WAR Main Persian Gulf Trouble thread
- Thread starter northern watch
- Start date
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Biden must have sent a pallet of money and whoever it was grabbed the cash and left.
There may be a lot more truth to this statement, then people realize.
jward
passin' thru
Israel Radar
@IsraelRadar_com
10m
Defense Minister Gantz: #Iran just 10 weeks away from producing enough weapons-grade materials for nuclear bomb, Iranian UAV chief behind deadly attack on #Israel-linked ship (via @LahavHarkov). Looks like the Israel-Iran conflict is moving toward eruption.
@IsraelRadar_com
10m
Defense Minister Gantz: #Iran just 10 weeks away from producing enough weapons-grade materials for nuclear bomb, Iranian UAV chief behind deadly attack on #Israel-linked ship (via @LahavHarkov). Looks like the Israel-Iran conflict is moving toward eruption.
jward
passin' thru
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
24m
#BREAKING: #Israel's defense minister names head of #Iran's IRGC Amir Ali Hajizadeh and Commander of the IRGC's Drone Unit Saeed Ara Jani as responsible for drone attacks on shipping. Would note other accounts list his name as Saeed Aghajani. #OOTT
View: https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1422898669930655745?s=20
@JasonMBrodsky
24m
#BREAKING: #Israel's defense minister names head of #Iran's IRGC Amir Ali Hajizadeh and Commander of the IRGC's Drone Unit Saeed Ara Jani as responsible for drone attacks on shipping. Would note other accounts list his name as Saeed Aghajani. #OOTT
View: https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1422898669930655745?s=20
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Yes, Israel despite Biden cannot allow Iran to get the bomb.
10 weeks takes us to mid-October
jward
passin' thru
NCRI-FAC
@iran_policy
4m
#Iran: The EU Must Apply Magnitsky Act For Ebrahim Raisi’s Role In The 1988 Massacre #ProsecuteRaisiNOW #1988Massacre #Europe
View: https://twitter.com/iran_policy/status/1422919752532512770?s=20
@iran_policy
4m
#Iran: The EU Must Apply Magnitsky Act For Ebrahim Raisi’s Role In The 1988 Massacre #ProsecuteRaisiNOW #1988Massacre #Europe
View: https://twitter.com/iran_policy/status/1422919752532512770?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Some stress that the 10weeks is for acquiring enough weapons-grade material, and the actual bomb is still 2 plus years away.
..not a source of comfort, even then, assuming one believes the extended timeline.. : (
..not a source of comfort, even then, assuming one believes the extended timeline.. : (
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Have the Israelis not heard of doing 2 tasks in parallel as opposed to doing 2 tasks in series that is do one task then another task?
Doing tasks in parallel saves time. One group works on the actual bomb and the other on the bomb material.
Also I serious doubt Iran is starting from square one.
Maybe the North Koreans have already given Iran the bomb or bomb material?
Last edited:
John Deere Girl
Veteran Member
Israel is going to take out the trash. I feel bad for the innocent people who live in Iran though.
jward
passin' thru
I am as guilable as they come, but have assumed Iran had a closet shelf full o' "interesting"
"party favours".
The one thing that lends credence to those experts' who's opinion it is that they may be a
year + from the bomb is how dang closely, and successfully, the Israelis have monitored and
"interfered" with the people, places, programs, knowledge and components building in Iran.
I think they know better than anyone what Iran's actual risk and trajectory is, and that if they
really thought it was a mere two months* out, we'd be talking bout the pretty glass parking lot
at this point. :: shrug :: That they're still working the diplomatic-coalition building angle suggests to
me that there is more than a few months* leeway left, even now.
Or, I guess, they are confident they have eyes and means enough to detect and stop any deployment?
Dunno. Not sure history will tell us, either...
*Edited to substitute "months" for "weeks".
"party favours".
The one thing that lends credence to those experts' who's opinion it is that they may be a
year + from the bomb is how dang closely, and successfully, the Israelis have monitored and
"interfered" with the people, places, programs, knowledge and components building in Iran.
I think they know better than anyone what Iran's actual risk and trajectory is, and that if they
really thought it was a mere two months* out, we'd be talking bout the pretty glass parking lot
at this point. :: shrug :: That they're still working the diplomatic-coalition building angle suggests to
me that there is more than a few months* leeway left, even now.
Or, I guess, they are confident they have eyes and means enough to detect and stop any deployment?
Dunno. Not sure history will tell us, either...
*Edited to substitute "months" for "weeks".
Last edited:
jward
passin' thru
Israel in contact with most Arab countries, including Iraq — senior diplomat
By Lazar Berman
7-9 minutes
The Foreign Ministry maintains some form of contact with almost all Arab countries, including ones officially designated as “enemy states” like Iraq, a senior Foreign Ministry official said Tuesday.
“Over the last twenty years, the Foreign Ministry was always in touch with almost all the players in the Arab World,” said the outgoing director of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Division, Haim Regev, during a briefing in Jerusalem.
While he clarified that this list of covert contacts does not include Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, it does extend to Baghdad.
In 2019, Iraqi ambassador in Washington Fareed Yasseen said, “There are objective reasons that may call for the establishment of relations between Iraq and Israel,” speaking in Arabic at an event entitled “How Iraq Is Dealing with the Current Regional and International Developments” at the Al-Hewar Center for Arab Culture and Dialogue in Washington.
He noted that there is an important Iraqi community in Israel and they are still proud of their Iraqi attributes. “At their weddings, there is Iraqi culture of celebration. At their weddings, there are Iraqi songs,” the veteran diplomat, who has served in DC since November 2016, went on. Yasseen also noted “outstanding” Israeli technologies in the fields of water management and agriculture.
