WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN
- Thread starter danielboon
- Start date
jward
passin' thru
EIJING, Nov 15 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to use his first virtual meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden to warn the United States to "step back" on the Taiwan issue, according to Chinese state media editorials printed on Monday.
Xi and Biden are scheduled to meet virtually on Tuesday morning Beijing time - Monday evening in Washington - as friction between the countries persist across a range of issues including trade, technology, Xinjiang and especially Taiwan, a self-ruled island claimed by China.
An editorial in the English language China Daily on Monday said that it was likely that Xi would impress upon Biden that Beijing is resolved to "realise national reunification in the foreseeable future no matter the cost".
State media outlets such as China Daily are briefed by authorities on important issues such as China-U.S. relations and have been accurate in reflecting the priorities of Chinese leaders.
"The Taiwan question is the ultimate red line of China", wrote a Monday editorial by Global Times, a tabloid published by the ruling Communist Party's People's Daily.
"In order to reduce the risk of a strategic collision between China and the U.S., the latter must take a step back from the Taiwan question and show its restraint," it wrote.
In a call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Saturday, senior Chinese diplomat Wang Yi warned Washington against sending the wrong signals to Taiwan pro-independence forces. read more
Some experts said China's emphasis on Taiwan amidst other friction points reflects its reluctance to be drawn into armed conflict with the United States unnecessarily, despite its recent words and actions, including sending an unprecedented number of planes into Taiwan's air defence zone.
"Chinese leaders are aware that China has not completed its modernisation and still faces many challenges in its domestic economy," said Li Mingjiang, associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
"A war could severely disrupt this modernisation and set back its rise," he told Reuters.
China also does not have full confidence that it can secure a clear military victory at this stage, Li said.
Reporting by Yew Lun Tian Editing by Tony Munroe and Michael Perry
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/FP2BLRBE2VO37JDPTT5G2WSIAE.jpg)
www.reuters.com
Xi and Biden are scheduled to meet virtually on Tuesday morning Beijing time - Monday evening in Washington - as friction between the countries persist across a range of issues including trade, technology, Xinjiang and especially Taiwan, a self-ruled island claimed by China.
An editorial in the English language China Daily on Monday said that it was likely that Xi would impress upon Biden that Beijing is resolved to "realise national reunification in the foreseeable future no matter the cost".
State media outlets such as China Daily are briefed by authorities on important issues such as China-U.S. relations and have been accurate in reflecting the priorities of Chinese leaders.
"The Taiwan question is the ultimate red line of China", wrote a Monday editorial by Global Times, a tabloid published by the ruling Communist Party's People's Daily.
"In order to reduce the risk of a strategic collision between China and the U.S., the latter must take a step back from the Taiwan question and show its restraint," it wrote.
In a call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Saturday, senior Chinese diplomat Wang Yi warned Washington against sending the wrong signals to Taiwan pro-independence forces. read more
Some experts said China's emphasis on Taiwan amidst other friction points reflects its reluctance to be drawn into armed conflict with the United States unnecessarily, despite its recent words and actions, including sending an unprecedented number of planes into Taiwan's air defence zone.
"Chinese leaders are aware that China has not completed its modernisation and still faces many challenges in its domestic economy," said Li Mingjiang, associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
"A war could severely disrupt this modernisation and set back its rise," he told Reuters.
China also does not have full confidence that it can secure a clear military victory at this stage, Li said.
Reporting by Yew Lun Tian Editing by Tony Munroe and Michael Perry
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
China's Xi expected to prioritise Taiwan issue in Biden discussion
Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to use his first virtual meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden to warn the United States to "step back" on the Taiwan issue, according to Chinese state media editorials printed on Monday.
www.reuters.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
If Australia is going to help defend Taiwan, then Australia should realize that it would be at war with China. Let that sink in. Australia in my opinion would be under Chinese long range missile attack.
If Australia is going to send troops to Taiwan, it better do that before Taiwan is under continuous missile attack and the airports and seaports are closed
danielboon
TB Fanatic
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
·
41s
Chinese bombers in night drills amid Taiwan, South China Sea tensions https://scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3156148/chinese-bombers-night-drills-amid-taiwan-south-china-sea?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=share_widget&utm_campaign=3156148… via
@scmpnews
@EndGameWW3
·
41s
Chinese bombers in night drills amid Taiwan, South China Sea tensions https://scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3156148/chinese-bombers-night-drills-amid-taiwan-south-china-sea?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=share_widget&utm_campaign=3156148… via
@scmpnews
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Chinese bombers in night drills amid Taiwan, South China Sea tensions
Liu Zhen in Beijing
Published: 8:49pm, 15 Nov, 2021
The H-6J bombers operated by the PLA Navy are modified versions of the air force’s H-6K bombers, with improvements to combat attacks from ships. Photo: Handout
The Chinese navy has stepped up assault training and combat readiness with a series of night bombing drills in waters off the southern island of Hainan.
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Southern Theatre Command said on Sunday that dozens of bombers from a naval aviation regiment carried out patrols earlier this month to improve the crews’ stamina and situational awareness at night.
In the “high intensity” exercise, H-6J bombers practised fending off ship and ground attacks as well as firing tactics.
“It laid a solid foundation for fighting night battles,” the command said on its social media account.
But it did not specify where the drills took place.
Philippine coast guard confronts Chinese maritime ‘militia’ vessels in South China Sea
The exercise comes as military tensions mount in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
The Southern Theatre Command oversees China’s military activities in the South China Sea and is responsible for aiding PLA forces covering the Taiwan Strait.
Last week, in response to a visit by a US congressional delegation to Taiwan, the PLA Eastern Theatre Command, which focuses on Taiwan and the East China Sea, held exercises near the island.
And in a show of strength and determination, the PLA also sent a record 149 military aircraft southwest of Taiwan in strike group formations in one day in October, prompting the island’s military to yet again scramble aircraft and activate its air defence missile systems.
South China Sea safeguards ‘not strong enough’ to stop international tensions escalating
14 Nov 2021
The PLA fighters and bombers also patrol from their base in Hainan over the South China Sea, most of which is claimed by Beijing, despite competing claims from five other neighbours.
The US Navy also frequently conducts freedom of navigation operations near Chinese-controlled islands in the disputed waters.
The Southern Theatre Command has troops and warships stationed at some of the islands and the US carries out the patrols to challenge the Chinese claims.
The South China Sea dispute explained
The United States also conducts exercises with aircraft carrier strike groups in the region, and invites allies to take part.
Last month, the US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force had a joint exercise with an aircraft carrier each in this region, one the world’s busiest waterways.
The H-6J bombers operated by the PLA Navy are modified versions of the air force’s H-6K bombers, with improvements to combat attacks from ships.
In the intended operational use, the anti-ship missiles it carries will be focused on an enemy’s large aircraft carrier group.
The H-6 series can also lay maritime mines, conduct electronic warfare, do maritime reconnaissance and coordinate activities with other naval units.
www.scmp.com
- PLA Navy aircraft take off from Hainan for exercises to improve night combat skills
- Drills involve the Southern Theatre Command and tactics to counter ship and ground attacks
Liu Zhen in Beijing
Published: 8:49pm, 15 Nov, 2021
The H-6J bombers operated by the PLA Navy are modified versions of the air force’s H-6K bombers, with improvements to combat attacks from ships. Photo: Handout
The Chinese navy has stepped up assault training and combat readiness with a series of night bombing drills in waters off the southern island of Hainan.
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Southern Theatre Command said on Sunday that dozens of bombers from a naval aviation regiment carried out patrols earlier this month to improve the crews’ stamina and situational awareness at night.
In the “high intensity” exercise, H-6J bombers practised fending off ship and ground attacks as well as firing tactics.
