reintegrate Taiwan into the international community, most recently with its U.S.-sanctioned bid to join the WHO, Taiwanese leaders can also make bold demands of the United States and international institutions like the IAEA to remove restrictive policies on waste treatment and nuclear technology that currently impede Taiwan’s nuclear sector, thereby opening another new front in Taiwan’s important struggle for greater international representation.
Ultimately, rather than opposing political parties having different stances on whether to use a technology, it makes far more sense for parties to have different ideas about how to govern and use that technology. Nuclear power in Taiwan may carry associations of community opposition, institutional distrust, risk, and partisan controversy, but these dynamics are not inherent to nuclear technology. There are problems that could be resolved with some of the same bold creativity that Taiwan’s people have applied to so many other corners of society. There is little doubt that progressive Taiwanese possess the power to craft a future-forward vision for nuclear power that reforms and overcomes its legacy challenges in Taiwan.
By Seaver Wang and Daniel Chen for The Diplomat
10-13 minutes
The Debate | Opinion
Past politics have tainted nuclear power in Taiwan, but a positive, forward-looking, and socially responsible platform is possible.
Credit: Flickr/ Nisa Yeh
Modern Taiwan is reinventing itself. From shifts in electoral politics to recognition of complicated historical legacies to reconsideration of the country’s climate future, Taiwanese are reimagining many aspects of society with a bold vision for what the country should look like tomorrow.
That same fearlessness doesn’t currently apply to how progressive Taiwanese think about the role of nuclear power. Nuclear attitudes have returned to center stage amidst an imminent referendum vote on whether to resume construction of the Longmen Nuclear Power Plant (often referred to as NPP4), a measure which left-wing politicians are rallying voters to oppose.
Rather than considering how to reform or improve Taiwan’s nuclear sector, the left and “pan-Green” political platforms have generally called for the complete phase-out of nuclear energy. Given that so many other domestic institutions in Taiwan are being transformed to better align with today’s world and values, why haven’t left-wing, pro-Taiwan politicians and activists also considered alternative approaches that would seek to reform nuclear energy production in Taiwan to better match their societal aspirations?
The answer is that nuclear politics in Taiwan today remain tied to decades of social and political history, with attitudes about nuclear power closely associated with political identity. Many of the core points of political contention surrounding nuclear issues in Taiwan are related to ideas about government accountability, Indigenous rights, and democratic community engagement.
During Taiwan’s period of authoritarian rule, the right-wing Kuomintang (KMT) administered nuclear power projects in the same way it conducted much of domestic policy – with disregard for local opposition and dissent. During the 1970s and ‘80s, left-wing activists joined forces with Taiwanese nationalists and anti-nuclear environmentalists to resist government oppression. The shared vision of a pristine Taiwan untainted by repressive dictators from the Chinese mainland united this seemingly rag-tag bunch into a coherent “pan-Green” political movement. In the decades since, a younger generation of progressive Taiwanese found their political awakening during the 2014 Sunflower Movement, in which a student occupation of the Legislative Yuan in rejection of the policies of the then-majority KMT took place contemporaneously with domestic anti-nuclear protests.
These political dynamics continue to mark nuclear politics in Taiwan today, as evidenced by intense recent debates over the upcoming December 18 referendum. Both the left-leaning and pan-Green groups continue to point out the problematic non-consultative, anti-democratic history of Taiwan’s nuclear facilities, especially long-standing disputes specifically related to NPP4. Meanwhile, KMT politicians and allied pro-nuclear advocates have only reinforced the association of nuclear power with forceful, callous institutions, bluntly dismissing public concerns regarding waste storage, mocking an Indigenous counterpart during a televised debate, and even making physical threats against political rivals.
It goes without saying that such offensive right-wing rhetorical theatrics have no place in civil political discourse. At the same time, this invective also has little to do with the fundamental technical matters inherent to nuclear technology or power plant management. The referendum process has rather highlighted how debates on nuclear power in Taiwan have become entrenched and narrowly focused, with attention revolving around polarizing statements and partisan politics.
This is problematic because the question of Taiwan’s energy future is ultimately much larger than made-for-TV politics or even than the upcoming referendum vote on NPP4. In pursuing both greater energy security and a greener energy landscape, Taiwan faces a difficult path ahead. If the Democratic Progressive Party’s nuclear phase-out policy becomes a reality as planned, removing nuclear power as an option, that path will only become more challenging.
Nuclear energy remains Taiwan’s largest source of clean electricity by a factor of two, producing 11 percent of Taiwan’s national power generation. While national policies call for the replacement of existing generation with additional wind and solar capacity, Taiwan is not currently on track to meet its renewable energy deployment targets. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Bureau of Energy had estimated in 2018 that renewable electricity might provide 9 percent of national generation in 2020, and current goals aim to have renewables support 20 percent of power production by 2025. In reality, renewable sources produced just 5.4 percent of Taiwan’s electricity in 2020, actually declining relative to 2019 generation. Granted, 2020 will be remembered as an anomalous year in history, but Taiwan must nearly quadruple its renewable generation in four years to meet the 2025 target. Meanwhile, 2025 capacity deployment goals envision only a two to threefold increase in renewable generation capacity relative to 2020 levels.
Should Taipei’s efforts to expand wind and solar energy fail to meet expectations, phasing out nuclear power in Taiwan would merely represent “treadmill decarbonization,” where new renewable capacity largely only replaces existing nuclear generation, without significantly changing the amount of Taiwan’s energy provided by import-dependent fossil fuels. At the same time, Taiwan’s demand for electricity is continuing to grow and may spike further as new energy-intensive semiconductor plants for 3 nanometer chips commence production. This combination of factors may thus leave Taiwan’s economy vulnerable to the unpredictability of fossil energy markets and global supply chains, with commensurate risks for Taiwan’s regional economic competitiveness. While the world will undoubtedly pay top dollar for 3 nm chips, other export commodities like electronics, appliances, or metals that become more expensive due to production hurdles may lose ground in the global marketplace.
One wonders whether such practical concerns might eventually prompt the political left in Taiwan to develop its own vision for nuclear energy – a positive, forward-looking, and socially responsible platform that is fully compatible with its progressive agenda, while outflanking and presenting a vibrant alternative to heavy-handed KMT politics. For instance, such a reform-focused strategy might direct Taipower and government regulators to better manage earthquake or disaster risks, or devise benefits-sharing policies to help reach consensus around new proposals. Current initiatives compensating communities for past, non-consultative projects could be expanded to include productive investments in local infrastructure and services that leave more lasting, long-term value for nearby inhabitants than financial payments. A new pan-Green nuclear strategy might consider how keeping nuclear capacity in order to retire more coal plants provides environmental justice benefits by reducing air pollution and hazardous coal ash production, as well as global benefits via greenhouse gas reductions that help fulfill Taiwan’s climate obligations to the wider world.