Get The Times of Israel's Daily Edition by email and never miss our top stories
By signing up, you agree to the terms
“But the objective reasons are not enough,” he added, stressing that there are “emotional and other reasons” that make open communication between Jerusalem and Baghdad impossible.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Deputy Director Thomas Homan (L) shakes hands with Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Fareed Yasseen after signing an agreement returning ancient artifacts to Iraq that were seized from Hobby Lobby May 2, 2018 in Washington, DC. (Win McNamee/Getty Images/AFP)
Though he faced backlash from other Iraqi officials, Yasseen was not recalled.
Iraq sent significant forces to fight Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, and Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles at Israel during the 1991 Gulf War.
Israel supported Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, bombed the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and is reported to occasionally strike Iranian proxies inside of Iraq.
The Foreign Ministry honors Israeli diplomats who secretly served in Arab Gulf states, December 2020 (courtesy MFA)
‘They didn’t hide me’
Regev is being dispatched to Brussels to head Israel’s mission to the European Union after five years leading the Middle East Division.
Along with Israel’s roving diplomat in the Arab World Bruce Kashdan, Regev was one of the key diplomats who laid the groundwork for the Abraham Accords normalizations agreements that Israel signed with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco in 2020.
Regev reflected on the changes he witnessed in the way Arab countries relate to visiting Israeli officials. When he flew to the International Renewable Energy Agency’s Abu Dhabi headquarters in 2014, he had to wait in a side room at the airport for forty minutes, was taken to a specific hotel, was instructed to not use his own credit card and to keep a low profile.
UAE delegates wave to the departing El Al plane at the end of Israel-UAE normalization talks in Abu Dhabi, September 1, 2020. (El Al Spokesperson’s Office)
“When I came two years later,” he said, “it took ten minutes. I paid by myself for the hotel. They didn’t hide me, and there was no special bubble around me.”
The preparations and years of quiet work paid off, Regev said. “When the Abraham Accords breakthrough happened, we were already there.”
Now that four new normalization agreements have been signed — in addition to the preexisting peace deals with Egypt and Jordan — almost half the population of the Arab world lives in a country that has open diplomatic ties with Israel.
Regev believes that the main draw for Arab states to recognize Israel is the fact that it is the only Middle Eastern country openly fighting against Iran and its proxies, and Jerusalem’s close ties with the US.
“We are the bridge to the Americans,” he argued.
US President Joe Biden meets with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in the Oval Office June 28, 2021, in Washington, DC. (Doug Mills/New York Times/Pool/Getty Images/AFP)
He also underscored Israel’s technological prowess and its success in combating the COVID-19 pandemic as reasons Arab states are interested in overt relations with Israel.
At the same time, Regev acknowledged that significant obstacles remain.
He pointed to Jerusalem — specifically the Temple Mount — as a source of tension, even for countries with which Israel already has relations. “It’s a very sensitive issue. We dealt with it all the time.”
The unrest in Jerusalem in May, and the subsequent 11-day conflict with Hamas, undoubtedly made waves in Israel’s efforts to put meat on the bones of the Abraham Accords, he said, but the process is back on track. Ministers are making official visits, diplomatic offices are being opened and agreements are being signed.
Regev said the Foreign Ministry has a four-pronged approach to expanding the Abraham Accords to new countries while deepening existing ties.
Yigal Unna, the director general of the Israel National Cyber Directorate, right to left, Morocco’s defense minister Abdellatif Loudiyi and Unna’s Moroccan counterpart General El Mostafa Rabii, sign a cybersecurity cooperation accord in Rabat, Morocco; July 2021 (Courtesy)
Developing diplomatic or government-to-government ties; furthering private sector trade with countries; working to enlist the support of international organizations and the US in reaching new partners; and public diplomacy directed at the Arab public.
These initiatives come from the lessons the Foreign Ministry has learned from its decades of cold peace with Egypt and Jordan — ties conducted almost exclusively at the governmental level.
In expanding its diplomatic outreach, Israel is seeking to avoid the “gaps” that emerged in its relations with Jordan and Egypt, Regev said.
www.timesofisrael.com
By Lazar Berman
7-9 minutes
The Foreign Ministry maintains some form of contact with almost all Arab countries, including ones officially designated as “enemy states” like Iraq, a senior Foreign Ministry official said Tuesday.
“Over the last twenty years, the Foreign Ministry was always in touch with almost all the players in the Arab World,” said the outgoing director of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Division, Haim Regev, during a briefing in Jerusalem.
While he clarified that this list of covert contacts does not include Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, it does extend to Baghdad.
In 2019, Iraqi ambassador in Washington Fareed Yasseen said, “There are objective reasons that may call for the establishment of relations between Iraq and Israel,” speaking in Arabic at an event entitled “How Iraq Is Dealing with the Current Regional and International Developments” at the Al-Hewar Center for Arab Culture and Dialogue in Washington.
He noted that there is an important Iraqi community in Israel and they are still proud of their Iraqi attributes. “At their weddings, there is Iraqi culture of celebration. At their weddings, there are Iraqi songs,” the veteran diplomat, who has served in DC since November 2016, went on. Yasseen also noted “outstanding” Israeli technologies in the fields of water management and agriculture.
Get The Times of Israel's Daily Edition by email and never miss our top stories
By signing up, you agree to the terms
“But the objective reasons are not enough,” he added, stressing that there are “emotional and other reasons” that make open communication between Jerusalem and Baghdad impossible.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Deputy Director Thomas Homan (L) shakes hands with Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Fareed Yasseen after signing an agreement returning ancient artifacts to Iraq that were seized from Hobby Lobby May 2, 2018 in Washington, DC. (Win McNamee/Getty Images/AFP)
Though he faced backlash from other Iraqi officials, Yasseen was not recalled.