“It laid a solid foundation for fighting night battles,” the command said on its social media account.
But it did not specify where the drills took place.
Philippine coast guard confronts Chinese maritime ‘militia’ vessels in South China Sea
The exercise comes as military tensions mount in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
The Southern Theatre Command oversees China’s military activities in the South China Sea and is responsible for aiding PLA forces covering the Taiwan Strait.
Last week, in response to a visit by a US congressional delegation to Taiwan, the PLA Eastern Theatre Command, which focuses on Taiwan and the East China Sea, held exercises near the island.
And in a show of strength and determination, the PLA also sent a record 149 military aircraft southwest of Taiwan in strike group formations in one day in October, prompting the island’s military to yet again scramble aircraft and activate its air defence missile systems.
South China Sea safeguards ‘not strong enough’ to stop international tensions escalating
14 Nov 2021
The PLA fighters and bombers also patrol from their base in Hainan over the South China Sea, most of which is claimed by Beijing, despite competing claims from five other neighbours.
The US Navy also frequently conducts freedom of navigation operations near Chinese-controlled islands in the disputed waters.
The Southern Theatre Command has troops and warships stationed at some of the islands and the US carries out the patrols to challenge the Chinese claims.
The South China Sea dispute explained
The United States also conducts exercises with aircraft carrier strike groups in the region, and invites allies to take part.
Last month, the US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force had a joint exercise with an aircraft carrier each in this region, one the world’s busiest waterways.
The H-6J bombers operated by the PLA Navy are modified versions of the air force’s H-6K bombers, with improvements to combat attacks from ships.
In the intended operational use, the anti-ship missiles it carries will be focused on an enemy’s large aircraft carrier group.
The H-6 series can also lay maritime mines, conduct electronic warfare, do maritime reconnaissance and coordinate activities with other naval units.
Chinese bombers in night drills amid Taiwan, South China Sea tensions
PLA Navy aircraft take off from Hainan for exercises to improve night combat skills.
www.scmp.com
jward
passin' thru
Guy Elster
@guyelster
#BREAKING Xi warns Biden of that China would have to take "decisive measures" if "pro-Taiwan independence" forces crossed a "red line"
12:14 AM · Nov 16, 2021·Twitter Web App
@guyelster
#BREAKING Xi warns Biden of that China would have to take "decisive measures" if "pro-Taiwan independence" forces crossed a "red line"
12:14 AM · Nov 16, 2021·Twitter Web App
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Disclose.tv
@disclosetv
·
2h
NEW - China sent 8 warplanes into Taiwan's air identification zone just hours after Xi and Biden's cozy virtual meeting.
@disclosetv
·
2h
NEW - China sent 8 warplanes into Taiwan's air identification zone just hours after Xi and Biden's cozy virtual meeting.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/898153945721339904/O****PfR_normal.jpg
Disclose.tv
@disclosetv
·
2h
JUST IN - No flexibility on Taiwan, sanctions, trade: "Europe underestimates the Chinese people's aspiration for a reunification," China's EU envoy says after the Xi-Biden meeting.
jward
passin' thru
US, Chinese Leaders Share Differing Interpretations on Taiwan
Nike Ching
7-9 minutes
U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping held "an extended discussion" on Taiwan Monday night, broaching a long-running point of disagreement between the two that many worry remains a flashpoint for conflict.
Officials said Biden made U.S. interests clear to ensure that there are "no unilateral changes to the status quo" across the Taiwan Strait during their virtual meeting that lasted for about three-and-a-half hours.
Biden "was quite direct about his concerns about some of Beijing's behavior that he believes is at odds with" the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, said a senior U.S. administration official during a phone briefing after the virtual meeting.
China has escalated the dispatch of its military planes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone in recent months, with a record number of sorties flown last month.
The White House readout said Biden "underscored that the United States remains committed to the 'one China' policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and that the United States strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." These are references to existing U.S. policy on Taiwan, set in place under past U.S. administrations.
The Chinese readout, however, struck a different tone, excluding the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances that the U.S. deemed as fundamental to its long-standing policy.
"The 'One-China principle' and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués are the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations," said the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
"Some people in the United States intend to use Taiwan to contain China. This trend is very dangerous. It is playing with fire, and playing with fire must burn oneself," added the Chinese statement, published following the virtual meeting.
That is "pretty provocative language to use in this type of setting," said Ryan Hass, who is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
FILE - A CH-47 Chinook helicopter carries a Taiwan flag during national day celebrations in Taipei on Oct. 10, 2021.
During a webinar on Tuesday, Hass said Beijing is doing so "because they're frustrated" as the United States continues to "demonstrate visibly its support for Taiwan" and make "progress in internationalizing the Taiwan issue."
"There's been a real effort to raise awareness of the international stakes of Taiwan's security in a way that frustrates Beijing's efforts to isolate, intimidate Taiwan and to treat Taiwan as a feature of U.S.-China competition," he added.
The U.S. says its one-China policy is "distinct" from Beijing's one-China principle, under which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) asserts sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. has never accepted the CCP's sovereignty claim over Taiwan and has refrained from taking a position on sovereignty over Taiwan.
China considers Taiwan a breakaway province that someday will be reunified with the mainland. Taipei considers the island a sovereign state.
"The U.S. and China are trying to signal the intention to each other, and it is worth noting how the U.S. and China put out policy guidance differently," said Professor Yeh-chung Lu, who chairs the Department of Diplomacy at Taiwan's National Cheng-chi University.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area and of grave concern.
The U.S. also maintains "the capacity of the United States" to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people who live on the island.
FILE - In this photo provided by the U.S. Navy, the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain conducts routine underway operations in support of stability and security for a free and open Indo-Pacific, at the Taiwan Strait, Dec. 30, 2020.
Lu sees the regular transits by U.S. Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait as "reassuring," as the Chinese military intensifies its warplane flights into Taiwan's air defense identification zone.
The U.S. is telling China "not to change the status quo," Lu told VOA in an email, adding, "There is a similarity" with 25 years ago.
He was referring to the Taiwan Strait crisis in March 1996.
At that time, the U.S. dispatched two carrier battle groups to waters surrounding Taiwan as China conducted missile tests during the run-up to Taiwan's first democratic presidential election.
The Pentagon still conducts Taiwan Strait transits in accordance with international law. A State Department spokesperson told VOA that the transits "demonstrate U.S. commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait."
The U.S. and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship.
Next week, the U.S. and Taiwan will hold economic talks, the so-called Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) which was launched last November, with the resilience of global supply chains among the topics.
The 1979 U.S.-China Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Relations between the U.S. and Taiwan have been governed by the Taiwan Relations Act that Congress passed in April 1979, under which the U.S. provides defense equipment to Taiwan.
Under the "Six Assurances" offered by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration, the U.S. did not agree to prior consultation with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan, nor did it agree to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. also promised it will never pressure Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing.
The Chinese readout said Biden stated during Monday night's virtual meeting that the U.S. does not support "Taiwan independence."
"On the question of Taiwan independence," a senior U.S. administration official told reporters after the meeting, "It is not something that the United States supports" but it is not a U.S. policy "that's particularly new."
FILE - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen attends a gala on the eve of Taiwan's National Day at Hsinchu Air Force Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan, Oct. 9, 2021.
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has said there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence as the Republic of China (R.O.C.) has been established since 1912.R.O.C. is Taiwan's formal name.
Tsai staked out her government's approach to the sensitive issue during her 2021 National Day Address.
"Let us here renew with one another our enduring commitment to a free and democratic constitutional system, our commitment that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other, our commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty, and our commitment that the future of the Republic of China (Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people," Tsai pledged.