Such a shift in attitude might be assisted by corresponding shifts in nuclear technology that can even more sharply separate the future of nuclear power in Taiwan from its past. Looking ahead, new advanced nuclear technologies could address many concerns that feature prominently in public nuclear discourse. Emerging designs offer vast improvements in safety, such as reactors that are incapable of losing cooling capacity or that can be sited underground for high protection. Such new technologies represent a far better future investment than new fossil gas infrastructure that will only impede Taiwan’s energy security and climate ambitions for the foreseeable future.
When it comes to advanced nuclear concepts, however, it is key to acknowledge that important obstacles stand in the way of plans to deploy such new nuclear projects in Taiwan. Despite no formal diplomatic recognition by the United States, Taiwan is one of only two nations in the world that the U.S. has imposed a Gold Standard 123 agreement upon, forfeiting Taiwan’s rights to fabricate nuclear fuel and recycle waste. Similarly, though Taiwan’s nuclear facilities are under intense surveillance under the IAEA Additional Protocols, exclusion from the United Nations means that Taiwan is not recognized by the IAEA, let alone able to participate in its decision making. This level of meddling by foreign entities that are otherwise hesitant to so much as publicly acknowledge Taiwan raises many practical obstacles to pursuing advanced nuclear development, on top of being deeply humiliating to the Taiwanese people.
However, such convoluted international dynamics also present useful progressive opportunities. In keeping with broader efforts to reintegrate Taiwan into the international community, most recently with its U.S.-sanctioned bid to join the WHO, Taiwanese leaders can also make bold demands of the United States and international institutions like the IAEA to remove restrictive policies on waste treatment and nuclear technology that currently impede Taiwan’s nuclear sector, thereby opening another new front in Taiwan’s important struggle for greater international representation.
Ultimately, rather than opposing political parties having different stances on whether to use a technology, it makes far more sense for parties to have different ideas about how to govern and use that technology. Nuclear power in Taiwan may carry associations of community opposition, institutional distrust, risk, and partisan controversy, but these dynamics are not inherent to nuclear technology. There are problems that could be resolved with some of the same bold creativity that Taiwan’s people have applied to so many other corners of society. There is little doubt that progressive Taiwanese possess the power to craft a future-forward vision for nuclear power that reforms and overcomes its legacy challenges in Taiwan.
Could Taiwan’s Political Left Reconsider Nuclear Power?
Past politics have tainted nuclear power in Taiwan, but a positive, forward-looking, and socially responsible platform is possible.
thediplomat.com
jward
passin' thru
I'm an oft admitted neophyte in all matters o this game, but this doesn't really strike me as a good solution 
Apex
@Apex_WW
5h
US needs to fly into Chinese airspace in response to provocation of Taiwan: Gordon Chang
View: https://twitter.com/Apex_WW/status/1467867070377472006?s=20
Apex
@Apex_WW
5h
US needs to fly into Chinese airspace in response to provocation of Taiwan: Gordon Chang
View: https://twitter.com/Apex_WW/status/1467867070377472006?s=20
I don't know if the olympics are going to happen.
Not if Russia kicks off. There wont be an Olympics.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Pacific chief says China’s military buildup largest since World War IIAquilino: Threat posed by Beijing drove new regional partnership
In this undated file photo released by the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, a Chinese PLA J-16 fighter jet flies in an undisclosed location. China flew more than 30 military planes toward Taiwan on Saturday, Oct. 2, 2021, the second large ... more >
Print
By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Monday, December 6, 2021
China’s buildup of military forces is the largest the world has seen since World War II and has driven Australia and other nations around the world to seek closer security ties to the United States, according to the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Adm. John Aquilino also said the U.S. military is working with Taiwan to strengthen its defenses as the island-state finds itself under growing pressure from Beijing.
“What I know we’re watching in the region is the largest military buildup we’ve seen since World War II,” the four-star admiral said in remarks at a recent defense conference in California.
Flush from a fast-growing economy, the Chinese military is rapidly modernizing its forces with new missiles, warships, nuclear forces, cyberattack capabilities and space weapons in recent years. The buildup has driven the Australians, in particular, to seek nuclear submarines as part of a new “AUKUS” security pact revealed in September with the United States and Britain, he said.
The submarine deal “was an Australian decision to be able to invest in a nuclear submarine program that provides the capabilities they need against the security threats in the region that they see,”Adm. Aquilino said. “We certainly endorse their decision as we’ve partnered with them,” he said, adding “we’ll develop those capabilities.”
www.washingtontimes.com
In this undated file photo released by the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, a Chinese PLA J-16 fighter jet flies in an undisclosed location. China flew more than 30 military planes toward Taiwan on Saturday, Oct. 2, 2021, the second large ... more >
By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Monday, December 6, 2021
China’s buildup of military forces is the largest the world has seen since World War II and has driven Australia and other nations around the world to seek closer security ties to the United States, according to the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Adm. John Aquilino also said the U.S. military is working with Taiwan to strengthen its defenses as the island-state finds itself under growing pressure from Beijing.
“What I know we’re watching in the region is the largest military buildup we’ve seen since World War II,” the four-star admiral said in remarks at a recent defense conference in California.
Flush from a fast-growing economy, the Chinese military is rapidly modernizing its forces with new missiles, warships, nuclear forces, cyberattack capabilities and space weapons in recent years. The buildup has driven the Australians, in particular, to seek nuclear submarines as part of a new “AUKUS” security pact revealed in September with the United States and Britain, he said.
The submarine deal “was an Australian decision to be able to invest in a nuclear submarine program that provides the capabilities they need against the security threats in the region that they see,”Adm. Aquilino said. “We certainly endorse their decision as we’ve partnered with them,” he said, adding “we’ll develop those capabilities.”
Pacific chief says China’s military buildup largest since World War II
China’s buildup of military forces is the largest the world has seen since World War II and has driven Australia and other nations around the world to seek closer security ties to the United States, according to the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
www.washingtontimes.com
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Illegal Strategy: China Suspected Of Unauthorized Sea Floor Survey In Pacific
China’s growing fleet of survey ships continue to cause friction in the Pacific region. One of the most modern and capable has been operating in the small country of Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This emphasizes the strategic importance of the small island chains in the region.