Iraq sent significant forces to fight Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, and Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles at Israel during the 1991 Gulf War.
Israel supported Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, bombed the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and is reported to occasionally strike Iranian proxies inside of Iraq.
The Foreign Ministry honors Israeli diplomats who secretly served in Arab Gulf states, December 2020 (courtesy MFA)
‘They didn’t hide me’
Regev is being dispatched to Brussels to head Israel’s mission to the European Union after five years leading the Middle East Division.
Along with Israel’s roving diplomat in the Arab World Bruce Kashdan, Regev was one of the key diplomats who laid the groundwork for the Abraham Accords normalizations agreements that Israel signed with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco in 2020.
Regev reflected on the changes he witnessed in the way Arab countries relate to visiting Israeli officials. When he flew to the International Renewable Energy Agency’s Abu Dhabi headquarters in 2014, he had to wait in a side room at the airport for forty minutes, was taken to a specific hotel, was instructed to not use his own credit card and to keep a low profile.
UAE delegates wave to the departing El Al plane at the end of Israel-UAE normalization talks in Abu Dhabi, September 1, 2020. (El Al Spokesperson’s Office)
“When I came two years later,” he said, “it took ten minutes. I paid by myself for the hotel. They didn’t hide me, and there was no special bubble around me.”
The preparations and years of quiet work paid off, Regev said. “When the Abraham Accords breakthrough happened, we were already there.”
Now that four new normalization agreements have been signed — in addition to the preexisting peace deals with Egypt and Jordan — almost half the population of the Arab world lives in a country that has open diplomatic ties with Israel.
Regev believes that the main draw for Arab states to recognize Israel is the fact that it is the only Middle Eastern country openly fighting against Iran and its proxies, and Jerusalem’s close ties with the US.
“We are the bridge to the Americans,” he argued.
US President Joe Biden meets with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in the Oval Office June 28, 2021, in Washington, DC. (Doug Mills/New York Times/Pool/Getty Images/AFP)
He also underscored Israel’s technological prowess and its success in combating the COVID-19 pandemic as reasons Arab states are interested in overt relations with Israel.
At the same time, Regev acknowledged that significant obstacles remain.
He pointed to Jerusalem — specifically the Temple Mount — as a source of tension, even for countries with which Israel already has relations. “It’s a very sensitive issue. We dealt with it all the time.”
The unrest in Jerusalem in May, and the subsequent 11-day conflict with Hamas, undoubtedly made waves in Israel’s efforts to put meat on the bones of the Abraham Accords, he said, but the process is back on track. Ministers are making official visits, diplomatic offices are being opened and agreements are being signed.
Regev said the Foreign Ministry has a four-pronged approach to expanding the Abraham Accords to new countries while deepening existing ties.
Yigal Unna, the director general of the Israel National Cyber Directorate, right to left, Morocco’s defense minister Abdellatif Loudiyi and Unna’s Moroccan counterpart General El Mostafa Rabii, sign a cybersecurity cooperation accord in Rabat, Morocco; July 2021 (Courtesy)
Developing diplomatic or government-to-government ties; furthering private sector trade with countries; working to enlist the support of international organizations and the US in reaching new partners; and public diplomacy directed at the Arab public.
These initiatives come from the lessons the Foreign Ministry has learned from its decades of cold peace with Egypt and Jordan — ties conducted almost exclusively at the governmental level.
In expanding its diplomatic outreach, Israel is seeking to avoid the “gaps” that emerged in its relations with Jordan and Egypt, Regev said.
Israel in contact with most Arab countries, including Iraq — senior diplomat
Outgoing Middle East Division head Haim Regev says official 'enemy states' among many countries Jerusalem is in touch with, though list does not include Lebanon, Syria and Yemen
www.timesofisrael.com
jward
passin' thru
Israel Radar
@IsraelRadar_com
14m
Defense Minister Gantz tells Ynet: #Israel is ready to strike in #Iran; at this point military action is needed; world must act against Iran now (via@attilus ). This is the bluntest Israeli threat so far about a potential assault on Iran's nuclear project.
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1423191835585904649
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Israeli defense minister threatens Iran with military action
Israel’s defense minister is warning that his country is prepared to strike Iran
By LAURIE KELLMAN Associated Press
5 August 2021, 04:47
The Associated Press
In this image provided by Maxar Technologies, the oil tanker Mercer Street is seen off the coast of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, Wednesday Aug. 4, 2021. The United States, United Kingdom and Israel blame Iran for an attack on the Mercer Street off Oman that killed two people amid tensions over Tehran's tattered nuclear deal with world powers. Iran has denied being involved. (Satellite image ©2021 Maxar Technologies via AP)
TEL AVIV, Israel -- Israel's defense minister warned Thursday that his country is prepared to strike Iran, issuing the threat against the Islamic Republic after a fatal drone strike on a oil tanker at sea that his nation blamed on Tehran.
The comments by Benny Gantz come as Israel meanwhile lobbies countries for action at the United Nations over last week's attack on the oil tanker Mercer Street that killed two people. The tanker, struck off Oman in the Arabian Sea, is managed by a firm owned by an Israeli billionaire.
The U.S. and the United Kingdom similarly blamed Iran for the attack, but no country has offered evidence or intelligence to support their claims. Iran, which along with its regional militia allies has launched similar drone attacks, has denied being involved.
Speaking to the news website Ynet, Gantz responded to whether Israel was prepared to attack Iran with a blunt “yes.”
“We are at a point where we need to take military action against Iran," Gantz said. "The world needs to take action against Iran now.”
Iran did not immediately respond to Gantz's comments. However, in a letter Wednesday to the U.N. Security Council, its chargé d’affaires in New York described Israel as “the main source of instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond for more than seven decades.”