Natasha Kassam, director of the public opinion and foreign policy program of the Australia-based Lowy Institute, recently wrote in an opinion piece in The New York Times that "most in Taiwan — 87 percent, according to a recent poll — want to maintain some form of the status quo."
Kassam added the status quo means maintaining de facto independence but avoiding retaliation from China. And she wrote the percentage of Taiwan's people who want to maintain the status quo indefinitely is growing.
www.voanews.com
Nike Ching
7-9 minutes
U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping held "an extended discussion" on Taiwan Monday night, broaching a long-running point of disagreement between the two that many worry remains a flashpoint for conflict.
Officials said Biden made U.S. interests clear to ensure that there are "no unilateral changes to the status quo" across the Taiwan Strait during their virtual meeting that lasted for about three-and-a-half hours.
Biden "was quite direct about his concerns about some of Beijing's behavior that he believes is at odds with" the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, said a senior U.S. administration official during a phone briefing after the virtual meeting.
China has escalated the dispatch of its military planes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone in recent months, with a record number of sorties flown last month.
The White House readout said Biden "underscored that the United States remains committed to the 'one China' policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and that the United States strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." These are references to existing U.S. policy on Taiwan, set in place under past U.S. administrations.
The Chinese readout, however, struck a different tone, excluding the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances that the U.S. deemed as fundamental to its long-standing policy.
"The 'One-China principle' and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués are the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations," said the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
"Some people in the United States intend to use Taiwan to contain China. This trend is very dangerous. It is playing with fire, and playing with fire must burn oneself," added the Chinese statement, published following the virtual meeting.
That is "pretty provocative language to use in this type of setting," said Ryan Hass, who is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
FILE - A CH-47 Chinook helicopter carries a Taiwan flag during national day celebrations in Taipei on Oct. 10, 2021.
During a webinar on Tuesday, Hass said Beijing is doing so "because they're frustrated" as the United States continues to "demonstrate visibly its support for Taiwan" and make "progress in internationalizing the Taiwan issue."
"There's been a real effort to raise awareness of the international stakes of Taiwan's security in a way that frustrates Beijing's efforts to isolate, intimidate Taiwan and to treat Taiwan as a feature of U.S.-China competition," he added.
The U.S. says its one-China policy is "distinct" from Beijing's one-China principle, under which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) asserts sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. has never accepted the CCP's sovereignty claim over Taiwan and has refrained from taking a position on sovereignty over Taiwan.
China considers Taiwan a breakaway province that someday will be reunified with the mainland. Taipei considers the island a sovereign state.
"The U.S. and China are trying to signal the intention to each other, and it is worth noting how the U.S. and China put out policy guidance differently," said Professor Yeh-chung Lu, who chairs the Department of Diplomacy at Taiwan's National Cheng-chi University.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area and of grave concern.
The U.S. also maintains "the capacity of the United States" to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people who live on the island.
FILE - In this photo provided by the U.S. Navy, the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain conducts routine underway operations in support of stability and security for a free and open Indo-Pacific, at the Taiwan Strait, Dec. 30, 2020.
Lu sees the regular transits by U.S. Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait as "reassuring," as the Chinese military intensifies its warplane flights into Taiwan's air defense identification zone.
The U.S. is telling China "not to change the status quo," Lu told VOA in an email, adding, "There is a similarity" with 25 years ago.
He was referring to the Taiwan Strait crisis in March 1996.
At that time, the U.S. dispatched two carrier battle groups to waters surrounding Taiwan as China conducted missile tests during the run-up to Taiwan's first democratic presidential election.
The Pentagon still conducts Taiwan Strait transits in accordance with international law. A State Department spokesperson told VOA that the transits "demonstrate U.S. commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait."
The U.S. and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship.
Next week, the U.S. and Taiwan will hold economic talks, the so-called Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) which was launched last November, with the resilience of global supply chains among the topics.
The 1979 U.S.-China Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Relations between the U.S. and Taiwan have been governed by the Taiwan Relations Act that Congress passed in April 1979, under which the U.S. provides defense equipment to Taiwan.
Under the "Six Assurances" offered by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration, the U.S. did not agree to prior consultation with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan, nor did it agree to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. also promised it will never pressure Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing.
The Chinese readout said Biden stated during Monday night's virtual meeting that the U.S. does not support "Taiwan independence."
"On the question of Taiwan independence," a senior U.S. administration official told reporters after the meeting, "It is not something that the United States supports" but it is not a U.S. policy "that's particularly new."
FILE - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen attends a gala on the eve of Taiwan's National Day at Hsinchu Air Force Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan, Oct. 9, 2021.
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has said there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence as the Republic of China (R.O.C.) has been established since 1912.R.O.C. is Taiwan's formal name.
Tsai staked out her government's approach to the sensitive issue during her 2021 National Day Address.
"Let us here renew with one another our enduring commitment to a free and democratic constitutional system, our commitment that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other, our commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty, and our commitment that the future of the Republic of China (Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people," Tsai pledged.
Natasha Kassam, director of the public opinion and foreign policy program of the Australia-based Lowy Institute, recently wrote in an opinion piece in The New York Times that "most in Taiwan — 87 percent, according to a recent poll — want to maintain some form of the status quo."
Kassam added the status quo means maintaining de facto independence but avoiding retaliation from China. And she wrote the percentage of Taiwan's people who want to maintain the status quo indefinitely is growing.
US, Chinese Leaders Share Differing Interpretations on Taiwan
US says no 'changes to status quo'; China says US 'playing with fire'
www.voanews.com
jward
passin' thru
Steve Herman
@W7VOA
2h
"We're not going to change our policy at all" on #Taiwan, @POTUS tells reporters, explaining it's up to the island to make up its own mind on the question of independence. "We are not encouraging independence," he adds.
Steve Herman
@W7VOA
48m
The extended comments at the airport in #NewHampshire by @POTUS may have been an attempt to clarify his earlier remark to reporters at the bridge when he declared #Taiwan "independent."
And here’s the official @WhiteHouse-issued transcript excerpt of the Q&A at the airport on #Taiwan “independence.”
northern watch
TB Fanatic
From my email inbox
jward
passin' thru
Chinese Military At or Near Ability to Invade Taiwan, U.S. Agency Concludes
The startling conclusion from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission comes at a particularly fraught time for security in and around Taiwan.
By Paul D. Shinkman
|
Nov. 17, 2021, at 2:20 p.m.
The Chinese military has now or will soon have the ability to invade Taiwan, a U.S. government agency has concluded, documenting also failed attempts by China and the U.S. to better understand one another's intentions.
[
READ:
China ‘Clearly’ Developing Ability to Invade Taiwan ]
The People's Liberation Army, China's name for its military, is capable of landing at least 25,000 troops on the island nation to establish an initial beachhead, according to the newly released annual report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressionally appointed agency designed to provide specific and nonpartisan national security and economic advice to Congress and the president.
The startling conclusion from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission comes at a particularly fraught time for security in and around Taiwan.
By Paul D. Shinkman
|
Nov. 17, 2021, at 2:20 p.m.
The Chinese military has now or will soon have the ability to invade Taiwan, a U.S. government agency has concluded, documenting also failed attempts by China and the U.S. to better understand one another's intentions.
[
READ:
China ‘Clearly’ Developing Ability to Invade Taiwan ]
The People's Liberation Army, China's name for its military, is capable of landing at least 25,000 troops on the island nation to establish an initial beachhead, according to the newly released annual report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressionally appointed agency designed to provide specific and nonpartisan national security and economic advice to Congress and the president.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
It is amazing from some saying China will be ready to attack Taiwan in 2025 to they are ready now!
jward
passin' thru
kind of like Iran always being 2 months away from the bomb, eh? That article wouldn't load for me, so not sure what all they had to state, but thought even that bit I brought over was interesting.