H I Sutton 08 Dec 2021
A Chinese government survey ship, Da Yang Hao, has been accused of illegal activities in Palau’s waters. Palau is a small island nation, strategically located between the Philippine Sea and the North Pacific. Using ship tracking data provided by MarineTraffic.com we can confirm that the Chinese vessel was operating in Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Based on the vessel involved, the survey could relate to undersea hydrocarbon or mineral resources. Alternatively, it could be a sea-bottom mapping missions or gathering data on the waters. The data could have a dual civilian and military use and is particularly relevant for submarine warfare. In any case it would need permission from Palau’s government to operate there.
In spite of its presence bein challenged, the ship appears to have conducted its activity unimpeded. It was there for 5 days, from November 29 until December 4, 2021.
Local authorities raised their concerns, as reported by the Island Times on December 3. Palau’s Maritime Security and Fish & Wildlife Protection (DMSFWP) were keeping track of it, but had been unable to act. Palau requested assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard.
What The Data Says
Analysis of the AIS (Automated Identification System) data by Damien Symon, a geo-intelligence analyst, followed the vessels path. It appears to have reached its survey area in the West Philippine Sea around November 22. It then ran up and down an underwater feature known as the Kyushu-Palau Ridge. Based on the analysis, the ship had clearly entered Palau’s EEZ by November 30. It spent some time there, tracing the lines of significant underwater features, before returning north again.
The pattern of movement is indicative of sea floor survey. As is the fact that it followed a significant underwater feature, principally the Kyushu-Palau Ridge. Surveys of this nature require the permission of the country’s whose EEZ it is.
Additionally, all mining (and fishing) is banned in the waters where the Chinese ship was. It is part of Palau’s massive National Marine Sanctuary (PNMS) which covers 80% of its EEZ, roughly 200,000 square miles. The remaining 20% is set aside for domestic fishing. Tis uses traditional methods and only supplies local markets.
Da Yang Hao, China’s Strategic Survey Ship
Da Yang Hao is one of the most modern, and capable, of China’s ocean-going survey vessels. When it was launched in December 2018 it was considered China’s first ‘global ocean-resource research vessel’. It was designed by China’s 701 Research Institute and is operated by the Ministry of Natural Resources. This implies a role in the exploration of natural resources. But it is more versatile than that and boasts a large capacity for laboratories and equipment. The 98 meter long, 4,780 ton, ship has already been used in the Atlantic and South China Sea.
The same survey vessel was previously reported operating in the in the South China Sea in September. This took it inside the EEZ’s of Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It is unclear whether it had their permission.
Palau and other smaller countries in the region are less able to challenge the apparent unauthorized survey of their EEZ. Despite its strategic location, which could place it on the frontline of future naval actions, Palau is one of the few countries without any armed forces. Instead, it relies on the United States for protection, and there is a growing US presence on the islands.
Screenshot of the AIS tracks, MarineTraffic.com
The police service does operate two small patrol boats, but these were apparently unable to reach the Chinese ship due to the weather. In the past Palau has called on the U.S. Coast Guard, typically stationed on Guam, for assistance.
It has not been reported whether the US Coast Guard, or Palau’s own patrol boats, ever met with the survey ship. Or what caused the ship to subsequently return north. However, circumstantially, it appears that it simply completed its mission, seemingly uninhibited. The Island Times reported that it left of its own accord on December 4, after spending about 5 days in Palau’s waters.
The data gathered in these types of survey has relevance in undersea warfare, particularly for submarines. The Kyushu-Palau Ridge will be an important feature in submarine operations. And knowing its details may help China in this regard. The alternative explanation, that the survey was about natural resources, will not be more reassuring for Palau or other regional players.
www.navalnews.com
China’s growing fleet of survey ships continue to cause friction in the Pacific region. One of the most modern and capable has been operating in the small country of Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This emphasizes the strategic importance of the small island chains in the region.
H I Sutton 08 Dec 2021
A Chinese government survey ship, Da Yang Hao, has been accused of illegal activities in Palau’s waters. Palau is a small island nation, strategically located between the Philippine Sea and the North Pacific. Using ship tracking data provided by MarineTraffic.com we can confirm that the Chinese vessel was operating in Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Based on the vessel involved, the survey could relate to undersea hydrocarbon or mineral resources. Alternatively, it could be a sea-bottom mapping missions or gathering data on the waters. The data could have a dual civilian and military use and is particularly relevant for submarine warfare. In any case it would need permission from Palau’s government to operate there.
In spite of its presence bein challenged, the ship appears to have conducted its activity unimpeded. It was there for 5 days, from November 29 until December 4, 2021.
Local authorities raised their concerns, as reported by the Island Times on December 3. Palau’s Maritime Security and Fish & Wildlife Protection (DMSFWP) were keeping track of it, but had been unable to act. Palau requested assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard.
What The Data Says
Analysis of the AIS (Automated Identification System) data by Damien Symon, a geo-intelligence analyst, followed the vessels path. It appears to have reached its survey area in the West Philippine Sea around November 22. It then ran up and down an underwater feature known as the Kyushu-Palau Ridge. Based on the analysis, the ship had clearly entered Palau’s EEZ by November 30. It spent some time there, tracing the lines of significant underwater features, before returning north again.
The pattern of movement is indicative of sea floor survey. As is the fact that it followed a significant underwater feature, principally the Kyushu-Palau Ridge. Surveys of this nature require the permission of the country’s whose EEZ it is.
Additionally, all mining (and fishing) is banned in the waters where the Chinese ship was. It is part of Palau’s massive National Marine Sanctuary (PNMS) which covers 80% of its EEZ, roughly 200,000 square miles. The remaining 20% is set aside for domestic fishing. Tis uses traditional methods and only supplies local markets.
Da Yang Hao, China’s Strategic Survey Ship
Da Yang Hao is one of the most modern, and capable, of China’s ocean-going survey vessels. When it was launched in December 2018 it was considered China’s first ‘global ocean-resource research vessel’. It was designed by China’s 701 Research Institute and is operated by the Ministry of Natural Resources. This implies a role in the exploration of natural resources. But it is more versatile than that and boasts a large capacity for laboratories and equipment. The 98 meter long, 4,780 ton, ship has already been used in the Atlantic and South China Sea.
The same survey vessel was previously reported operating in the in the South China Sea in September. This took it inside the EEZ’s of Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It is unclear whether it had their permission.
Palau and other smaller countries in the region are less able to challenge the apparent unauthorized survey of their EEZ. Despite its strategic location, which could place it on the frontline of future naval actions, Palau is one of the few countries without any armed forces. Instead, it relies on the United States for protection, and there is a growing US presence on the islands.