“This regime has a long dark record in attacking commercial navigation and civilian ships,” Zahra Ershadi wrote. “In less than two years, this regime has attacked over 10 commercial vessels carrying oil and humanitarian goods destined to Syria.”
Ershadi's comments refer to an ongoing shadow war being waged on Mideast waterways since 2019 that has seen both Iranian and Western-linked ships attacked.
Last week's attack killed the vessel’s Romanian captain as well as a British crew member who worked for Ambrey, a maritime security firm. In a statement Thursday, Ambrey identified the victim as Adrian Underwood, a former soldier in the British Army who started at the firm as a maritime security officer in 2020 before becoming a team leader.
“We continue to be in contact with Adrian’s family to offer support at this sad and difficult time,” said John Thompson, Ambrey’s management director.
The attacks began a year after then-President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from Iran's nuclear deal with world powers, which saw Iran limit its enrichment of uranium in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. President Joe Biden has said he's willing to rejoin the accord, but talks over salvaging the deal have stalled in Vienna.
———
Associated Press writer Isabel DeBre contributed from Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Israeli defense minister threatens Iran with military action - ABC News (go.com)
Israel’s defense minister is warning that his country is prepared to strike Iran
By LAURIE KELLMAN Associated Press
5 August 2021, 04:47
In this image provided by Maxar Technologies, the oil tanker Mercer Street is seen off the coast of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, Wednesday Aug. 4, 2021. The United States, United Kingdom and Israel blame Iran for an attack on the Mercer Street off Oman that killed two people amid tensions over Tehran's tattered nuclear deal with world powers. Iran has denied being involved. (Satellite image ©2021 Maxar Technologies via AP)
TEL AVIV, Israel -- Israel's defense minister warned Thursday that his country is prepared to strike Iran, issuing the threat against the Islamic Republic after a fatal drone strike on a oil tanker at sea that his nation blamed on Tehran.
The comments by Benny Gantz come as Israel meanwhile lobbies countries for action at the United Nations over last week's attack on the oil tanker Mercer Street that killed two people. The tanker, struck off Oman in the Arabian Sea, is managed by a firm owned by an Israeli billionaire.
The U.S. and the United Kingdom similarly blamed Iran for the attack, but no country has offered evidence or intelligence to support their claims. Iran, which along with its regional militia allies has launched similar drone attacks, has denied being involved.
Speaking to the news website Ynet, Gantz responded to whether Israel was prepared to attack Iran with a blunt “yes.”
“We are at a point where we need to take military action against Iran," Gantz said. "The world needs to take action against Iran now.”
Iran did not immediately respond to Gantz's comments. However, in a letter Wednesday to the U.N. Security Council, its chargé d’affaires in New York described Israel as “the main source of instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond for more than seven decades.”
“This regime has a long dark record in attacking commercial navigation and civilian ships,” Zahra Ershadi wrote. “In less than two years, this regime has attacked over 10 commercial vessels carrying oil and humanitarian goods destined to Syria.”
Ershadi's comments refer to an ongoing shadow war being waged on Mideast waterways since 2019 that has seen both Iranian and Western-linked ships attacked.
Last week's attack killed the vessel’s Romanian captain as well as a British crew member who worked for Ambrey, a maritime security firm. In a statement Thursday, Ambrey identified the victim as Adrian Underwood, a former soldier in the British Army who started at the firm as a maritime security officer in 2020 before becoming a team leader.
“We continue to be in contact with Adrian’s family to offer support at this sad and difficult time,” said John Thompson, Ambrey’s management director.
The attacks began a year after then-President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from Iran's nuclear deal with world powers, which saw Iran limit its enrichment of uranium in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. President Joe Biden has said he's willing to rejoin the accord, but talks over salvaging the deal have stalled in Vienna.
———
Associated Press writer Isabel DeBre contributed from Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Israeli defense minister threatens Iran with military action - ABC News (go.com)
Posted for fair use.....
www.foxnews.com
Iran
Published 1 hour ago
Iran nuclear concerns: Israel warns Tehran is only ‘10 weeks away’ from acquiring weapons-grade materials
Israel Defense Minister Benny Gantz reportedly makes comment to UN Security Council diplomats
By Greg Norman | Fox News
Israel Defense Minister Benny Gantz reportedly has warned U.N. Security Council diplomats this week that Iran is "only around 10 weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon."
Gantz made the comment during a presentation aimed at having the Council sanction Iran for a series of recent maritime attacks, including one last week on the oil tanker Mercer Street that killed two people, according to the Jerusalem Post. The tanker, struck off Oman in the Arabian Sea, is managed by a firm owned by an Israeli billionaire. Israel, the U.S. and the U.K. have blamed Iran for carrying out the attack.
"Iran has violated all of the guidelines set in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and is only around 10 weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon," Gantz was quoted by the Jerusalem Post as saying Wednesday.
US, UK AND ISRAEL BLAME IRAN FOR ATTACK ON ISRAELI-MANAGED TANKER
"Therefore, it is time to act," he added. "The world must apply economic sanctions and take operative action against the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps."
The newspaper also says in recent weeks, top Israeli officials including Prime Minister Naftali Bennett have expressed warnings that Iran is advancing its nuclear program during a halt in negotiations on returning to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action deal.
Iran has said the talks – which have been on pause since June – won't restart until president-elect Ebrahim Raisi forms a new government later in August, the Jerusalem Post reports.
In 2015, Iran had signed an agreement with the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, France and Britain that was intended to set limits on Tehran’s nuclear program in order to block it from building a nuclear weapon — something it insists it doesn’t want to do.