Chinese fishing boats ram Taiwan coast guard ships. 3 min run time.
Getting hotter by the day.
Shots Fired as Chinese Ships ram Taiwan's new Coast Guard Ship - YouTube
Getting hotter by the day.
Shots Fired as Chinese Ships ram Taiwan's new Coast Guard Ship - YouTube
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Taiwan opens Lithuania representative office using its own name
Saulius Jakucionis
Thu, 18 November 2021, 5:05 am·3-min read
POSTED FOR FAIR USE
President Tsai Ing-wen is loathed by Beijing because she regards Taiwan as an already sovereign nation and not part of 'one China' (AFP/Sam Yeh)
Taipei announced on Thursday it had formally opened a de facto embassy in Lithuania using the name Taiwan, a significant diplomatic departure that defied a pressure campaign by Beijing.
China tries to keep Taipei isolated on the world stage and baulks at any official use of the word "Taiwan", lest it lend a sense of international legitimacy to the island, which Beijing claims as part of its territory and has vowed to one day seize, by force if needed.
"The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania officially commences its operation in Vilnius on November 18, 2021," the foreign ministry said, breaking with the island's tradition of calling its representative outposts Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices.
Lithuania in July agreed to let democratic self-ruled Taiwan open a representative office using its name, the island's first new diplomatic outpost in Europe in 18 years.
That move prompted a fierce rebuke by China which withdrew its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius do the same, which it eventually did.
China also halted freight trains to Lithuania and stopped issuing food export permits.
Taiwan's foreign ministry said the Lithuania office would be headed by Eric Huang, currently Taipei's chief of mission in neighbouring Latvia.
"We are very happy that we have the opportunity to be a facilitator and promoter for the relations between Taiwan and Lithuania," Huang told AFP.
On the significance of using the name Taiwan, he said it was "of course very meaningful".
"We will not emphasise too much about the geopolitical context. As the representative office of my country, what I am focused on is to promote a substantive relationship."
Only 15 countries officially recognise Taipei over Beijing.
But Taiwan maintains embassy equivalent representative offices with many nations and several countries have similar arrangements in Taipei.
International support for Taiwan has grown since China's President Xi Jinping came to power.
He has ushered in a more authoritarian and muscular era for China and taken a markedly more aggressive approach to Taipei since the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen.
She is loathed by Beijing because she regards Taiwan as an already sovereign nation and not part of "one China".
The opening of the Vilnius office is the latest sign that some Baltic and central European countries are seeking closer relations with Taiwan, even if that angers China.
In May, Lithuania announced it was quitting China's 17+1 cooperation forum with central and eastern European states, calling it "divisive".
The EU nation was already at the forefront of the struggle against the authoritarian government in neighbouring Belarus by welcoming exiled leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya who says she won last year's elections.
Politicians in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have also pushed for closer ties with Taiwan.
In 2019, Prague cancelled a sister-city agreement with Beijing and signed one with Taipei, while a high-profile visit to Taiwan last year by Czech senate leader Milos Vystrcil infuriated China.
Last month a delegation of Taiwanese officials visited Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, sparking anger from Beijing.
China remains a major trade and diplomatic ally to many other nations in the region, as well as a valuable source of coronavirus vaccines.
Last year, Taiwan opened reciprocal offices with Somaliland.
That office also used the word "Taiwan" but, unlike Lithuania, Somaliland is not recognised as a sovereign state by most nations.
uk.news.yahoo.com
Saulius Jakucionis
Thu, 18 November 2021, 5:05 am·3-min read
POSTED FOR FAIR USE
President Tsai Ing-wen is loathed by Beijing because she regards Taiwan as an already sovereign nation and not part of 'one China' (AFP/Sam Yeh)
Taipei announced on Thursday it had formally opened a de facto embassy in Lithuania using the name Taiwan, a significant diplomatic departure that defied a pressure campaign by Beijing.
China tries to keep Taipei isolated on the world stage and baulks at any official use of the word "Taiwan", lest it lend a sense of international legitimacy to the island, which Beijing claims as part of its territory and has vowed to one day seize, by force if needed.
"The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania officially commences its operation in Vilnius on November 18, 2021," the foreign ministry said, breaking with the island's tradition of calling its representative outposts Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices.
Lithuania in July agreed to let democratic self-ruled Taiwan open a representative office using its name, the island's first new diplomatic outpost in Europe in 18 years.
That move prompted a fierce rebuke by China which withdrew its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius do the same, which it eventually did.
China also halted freight trains to Lithuania and stopped issuing food export permits.
Taiwan's foreign ministry said the Lithuania office would be headed by Eric Huang, currently Taipei's chief of mission in neighbouring Latvia.
"We are very happy that we have the opportunity to be a facilitator and promoter for the relations between Taiwan and Lithuania," Huang told AFP.
On the significance of using the name Taiwan, he said it was "of course very meaningful".
"We will not emphasise too much about the geopolitical context. As the representative office of my country, what I am focused on is to promote a substantive relationship."
Only 15 countries officially recognise Taipei over Beijing.
But Taiwan maintains embassy equivalent representative offices with many nations and several countries have similar arrangements in Taipei.
International support for Taiwan has grown since China's President Xi Jinping came to power.
He has ushered in a more authoritarian and muscular era for China and taken a markedly more aggressive approach to Taipei since the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen.
She is loathed by Beijing because she regards Taiwan as an already sovereign nation and not part of "one China".
The opening of the Vilnius office is the latest sign that some Baltic and central European countries are seeking closer relations with Taiwan, even if that angers China.
In May, Lithuania announced it was quitting China's 17+1 cooperation forum with central and eastern European states, calling it "divisive".
The EU nation was already at the forefront of the struggle against the authoritarian government in neighbouring Belarus by welcoming exiled leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya who says she won last year's elections.
Politicians in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have also pushed for closer ties with Taiwan.
In 2019, Prague cancelled a sister-city agreement with Beijing and signed one with Taipei, while a high-profile visit to Taiwan last year by Czech senate leader Milos Vystrcil infuriated China.
Last month a delegation of Taiwanese officials visited Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, sparking anger from Beijing.
China remains a major trade and diplomatic ally to many other nations in the region, as well as a valuable source of coronavirus vaccines.
Last year, Taiwan opened reciprocal offices with Somaliland.
That office also used the word "Taiwan" but, unlike Lithuania, Somaliland is not recognised as a sovereign state by most nations.
Taiwan opens Lithuania representative office using its own name
Taipei announced on Thursday it had formally opened a de facto embassy in Lithuania using the name Taiwan, a significant diplomatic departure that defied a pressure campaign by Beijing.
The chilling thing about this article is this:
""Given these deployments, it has become less certain that U.S. conventional military forces alone will continue to deter China's leaders from initiating an attack on Taiwan," the report concludes."
If not conventional what then are our options?
Chinas challenge with Taiwan would be reinforcement and supply. 25000 on a beach but whos coming next? Many of their backup craft, ferries, barges etc would need some sort of infrastructure to be used. Either a port city/town or an artificial port like the Mulberries of DDay. They would need almost total air and sea superiority to achieve that.
I would also recommend to everyone to read the whole report as it looks very interesting.
jward
passin' thru
It's posted on this weeks' Winds of War thread- and yes, it's interesting, if by interesting you mean guaranteed to raise your BP 10 pnts
jward
passin' thru
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
Taiwan deploys advanced fighter jets amid tensions with China
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1461376433448800259?s=20
TheDoberman
Veteran Member
Seems like that is a de facto crossing of the red line.Taiwan opens Lithuania representative office using its own name
Saulius Jakucionis
Thu, 18 November 2021, 5:05 am·3-min read
POSTED FOR FAIR USE
President Tsai Ing-wen is loathed by Beijing because she regards Taiwan as an already sovereign nation and not part of 'one China' (AFP/Sam Yeh)
Taipei announced on Thursday it had formally opened a de facto embassy in Lithuania using the name Taiwan, a significant diplomatic departure that defied a pressure campaign by Beijing.