The police service does operate two small patrol boats, but these were apparently unable to reach the Chinese ship due to the weather. In the past Palau has called on the U.S. Coast Guard, typically stationed on Guam, for assistance.
It has not been reported whether the US Coast Guard, or Palau’s own patrol boats, ever met with the survey ship. Or what caused the ship to subsequently return north. However, circumstantially, it appears that it simply completed its mission, seemingly uninhibited. The Island Times reported that it left of its own accord on December 4, after spending about 5 days in Palau’s waters.
The data gathered in these types of survey has relevance in undersea warfare, particularly for submarines. The Kyushu-Palau Ridge will be an important feature in submarine operations. And knowing its details may help China in this regard. The alternative explanation, that the survey was about natural resources, will not be more reassuring for Palau or other regional players.
Illegal Strategy: China Suspected Of Unauthorized Sea Floor Survey In Pacific - Naval News
China’s growing fleet of survey ships continue to cause friction in the Pacific region. One of the most modern and capable has been operating in the small country of Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This emphasizes the strategic importance of the small island chains in the region.
www.navalnews.com
jward
passin' thru
U.S. defense official says boosting Taiwan's defenses an 'urgent task'
Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom
3-4 minutes
By Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Bolstering Taiwan's defenses is an urgent task and essential to deterring the threat of invasion by China, the Pentagon's top official for Asia said on Wednesday, adding that U.S. partners were stepping up their military presence in the region.
Tensions between Taiwan and China have escalated in recent months as Beijing raises pressure on the island it claims as its own with repeated air missions over the Taiwan Strait, the waterway separating the democratically governed island from China.
"Without question, bolstering Taiwan's self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence," U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.
Ratner added that China's air and maritime campaigns around Taiwan were "intentionally provocative" and increased the likelihood of miscalculation between armed forces in the Indo-Pacific.
"They put the prosperity and security of the region at risk, and are part of a pattern of PRC military coercion and aggression against other U.S. allies and partners in the region, including India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam," Ratner said, referring to the People's Republic of China.
"We are seeing countries stepping up their military presence in the region and their willingness to support deterrence in a way that we haven't before," he added, mentioning joint military activities with Canada, Britain and Japan.
The United States has no formal ties with Taiwan but is its largest arms supplier, and has been trying to carve out more space for it in the international system in the face of escalating efforts by Beijing to isolate Taipei.
U.S. President Joe Biden caused a stir in October when he said the United States, which is obliged by a 1979 law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, would come to its defense if China attacked.
Those remarks appeared to depart from Washington's long-held policy of "strategic ambiguity" - not making clear how the United States would respond - though the White House quickly said Biden was not signaling a change in policy.
Some U.S. lawmakers, including Democratic chairman of the influential House Intelligence Committee Adam Schiff, have urged the Biden administration to be less ambiguous.
Asked by the committee chairman, Senator Bob Menendez, if that policy should be altered, Ratner said he believed it would not meaningfully strengthen deterrence.
When asked what he saw as the greatest risk to Taiwan, Ratner replied: "The China challenge is a today problem, a tomorrow problem, a 2027 problem, a 2030 problem, a 2040 problem and beyond. I don't think there is a date we ought to pick on the calendar and we ought to make sure that we're sustaining deterrence from today."
(Reporting by Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom; additional reporting by Ismail Shakil; editing by Jonathan Oatis and Karishma Singh)
news.yahoo.com
Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom
3-4 minutes
By Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Bolstering Taiwan's defenses is an urgent task and essential to deterring the threat of invasion by China, the Pentagon's top official for Asia said on Wednesday, adding that U.S. partners were stepping up their military presence in the region.
Tensions between Taiwan and China have escalated in recent months as Beijing raises pressure on the island it claims as its own with repeated air missions over the Taiwan Strait, the waterway separating the democratically governed island from China.
"Without question, bolstering Taiwan's self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence," U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.
Ratner added that China's air and maritime campaigns around Taiwan were "intentionally provocative" and increased the likelihood of miscalculation between armed forces in the Indo-Pacific.
"They put the prosperity and security of the region at risk, and are part of a pattern of PRC military coercion and aggression against other U.S. allies and partners in the region, including India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam," Ratner said, referring to the People's Republic of China.
"We are seeing countries stepping up their military presence in the region and their willingness to support deterrence in a way that we haven't before," he added, mentioning joint military activities with Canada, Britain and Japan.
The United States has no formal ties with Taiwan but is its largest arms supplier, and has been trying to carve out more space for it in the international system in the face of escalating efforts by Beijing to isolate Taipei.
U.S. President Joe Biden caused a stir in October when he said the United States, which is obliged by a 1979 law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, would come to its defense if China attacked.
Those remarks appeared to depart from Washington's long-held policy of "strategic ambiguity" - not making clear how the United States would respond - though the White House quickly said Biden was not signaling a change in policy.
Some U.S. lawmakers, including Democratic chairman of the influential House Intelligence Committee Adam Schiff, have urged the Biden administration to be less ambiguous.
Asked by the committee chairman, Senator Bob Menendez, if that policy should be altered, Ratner said he believed it would not meaningfully strengthen deterrence.
When asked what he saw as the greatest risk to Taiwan, Ratner replied: "The China challenge is a today problem, a tomorrow problem, a 2027 problem, a 2030 problem, a 2040 problem and beyond. I don't think there is a date we ought to pick on the calendar and we ought to make sure that we're sustaining deterrence from today."
(Reporting by Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom; additional reporting by Ismail Shakil; editing by Jonathan Oatis and Karishma Singh)
U.S. defense official says boosting Taiwan's defenses an 'urgent task'
Bolstering Taiwan's defenses is an urgent task and essential to deterring the threat of invasion by China, the Pentagon's top official for Asia said on Wednesday, adding that U.S. partners were stepping up their military presence in the region. Tensions between Taiwan and China have escalated...
northern watch
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From my email inbox
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jward
passin' thru
only thing worse than no friends is a false friend who chases after the highest bidder... : (
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
7m
#Nicaragua ends diplomatic relations with #Taiwan, recognizes #China Loss of Nicaragua leaves Taiwan with 14 diplomatic allies https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4371371
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1469139249010130945?s=20
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
7m
#Nicaragua ends diplomatic relations with #Taiwan, recognizes #China Loss of Nicaragua leaves Taiwan with 14 diplomatic allies https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4371371
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1469139249010130945?s=20
Jaybird
Veteran Member
So we know who owns Nicaragua. It isn’t us.only thing worse than no friends is a false friend who chases after the highest bidder... : (
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
7m
#Nicaragua ends diplomatic relations with #Taiwan, recognizes #China Loss of Nicaragua leaves Taiwan with 14 diplomatic allies https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4371371
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1469139249010130945?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Ending Strategic Ambiguity Won’t Help Taiwan
By Eric Sayers Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
6-8 minutes
The USS Barry conducts operations in the Taiwan Strait, April 10, 2020. U.S. Navy / Ensign Samuel Hardgrove
America’s position in the Indo-Pacific is tied in many ways to stability across the Taiwan strait, and China’s growing ability to seize Taiwan is not a problem we can put off. We need a strategy to heighten Beijing’s perception of the risks of taking the island, and we need to deploy it within two to three years. Some say the solution is as simple as adjusting Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity, but a surer approach would increase military assistance to Taiwan, launch a multi-domain training program, and hasten delivery of arms already purchased by Taipei.
