WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN
- Thread starter danielboon
- Start date
vector7
Dot Collector
Woke Biden led Pentagon struggles to understand how Beijing mastered technology that tests the constraints of physics
View: https://twitter.com/KyJustified/status/1462488736793600001?t=93Dv1EHvB1Vo32_E3WHIqA&s=19
View: https://twitter.com/btfu2018/status/1462492916690169869?t=igVHjL-4Gt0cWU_dTlXIKA&s=19
In other news…
Hunter Biden's firm helped secure China's dominance over the precious metal cobalt, which is one of the key components of the batteries used for electric vehicles.
View: https://twitter.com/disclosetv/status/1462422587938643974?t=zXcLpzg2LpEPaIkvdJM3nQ&s=19
View: https://twitter.com/KyJustified/status/1462488736793600001?t=93Dv1EHvB1Vo32_E3WHIqA&s=19
View: https://twitter.com/btfu2018/status/1462492916690169869?t=igVHjL-4Gt0cWU_dTlXIKA&s=19
In other news…
Hunter Biden's firm helped secure China's dominance over the precious metal cobalt, which is one of the key components of the batteries used for electric vehicles.
View: https://twitter.com/disclosetv/status/1462422587938643974?t=zXcLpzg2LpEPaIkvdJM3nQ&s=19
Last edited:
danielboon
TB Fanatic
xi is quaking in his pants
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
No, not since 1979. Lots of fake news on the internet and sadly here as well.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
American Institute in Taiwan - Wikipedia
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Yes we do and it is guarded by marines just under a different nameAmerican Institute in Taiwan - Wikipedia
en.m.wikipedia.org
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
American Institute in Taiwan - Wikipedia
That is not an Embassy. An Embassy is only for a country that we have official relations with and recognize as an independent government.
The USA has not had an official embassy since 1979 when we agreed to a one china policy ruled by Mainland china.
@@@
American Institute in Taiwan
"The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a non-profit, private corporation established shortly after the United States Government changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act (PL 96-8) of April 10, 1979, authorized the continuation of “commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.” It also provided that “any programs, transactions, or other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any Agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through the American Institute in Taiwan.” The Department of State, through a contract with the Institute, provides a large part of AIT’s funding and guidance in its operations. Congress, in passing the Taiwan Relations Act, also assumed an oversight role with respect to the Institute’s operations. "
danielboon
TB Fanatic
The AIT now serves to assist and protect U.S. interests in Taiwan in a quasi-official manner,[4] and also processes US visas and provides consular services to U.S. expatriates. Following the swift passage of the 2018 Taiwan Travel Act by the United States, it now serves as a high-level representative bureau on behalf of United States in Taiwan.[5] It receives full protection from the United States Marine Corps as do all US Embassies.[6][7][8]
American Institute in Taiwan
美國在台協會
American Institute in Taiwan Kaohsiung Branch Office is a division of the AIT institution located in southern Taiwan.
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
Nothing against any poster on this board, but this is the issue with "news" about other countries that I see here and in many other internet boards. For example, there are only 2 offices for the AIiT in Taiwan, one in Taipei and the other in Kaohsiung. ( Taiwan International Travel Information)
I been traveling to Taiwan since the 80s since I have relatives that live there. I had to do business with the AIiT office back in the 80s in Kaohsiung and guess what I found. It was a 2 room office located on the 2nd floor of an office building, with a native Taiwanese secretary and a single American staffer. That was it.
I been traveling to Taiwan since the 80s since I have relatives that live there. I had to do business with the AIiT office back in the 80s in Kaohsiung and guess what I found. It was a 2 room office located on the 2nd floor of an office building, with a native Taiwanese secretary and a single American staffer. That was it.
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
I been there in person. It had a single secretary and a single American staffer. No USMC anywhere in sight, or any guards of any type. I went to the 2nd floor of a common office building and walked in with out any issue.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
when were you there
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
Also, lets see how it is stated at the official like I provided above:
Taiwan International Travel Information
"The U.S. maintains unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private nonprofit corporation, which performs U.S. citizen and other consular services similar to those at embassies. "
Similar to an Embassy, as it is NOT an Embassy.
Taiwan International Travel Information
"The U.S. maintains unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private nonprofit corporation, which performs U.S. citizen and other consular services similar to those at embassies. "
Similar to an Embassy, as it is NOT an Embassy.
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
Started back in the 80s. I have not had to go to them for help in my later visits thankfully. Dealing with a one staff office who is quite busy is no fun. Last visit was just before the pandemic hit.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
well thanks for the info
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
Welcome. And as I said, this is not aimed at anyone here. I see this so often all over the internet. And I have to add that this is only for the office in Kaohsiung, not in Taipei, thank goodness. The staffer warned me that the wait time I was dealing with in Kaohsiung was nothing compared to Taipei. Their best day was worse than the worst day in Kaohsiung. Also, this stuck in my mind as the staffer had to make sure I understood that they were not an embassy but assisted US citizens with issues that an Embassy did. He did that as I had done the same thing, as probably everyone else going there had been doing, and was thinking he was an official USA Embassy rep.
wait-n-see
Veteran Member
Drat ..... just to clarify ..... I have not been back to that office since the mid80s, but have traveled to Taiwan since the 80s.
I have the horrible habit of thinking of what I am going to type faster than I type and as a result I don't type completely what I was thinking I was typing. Causes a lot fun with work texting.
jward
passin' thru
U.S. warship again transits sensitive Taiwan Strait
Reuters
The USS Milius (DDG69) guided-missile destroyer arrives to join the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNS) at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka, Japan May 22, 2018. REUTERS/Issei Kato/File Photo
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TAIPEI, Nov 23 (Reuters) - A U.S. warship again sailed through the sensitive Taiwan Strait on Tuesday, part of what the U.S. military calls routine activity but which always riles China whose government believes Washington is trying to stir regional tensions.
The U.S. Navy said the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Milius conducted a "routine Taiwan Strait transit" through international waters in accordance with international law.
"The ship's transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States military flies, sails, and operates anywhere international law allows," it added.