China tries to keep Taipei isolated on the world stage and baulks at any official use of the word "Taiwan", lest it lend a sense of international legitimacy to the island, which Beijing claims as part of its territory and has vowed to one day seize, by force if needed.
"The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania officially commences its operation in Vilnius on November 18, 2021," the foreign ministry said, breaking with the island's tradition of calling its representative outposts Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices.
Lithuania in July agreed to let democratic self-ruled Taiwan open a representative office using its name, the island's first new diplomatic outpost in Europe in 18 years.
That move prompted a fierce rebuke by China which withdrew its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius do the same, which it eventually did.
China also halted freight trains to Lithuania and stopped issuing food export permits.
Taiwan's foreign ministry said the Lithuania office would be headed by Eric Huang, currently Taipei's chief of mission in neighbouring Latvia.
"We are very happy that we have the opportunity to be a facilitator and promoter for the relations between Taiwan and Lithuania," Huang told AFP.
On the significance of using the name Taiwan, he said it was "of course very meaningful".
"We will not emphasise too much about the geopolitical context. As the representative office of my country, what I am focused on is to promote a substantive relationship."
Only 15 countries officially recognise Taipei over Beijing.
But Taiwan maintains embassy equivalent representative offices with many nations and several countries have similar arrangements in Taipei.
International support for Taiwan has grown since China's President Xi Jinping came to power.
He has ushered in a more authoritarian and muscular era for China and taken a markedly more aggressive approach to Taipei since the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen.
She is loathed by Beijing because she regards Taiwan as an already sovereign nation and not part of "one China".
The opening of the Vilnius office is the latest sign that some Baltic and central European countries are seeking closer relations with Taiwan, even if that angers China.
In May, Lithuania announced it was quitting China's 17+1 cooperation forum with central and eastern European states, calling it "divisive".
The EU nation was already at the forefront of the struggle against the authoritarian government in neighbouring Belarus by welcoming exiled leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya who says she won last year's elections.
Politicians in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have also pushed for closer ties with Taiwan.
In 2019, Prague cancelled a sister-city agreement with Beijing and signed one with Taipei, while a high-profile visit to Taiwan last year by Czech senate leader Milos Vystrcil infuriated China.
Last month a delegation of Taiwanese officials visited Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, sparking anger from Beijing.
China remains a major trade and diplomatic ally to many other nations in the region, as well as a valuable source of coronavirus vaccines.
Last year, Taiwan opened reciprocal offices with Somaliland.
That office also used the word "Taiwan" but, unlike Lithuania, Somaliland is not recognised as a sovereign state by most nations.
Taiwan opens Lithuania representative office using its own name
Taipei announced on Thursday it had formally opened a de facto embassy in Lithuania using the name Taiwan, a significant diplomatic departure that defied a pressure campaign by Beijing.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
listen to putin as he talks about red lines
View: https://twitter.com/theragex/status/1461374984216006662
jward
passin' thru
The Epoch Times - China Insider
@EpochTimesChina
2h
#Taiwan opened a de facto embassy in #Lithuania on Thursday in a diplomatic breakthrough, brushing aside #Beijing’s strong opposition to the move.
View: https://twitter.com/EpochTimesChina/status/1461734769096630276?s=20
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Civil Defense Training in Taiwan is stepping up
RT: 1.30 minutes
RT: 1.30 minutes
Last edited:
Just saw a YouTube video on Australian tv, retired general talking about how fast and what/where would be hit prior to Taiwan invasion. It was very sobering to hear. If they strike first, it will be felt across the world and will be devastating. Just makes me want to prepare harder...faster.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Your post rises some good points.
The Chinese have calculated that there will be an Allied response to a Taiwan invasion. Therefore to cut this off, Chinese will just not strike Taiwan but other places as well.
jward
passin' thru
zerohedge
@zerohedge
19m
Taiwan Rolls Out Advanced F-16 Fighter Jets In Ceremony With US Diplomats In Attendance
View: https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1461912256376152070?s=20
Posted for fair use.....
WAR BY TIMEFRAME: RESPONDING TO CHINA’S PACING CHALLENGE
MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ
NOVEMBER 19, 2021
COMMENTARY
The Latin adage “si vis pacem, para bellum” states that if you want peace, prepare for war. But doing that successfully is much easier if you know when the war might occur.
As it drafts its new national defense strategy, the Biden administration has argued that China is the pacing challenge that should drive U.S. military planning moving forward. However, to plan for a conflict with China — most likely over Taiwan — Washington needs to think harder about the timeframe in which it is most likely to happen. The default U.S. defense strategy is to hedge against the risk of war in all timeframes. In a world of limited budgets, though, it is not possible to maximize U.S. capabilities in all time periods simultaneously. This means that, despite the uncertainty of even the best risk assessments, Washington will need to place bets to sustain its defense leadership in the Indo-Pacific. America may need “more” to deter and defeat China, but the right “more” depends on the timing.
If war over Taiwan is imminent in the next two years, the United States should emphasize readiness and posture over modernization and future investments. If war is most likely later in the 2020s, new warfighting concepts, modernization, adapting off-the-shelf technologies, and delaying retiring some older platforms should become the priorities. If war is most likely in the 2030s or beyond, longer-term defense investments, such as AI-enabled systems that require bigger changes to force structure, combined with innovative operational concepts, should be prioritized.
Success in any timeframe will require new operational concepts, posture changes that complicate Chinese planning, and greater coordination with allies and partners. To make matters more difficult, if the United States is fully transparent about the timeframe in which it thinks war is most likely and how it is investing, China will adapt, increasing the risk of aggression in other time periods. This means that greater opacity about Department of Defense planning and investment priorities is essential. While complete opacity is neither realistic nor desirable in a democracy, some degree of opacity could complicate Chinese planning across all time periods, making deterrence more likely to succeed — and victory for the United States and its allies and partners more likely if deterrence fails. Threading this needle will require greater integration of intelligence analysis into the national defense strategy. It will also require making real choices in that document to direct military service planning.
Potential Timeframes
Everyone hopes that a U.S.-Chinese war will not occur. But in the context of great-power competition, concerns are growing. At present, there are competing perspectives on when U.S.-Chinese conflict is most likely, and what the United States should do in response. The most proximate potential timeframe for war is in the next two years. A massive surge in Chinese air force incursions into Taiwanese airspace in early October may demonstrate that the Chinese are already planning for war in the near term. Ongoing U.S. and Taiwanese investments in advanced munitions, modified Virginia-class submarines, Taiwanese procurement of anti-ship cruise missiles, and other programs would substantially raise the costs of a Chinese invasion further in the future. Knowing this, China could choose to invade before even before their own planned readiness point to forestall future advances in U.S. and Taiwanese capabilities.
A second possible timeframe for war envisions China acquiring the ability to effectively threaten Taiwan in the middle to late 2020s. Xi’s desire to for a legacy-making achievement, and concerns about the sustainability of the Chinese economic growth model, may drive the point of maximum risk to the latter half of the 2020s, since the Chinese will view their window as closing after that. In March 2021, Adm. Phil Davidson, then the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said that China has the intent, and increasingly the capability, to threaten Taiwan “during this decade, in fact in the next six years.” Later that month, while not giving a specific timeframe, his successor, Adm. John Aquilino, said the threat of a Chinese invasion is “closer than most think.” Rear Adm. Mike Studeman stated in July 2021 that there is “clear and present danger” now and within the 2020s. And some interpret the Department of Defense’s annual report on Chinese military power as saying that China seeks to acquire the ability to militarily coerce Taiwan with the credible threat of invasion by 2027.