The potential consequences of a war over Taiwan are difficult to overstate. They include the devastation of Taiwan’s democracy, its free people, and its economy; and instability across the first island chain and beyond. Indeed, a conflict that begins over Taiwan may not end there. A military clash could reshape Japan’s southwestern islands and even extend to strikes on bases in northern Australia or naval clashes in the Indian Ocean region. Moreover, given the contributions of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, to the global economy, a conflict over Taiwan would cause supply-chain disruptions in ways that would dwarf those of the COVID pandemic.
Some military leaders have tried to put a timeline on the potential for conflict. But viewing the problem as a shot-clock is an unhelpful way to think about when Beijing’s capabilities and intentions may align. Instead, we should seek policies that continue to persuade Beijing that taking Taiwan is too costly and therefore not worth the risk.
One policy recommendation that has become fashionable this past year is to abandon Washington’s longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan in favor of a simple declaration that the United States would intervene if China moves to take the island by force. But changing the policy would only create greater uncertainty about our intentions. It would elevate this issue to a policy question that each presidential candidate would need to take a position on—and likely, each administration when Taiwan elects its own new president. The confusion and political uncertainty would undermine any positive effect it may have on deterrence. Moreover, the central issue at hand is not whether Beijing believes Washington will intervene – it certainly has to plan for this assumption – but whether Beijing believes Washington and Taipei can successfully deny Beijing’s military objectives. Given this, Washington is better served by continuing to be strategically ambiguous on the specifics of its hypothetical action while introducing more tactical clarity about its intentions through a range of other policies with Taipei that can directly improve cross-strait deterrent posture.
Foremost among the range of steps Washington can take in the near term is to launch a robust foreign military financing program to increase Taiwan’s security. Washington already conducts similar programs with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Like these countries, a security assistance program for Taiwan—ideally led by the State Department, with planning support from the Pentagon—could start with five years of annual aid of about $1 billion to $2 billion. This would not seek to replace Taipei’s current defense budget but to accelerate and bolster their asymmetric investments in key ways that can help delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces to operate in and around the Taiwan Strait and adjoining seas.
In the past, I have been suspicious of recommendations to provide more resources to a government in Taipei that has underfunded its defenses for too long. But the situation has deteriorated in recent years to the point that we cannot afford to stand on the sidelines hoping for a more ideal situation to emerge. If the security of Taiwan and stability in the Indo-Pacific are as critical as many now agree, we must be willing to further assist Taipei by directing more resourcing to this challenge today.
Senator Risch and his colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have introduced the Taiwan Deterrence Initiative, which would seek to operationalize a State-led military financing program for Taiwan. Senator Hawley’s Arm Taiwan Act takes a similar approach but seeks to use Pentagon security assistance funding. Given this growing interest from Congress, another advantage of this approach is that it provides a unique opportunity for both parties to work together on the hill and with the Biden administration to take bipartisan action in 2022 to increase stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The administration might also deploy a multi-domain training program with Taiwan’s military that is more aligned with the scope of the operational challenge it faces. To this point, training with Taipei has been minimal, targeted, and only focused on several military domains. An expanded training regime could push into the maritime domain, add cyber and electronic warfare efforts, and conduct more senior-leader bilateral war games that could eventually include Japan and Australia.
Finally, the administration should seek to expedite arms exports to Taiwan. Taipei has bought a range of systems in recent years, but it will take four to six years—in one case, eight—before many of these orders can be fulfilled, because other countries are at the front of the line. An effort to review and adjust these timelines could have an outsized impact on Taiwan’s defenses during the 2020s.
The level of attention Washington is now devoting to Taiwan and stability across the strait is encouraging. The challenge now for policymakers is to devote their newfound focus to a set of policies that can be effective and imminent.
Eric Sayers is a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He previously worked as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee and as a consultant to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, where he worked as special assistant to the commander.
By Eric Sayers Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
6-8 minutes
The USS Barry conducts operations in the Taiwan Strait, April 10, 2020. U.S. Navy / Ensign Samuel Hardgrove
America’s position in the Indo-Pacific is tied in many ways to stability across the Taiwan strait, and China’s growing ability to seize Taiwan is not a problem we can put off. We need a strategy to heighten Beijing’s perception of the risks of taking the island, and we need to deploy it within two to three years. Some say the solution is as simple as adjusting Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity, but a surer approach would increase military assistance to Taiwan, launch a multi-domain training program, and hasten delivery of arms already purchased by Taipei.
The potential consequences of a war over Taiwan are difficult to overstate. They include the devastation of Taiwan’s democracy, its free people, and its economy; and instability across the first island chain and beyond. Indeed, a conflict that begins over Taiwan may not end there. A military clash could reshape Japan’s southwestern islands and even extend to strikes on bases in northern Australia or naval clashes in the Indian Ocean region. Moreover, given the contributions of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, to the global economy, a conflict over Taiwan would cause supply-chain disruptions in ways that would dwarf those of the COVID pandemic.
Some military leaders have tried to put a timeline on the potential for conflict. But viewing the problem as a shot-clock is an unhelpful way to think about when Beijing’s capabilities and intentions may align. Instead, we should seek policies that continue to persuade Beijing that taking Taiwan is too costly and therefore not worth the risk.
One policy recommendation that has become fashionable this past year is to abandon Washington’s longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan in favor of a simple declaration that the United States would intervene if China moves to take the island by force. But changing the policy would only create greater uncertainty about our intentions. It would elevate this issue to a policy question that each presidential candidate would need to take a position on—and likely, each administration when Taiwan elects its own new president. The confusion and political uncertainty would undermine any positive effect it may have on deterrence. Moreover, the central issue at hand is not whether Beijing believes Washington will intervene – it certainly has to plan for this assumption – but whether Beijing believes Washington and Taipei can successfully deny Beijing’s military objectives. Given this, Washington is better served by continuing to be strategically ambiguous on the specifics of its hypothetical action while introducing more tactical clarity about its intentions through a range of other policies with Taipei that can directly improve cross-strait deterrent posture.