There was no immediate response from China.
Last month, the Chinese military condemned the United States and Canada for each sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, saying they were threatening peace and stability in the region.
China claims democratically ruled Taiwan as its own territory, and has mounted repeated air force missions into Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the past year or so, provoking anger in Taipei.
The United States like most countries has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan but is its most important international backer and arms supplier.
Beijing calls Taiwan the most sensitive and important issue in its relations with Washington.
U.S. Navy ships have been transiting the strait roughly monthly, to the anger of Beijing. U.S. allies occasionally also send ships through the strait, including Britain in September.
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/QNV3S6SA4FISZFDKNPUXCEGO34.jpg)
www.reuters.com
Reuters
The USS Milius (DDG69) guided-missile destroyer arrives to join the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNS) at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka, Japan May 22, 2018. REUTERS/Issei Kato/File Photo
Register now for FREE unlimited access to reuters.com
TAIPEI, Nov 23 (Reuters) - A U.S. warship again sailed through the sensitive Taiwan Strait on Tuesday, part of what the U.S. military calls routine activity but which always riles China whose government believes Washington is trying to stir regional tensions.
The U.S. Navy said the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Milius conducted a "routine Taiwan Strait transit" through international waters in accordance with international law.
"The ship's transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States military flies, sails, and operates anywhere international law allows," it added.
There was no immediate response from China.
Last month, the Chinese military condemned the United States and Canada for each sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, saying they were threatening peace and stability in the region.
China claims democratically ruled Taiwan as its own territory, and has mounted repeated air force missions into Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the past year or so, provoking anger in Taipei.
The United States like most countries has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan but is its most important international backer and arms supplier.
Beijing calls Taiwan the most sensitive and important issue in its relations with Washington.
U.S. Navy ships have been transiting the strait roughly monthly, to the anger of Beijing. U.S. allies occasionally also send ships through the strait, including Britain in September.
U.S. warship again transits sensitive Taiwan Strait
A U.S. warship again sailed through the sensitive Taiwan Strait on Tuesday, part of what the U.S. military calls routine activity but which always riles China whose government believes Washington is trying to stir regional tensions.
www.reuters.com
jward
passin' thru
Changing the Discourse on China’s Taiwan Policy
There has been much talk of an invasion. Time for a closer look.
By KAWASHIMA Shin
November 23, 2021
Credit: ASSOCIATED PRESS
A potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has received exhaustive coverage in recent months. In Japan, too, there has been considerable discourse about cooperating with the United States to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In fact, at the U.S.-Japan summit in April 2021, the phrase “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” was included in the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement for the first time since the late 1960s. That marks a major change. Now, some observers within Japan are calling for simulations to see what preparations might be possible for the “Liberation of Taiwan.”
What is driving all this? Certainly, the Chinese military has stepped up its activities around the Taiwan Strait during the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese military aircraft are violating the median line in the Taiwan Strait and are increasingly present around Taiwan and the Dongsha Islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China is rapidly acquiring the equipment it would need for an invasion; for instance, it is preparing to commission landing craft to attack the east side of the Central Mountain Range, which has been a problem. The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense likely interprets the building of these landing craft as a sign that China will soon possess the ability to invade.
Given all this, it is easy to get the impression that an invasion of Taiwan is not far off. In Japan, some believe that China will launch an invasion of Taiwan during President Xi Jinping’s approaching third term (2022-2027).
Yet in parallel with these military developments, China has toned down its rhetoric. In January 2019, Xi Jinping opened the year with a speech where he expressed a desire for the liberation of Taiwan and explicitly stated that the use of force was not off the table. The plan he suggested then is known as Xi’s five-point proposal. Yet, already at that point, he identified the “younger generation and the grassroots frontline” as targets of the proposal. As suggested by the “31 Measures” to attract Taiwanese citizens and companies to work in China in February 2018 and Beijing’s New 26 Measures for Cross-Strait Exchanges in November 2019, this is a policy of fostering people wanting unification with China within Taiwanese societies and Taiwanese companies.
Yet what was primarily reported on that occasion was the question of the possible use of force. In fact, Xi’s mention of the use of force caused Tsai Ing-wen’s approval rating, which had already gone down considerably, to rise again in Taiwan.
There has been talk about realizing policies of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs on January 19, 2020 and elsewhere. Likewise, the “unification” of Taiwan was reaffirmed as a policy goal at the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of CCP in October 2020, while also suggesting a “fusion development” strategy for China’s Fujian Province and Taiwan.
All of these, while building on Xi’s five-point proposal, seem to be emphasizing permeation of Taiwanese society rather than forceful unification. Moreover, the object of China’s united front work changed to “strengthening Taiwan’s patriotic reunification force” in the “regulations on the united front work of CCP” of the Chinese Communist Party on January 5, 2021. The goal became for China to call for strengthening Taiwan’s patriotic reunification force within Taiwan, rather than unification through the Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan. Then, at the 2021 Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs in January 2021, [Member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] Wang Yang emphasized initiatives targeting companies and individuals in Taiwan and the fusion of Fujian Province and Taiwan.
In Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemorative ceremony of 100th anniversary of Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 2021, he again mentioned unification with Taiwan. Yet this time he did not speak of the use of force but connected the “One China” Policy and the 1992 Consensus with an “and.” The 1992 Consensus is included in One China and was previously not connected with an “and.” Likewise, Xi’s speech at a Meeting Marking the 110th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 on October 9 in 2021 used similar wording and especially stressed peaceful reunification. Further, Xi Jinping’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly the same month made no mention of Taiwan despite it being China’s 50th Anniversary of the Restoration of the Lawful Seat.
China itself aims to achieve unification by 2049. Beijing’s plan is for all “Chinese children,” including the people of Taiwan, to celebrate unification at that time. We can argue that this is just rhetoric, and hardly portends military action, but it could suggest efforts for the time being to strengthen the “patriotic reunification force” within Taiwanese companies and broader society. Of course, that will be no easy task. Sentiment towards China within Taiwanese society has in fact been deteriorating considerably.