IRANIAN BASED IN CANADA ACCUSED OF EXPORTING EQUIPMENT THAT CAN BE USED TO ‘MEASURE NUCLEAR FISSILE MATERIAL’
In exchange, Iran received relief from sanctions that those powers had imposed, including on its exports of oil and access to the global banking system. Iran was allowed to continue to pursue its nuclear program for civilian purposes, with strict limits on how much uranium it could enrich, the purity it could enrich it to and other measures.
But in 2018, then-President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. unilaterally out of the deal, criticizing clauses that ease restrictions on Iran in stages — and also the fact that eventually the deal would expire and Iran would be allowed to do whatever it wanted with its nuclear technology. He also said it needed to be renegotiated to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional influence such as backing militant groups.
Separately, Gantz told the news website Ynet on Thursday that Israel is prepared to strike Iran following the fatal drone strike on the Mercer Street oil tanker.
"We are at a point where we need to take military action against Iran," Gantz said. "The world needs to take action against Iran now."
Iran did not immediately respond to Gantz's comments.
However, in a letter Wednesday to the U.N. Security Council, its chargé d’affaires in New York accused Israel of being "the main source of instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond for more than seven decades," the Associated Press reports.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Iran nuclear concerns: Israel warns Tehran is only ‘10 weeks away’ from acquiring weapons-grade materials
Israel Defense Minister Benny Gantz reportedly has warned U.N. Security Council diplomats this week that Iran is “only around 10 weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon.”
www.foxnews.com
Iran
Published 1 hour ago
Iran nuclear concerns: Israel warns Tehran is only ‘10 weeks away’ from acquiring weapons-grade materials
Israel Defense Minister Benny Gantz reportedly makes comment to UN Security Council diplomats
By Greg Norman | Fox News
Israel Defense Minister Benny Gantz reportedly has warned U.N. Security Council diplomats this week that Iran is "only around 10 weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon."
Gantz made the comment during a presentation aimed at having the Council sanction Iran for a series of recent maritime attacks, including one last week on the oil tanker Mercer Street that killed two people, according to the Jerusalem Post. The tanker, struck off Oman in the Arabian Sea, is managed by a firm owned by an Israeli billionaire. Israel, the U.S. and the U.K. have blamed Iran for carrying out the attack.
"Iran has violated all of the guidelines set in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and is only around 10 weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon," Gantz was quoted by the Jerusalem Post as saying Wednesday.
US, UK AND ISRAEL BLAME IRAN FOR ATTACK ON ISRAELI-MANAGED TANKER
"Therefore, it is time to act," he added. "The world must apply economic sanctions and take operative action against the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps."
The newspaper also says in recent weeks, top Israeli officials including Prime Minister Naftali Bennett have expressed warnings that Iran is advancing its nuclear program during a halt in negotiations on returning to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action deal.
Iran has said the talks – which have been on pause since June – won't restart until president-elect Ebrahim Raisi forms a new government later in August, the Jerusalem Post reports.
In 2015, Iran had signed an agreement with the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, France and Britain that was intended to set limits on Tehran’s nuclear program in order to block it from building a nuclear weapon — something it insists it doesn’t want to do.
IRANIAN BASED IN CANADA ACCUSED OF EXPORTING EQUIPMENT THAT CAN BE USED TO ‘MEASURE NUCLEAR FISSILE MATERIAL’
In exchange, Iran received relief from sanctions that those powers had imposed, including on its exports of oil and access to the global banking system. Iran was allowed to continue to pursue its nuclear program for civilian purposes, with strict limits on how much uranium it could enrich, the purity it could enrich it to and other measures.
But in 2018, then-President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. unilaterally out of the deal, criticizing clauses that ease restrictions on Iran in stages — and also the fact that eventually the deal would expire and Iran would be allowed to do whatever it wanted with its nuclear technology. He also said it needed to be renegotiated to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional influence such as backing militant groups.
Separately, Gantz told the news website Ynet on Thursday that Israel is prepared to strike Iran following the fatal drone strike on the Mercer Street oil tanker.
"We are at a point where we need to take military action against Iran," Gantz said. "The world needs to take action against Iran now."
Iran did not immediately respond to Gantz's comments.
However, in a letter Wednesday to the U.N. Security Council, its chargé d’affaires in New York accused Israel of being "the main source of instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond for more than seven decades," the Associated Press reports.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Israel 'Ready' To Attack Iran In Response To Tanker Incidents
BY TYLER DURDEN
ZERO HEDGE
THURSDAY, AUG 05, 2021 - 11:47 AM
Two tanker attack incidents within the span of less than a week are now being blamed by the US, UK, and Israel on Iran. First there was last Thursday's Mercer Street tanker drone attack which left two British and Romanian crew members dead, and then on Tuesday there was the hijacking on the Panama-flagged Asphalt Princess - boarded by a half dozen armed Iranian militants.
Since the Israeli-managed Mercer came under assault, Israeli leaders have been openly proposing military action to allies, saying it may be needed to stop the Iranian attacks. Israel says it has provided allies like the United States with "hard evidence" that Tehran was indeed behind the drone attack in the Arabian Sea. And now Israel's defense chief says the country is prepared to strike in Iran in his latest comments.
F-35 file, Lockheed Martin
Defense Minister Benny Gantz was asked directly in an interview published Thursday with YNet News whether Israel is prepared to launch a military attack on Iran, to which he replied simply with, "Yes".
Gantz explained Israel's military stands ready to engage in a "multi-front" conflict - likely a reference to Syria where it's already conducting weekly airstrikes against "Iran-backed" groups allied with Assad.
He specifically charged that Islamic Jihad and Hamas rocket-fire out of Gaza had the direct backing of the Islamic Republic. There's also Iran ally Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, where this week rare exchanges of fire have taken place along Israel's northern border.
He addressed this new Lebanon flare-up, saying "Our actions overnight were meant to send a clear message that we will not accept such attacks."