Foremost among the range of steps Washington can take in the near term is to launch a robust foreign military financing program to increase Taiwan’s security. Washington already conducts similar programs with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Like these countries, a security assistance program for Taiwan—ideally led by the State Department, with planning support from the Pentagon—could start with five years of annual aid of about $1 billion to $2 billion. This would not seek to replace Taipei’s current defense budget but to accelerate and bolster their asymmetric investments in key ways that can help delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces to operate in and around the Taiwan Strait and adjoining seas.
In the past, I have been suspicious of recommendations to provide more resources to a government in Taipei that has underfunded its defenses for too long. But the situation has deteriorated in recent years to the point that we cannot afford to stand on the sidelines hoping for a more ideal situation to emerge. If the security of Taiwan and stability in the Indo-Pacific are as critical as many now agree, we must be willing to further assist Taipei by directing more resourcing to this challenge today.
Senator Risch and his colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have introduced the Taiwan Deterrence Initiative, which would seek to operationalize a State-led military financing program for Taiwan. Senator Hawley’s Arm Taiwan Act takes a similar approach but seeks to use Pentagon security assistance funding. Given this growing interest from Congress, another advantage of this approach is that it provides a unique opportunity for both parties to work together on the hill and with the Biden administration to take bipartisan action in 2022 to increase stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The administration might also deploy a multi-domain training program with Taiwan’s military that is more aligned with the scope of the operational challenge it faces. To this point, training with Taipei has been minimal, targeted, and only focused on several military domains. An expanded training regime could push into the maritime domain, add cyber and electronic warfare efforts, and conduct more senior-leader bilateral war games that could eventually include Japan and Australia.
Finally, the administration should seek to expedite arms exports to Taiwan. Taipei has bought a range of systems in recent years, but it will take four to six years—in one case, eight—before many of these orders can be fulfilled, because other countries are at the front of the line. An effort to review and adjust these timelines could have an outsized impact on Taiwan’s defenses during the 2020s.
The level of attention Washington is now devoting to Taiwan and stability across the strait is encouraging. The challenge now for policymakers is to devote their newfound focus to a set of policies that can be effective and imminent.
Eric Sayers is a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He previously worked as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee and as a consultant to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, where he worked as special assistant to the commander.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
DEFCONWarningSystem
@DEFCONWSALERTS
·
15h
China states it will attack U.S. forces that come to aid Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
@DEFCONWSALERTS
·
15h
China states it will attack U.S. forces that come to aid Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
jward
passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
2m
German video game ad labels #China as 'West #Taiwan' An online advertisement for a video game has gone viral for listing China as "West Taiwan," among other changes to a map of the Asia-Pacific region. https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4370307
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1469533780410912768?s=20
@IndoPac_Info
2m
German video game ad labels #China as 'West #Taiwan' An online advertisement for a video game has gone viral for listing China as "West Taiwan," among other changes to a map of the Asia-Pacific region. https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4370307
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1469533780410912768?s=20
jward
passin' thru
War on the Rocks
@WarOnTheRocks
12m
As China's rhetoric about "reunification" with Taiwan and the military's gray-zone activities intensify, there are quite a few things Taiwan can do to deter and defend itself
View: https://twitter.com/WarOnTheRocks/status/1469567633913700354?s=20
Replying to
@WarOnTheRocks
Define Gray zone. Not much Gray Zone about the Spratley's, Fiery Cross, Hainan sub base. Taiwan is just E. Ukraine waiting to be annexed, because of an ineffective Executive Branch. Doesn't take War College to figure this one out. Look at GEOINT. Pretty easy to see.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
well it wouldn,t shock me we have a plane currently over the Ukraine surveying Russias boardersI'm an oft admitted neophyte in all matters o this game, but this doesn't really strike me as a good solution
Apex
@Apex_WW
5h
US needs to fly into Chinese airspace in response to provocation of Taiwan: Gordon Chang
View: https://twitter.com/Apex_WW/status/1467867070377472006?s=20
AEROSINT Division PSF
@PSFAERO
·
2h
Wow, it’s heading to #Donetsk I guess. Extremely rare to see a RC-135W or frankly any manned U.S. ISR asset over Ukraine after 2014 (usually these missions are done by RQ-4s). And it being so near to the Russian border, probably being escorted by PSU fighters.
jward
passin' thru
Taiwan says confident Chinese invasion would be very hard
By Ben Blanchard
Chinese and Taiwanese national flags are displayed alongside military airplanes in this illustration taken April 9, 2021. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration
Register now for FREE unlimited access to reuters.com
TAIPEI, Dec 13 (Reuters) - A full Chinese invasion of Taiwan with troops landed and ports and airports seized would be very difficult to achieve due to problems China would have in landing and supplying troops, Taiwan's Defence Ministry said in its latest threat assessment.
Tensions between Taipei and Beijing, which claims the democratically-ruled island as its own territory, have risen in the past two years as China steps up military activities near Taiwan to pressure it to accept Chinese rule.
In a report to lawmakers, Taiwan's Defence Ministry said China's transport capacity was at present limited, it would not be able to land all its forces in one go, and would have to rely on "non-standard" roll-on, roll-off ships that would need to use port facilities and transport aircraft that would need airports.
"However, the nation's military strongly defends ports and airports, and they will not be easy to occupy in a short time. Landing operations will face extremely high risks," the ministry said in its report, a copy of which was reviewed by Reuters.
China's logistics face challenges too, as any landing forces would need to be resupplied with weapons, food and medicines across the Taiwan Strait that separates the two, it added.
"The nation's military has the advantage of the Taiwan Strait being a natural moat and can use joint intercept operations, cutting off the Communist military's supplies, severely reducing the combat effectiveness and endurance of the landing forces."
China would also need to keep some of its forces in reserve to prevent any foreign forces joining in to help Taiwan and to keep close watch on other fractious areas of China's border, like with India and in the South China Sea, the ministry said.
"U.S. and Japanese military bases are close to Taiwan, and any Chinese Communist attack would necessarily be closely monitored, plus it would need to reserve forces to prevent foreign military intervention," it added.
"It is difficult to concentrate all its efforts on fighting with Taiwan."
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen is overseeing a military modernisation programme to make the island harder to attack, making the military more mobile and with precision weapons like longer-range missiles to take out an attacking force.
The government is planning an extra T$240 billion ($8.66 billion) over the next five years in military spending to go mostly toward naval weapons, including missiles and warships.