A third possible timeframe sees the maximum risk of war as happening in the 2030s or beyond, since the Chinese economy is likely to continue growing. In contrast to Davidson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley argues that while China wants to develop the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, it does not actually intend to do so — meaning there is more time before the period of maximum risk. In this case, the People’s Liberation Army would face limits on their operational capacity until the 2030s, and/or China’s economic challenges would not generate pressure to fight now. China might also act later so it can first grow its power projection capability to limit the effectiveness of a blockade response or horizontal escalation. It also might choose to wait if its economic power continues to grow and it sees the capacity to defend Taiwan declining.
The Right Responses?
Domestic political constraints make defense budget limits inevitable, meaning it is not possible to simultaneously maximize readiness for today, modernization of force structure for tomorrow, and investments in emerging technologies for the future. So what can the U.S. do?
Short Term
If the risk of Chinese aggression is most likely in the coming two years, then reinforcing America’s forward presence while distributing forces more broadly in the Indo-Pacific would be the best response. In this scenario, the United States should invest in readiness and the ability to operate its current force, buy as many smart munitions as possible with emergency authorizations, and prepare for imminent conflict. It would be nearly impossible to speed up production of submarines as construction timelines recover from the impact of COVID-19. But the United States could look to mature technologies ready for deployment, leveraging prior Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency programs. The United States could also seek to reinforce Taiwan’s defenses with anti-ship cruise missiles, and it could rapidly deploy U.S. troops to Taiwan to convince Beijing that Washington is serious about Taiwan’s defense.
If war is in fact imminent in the next two years, there is almost no time for investments in emerging technologies to pay off, or even to integrate many commercial, off-the-shelf capabilities. Instead, the United States would have to go to war with its current force structure and operational concepts, potentially with some changes in posture. Longer-term investments like modernization would likely have their timelines pushed back.
Medium Term
Alternatively, what if the maximum risk period for a U.S.-Chinese conflict runs from roughly 2024 to 2029? Some have already made the point that, in this scenario, the United States would need to invest in “more conventional hard power — more ships, more long-range missiles and more long-range bombers in the Indo-Pacific,” rather than in emerging technologies with uncertain reliability. In addition, if war is most likely in the latter part of the 2020s, the Biden administration should focus on the types of efforts envisioned by the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. This would involve increasing protection for Guam, building out runways and pre-positioning equipment in additional locations throughout the Pacific to create a more distributed force structure, and speeding and growing purchases of smart munitions.
In this scenario, the Department of Defense should also shift how it thinks about using existing capabilities, including increasing efforts by the Strategic Capabilities Office to use off-the-shelf commercial technologies as force multipliers for existing U.S. assets. It could also think about novel ways to employ capabilities slated for retirement: placing Ticonderoga-class cruisers near U.S. military bases to serve the function of Aegis-ashore systems, or using older submarines as missile batteries.
Inevitably, this approach comes with trade-offs. The emphasis on new equipment and new operational concepts for today’s capabilities would come at the expense of emerging technologies and experimentation that could reshape military power in the 2030s. It also might not solve the readiness and posture challenges for the nearest-term scenario.
Long Term
Finally, if the maximum risk of war is in the 2030s and beyond, there is time for the American military to plan ahead, investing more in emerging technologies and experimenting with new operational concepts in ways that substantially shift U.S. posture and the size and shape of the American military in the Pacific. These investments could involve a greater reliance on AI-enabled capabilities, hypersonics, and shifts in force structure that emphasize swarms and mass over higher-cost, lower-quantity platforms. This approach could create more risk in the nearer term if resources or organizational focus are not available to make progress on posture challenges. The United States could seek to mitigate risk in earlier timeframes by shifting forces from other regions (thus taking more risk in those regions), or enacting acquisition reform that enables more rapid prototyping and deployment of new systems.
Strategies for All Seasons
Any assessment of the “most likely” timeframe for war will be necessarily uncertain. How can the United States hedge against the risk of war in every timeframe, even as it identifies priorities based on timeframe?
First, maintaining advantage requires organizational innovation, not just acquiring technologies. If the U.S. military simply moves forward incrementally, it will increase the risk of relative decline. Failure to develop new operational concepts, modernize forces with sufficient capacity, and invest in emerging capabilities will lead to a scenario in which the United States fights tomorrow’s wars with yesterday’s capabilities. Organizational change, which could require sizing and shaping the force in different ways, is necessary given the extent of the challenge China poses. Decreasing risk across multiple timeframes simultaneously will require acquisition reform to enable more rapid prototyping and deployment, new operational concepts, and changes in posture — all at once.
Second, more external opacity about how the United States thinks about the risk of war and designs its defense strategy and investment portfolio would help. There is always a dilemma when it comes to revealing and concealing capabilities. Revealing capabilities makes them more likely to deter aggression, but the capabilities cannot then surprise an adversary if a conflict occurs. Concealed capabilities cannot deter, but can offer the advantage of surprise in the event of a conflict. Concealing pieces of the U.S. defense investment strategy externally could help complicate Chinese planning, aiding U.S. efforts across time periods. There are some advantages, from this perspective, in focusing on the future but not revealing that focus too clearly. This could similarly apply to efforts to bolster Taiwanese defenses: Some opacity about what exactly the United States is supplying Taiwan, and in what quantity, could also complicate Chinese planning. Especially if war is likely in the short term, opacity could bolster Taiwan’s defenses by making China uncertain about what the United States has done to assist Taiwan, and what exactly Taiwan’s capacity might be.
Third, improving the ability of allies and partners to fight — and especially to strike Chinese assets in the case of attack — could raise the costs of aggression and theoretically help fill U.S. capability gaps. Delivering advanced platforms, as in the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (or AUKUS) deal, can take time, but these agreements serve as valuable signals in the short term. Similarly, building stronger ties with countries like Indonesia and tighter defense relationships with Singapore could signal U.S. support for the region immediately, while also improving these countries’ capabilities over time.
Another alternative would be for the United States to use the threat of nuclear weapons to deter the risk of conventional war, as it did with doctrines such as flexible response and massive retaliation during the Cold War. But whatever one thinks of the merits of this approach, it will not forestall the need for better conventional planning. This is all the more true as the Biden administration seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and China builds up its nuclear arsenal so as to prevent just such an approach.
Time to Decide
The United States should deter the risk of war with China and be prepared to defeat China if war occurs across all timeframes. New operational concepts and organizational changes will be critical to successfully hedging across timeframes. Increasing the striking power of allies and partners can further raise the costs of action for China.
The challenge does not stop there. To deter or defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan or other forms of aggression in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should assess when this is most likely to occur and plan accordingly. Yet Chinese diplomatic and military reactions to U.S. defense investment strategies will naturally shift the timeframe in which conflict is most likely, and what would happen if a conflict occurred. Bolstering US capabilities in the present could decrease the probability of war today while pushing risk more into the future. Conversely, bolstering capabilities in the long term could increase the short-term risk. This means intelligence assessments and timeframe estimates should not be static. The U.S. intelligence and defense communities will have to work together to integrate updated assessments into a more dynamic defense planning process. It also means that Washington should not let Beijing read its entire defense strategy playbook. Greater opacity about defense planning and investment priorities (to the extent plausible and desirable in a democracy) could help the United States prevent China from adapting to U.S. defense investments by prioritizing planning for war in other time periods. This is important because a Chinese decision to go to war would not just be about when Beijing believes it is ready, but also about whether Beijing believes waiting will increase its relative strength.