Still, China will likely try to permeate Taiwanese society with this kind of hybrid approach. Military activity is clearly gathering pace, but the idea scenario for China is more likely to be to simply display its military superiority while getting Taiwanese society on board with the idea of unification.
There has been much talk of an invasion. Time for a closer look.
By KAWASHIMA Shin
November 23, 2021
Credit: ASSOCIATED PRESS
A potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has received exhaustive coverage in recent months. In Japan, too, there has been considerable discourse about cooperating with the United States to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In fact, at the U.S.-Japan summit in April 2021, the phrase “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” was included in the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement for the first time since the late 1960s. That marks a major change. Now, some observers within Japan are calling for simulations to see what preparations might be possible for the “Liberation of Taiwan.”
What is driving all this? Certainly, the Chinese military has stepped up its activities around the Taiwan Strait during the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese military aircraft are violating the median line in the Taiwan Strait and are increasingly present around Taiwan and the Dongsha Islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China is rapidly acquiring the equipment it would need for an invasion; for instance, it is preparing to commission landing craft to attack the east side of the Central Mountain Range, which has been a problem. The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense likely interprets the building of these landing craft as a sign that China will soon possess the ability to invade.
Given all this, it is easy to get the impression that an invasion of Taiwan is not far off. In Japan, some believe that China will launch an invasion of Taiwan during President Xi Jinping’s approaching third term (2022-2027).
Yet in parallel with these military developments, China has toned down its rhetoric. In January 2019, Xi Jinping opened the year with a speech where he expressed a desire for the liberation of Taiwan and explicitly stated that the use of force was not off the table. The plan he suggested then is known as Xi’s five-point proposal. Yet, already at that point, he identified the “younger generation and the grassroots frontline” as targets of the proposal. As suggested by the “31 Measures” to attract Taiwanese citizens and companies to work in China in February 2018 and Beijing’s New 26 Measures for Cross-Strait Exchanges in November 2019, this is a policy of fostering people wanting unification with China within Taiwanese societies and Taiwanese companies.
Yet what was primarily reported on that occasion was the question of the possible use of force. In fact, Xi’s mention of the use of force caused Tsai Ing-wen’s approval rating, which had already gone down considerably, to rise again in Taiwan.
There has been talk about realizing policies of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs on January 19, 2020 and elsewhere. Likewise, the “unification” of Taiwan was reaffirmed as a policy goal at the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of CCP in October 2020, while also suggesting a “fusion development” strategy for China’s Fujian Province and Taiwan.
All of these, while building on Xi’s five-point proposal, seem to be emphasizing permeation of Taiwanese society rather than forceful unification. Moreover, the object of China’s united front work changed to “strengthening Taiwan’s patriotic reunification force” in the “regulations on the united front work of CCP” of the Chinese Communist Party on January 5, 2021. The goal became for China to call for strengthening Taiwan’s patriotic reunification force within Taiwan, rather than unification through the Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan. Then, at the 2021 Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs in January 2021, [Member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] Wang Yang emphasized initiatives targeting companies and individuals in Taiwan and the fusion of Fujian Province and Taiwan.
In Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemorative ceremony of 100th anniversary of Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 2021, he again mentioned unification with Taiwan. Yet this time he did not speak of the use of force but connected the “One China” Policy and the 1992 Consensus with an “and.” The 1992 Consensus is included in One China and was previously not connected with an “and.” Likewise, Xi’s speech at a Meeting Marking the 110th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 on October 9 in 2021 used similar wording and especially stressed peaceful reunification. Further, Xi Jinping’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly the same month made no mention of Taiwan despite it being China’s 50th Anniversary of the Restoration of the Lawful Seat.
China itself aims to achieve unification by 2049. Beijing’s plan is for all “Chinese children,” including the people of Taiwan, to celebrate unification at that time. We can argue that this is just rhetoric, and hardly portends military action, but it could suggest efforts for the time being to strengthen the “patriotic reunification force” within Taiwanese companies and broader society. Of course, that will be no easy task. Sentiment towards China within Taiwanese society has in fact been deteriorating considerably.
Still, China will likely try to permeate Taiwanese society with this kind of hybrid approach. Military activity is clearly gathering pace, but the idea scenario for China is more likely to be to simply display its military superiority while getting Taiwanese society on board with the idea of unification.
Changing the Discourse on China’s Taiwan Policy
There has been much talk of an invasion. Time for a closer look.
thediplomat.com
jward
passin' thru
National security.For insiders. By insiders.
Japan’s Revolution on Taiwan Affairs
Ryan Ashley
November 23, 2021
The most important development for Taiwan’s security might be unfolding right now in Japan. Tokyo’s strategy toward Taiwan is dramatically shifting. Once reluctant to join all but the most anodyne of pro-Taiwan statements with the United States, Japanese officials now increasingly state their desire to “protect Taiwan as a democratic country.” While no formal changes in security policy or diplomatic legalities are likely, Tokyo is signaling that it is willing to support Taiwan’s sovereignty, up to and including joining a military defense of the island against Chinese attack. This is likely giving Chinese Communist Party leaders and military planners much more short-term heartburn than the recently announced submarine and technology sharing deal between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Japan’s Rapidly Shifting Consensus
Until recently, Japan treaded far more carefully than the United States on Taiwan, focusing its language on “hope” for peaceful reconciliation between Beijing and Taipei. While, similarly to the United States, Japan never fully recognized China’s claims over Taiwan, Tokyo preferred to keep its official policies even more ambiguous than Washington’s through the Joint Communiqué of 1972. This document, which restored diplomatic ties between Tokyo and Beijing, contained a Japanese recognition that the “Government of the People’s Republic of China” is the “sole legal Government of China.” Furthermore, Japan never created its own version of America’s Taiwan Relations Act, which provided (and still provides) a baseline of unofficial recognition, engagement, and security guarantees from Washington to Taipei in the aftermath of the former’s recognition of the Chinese Communist Party-state.