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/L4M57YGIH5N3ZIDOKGJXJYVZ24.jpg)
www.reuters.com
By Ben Blanchard
Chinese and Taiwanese national flags are displayed alongside military airplanes in this illustration taken April 9, 2021. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration
Register now for FREE unlimited access to reuters.com
TAIPEI, Dec 13 (Reuters) - A full Chinese invasion of Taiwan with troops landed and ports and airports seized would be very difficult to achieve due to problems China would have in landing and supplying troops, Taiwan's Defence Ministry said in its latest threat assessment.
Tensions between Taipei and Beijing, which claims the democratically-ruled island as its own territory, have risen in the past two years as China steps up military activities near Taiwan to pressure it to accept Chinese rule.
In a report to lawmakers, Taiwan's Defence Ministry said China's transport capacity was at present limited, it would not be able to land all its forces in one go, and would have to rely on "non-standard" roll-on, roll-off ships that would need to use port facilities and transport aircraft that would need airports.
"However, the nation's military strongly defends ports and airports, and they will not be easy to occupy in a short time. Landing operations will face extremely high risks," the ministry said in its report, a copy of which was reviewed by Reuters.
China's logistics face challenges too, as any landing forces would need to be resupplied with weapons, food and medicines across the Taiwan Strait that separates the two, it added.
"The nation's military has the advantage of the Taiwan Strait being a natural moat and can use joint intercept operations, cutting off the Communist military's supplies, severely reducing the combat effectiveness and endurance of the landing forces."
China would also need to keep some of its forces in reserve to prevent any foreign forces joining in to help Taiwan and to keep close watch on other fractious areas of China's border, like with India and in the South China Sea, the ministry said.
"U.S. and Japanese military bases are close to Taiwan, and any Chinese Communist attack would necessarily be closely monitored, plus it would need to reserve forces to prevent foreign military intervention," it added.
"It is difficult to concentrate all its efforts on fighting with Taiwan."
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen is overseeing a military modernisation programme to make the island harder to attack, making the military more mobile and with precision weapons like longer-range missiles to take out an attacking force.
The government is planning an extra T$240 billion ($8.66 billion) over the next five years in military spending to go mostly toward naval weapons, including missiles and warships.
Taiwan says confident Chinese invasion would be very hard
A full Chinese invasion of Taiwan with troops landed and ports and airports seized would be very difficult to achieve due to problems China would have in landing and supplying troops, Taiwan's Defence Ministry said in its latest threat assessment.
www.reuters.com
Taiwan says Chinese invasion would be “very hard?” Only a 90% reduction, or better, in China’s population, would be ”very hard” for China to absorb- MAYBE. Such a drop in population would yield at approximately 170 MILLION remaining. Suddenly, the ability to produce sufficient food stocks, not overtax production of necessary industrial goods, and the provision of realistic energy goals would be easily within their grasp. IF Taiwan could actuate such a happening, the world would become a nicer, more peaceful place.
OA
OA
This is a definite "DOT" moment.......
danielboon
TB Fanatic
French MPs arrive in Taiwan for visit amid China tensions
an hour ago
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In this photo released by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, François de Rugy, the head of the Taiwan Friendship group in the National Assembly, the lower house of France's parliament, center leads a group of French lawmakers arriving at the airport in Taoyuan, northern Taiwan on Wednesday, Dec. 15, 2021. The group of six French lawmakers arrived in Taiwan for a five-day visit on Wednesday that will include meetings with the Taiwanese President and other senior officials, following a similar trip led by another group of French parliamentarians in October that China sought to discourage. ( Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs via AP)
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — A group of six French lawmakers arrived in Taiwan for a five-day visit on Wednesday, following a similar trip led by a group of French parliamentarians in October that China sought to discourage.
François de Rugy, the head of the Taiwan Friendship group in the National Assembly, the lower house of France’s Parliament, is leading the latest delegation’s visit, which will include meetings with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and other senior government officials.
“We wish to have exchanges on all dimensions of the relations between Taiwan, the EU and France on the economy and culture and all the issues at stake for our countries,” de Rugy told reporters at the airport.
In October, another group of French lawmakers led by Sen. Alain Richard met with Tsai, Taiwanese economic and health officials, and the Mainland Affairs Council. That visit was part of regular parliamentary exchanges that had been ongoing for years.
China tried to get the previous visit called-off, with its embassy in France saying ahead of time that it would not only damage China’s core interests and undermine Chinese-French relations, but would also impact France’s own “reputation and interests.”
China claims Taiwan as part of its national territory and says the self-ruled island democracy should not have official government exchanges with other countries. Taiwan, however, has been stepping up exchanges with countries that don’t officially recognize it as a country. Chinese pressure has reduced the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to just 14.
Speaking to reporters about the visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian on Wednesday reiterated that “China firmly opposes any forms of official and political exchanges between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic ties with China.”
Zhao called on countries to “earnestly abide by the one-China principle.”
In a commentary, the Communist Party tabloid Global Times called the visit “an insignificant stunt by trivial French politicians,” citing a Chinese expert.
China has at times lashed out at European nations it accuses of drawing too close to Taiwan or trampling on other matters it considers its “core interests.”
Beijing has sought to punish Lithuania, which like France a member of the European Union, after it agreed to allow Taiwan to set up a representative office in the capital Vilnius under the name “Taiwan,” rather than “Chinese Taipei,” as Beijing prefers.
Beijing slapped a trade embargo on the Baltic state and has threatened multinationals that do business with it. It also withdrew its ambassador to Vilnius and expelled the Lithuanian ambassador to Beijing.
On Wednesday, Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry said it had closed its embassy in Beijing and pulled its last diplomat out of the Chinese capital. Lithuania was “ready to continue the dialogue with China and restore the functions of the embassy to their full extent once a mutually beneficial agreement is reached,” the ministry said.
apnews.com
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posted for fair use
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In this photo released by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, François de Rugy, the head of the Taiwan Friendship group in the National Assembly, the lower house of France's parliament, center leads a group of French lawmakers arriving at the airport in Taoyuan, northern Taiwan on Wednesday, Dec. 15, 2021. The group of six French lawmakers arrived in Taiwan for a five-day visit on Wednesday that will include meetings with the Taiwanese President and other senior officials, following a similar trip led by another group of French parliamentarians in October that China sought to discourage. ( Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs via AP)
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — A group of six French lawmakers arrived in Taiwan for a five-day visit on Wednesday, following a similar trip led by a group of French parliamentarians in October that China sought to discourage.