By predicting the pace of China’s pacing challenge, Washington can ensure that Beijing doesn’t conclude it has found the right time to attack Taiwan in the next two decades. In other words, if you want peace, prepare for war in the appropriate timeframe.
BECOME A MEMBER
Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also senior fellow for defense technology and innovation at the Council on Foreign Relations. You can find him on twitter @mchorowitz. Thanks to Katrina McDermott and Jared Rosen for research assistance, and Lauren Kahn for the graphic. All fault for errors lies with the author.
COMMENTARY
War by Timeframe: Responding to China’s Pacing Challenge - War on the Rocks
The Latin adage “si vis pacem, para bellum” states that if you want peace, prepare for war. But doing that successfully is much easier if you know when
warontherocks.com
WAR BY TIMEFRAME: RESPONDING TO CHINA’S PACING CHALLENGE
MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ
NOVEMBER 19, 2021
COMMENTARY
The Latin adage “si vis pacem, para bellum” states that if you want peace, prepare for war. But doing that successfully is much easier if you know when the war might occur.
As it drafts its new national defense strategy, the Biden administration has argued that China is the pacing challenge that should drive U.S. military planning moving forward. However, to plan for a conflict with China — most likely over Taiwan — Washington needs to think harder about the timeframe in which it is most likely to happen. The default U.S. defense strategy is to hedge against the risk of war in all timeframes. In a world of limited budgets, though, it is not possible to maximize U.S. capabilities in all time periods simultaneously. This means that, despite the uncertainty of even the best risk assessments, Washington will need to place bets to sustain its defense leadership in the Indo-Pacific. America may need “more” to deter and defeat China, but the right “more” depends on the timing.
If war over Taiwan is imminent in the next two years, the United States should emphasize readiness and posture over modernization and future investments. If war is most likely later in the 2020s, new warfighting concepts, modernization, adapting off-the-shelf technologies, and delaying retiring some older platforms should become the priorities. If war is most likely in the 2030s or beyond, longer-term defense investments, such as AI-enabled systems that require bigger changes to force structure, combined with innovative operational concepts, should be prioritized.
Success in any timeframe will require new operational concepts, posture changes that complicate Chinese planning, and greater coordination with allies and partners. To make matters more difficult, if the United States is fully transparent about the timeframe in which it thinks war is most likely and how it is investing, China will adapt, increasing the risk of aggression in other time periods. This means that greater opacity about Department of Defense planning and investment priorities is essential. While complete opacity is neither realistic nor desirable in a democracy, some degree of opacity could complicate Chinese planning across all time periods, making deterrence more likely to succeed — and victory for the United States and its allies and partners more likely if deterrence fails. Threading this needle will require greater integration of intelligence analysis into the national defense strategy. It will also require making real choices in that document to direct military service planning.
Potential Timeframes
Everyone hopes that a U.S.-Chinese war will not occur. But in the context of great-power competition, concerns are growing. At present, there are competing perspectives on when U.S.-Chinese conflict is most likely, and what the United States should do in response. The most proximate potential timeframe for war is in the next two years. A massive surge in Chinese air force incursions into Taiwanese airspace in early October may demonstrate that the Chinese are already planning for war in the near term. Ongoing U.S. and Taiwanese investments in advanced munitions, modified Virginia-class submarines, Taiwanese procurement of anti-ship cruise missiles, and other programs would substantially raise the costs of a Chinese invasion further in the future. Knowing this, China could choose to invade before even before their own planned readiness point to forestall future advances in U.S. and Taiwanese capabilities.
A second possible timeframe for war envisions China acquiring the ability to effectively threaten Taiwan in the middle to late 2020s. Xi’s desire to for a legacy-making achievement, and concerns about the sustainability of the Chinese economic growth model, may drive the point of maximum risk to the latter half of the 2020s, since the Chinese will view their window as closing after that. In March 2021, Adm. Phil Davidson, then the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said that China has the intent, and increasingly the capability, to threaten Taiwan “during this decade, in fact in the next six years.” Later that month, while not giving a specific timeframe, his successor, Adm. John Aquilino, said the threat of a Chinese invasion is “closer than most think.” Rear Adm. Mike Studeman stated in July 2021 that there is “clear and present danger” now and within the 2020s. And some interpret the Department of Defense’s annual report on Chinese military power as saying that China seeks to acquire the ability to militarily coerce Taiwan with the credible threat of invasion by 2027.
A third possible timeframe sees the maximum risk of war as happening in the 2030s or beyond, since the Chinese economy is likely to continue growing. In contrast to Davidson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley argues that while China wants to develop the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, it does not actually intend to do so — meaning there is more time before the period of maximum risk. In this case, the People’s Liberation Army would face limits on their operational capacity until the 2030s, and/or China’s economic challenges would not generate pressure to fight now. China might also act later so it can first grow its power projection capability to limit the effectiveness of a blockade response or horizontal escalation. It also might choose to wait if its economic power continues to grow and it sees the capacity to defend Taiwan declining.
The Right Responses?
Domestic political constraints make defense budget limits inevitable, meaning it is not possible to simultaneously maximize readiness for today, modernization of force structure for tomorrow, and investments in emerging technologies for the future. So what can the U.S. do?
Short Term
If the risk of Chinese aggression is most likely in the coming two years, then reinforcing America’s forward presence while distributing forces more broadly in the Indo-Pacific would be the best response. In this scenario, the United States should invest in readiness and the ability to operate its current force, buy as many smart munitions as possible with emergency authorizations, and prepare for imminent conflict. It would be nearly impossible to speed up production of submarines as construction timelines recover from the impact of COVID-19. But the United States could look to mature technologies ready for deployment, leveraging prior Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency programs. The United States could also seek to reinforce Taiwan’s defenses with anti-ship cruise missiles, and it could rapidly deploy U.S. troops to Taiwan to convince Beijing that Washington is serious about Taiwan’s defense.
If war is in fact imminent in the next two years, there is almost no time for investments in emerging technologies to pay off, or even to integrate many commercial, off-the-shelf capabilities. Instead, the United States would have to go to war with its current force structure and operational concepts, potentially with some changes in posture. Longer-term investments like modernization would likely have their timelines pushed back.
Medium Term
Alternatively, what if the maximum risk period for a U.S.-Chinese conflict runs from roughly 2024 to 2029? Some have already made the point that, in this scenario, the United States would need to invest in “more conventional hard power — more ships, more long-range missiles and more long-range bombers in the Indo-Pacific,” rather than in emerging technologies with uncertain reliability. In addition, if war is most likely in the latter part of the 2020s, the Biden administration should focus on the types of efforts envisioned by the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. This would involve increasing protection for Guam, building out runways and pre-positioning equipment in additional locations throughout the Pacific to create a more distributed force structure, and speeding and growing purchases of smart munitions.
In this scenario, the Department of Defense should also shift how it thinks about using existing capabilities, including increasing efforts by the Strategic Capabilities Office to use off-the-shelf commercial technologies as force multipliers for existing U.S. assets. It could also think about novel ways to employ capabilities slated for retirement: placing Ticonderoga-class cruisers near U.S. military bases to serve the function of Aegis-ashore systems, or using older submarines as missile batteries.
Inevitably, this approach comes with trade-offs. The emphasis on new equipment and new operational concepts for today’s capabilities would come at the expense of emerging technologies and experimentation that could reshape military power in the 2030s. It also might not solve the readiness and posture challenges for the nearest-term scenario.