Rather, in its dealings with China, Japan typically took an accommodating tone on the topic, repeatedly stating that it “fully respects and understands the stance” that Taiwan is an “inalienable part of the territory of the Peoples’ Republic of China,” while never clearly laying out its own stance. Moreover, while there is a history of stridently anti-Chinese Communist Party Japanese politicians, especially within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, their efforts rarely impacted this delicate balance. Successive Japanese governments even actively worked to stifle any public statements of support for Taiwan within their ranks, prioritizing the growing economic relationship with China over geopolitics. For example, in November 1999, the Japanese Foreign Ministry publicly rebuked the right-wing populist governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, for publicly referring to Taiwan as a “state,” denigrating him as a mere “local official” without the ability to speak on behalf of the government. During a 2017 visit to Taiwan by Japanese Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Akama Jiro, the state broadcaster Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (commonly known as NHK) stated that the visit did not represent a shift in the government’s views toward Taiwan, and the government instructed Akama to partially focus his visit on disagreements over Taiwanese claims to an exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea, in effect treating Taiwan as a partial proxy for equivalent Chinese claims.
Now, Japan is unmistakably changing its approach. While official policies and legal authorities toward Taiwan have not changed and are unlikely to do so, the intent in, and signaling from, Tokyo is clearly different. Japan’s most recent defense white paper discussed Taiwan as “important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community” and described cross-strait tensions as requiring a “sense of crisis.” Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party launched party-to-party talks in August with Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party involving discussions of security cooperation via joint coast guard exercises. In addition, Japanese politicians are making several once-unthinkable statements supporting Taiwan, like Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi’s assertion that “the peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected to Japan.” The statement from the April 2021 meeting between then-Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide and U.S. President Joe Biden included a reference to “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” the first such reference to Taiwan in a U.S.-Japanese statement since 1969. Perhaps most strikingly, there are increasing calls within the Liberal Democratic Party for Japan to create its own version of a Taiwan Relations Act, which would provide a new basis for Japan’s informal recognition of Taipei and would represent both a legal and policy formalization of a political atmosphere that is increasingly willing to part with decades-old communiques.
The Causes of Tokyo’s Shift
What explains these shifts in Japanese strategic thinking and public opinion? First, Japan has cover as part of a larger internationalization of the Taiwan issue, in which the United States, Australia, and many European states are embracing closer ties with Taipei. This, in turn, is leading to more unambiguous statements and acts of support for Taiwanese sovereignty, ranging widely from international calls for Taiwan’s full inclusion in the World Health Organization to Lithuania’s opening of a Taiwan representative office in its capital, Vilnius. Japan’s outreach to Taiwan still appears relatively moderate compared to these initiatives, placing them out of Beijing’s immediate crosshairs.
Second, Japanese priorities in regional engagement are shifting in line with its increasingly leading role within the liberal international order. Exemplified by Tokyo’s leadership to promote the re-booted Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the “free and open Indo-Pacific,” Japanese strategists increasingly see national security imperatives as intertwined with regional stability. Once widely derided as a free-rider on a U.S.-backed security system, Japan now actively seeks to promote closer defense ties with liberal and democratic states in Asia as an act of strategy. Within this framework, Taiwan is a top candidate for closer relations as a fellow island democracy close with the United States and facing threats from China. From a broader perspective, Japan’s leadership position also draws it closer to Taiwan on its own terms: Japan’s legitimacy as a leader in the liberal world order necessitates its deeper involvement in the increasingly internationalized Taiwan issue, adding an additional motivation beyond geopolitics.
Third, Tokyo’s increasingly hawkish consensus on China is eclipsing traditionally dovish constituencies, ranging from pacifists to big business, who prioritized functional economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing. With Sino-Japanese ties already strained by the U.S. alliance, confrontations in the East China Sea, and fraught disputes over historical memory, these factions worked hard to ensure that relations could remain cordial and functional by keeping Japan out of disputes over Taiwan. However, with perceptions of strategic mistrust increasingly overcoming these imperatives, Tokyo is more willing to take stances on regional and international issues that will draw ire from China, including Taiwan. Even current Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, a noted foreign policy dove throughout his long political career, embraced a tough line on China upon taking office. While serving as foreign minister from 2012 to 2017, Kishida prioritized moderation and balance in Japan’s dealings with China and was widely considered a dovish counterbalance to the more hardline Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. As a more junior member, he even based his political brand in opposing his party’s hawkish right wing, writing in 2005 that “balance in the trilateral Japan-US-China relationship is essential.” Nevertheless, upon winning the Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership contest in September 2021, Kishida pivoted to a more hawkish position, criticizing Chinese human rights violations and pledging to expand Japan’s long-distance strike capabilities. With the Japanese public growing increasingly skeptical of China in the face of regular military provocations, this hawkish consensus is likely to continue to grow in influence.
Indeed, the pro-Taiwan shift is not only evident in the government halls of Tokyo, but among the Japanese people. Polling suggests that support for Taiwan is even popular amongst the still pacifist-leaning Japanese population, with 74 percent of respondents in an April 2021 poll by Nikkei and TV Tokyo supporting active Japanese engagement toward “stability in the Taiwan Strait.” An earlier poll in January 2021 found 67 percent of Japanese respondents describing Taiwan as a “trustworthy ally” in global affairs. It is worth noting that the feeling is mutual in Taiwan, where 58 percent of respondents in a November 2021 poll agreed that Japan would send troops for Taiwan’s defense against a Chinese invasion. This matches a more extensive history of relative “Japanophilia” in Taiwanese politics, making the state a notable outlier in a region deeply immersed in anti-Japanese views. Far from the “Japan-bashing” frequently practiced in Korea and China, President Tsai Ing-wen is known for occasionally tweeting to her 1.7 million followers in Japanese, something nearly unthinkable in any other former colony of the Japanese Empire. Several Japanese and Taiwanese commentaries on Tsai’s unlikely re-election victory in 2020 even mentioned her courting of Taiwan’s “pro-Japan young people” as part of her political appeal. Japanese politicians often return the favor, with tweets celebrating Taiwan’s national day and of Japanese politicians eating Chinese-boycotted Taiwanese pineapples garnering widespread attention. These warm and longstanding cultural and political ties only smooth the path toward closer defense relations.
jward
passin' thru
What About Formal Policies and Laws?