François de Rugy, the head of the Taiwan Friendship group in the National Assembly, the lower house of France’s Parliament, is leading the latest delegation’s visit, which will include meetings with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and other senior government officials.
“We wish to have exchanges on all dimensions of the relations between Taiwan, the EU and France on the economy and culture and all the issues at stake for our countries,” de Rugy told reporters at the airport.
In October, another group of French lawmakers led by Sen. Alain Richard met with Tsai, Taiwanese economic and health officials, and the Mainland Affairs Council. That visit was part of regular parliamentary exchanges that had been ongoing for years.
China tried to get the previous visit called-off, with its embassy in France saying ahead of time that it would not only damage China’s core interests and undermine Chinese-French relations, but would also impact France’s own “reputation and interests.”
China claims Taiwan as part of its national territory and says the self-ruled island democracy should not have official government exchanges with other countries. Taiwan, however, has been stepping up exchanges with countries that don’t officially recognize it as a country. Chinese pressure has reduced the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to just 14.
Speaking to reporters about the visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian on Wednesday reiterated that “China firmly opposes any forms of official and political exchanges between Taiwan and countries having diplomatic ties with China.”
Zhao called on countries to “earnestly abide by the one-China principle.”
In a commentary, the Communist Party tabloid Global Times called the visit “an insignificant stunt by trivial French politicians,” citing a Chinese expert.
China has at times lashed out at European nations it accuses of drawing too close to Taiwan or trampling on other matters it considers its “core interests.”
Beijing has sought to punish Lithuania, which like France a member of the European Union, after it agreed to allow Taiwan to set up a representative office in the capital Vilnius under the name “Taiwan,” rather than “Chinese Taipei,” as Beijing prefers.
Beijing slapped a trade embargo on the Baltic state and has threatened multinationals that do business with it. It also withdrew its ambassador to Vilnius and expelled the Lithuanian ambassador to Beijing.
On Wednesday, Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry said it had closed its embassy in Beijing and pulled its last diplomat out of the Chinese capital. Lithuania was “ready to continue the dialogue with China and restore the functions of the embassy to their full extent once a mutually beneficial agreement is reached,” the ministry said.
French MPs arrive in Taiwan for visit amid China tensions
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — A group of six French lawmakers arrived in Taiwan for a five-day visit on Wednesday, following a similar trip led by a group of French parliamentarians in October that China sought to discourage.
apnews.com
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I suppose holding drills is safer than holding recip saws, you could poke an eye out!
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passin' thru
Germany warns China its recent naval mission was just a ‘teaser’
21 Dec, 2021 17:49
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The German Navy Frigate Bayern, docked at the International Cruise Terminal, in Tokyo, Japan. November 5, 2021. © Reuters / David Mareuil
Germany’s naval chief has said the country’s recent deployment of a warship into the South China Sea was a “teaser” intended to signal to Beijing that Berlin planned to ramp up its military presence in the disputed waters.
Speaking from on board the Bayern frigate on Tuesday, Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schonbach said the vessel’s foray into the contested region last week – the first such journey in nearly two decades – was a sign that Germany was “perpetuating” its activity in the region in “small steps.”
Hinting at further deployments following the “teaser,” Schonbach said Berlin hoped to dispatch additional ships and aircraft to Asia from 2023. He added that Germany’s primary interest was in maintaining an international rules-based order in the region.
“This time, we start with small steps … probably we’ll pass [the Taiwan Strait] the next time on a bilateral basis,” Schonbach said when asked why the vessel did not sail through the strait. He said the navy was focused on Berlin’s “value partners,” and it was “not starting with a hammer.”
At a separate event on the same day in Singapore – where the frigate is docked at the Changi Naval Base, Schonbach said the intention of the naval tour was not to provoke, but a sign that things had reached a point where Berlin felt the need to send a “signal” to Beijing.
Germany responds to Russian NATO proposals
The Bayern set sail for Asia with a crew of 200 in August. The following month, Germany claimed Beijing had denied the Brandenburg-class frigate entry into its harbors, which Schonbach suggested was a “political decision.” He added that he did not have a direct line to his Chinese counterpart.
At the time, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had said Beijing attached “great importance to the development of an all-round strategic partnership between China and Germany, including cooperation between the two militaries.”
Although German officials have equated the trip to “standing up” for “values and interests,” an op-ed in China's state-run Global Times paper last week likened it to a call for “attention” from Beijing. It dismissed the move as an “opportunistic” attempt to seek “free publicity.”
www.rt.com
21 Dec, 2021 17:49
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The German Navy Frigate Bayern, docked at the International Cruise Terminal, in Tokyo, Japan. November 5, 2021. © Reuters / David Mareuil
Germany’s naval chief has said the country’s recent deployment of a warship into the South China Sea was a “teaser” intended to signal to Beijing that Berlin planned to ramp up its military presence in the disputed waters.
Speaking from on board the Bayern frigate on Tuesday, Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schonbach said the vessel’s foray into the contested region last week – the first such journey in nearly two decades – was a sign that Germany was “perpetuating” its activity in the region in “small steps.”
Hinting at further deployments following the “teaser,” Schonbach said Berlin hoped to dispatch additional ships and aircraft to Asia from 2023. He added that Germany’s primary interest was in maintaining an international rules-based order in the region.
“This time, we start with small steps … probably we’ll pass [the Taiwan Strait] the next time on a bilateral basis,” Schonbach said when asked why the vessel did not sail through the strait. He said the navy was focused on Berlin’s “value partners,” and it was “not starting with a hammer.”
At a separate event on the same day in Singapore – where the frigate is docked at the Changi Naval Base, Schonbach said the intention of the naval tour was not to provoke, but a sign that things had reached a point where Berlin felt the need to send a “signal” to Beijing.
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Germany responds to Russian NATO proposals The Bayern set sail for Asia with a crew of 200 in August. The following month, Germany claimed Beijing had denied the Brandenburg-class frigate entry into its harbors, which Schonbach suggested was a “political decision.” He added that he did not have a direct line to his Chinese counterpart.
At the time, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had said Beijing attached “great importance to the development of an all-round strategic partnership between China and Germany, including cooperation between the two militaries.”
Although German officials have equated the trip to “standing up” for “values and interests,” an op-ed in China's state-run Global Times paper last week likened it to a call for “attention” from Beijing. It dismissed the move as an “opportunistic” attempt to seek “free publicity.”
Germany warns China its recent naval mission was just a ‘teaser’
Germany’s naval chief has said the country’s recent deployment of a warship into the South China Sea was a “teaser” intended to signal to Beijing that Berlin planned to ramp up its military presence in the disputed waters.