"I hope we are not forced into further action. Lebanon is in a state of chaos caused in a large extend by the Hezbollah terror group."
Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Getty Images
"Iran seeks to pose a multi-front challenge to Israel, as such is building up its forces in Lebanon and Gaza, deploying militias in Syria and Iraq and maintaining its supporters in Yemen. Iran is a global and regional problem and an Israeli challenge," Gantz told Ynet further.
"We need to continue to develop our abilities to cope with multiple fronts, for this is the future," he added.
Israel 'Ready' To Attack Iran In Response To Tanker Incidents | ZeroHedge
BY TYLER DURDEN
ZERO HEDGE
THURSDAY, AUG 05, 2021 - 11:47 AM
Two tanker attack incidents within the span of less than a week are now being blamed by the US, UK, and Israel on Iran. First there was last Thursday's Mercer Street tanker drone attack which left two British and Romanian crew members dead, and then on Tuesday there was the hijacking on the Panama-flagged Asphalt Princess - boarded by a half dozen armed Iranian militants.
Since the Israeli-managed Mercer came under assault, Israeli leaders have been openly proposing military action to allies, saying it may be needed to stop the Iranian attacks. Israel says it has provided allies like the United States with "hard evidence" that Tehran was indeed behind the drone attack in the Arabian Sea. And now Israel's defense chief says the country is prepared to strike in Iran in his latest comments.
F-35 file, Lockheed Martin
Defense Minister Benny Gantz was asked directly in an interview published Thursday with YNet News whether Israel is prepared to launch a military attack on Iran, to which he replied simply with, "Yes".
Gantz explained Israel's military stands ready to engage in a "multi-front" conflict - likely a reference to Syria where it's already conducting weekly airstrikes against "Iran-backed" groups allied with Assad.
He specifically charged that Islamic Jihad and Hamas rocket-fire out of Gaza had the direct backing of the Islamic Republic. There's also Iran ally Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, where this week rare exchanges of fire have taken place along Israel's northern border.
He addressed this new Lebanon flare-up, saying "Our actions overnight were meant to send a clear message that we will not accept such attacks."
"I hope we are not forced into further action. Lebanon is in a state of chaos caused in a large extend by the Hezbollah terror group."
Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Getty Images
"Iran seeks to pose a multi-front challenge to Israel, as such is building up its forces in Lebanon and Gaza, deploying militias in Syria and Iraq and maintaining its supporters in Yemen. Iran is a global and regional problem and an Israeli challenge," Gantz told Ynet further.
"We need to continue to develop our abilities to cope with multiple fronts, for this is the future," he added.
Israel 'Ready' To Attack Iran In Response To Tanker Incidents | ZeroHedge
jward
passin' thru
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
#Iran's media is having great fun with the deputy-secretary general of the EU's External Action Service sitting in the row behind senior officials from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah at Raisi's inauguration today.
@JasonMBrodsky
#Iran's media is having great fun with the deputy-secretary general of the EU's External Action Service sitting in the row behind senior officials from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah at Raisi's inauguration today.
jward
passin' thru
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
10m
“A firm stance with Israel and tough diplomacy on the nuclear deal just might allow the United States to avert the slide toward dangerous escalation between Israel and Iran.”
View: https://twitter.com/ForeignAffairs/status/1423339928994340864?s=20
Ragnarok
On and On, South of Heaven
Not NK... Pakistan
Actually either are possible sources. IIRC there was an "oops" at Tehran Airport's freight terminal reported years ago involving a "hot" shipment from North Korea and the Iranians have been "guests" at quite a few of the North Korean nuclear tests as well as getting their initial SCUD tech form Pyongyang.
Last edited:
Posted for fair use.....
Warning Signs: Qassem Musleh and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
Nancy Ezzeddine and Erwin van Veen
August 4, 2021
Commentary
Who calls the shots in Iraq — the government or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)? Some observers think it is the latter, especially in light of recent events. On May 26, 2021, Iraqi police arrested Qassem Musleh — the commander of the PMF in Anbar province — in connection with the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. Immediately after, PMF militias circulated videos purportedly showing their fighters driving heavily armed trucks around Baghdad’s “Green Zone” in a show of force designed to compel Musleh’s release. When he was set free two weeks later, some analysts interpreted it as another exhibit of state weakness vis-à-vis the PMF, an umbrella organization of mostly Shiite, pro-Iran paramilitary groups that have fought the Islamic State.
In reality, the PMF has some pronounced weaknesses and faces growing challenges. Instead of viewing Musleh’s arrest and release as a victory for the PMF in a trial of strength against the Iraqi state, what actually occurred was a scramble by different PMF elements to maintain a united front against the prime minister when faced with the detention of one of their own. During Musleh’s two weeks in custody, it became clear that the PMF — which was incorporated into the Iraqi armed forces in 2016 — is more divided and weaker than it used to be, even though the shared interests of its main armed factions keep it afloat.
The PMF’s major organizational challenges are competition between the various networks of forces, as they each seek to maintain their privileges and enhance their status, and limited central restraint on their actions. That reality generates the risk that further destabilization and provocation of the PMF by the Iraqi state might trigger more serious bouts of violence. The Iraqi government should, therefore, consider adopting a policy of non-confrontation toward the PMF, provided its constituent groups are willing to reciprocate.
Roots of the PMF’s Weakness: The Assassination of ‘Mr. PMF’ in 2020
Abu Mahdi al Muhandis was a charismatic, father-like figure and as commander of the PMF he was a major source of the groups’ strength. When U.S. forces killed him in a drone strike in January 2020 — in the same attack that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani — it dealt a major blow to the PMF. Even though sentiments about him among the Iraqi Shiite leadership were mixed, he exercised a substantial level of control over the paramilitary groups. In part he did so through the PMF Commission — a state-sponsored umbrella organization under the office of the Iraqi prime minister — and also on the basis of his own personal history, militant credentials, and leadership skills.