Of course, security policy is hardly the result of tweets about pineapples. Prospects for any formal change to policies or laws toward Taiwan appear highly unlikely, despite supportive talk for some reforms within the Liberal Democratic Party. However, those focusing on the unlikelihood of Japanese legal or policy changes should consider the analogous case of the United States. Washington has also not committed to any significant changes in security policies or legal authorities despite an increasingly hawkish consensus and meaningful shifts in strategic thinking toward Taiwan. While it is true that recent statements from Japanese leaders should not be perceived as pledges to defend Taiwan, such ambiguity is also the cornerstone of the Washington’s policy. Thus, a lack of legal or policy changes should not be conflated with a continuity of Japan’s previous posture toward the Taiwan issue. Rather, the combination of political statements, shifting public opinion, and Tokyo’s acceptance of a more broadly confrontational relationship with China do represent a revolution for Japan’s role in Taiwan’s security. Regardless of policies and legalities, the Japanese security establishment appears willing to defend Taiwan to an unprecedented extent.
Take, for example, the idea of a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act, mentioned above. America’s Taiwan Relations Act, signed in 1979 as a counterbalance to the decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China and end formal recognition of Taiwan’s government, still acts as the primary legal basis for a hypothetical American defense of Taiwan. The act commits the United States to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and provides an ambiguous but meaningful commitment to defend the island from “any resort to force or other forms of coercion” from China.
Despite calls for a clarification of this “strategic ambiguity,” the 1979 law appears likely to remain the main legal basis for Washington’s continued support for Taipei. Regardless of the law’s non-committal language, however, an increasing and bipartisan consensus is forming in the United States to diplomatically engage with Taipei and defend Taiwan with military force, even if laws and policies still call for ambiguity. Similarly, despite hopes for a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act in hawkish factions of the Liberal Democratic Party, prospects for such a law passing the Diet are dim. Nevertheless, the Japanese consensus is similarly fundamentally shifting without any likely legal formalization or change in explicit security policy, a fact that should not be misunderstood as a lack of seriousness or commitment by Tokyo. As for the legal authorities for a defense of Taiwan, the move by then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to expand the definition of the pacifist Article 9 of the constitution to include “collective self-defense” of partners appears to provide Tokyo all the justification it would need to defend Taiwan. This is especially true if Japanese strategists and public opinion supported such an action.
Likely Regional Responses
Beijing will undoubtedly bristle at any deepening relations between Taipei and Tokyo, especially security ties. Japan’s statements on Taiwanese issues are a particularly jarring for Chinese leaders, who still associate any Japanese involvement with the imperial and colonial era of the early 20th century. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party often conflates “separatist” Taiwanese movements with Japan itself. Victor Gao, the vice president of the party-backed Center for China and Globalization, told Le Monde newspaper in October 2021 that “separatist” Taiwanese were mostly made up of the “10% of the 23 million Taiwanese [that] are in fact of Japanese descent.” Any further engagement with Taipei almost ensures that the ongoing campaign of air defense identification zone incursions and “gray zone” activities in disputed waters in the East China Sea are here to stay. Moreover, economic retaliation, along the lines of Chinese actions taken against South Korean business giant Lotte after a dispute over missile defense systems, remains in the cards for any Japanese business that crosses Beijing’s commercial red lines. Nevertheless, Tokyo’s increasingly hawkish security community sees such actions as par for the course in today’s geopolitical climate.
On the other hand, this trend offers nothing but upside for strategists in Washington and Taipei. Any credible military defense of Taiwan always depended on free U.S. military access to Japanese-based forces and materiel. For decades, this forced U.S. and Taiwanese leaders and planners to ask whether Japan would risk potential Chinese attacks by allowing such access in wartime. A Japan that is not only willing to allow a war to be fought from its territory, but also to join in with its own forces, could provide a decisive edge for Washington and Taipei’s deterrence efforts. A shared warfighting scenario of the defense of Taiwan could also provide the U.S.-Japanese alliance with a renewed unified purpose and direction besides Japan’s immediate territorial defense, an admittedly more far-fetched scenario. However, while Japan still maintains a more ambiguous policy and legal stance than the United States, Washington should refrain from pushing its ally to go even further. The strategy of “strategic ambiguity” that provides political flexibility within set legal and policy boundaries works for the United States and should be allowed to work for Japan.
In Tokyo, Japanese leaders are likely to continue to see manageable and limited downsides in continued outreach to Taiwan. Tokyo’s embrace of a more prominent role within the liberal international order and increasing realist consensus on China is overcoming specific economic-minded constituencies within the Liberal Democratic Party and Japanese government that favor a more cooperative relationship with Beijing. Future areas of Tokyo-Taipei cooperation, such as Taiwan’s recent bid to join the rebooted Trans-Pacific Partnership and other international forums, are similarly agreeable in both Tokyo and Taipei. Discussions of security cooperation, like joint coast guard exercises, have a reasonable chance of bearing fruit. These meaningful developments can be contextualized within a larger internationalization of the Taiwan issue, giving Japan cover in its bilateral relationship with China. While such actions mean Japan can expect continued aggressive Chinese military actions near Japanese seas and airspace, Tokyo essentially perceives such provocations as inevitable regardless of Japan’s relations with Taiwan. Japan’s revolution on Taiwan affairs is likely to be lasting.
Of course, security policy is hardly the result of tweets about pineapples. Prospects for any formal change to policies or laws toward Taiwan appear highly unlikely, despite supportive talk for some reforms within the Liberal Democratic Party. However, those focusing on the unlikelihood of Japanese legal or policy changes should consider the analogous case of the United States. Washington has also not committed to any significant changes in security policies or legal authorities despite an increasingly hawkish consensus and meaningful shifts in strategic thinking toward Taiwan. While it is true that recent statements from Japanese leaders should not be perceived as pledges to defend Taiwan, such ambiguity is also the cornerstone of the Washington’s policy. Thus, a lack of legal or policy changes should not be conflated with a continuity of Japan’s previous posture toward the Taiwan issue. Rather, the combination of political statements, shifting public opinion, and Tokyo’s acceptance of a more broadly confrontational relationship with China do represent a revolution for Japan’s role in Taiwan’s security. Regardless of policies and legalities, the Japanese security establishment appears willing to defend Taiwan to an unprecedented extent.