Long Term
Finally, if the maximum risk of war is in the 2030s and beyond, there is time for the American military to plan ahead, investing more in emerging technologies and experimenting with new operational concepts in ways that substantially shift U.S. posture and the size and shape of the American military in the Pacific. These investments could involve a greater reliance on AI-enabled capabilities, hypersonics, and shifts in force structure that emphasize swarms and mass over higher-cost, lower-quantity platforms. This approach could create more risk in the nearer term if resources or organizational focus are not available to make progress on posture challenges. The United States could seek to mitigate risk in earlier timeframes by shifting forces from other regions (thus taking more risk in those regions), or enacting acquisition reform that enables more rapid prototyping and deployment of new systems.
Strategies for All Seasons
Any assessment of the “most likely” timeframe for war will be necessarily uncertain. How can the United States hedge against the risk of war in every timeframe, even as it identifies priorities based on timeframe?
First, maintaining advantage requires organizational innovation, not just acquiring technologies. If the U.S. military simply moves forward incrementally, it will increase the risk of relative decline. Failure to develop new operational concepts, modernize forces with sufficient capacity, and invest in emerging capabilities will lead to a scenario in which the United States fights tomorrow’s wars with yesterday’s capabilities. Organizational change, which could require sizing and shaping the force in different ways, is necessary given the extent of the challenge China poses. Decreasing risk across multiple timeframes simultaneously will require acquisition reform to enable more rapid prototyping and deployment, new operational concepts, and changes in posture — all at once.
Second, more external opacity about how the United States thinks about the risk of war and designs its defense strategy and investment portfolio would help. There is always a dilemma when it comes to revealing and concealing capabilities. Revealing capabilities makes them more likely to deter aggression, but the capabilities cannot then surprise an adversary if a conflict occurs. Concealed capabilities cannot deter, but can offer the advantage of surprise in the event of a conflict. Concealing pieces of the U.S. defense investment strategy externally could help complicate Chinese planning, aiding U.S. efforts across time periods. There are some advantages, from this perspective, in focusing on the future but not revealing that focus too clearly. This could similarly apply to efforts to bolster Taiwanese defenses: Some opacity about what exactly the United States is supplying Taiwan, and in what quantity, could also complicate Chinese planning. Especially if war is likely in the short term, opacity could bolster Taiwan’s defenses by making China uncertain about what the United States has done to assist Taiwan, and what exactly Taiwan’s capacity might be.
Third, improving the ability of allies and partners to fight — and especially to strike Chinese assets in the case of attack — could raise the costs of aggression and theoretically help fill U.S. capability gaps. Delivering advanced platforms, as in the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (or AUKUS) deal, can take time, but these agreements serve as valuable signals in the short term. Similarly, building stronger ties with countries like Indonesia and tighter defense relationships with Singapore could signal U.S. support for the region immediately, while also improving these countries’ capabilities over time.
Another alternative would be for the United States to use the threat of nuclear weapons to deter the risk of conventional war, as it did with doctrines such as flexible response and massive retaliation during the Cold War. But whatever one thinks of the merits of this approach, it will not forestall the need for better conventional planning. This is all the more true as the Biden administration seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and China builds up its nuclear arsenal so as to prevent just such an approach.
Time to Decide
The United States should deter the risk of war with China and be prepared to defeat China if war occurs across all timeframes. New operational concepts and organizational changes will be critical to successfully hedging across timeframes. Increasing the striking power of allies and partners can further raise the costs of action for China.
The challenge does not stop there. To deter or defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan or other forms of aggression in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should assess when this is most likely to occur and plan accordingly. Yet Chinese diplomatic and military reactions to U.S. defense investment strategies will naturally shift the timeframe in which conflict is most likely, and what would happen if a conflict occurred. Bolstering US capabilities in the present could decrease the probability of war today while pushing risk more into the future. Conversely, bolstering capabilities in the long term could increase the short-term risk. This means intelligence assessments and timeframe estimates should not be static. The U.S. intelligence and defense communities will have to work together to integrate updated assessments into a more dynamic defense planning process. It also means that Washington should not let Beijing read its entire defense strategy playbook. Greater opacity about defense planning and investment priorities (to the extent plausible and desirable in a democracy) could help the United States prevent China from adapting to U.S. defense investments by prioritizing planning for war in other time periods. This is important because a Chinese decision to go to war would not just be about when Beijing believes it is ready, but also about whether Beijing believes waiting will increase its relative strength.
By predicting the pace of China’s pacing challenge, Washington can ensure that Beijing doesn’t conclude it has found the right time to attack Taiwan in the next two decades. In other words, if you want peace, prepare for war in the appropriate timeframe.
BECOME A MEMBER
Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also senior fellow for defense technology and innovation at the Council on Foreign Relations. You can find him on twitter @mchorowitz. Thanks to Katrina McDermott and Jared Rosen for research assistance, and Lauren Kahn for the graphic. All fault for errors lies with the author.
COMMENTARY
jward
passin' thru
Home > Top Stories
Wang Yi: China Will Absolutely Not Tolerate Any "Taiwan Independence" Moves That Aim to Separate the Country and Will Absolutely Not Accept Any Attempt to Create "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan" in the World
2021/11/20
On November 20, 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered video remarks at the Global Town Hall, stating China's position on the Taiwan question.
Wang Yi said, in response to Taiwan authorities' attempt to seek U.S. support for their independence agenda and some Americans' move to use Taiwan to contain China, President Xi Jinping sounded a warning bell and made clear the firm position of China at his video meeting with President Joe Biden. There is but one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China. We will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost efforts. But we will absolutely not tolerate any "Taiwan independence" moves that aim to separate the country and will absolutely not accept any attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" in the world.
Wang Yi emphasized, the more unequivocal the opposition against "Taiwan independence" is, and the more resolute the actions against "Taiwan independence" are, the more hopeful that peaceful reunification will be achieved, the more possible that the Taiwan Strait will be peaceful and stable, and the more guarantee that peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific will enjoy.
Wang Yi: China Will Absolutely Not Tolerate Any "Taiwan Independence" Moves That Aim to Separate the Country and Will Absolutely Not Accept Any Attempt to Create "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan" in the World
2021/11/20
On November 20, 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered video remarks at the Global Town Hall, stating China's position on the Taiwan question.
Wang Yi said, in response to Taiwan authorities' attempt to seek U.S. support for their independence agenda and some Americans' move to use Taiwan to contain China, President Xi Jinping sounded a warning bell and made clear the firm position of China at his video meeting with President Joe Biden. There is but one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China. We will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost efforts. But we will absolutely not tolerate any "Taiwan independence" moves that aim to separate the country and will absolutely not accept any attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" in the world.
Wang Yi emphasized, the more unequivocal the opposition against "Taiwan independence" is, and the more resolute the actions against "Taiwan independence" are, the more hopeful that peaceful reunification will be achieved, the more possible that the Taiwan Strait will be peaceful and stable, and the more guarantee that peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific will enjoy.
- Wang Yi: Whether China and the United States Can Manage Their Relations Well Bears on the Future of the World
- Wang Yi Delivers Remarks Titled "Opposing Division Through Solidarity, Promoting Development Through Cooperation" at the Global Town Hall
- Opposing Division Through Solidarity, Promoting Development Through Cooperation
- Wang Yi Speaks with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi
- Wang Yi Meets with Diplomatic Envoys of ASEAN Countries to China
- Wang Yi Speaks on the Phone with US Secretary of State Blinken
- Enhancing Solidarity and Cooperation to Build Together A Maritime Community with a Shared Future
- Wang Yi Speaks with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian on the Phone
Jaybird
Veteran Member
I know when it happens it will be fast and violent but I really want to see a Taiwanese Viper splash a Chinese su-27 or any other reverse engineered soviet fighter. Would be good for my soul.
zerohedge
@zerohedge
19m
Taiwan Rolls Out Advanced F-16 Fighter Jets In Ceremony With US Diplomats In Attendance
View: https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1461912256376152070?s=20