Muhandis was also a major power broker among Iraq’s political elites as well as a linchpin in Iran’s regional networks of armed groups and political parties. He was the proverbial glue that kept different PMF networks together — Sunni, Shiite, and other ethno-sectarian factions, local and transnational PMF elements, as well as groups loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Muqtada al Sadr, and the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. While the PMF has never taken the form of a single hierarchical organization, under Muhandis it comprised an interlocking series of networks with interdependent interests and subject to a measure of central command.
The assassination of “Mr. PMF” shook those networks to their core in two ways. His removal left them relatively leaderless and weakened by a protracted struggle for control between different factions. Muhandis wielded more power than his fellow commanders — Falih al Fayyadh, Hadi al Ameri, or Qais al Khazali — and his death left the PMF leadership disputed and without a single unifying figure. Without Muhandis, individual groups also became subject to weaker constraints on their local autonomy. Together, these developments halted a process that had been underway in which a set of fairly loose, and sometimes competing, PMF networks were moving toward becoming a more integrated organization. Admittedly this remained a work in progress under Muhandis, but the PMF has found it impossible to continue this trajectory without him.
The result has been growing fragmentation within the PMF and stresses on its collective organizational structure. Pressure from protestors, political factions not linked to the PMF, and Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi have intensified these challenges. Since October 2019, protestors have condemned Iran’s increasing intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs and some PMF groups have used violence against their critics. In response, Kadhimi set the ambitious goal of holding the perpetrators accountable and imposing the government’s command over all armed groups.
The arrest and release of Musleh was a vivid illustration of the PMF’s fragmentation and weakening. To begin with, the seemingly integrated and much-touted PMF response of “occupying the Green Zone” on May 26 and 27 was misrepresented by the paramilitary groups. There was no substantial incursion by PMF groups into the Green Zone beyond their usual presence. The temporary handover of a number of checkpoints by security forces to the PMF was relatively peaceful and resulted from a decision by Kadhimi to avoid direct confrontation. In addition, the media spin that PMF pressure on the Green Zone secured Musleh’s swift release turned out to be largely spurious. He was only released about 14 days later, after the charges against him were officially dropped due to insufficient evidence. Behind the scenes, prominent Shiite leaders and commanders had rushed to negotiate the release with Kadhimi in order to avoid further escalation.
Widening Cracks in the PMF
There are several significant cracks in the PMF’s organizational structure. The most profound is the schism between the Atabat — or shrine — groups, which are loyal to Sistani, and the rest of the PMF. The Atabat groups split from the PMF in April 2020 to join the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense structures. They were followed by several smaller groups. Their departure caused a serious loss of legitimacy for the PMF as a whole among its Shiite and non-Shiite followers because the organization and its networks are grounded in Sistani’s fatwa of 2014 and he is the very person to whom the Atabat groups pledge their loyalty. While the differences between the Atabat groups and the rest of the PMF predated their actual split, it was largely the influence and control of Muhandis that had prevented it from occurring sooner. So far, leaders from the Badr and Asaib ahl al-Haq armed groups have failed to salvage the relationship between the PMF and Sistani, depriving those groups of some of their religious legitimacy. Notably, Sistani recently condemned PMF actions in several statements. Atabat groups also recently commemorated the fatwa’s anniversary without inviting other groups, triggering hateful reactions from some of them toward the representative of Sistani who spoke at the event.
Another divide in the PMF has opened up between groups such as Kataib Hizballah, on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib ahl al-Haq, and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hizballah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis’ death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions — like internal affairs and intelligence — are controlled by Kataib Hizballah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMF’s leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard. But Kataib Hizballah’s imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders — Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi — to succeed Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib.
Since then, opposing camps have formed in the commission that are in dispute about strategic matters, such as the allocation of the additional funds obtained through the 2020 state budget, but also about tactical issues, such as the framing of the response to Musleh’s arrest. In essence, this is a competition for domestic power. Khazali, the leader of Asaib ahl al-Haq, has for example made barbed comments over the past few weeks toward Badr’s leader — Ameri — and Kataib Hizballah that express his dissatisfaction with their monopolization of power within the PMF. In response, Kataib Hizballah and Harakat al-Nujaba excluded Asaib ahl al-Haq from the Tansiqiya, a loose confederation of resistance groups, muqawama, that pursue the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
Continued.....
Warning Signs: Qassem Musleh and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces - War on the Rocks
Who calls the shots in Iraq — the government or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)? Some observers think it is the latter, especially in light of
warontherocks.com
Warning Signs: Qassem Musleh and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
Nancy Ezzeddine and Erwin van Veen
August 4, 2021
Commentary
Who calls the shots in Iraq — the government or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)? Some observers think it is the latter, especially in light of recent events. On May 26, 2021, Iraqi police arrested Qassem Musleh — the commander of the PMF in Anbar province — in connection with the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. Immediately after, PMF militias circulated videos purportedly showing their fighters driving heavily armed trucks around Baghdad’s “Green Zone” in a show of force designed to compel Musleh’s release. When he was set free two weeks later, some analysts interpreted it as another exhibit of state weakness vis-à-vis the PMF, an umbrella organization of mostly Shiite, pro-Iran paramilitary groups that have fought the Islamic State.
In reality, the PMF has some pronounced weaknesses and faces growing challenges. Instead of viewing Musleh’s arrest and release as a victory for the PMF in a trial of strength against the Iraqi state, what actually occurred was a scramble by different PMF elements to maintain a united front against the prime minister when faced with the detention of one of their own. During Musleh’s two weeks in custody, it became clear that the PMF — which was incorporated into the Iraqi armed forces in 2016 — is more divided and weaker than it used to be, even though the shared interests of its main armed factions keep it afloat.