Take, for example, the idea of a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act, mentioned above. America’s Taiwan Relations Act, signed in 1979 as a counterbalance to the decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China and end formal recognition of Taiwan’s government, still acts as the primary legal basis for a hypothetical American defense of Taiwan. The act commits the United States to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and provides an ambiguous but meaningful commitment to defend the island from “any resort to force or other forms of coercion” from China.
Despite calls for a clarification of this “strategic ambiguity,” the 1979 law appears likely to remain the main legal basis for Washington’s continued support for Taipei. Regardless of the law’s non-committal language, however, an increasing and bipartisan consensus is forming in the United States to diplomatically engage with Taipei and defend Taiwan with military force, even if laws and policies still call for ambiguity. Similarly, despite hopes for a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act in hawkish factions of the Liberal Democratic Party, prospects for such a law passing the Diet are dim. Nevertheless, the Japanese consensus is similarly fundamentally shifting without any likely legal formalization or change in explicit security policy, a fact that should not be misunderstood as a lack of seriousness or commitment by Tokyo. As for the legal authorities for a defense of Taiwan, the move by then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to expand the definition of the pacifist Article 9 of the constitution to include “collective self-defense” of partners appears to provide Tokyo all the justification it would need to defend Taiwan. This is especially true if Japanese strategists and public opinion supported such an action.
Likely Regional Responses
Beijing will undoubtedly bristle at any deepening relations between Taipei and Tokyo, especially security ties. Japan’s statements on Taiwanese issues are a particularly jarring for Chinese leaders, who still associate any Japanese involvement with the imperial and colonial era of the early 20th century. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party often conflates “separatist” Taiwanese movements with Japan itself. Victor Gao, the vice president of the party-backed Center for China and Globalization, told Le Monde newspaper in October 2021 that “separatist” Taiwanese were mostly made up of the “10% of the 23 million Taiwanese [that] are in fact of Japanese descent.” Any further engagement with Taipei almost ensures that the ongoing campaign of air defense identification zone incursions and “gray zone” activities in disputed waters in the East China Sea are here to stay. Moreover, economic retaliation, along the lines of Chinese actions taken against South Korean business giant Lotte after a dispute over missile defense systems, remains in the cards for any Japanese business that crosses Beijing’s commercial red lines. Nevertheless, Tokyo’s increasingly hawkish security community sees such actions as par for the course in today’s geopolitical climate.
On the other hand, this trend offers nothing but upside for strategists in Washington and Taipei. Any credible military defense of Taiwan always depended on free U.S. military access to Japanese-based forces and materiel. For decades, this forced U.S. and Taiwanese leaders and planners to ask whether Japan would risk potential Chinese attacks by allowing such access in wartime. A Japan that is not only willing to allow a war to be fought from its territory, but also to join in with its own forces, could provide a decisive edge for Washington and Taipei’s deterrence efforts. A shared warfighting scenario of the defense of Taiwan could also provide the U.S.-Japanese alliance with a renewed unified purpose and direction besides Japan’s immediate territorial defense, an admittedly more far-fetched scenario. However, while Japan still maintains a more ambiguous policy and legal stance than the United States, Washington should refrain from pushing its ally to go even further. The strategy of “strategic ambiguity” that provides political flexibility within set legal and policy boundaries works for the United States and should be allowed to work for Japan.
In Tokyo, Japanese leaders are likely to continue to see manageable and limited downsides in continued outreach to Taiwan. Tokyo’s embrace of a more prominent role within the liberal international order and increasing realist consensus on China is overcoming specific economic-minded constituencies within the Liberal Democratic Party and Japanese government that favor a more cooperative relationship with Beijing. Future areas of Tokyo-Taipei cooperation, such as Taiwan’s recent bid to join the rebooted Trans-Pacific Partnership and other international forums, are similarly agreeable in both Tokyo and Taipei. Discussions of security cooperation, like joint coast guard exercises, have a reasonable chance of bearing fruit. These meaningful developments can be contextualized within a larger internationalization of the Taiwan issue, giving Japan cover in its bilateral relationship with China. While such actions mean Japan can expect continued aggressive Chinese military actions near Japanese seas and airspace, Tokyo essentially perceives such provocations as inevitable regardless of Japan’s relations with Taiwan. Japan’s revolution on Taiwan affairs is likely to be lasting.
Japan’s Revolution on Taiwan Affairs - War on the Rocks
The most important development for Taiwan’s security might be unfolding right now in Japan. Tokyo’s strategy toward Taiwan is dramatically shifting. Once
warontherocks.com
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Japan media: Chinese ships simulated landing east of Taiwan in mid-November
Sankei Shimbun reports 2 amphibious landing dock ships lingered east of Hualien
1696
By Matthew Strong, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2021/11/24 20:28
A Type 071 Chinese amphibious transport dock ship. (Wikicommons, U.S. Naval Institute News blog photo)
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Two Chinese Navy vessels simulated a landing attack against Taiwan in mid-November in an area just 111 kilometers east of the country, Japan’s Sankei Shimbun reported Wednesday (Nov. 24).
The ships were seen maneuvering around the waters near Japan’s Okinawa, Yonaguni, and Taiwan, according to the report. Both were amphibious transport landing dock ships of the Yuzhao Class, also known as Type 071.
After moving south between Taiwan and Yonaguni on Nov. 14, the ships lingered in the area east of Hualien County, but it was not clear what they did there, according to CNA.
The Japanese newspaper explained how a Chinese attack was more likely to target Taiwan’s west coast, as the east coast featured numerous steep cliffs and few spots easy to land on. However, the report noted how a military airport near Hualien might provide refuge to Taiwan Air Force planes if China launched a missile attack against the west coast.
The Sankei Shimbun quoted an unnamed Taiwan official as saying China might add southwestern islands in Japan as targets during a war, while the communist country’s Marines were practicing amphibious landings, as well as how to occupy small islands and repel air and sea attacks.
The report also mentioned that the Chinese Navy’s Type 071 ships could carry four helicopters and 900 soldiers, as well as smaller landing vessels and amphibious vehicles. There were eight of the ships in operation, with the first of a newer version, Type 075, having been launched in April.
www.taiwannews.com.tw
Sankei Shimbun reports 2 amphibious landing dock ships lingered east of Hualien
1696
By Matthew Strong, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2021/11/24 20:28
A Type 071 Chinese amphibious transport dock ship. (Wikicommons, U.S. Naval Institute News blog photo)
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Two Chinese Navy vessels simulated a landing attack against Taiwan in mid-November in an area just 111 kilometers east of the country, Japan’s Sankei Shimbun reported Wednesday (Nov. 24).
The ships were seen maneuvering around the waters near Japan’s Okinawa, Yonaguni, and Taiwan, according to the report. Both were amphibious transport landing dock ships of the Yuzhao Class, also known as Type 071.
After moving south between Taiwan and Yonaguni on Nov. 14, the ships lingered in the area east of Hualien County, but it was not clear what they did there, according to CNA.
The Japanese newspaper explained how a Chinese attack was more likely to target Taiwan’s west coast, as the east coast featured numerous steep cliffs and few spots easy to land on. However, the report noted how a military airport near Hualien might provide refuge to Taiwan Air Force planes if China launched a missile attack against the west coast.
The Sankei Shimbun quoted an unnamed Taiwan official as saying China might add southwestern islands in Japan as targets during a war, while the communist country’s Marines were practicing amphibious landings, as well as how to occupy small islands and repel air and sea attacks.
The report also mentioned that the Chinese Navy’s Type 071 ships could carry four helicopters and 900 soldiers, as well as smaller landing vessels and amphibious vehicles. There were eight of the ships in operation, with the first of a newer version, Type 075, having been launched in April.
Taiwan News － Breaking News, Politics, Environment, Immigrants, Travel, and Health
Taiwan News is the most widely visited English-language portal for news about Taiwan, offering the outside world a revealing look at all things Taiwan
danielboon
TB Fanatic
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1463627130399596550
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
·
2h
Army says Iron Dome system test validates layered air defense for Guam
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
·
2h
Army says Iron Dome system test validates layered air defense for Guam
danielboon
TB Fanatic
jward
passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
2h
New #German government voices support for #Taiwan’s participation in global bodies Mention of #Taiwan in governing coalition deal a first for #Germany Pro #China Merkel is finally out........ https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4355914
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1463724710072504320?s=20
@IndoPac_Info
2h
New #German government voices support for #Taiwan’s participation in global bodies Mention of #Taiwan in governing coalition deal a first for #Germany Pro #China Merkel is finally out........ https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4355914
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1463724710072504320?s=20
jward
passin' thru
no wonder i no longer sleep or eat well these days
Guy Elster
@guyelster
China military said that the transit of a US warship in the Taiwan Strait creates security risks and undermining regional stability, warns it will take all necessary steps to counter all threats and provocations, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity
China defence ministry says there is no room for compromise over #Taiwan,US should not have any illusions about this
Guy Elster
@guyelster
China military said that the transit of a US warship in the Taiwan Strait creates security risks and undermining regional stability, warns it will take all necessary steps to counter all threats and provocations, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity
China defence ministry says there is no room for compromise over #Taiwan,US should not have any illusions about this
thereisnofork
Veteran Member
Back in about 2008 there was a speaker at the Government Microelectronics Conference (GOMAC). He said the Chinese graduate about 300,000 engineers a year, the U.S. only graduates 100,000/year. Simple mathematics, they have 3 times the brain power working on the problems/solutions.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
It will happen when God says so. God has a plan trust himno wonder i no longer sleep or eat well these days
Guy Elster
@guyelster
China military said that the transit of a US warship in the Taiwan Strait creates security risks and undermining regional stability, warns it will take all necessary steps to counter all threats and provocations, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity
China defence ministry says there is no room for compromise over #Taiwan,US should not have any illusions about this
TheDoberman
Veteran Member
This might be a pretty big dot..
m.republicworld.com
China's disappearing ships adversely affecting global trade as supply chains hit: Report- Republic World
In what is being termed as “a headache” for the global supply chain, trade vessels in the Chinese waters have been shrinking, owing to deepening geopolitical spat between Beijing and the rest of the world, CNN’s Laura He writes in an opinion piece, cited by ANI on Thursday, Nov. 25. Laying down...
m.republicworld.com
China's disappearing ships adversely affecting global trade as supply chains hit: Report- Republic World
In what is being termed as “a headache” for the global supply chain, trade vessels in the Chinese waters have been shrinking, owing to deepening geopolitical spat between Beijing and the rest of the world, CNN’s Laura He writes in an opinion piece, cited by ANI on Thursday, Nov. 25. Laying down...
www.republicworld.com
In what is being termed as “a headache” for the global supply chain, trade vessels in the Chinese waters have been shrinking, owing to deepening geopolitical spat between Beijing and the rest of the world, CNN’s Laura He writes in an opinion piece, cited by ANI on Thursday, Nov. 25.
Laying down concerns about China's ‘growing isolation’ with the rest of the West, He says that the disappearance of the Chinese ships, which undoubtedly obstructs the global supply chain and are a victim of the “mistrust” of the foreign influence, is a huge setback for foreign trade and the global economy.
This significant “drop off” in the Chinese shipping traffic was first noted towards the end of October, when Beijing enacted its data protection law, which took effect on November 1.
The law was designed to protect the personal data of the Chinese and boost data security in China.
The Personal Information Protection Law unravelled a comprehensive framework that regulated how Chinese firms -- both inside and outside China, were given the extraterritorial jurisdiction by Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party government, including the cross-border transfer of data.
China's Personal Information Protection Law, and missing trade ships data explained
According to CNN’s analysts, the data companies are able to track down the foreign ships worldwide owing to a technology termed as Automatic Identification System, or AIS that acts as a transceiver reflecting information related to the vessels in the sea such as — ship’s position, speed, course and its name via a high-frequency radio to determine the vessels’ location. If, in case, the vessels sail out of range, this task is accomplished via a satellite that helps exchange such information.
“That's not happening in the world's second-largest economy, a critical player in global trade,” He wrote, referring to the Chinese vessels. Further, she adds, that about 90% of trade ships from China over the last three weeks have disappeared, and there have been no signals recorded from its vessels, according to data from the global shipping data provider VesselsValue.
READ | China making serious efforts to develop military bases in Pacific islands: Report
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meanwhile, told CNN Business that Beijing’s coastlines constructed in accordance with the rules transcribed in the international treaties have been shut down, ANI reported. It added that all AIS technology has been operating normally but shipping providers were losing access to data.
The reason is not yet understood. China’s State Council Office did not respond to the query about the unexplainable trend about Chinese vessels’ missing from global waters. Even as China’s Personal Information Protection Law does not mention the ships, Laura He writes that the Chinese data providers may be blocking the vessel information as a ‘precaution’, as explained by AIS Network’s team leader Anastassis Touris to CNN. The firm deals in ship tracking information.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Taiwan sends jets after 27 Chinese planes enter buffer zone
Taiwan says 27 Chinese aircraft entered its air defense buffer zone in the latest in a long series of incursions as part of Beijing’s pressure on the self-ruled island
By The Associated Press
28 November 2021, 07:24
The Associated Press
Newly commissioned upgraded F-16V fighter jets are seen at Air Force base in Chiayi in southwestern Taiwan Thursday, Nov. 18, 2021. Taiwan has deployed the most advanced version of the F-16 fighter jet in its Air Force, as the island steps up its defense capabilities in the face of continuing threats from China. (AP Photo/Johnson Lai)
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Taiwan said 27 Chinese aircraft entered its air defense buffer zone on Sunday, the latest in a long series of incursions as part of Beijing's pressure on the self-ruled island.
The Defense Ministry said Taiwan scrambled combat aircraft to “warn” the Chinese planes to leave. It also deployed missile systems to monitor them.
Sunday’s incursion included 18 fighter jets and five H-6 bombers, as well as a Y-20 aerial refueling aircraft, according to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry.
The Chinese aircraft flew into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone near the southern part of the island and out into the Pacific Ocean before returning to China, according to a map by Taiwan authorities.
Over the past year, the frequency of Chinese incursions has increased, with about 150 aircraft over a period of four days.
China’s air force mission toward Taiwan came as Chinese President Xi Jinping met with officers at a military conference, where he called for military talent cultivation to support and strengthen the armed forces, according to state-owned news agency Xinhua.
Xi said that talent is imperative in achieving victory in military competition and gaining the upper hand in future wars, according to Xinhua.
China claims democratically ruled Taiwan as its own territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. It refuses to recognize the island’s government and has increasingly sought to isolate the independence-leaning administration of President Tsai Ing-wen.
Taiwan and China split during a civil war in 1949, and Beijing opposes Taiwan’s involvement in international organizations.
Taiwan sends jets after 27 Chinese planes enter buffer zone - ABC News (go.com)
Taiwan says 27 Chinese aircraft entered its air defense buffer zone in the latest in a long series of incursions as part of Beijing’s pressure on the self-ruled island
By The Associated Press
28 November 2021, 07:24
Newly commissioned upgraded F-16V fighter jets are seen at Air Force base in Chiayi in southwestern Taiwan Thursday, Nov. 18, 2021. Taiwan has deployed the most advanced version of the F-16 fighter jet in its Air Force, as the island steps up its defense capabilities in the face of continuing threats from China. (AP Photo/Johnson Lai)
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Taiwan said 27 Chinese aircraft entered its air defense buffer zone on Sunday, the latest in a long series of incursions as part of Beijing's pressure on the self-ruled island.
The Defense Ministry said Taiwan scrambled combat aircraft to “warn” the Chinese planes to leave. It also deployed missile systems to monitor them.
Sunday’s incursion included 18 fighter jets and five H-6 bombers, as well as a Y-20 aerial refueling aircraft, according to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry.
The Chinese aircraft flew into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone near the southern part of the island and out into the Pacific Ocean before returning to China, according to a map by Taiwan authorities.
Over the past year, the frequency of Chinese incursions has increased, with about 150 aircraft over a period of four days.
China’s air force mission toward Taiwan came as Chinese President Xi Jinping met with officers at a military conference, where he called for military talent cultivation to support and strengthen the armed forces, according to state-owned news agency Xinhua.
Xi said that talent is imperative in achieving victory in military competition and gaining the upper hand in future wars, according to Xinhua.
China claims democratically ruled Taiwan as its own territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. It refuses to recognize the island’s government and has increasingly sought to isolate the independence-leaning administration of President Tsai Ing-wen.
Taiwan and China split during a civil war in 1949, and Beijing opposes Taiwan’s involvement in international organizations.
Taiwan sends jets after 27 Chinese planes enter buffer zone - ABC News (go.com)
jward
passin' thru
Buckle up, babe Drums beatin' ever faster now :: insert drum emoji n big eyed waitin' fer the world to end emoji here ::
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
#China won’t stop at #Taiwan Defence Minister Peter Dutton warned that all #Australian major cities are within range of Chinese missiles & claims the taking of Taiwan will be the first domino to fall in a campaign by Beijing to dominate the #IndoPacific
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1464995012077228042?s=20
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info
#China won’t stop at #Taiwan Defence Minister Peter Dutton warned that all #Australian major cities are within range of Chinese missiles & claims the taking of Taiwan will be the first domino to fall in a campaign by Beijing to dominate the #IndoPacific
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1464995012077228042?s=20