The PMF’s major organizational challenges are competition between the various networks of forces, as they each seek to maintain their privileges and enhance their status, and limited central restraint on their actions. That reality generates the risk that further destabilization and provocation of the PMF by the Iraqi state might trigger more serious bouts of violence. The Iraqi government should, therefore, consider adopting a policy of non-confrontation toward the PMF, provided its constituent groups are willing to reciprocate.
Roots of the PMF’s Weakness: The Assassination of ‘Mr. PMF’ in 2020
Abu Mahdi al Muhandis was a charismatic, father-like figure and as commander of the PMF he was a major source of the groups’ strength. When U.S. forces killed him in a drone strike in January 2020 — in the same attack that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani — it dealt a major blow to the PMF. Even though sentiments about him among the Iraqi Shiite leadership were mixed, he exercised a substantial level of control over the paramilitary groups. In part he did so through the PMF Commission — a state-sponsored umbrella organization under the office of the Iraqi prime minister — and also on the basis of his own personal history, militant credentials, and leadership skills.
Muhandis was also a major power broker among Iraq’s political elites as well as a linchpin in Iran’s regional networks of armed groups and political parties. He was the proverbial glue that kept different PMF networks together — Sunni, Shiite, and other ethno-sectarian factions, local and transnational PMF elements, as well as groups loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Muqtada al Sadr, and the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. While the PMF has never taken the form of a single hierarchical organization, under Muhandis it comprised an interlocking series of networks with interdependent interests and subject to a measure of central command.
The assassination of “Mr. PMF” shook those networks to their core in two ways. His removal left them relatively leaderless and weakened by a protracted struggle for control between different factions. Muhandis wielded more power than his fellow commanders — Falih al Fayyadh, Hadi al Ameri, or Qais al Khazali — and his death left the PMF leadership disputed and without a single unifying figure. Without Muhandis, individual groups also became subject to weaker constraints on their local autonomy. Together, these developments halted a process that had been underway in which a set of fairly loose, and sometimes competing, PMF networks were moving toward becoming a more integrated organization. Admittedly this remained a work in progress under Muhandis, but the PMF has found it impossible to continue this trajectory without him.
The result has been growing fragmentation within the PMF and stresses on its collective organizational structure. Pressure from protestors, political factions not linked to the PMF, and Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi have intensified these challenges. Since October 2019, protestors have condemned Iran’s increasing intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs and some PMF groups have used violence against their critics. In response, Kadhimi set the ambitious goal of holding the perpetrators accountable and imposing the government’s command over all armed groups.
The arrest and release of Musleh was a vivid illustration of the PMF’s fragmentation and weakening. To begin with, the seemingly integrated and much-touted PMF response of “occupying the Green Zone” on May 26 and 27 was misrepresented by the paramilitary groups. There was no substantial incursion by PMF groups into the Green Zone beyond their usual presence. The temporary handover of a number of checkpoints by security forces to the PMF was relatively peaceful and resulted from a decision by Kadhimi to avoid direct confrontation. In addition, the media spin that PMF pressure on the Green Zone secured Musleh’s swift release turned out to be largely spurious. He was only released about 14 days later, after the charges against him were officially dropped due to insufficient evidence. Behind the scenes, prominent Shiite leaders and commanders had rushed to negotiate the release with Kadhimi in order to avoid further escalation.
Widening Cracks in the PMF
There are several significant cracks in the PMF’s organizational structure. The most profound is the schism between the Atabat — or shrine — groups, which are loyal to Sistani, and the rest of the PMF. The Atabat groups split from the PMF in April 2020 to join the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense structures. They were followed by several smaller groups. Their departure caused a serious loss of legitimacy for the PMF as a whole among its Shiite and non-Shiite followers because the organization and its networks are grounded in Sistani’s fatwa of 2014 and he is the very person to whom the Atabat groups pledge their loyalty. While the differences between the Atabat groups and the rest of the PMF predated their actual split, it was largely the influence and control of Muhandis that had prevented it from occurring sooner. So far, leaders from the Badr and Asaib ahl al-Haq armed groups have failed to salvage the relationship between the PMF and Sistani, depriving those groups of some of their religious legitimacy. Notably, Sistani recently condemned PMF actions in several statements. Atabat groups also recently commemorated the fatwa’s anniversary without inviting other groups, triggering hateful reactions from some of them toward the representative of Sistani who spoke at the event.
Another divide in the PMF has opened up between groups such as Kataib Hizballah, on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib ahl al-Haq, and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hizballah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis’ death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions — like internal affairs and intelligence — are controlled by Kataib Hizballah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMF’s leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard. But Kataib Hizballah’s imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders — Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi — to succeed Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib.
Since then, opposing camps have formed in the commission that are in dispute about strategic matters, such as the allocation of the additional funds obtained through the 2020 state budget, but also about tactical issues, such as the framing of the response to Musleh’s arrest. In essence, this is a competition for domestic power. Khazali, the leader of Asaib ahl al-Haq, has for example made barbed comments over the past few weeks toward Badr’s leader — Ameri — and Kataib Hizballah that express his dissatisfaction with their monopolization of power within the PMF. In response, Kataib Hizballah and Harakat al-Nujaba excluded Asaib ahl al-Haq from the Tansiqiya, a loose confederation of resistance groups, muqawama, that pursue the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
Continued.....
Continued.....
A third divide relates to the nature of the relationship between key PMF groups and Iran. While this association was always contentious for some groups, like the Sadrists, and not in dispute for others, like Kataib Hizballah, the real battle is for the “middle” of the PMF that consists of Badr and Asaib. Both are shifting their discourse toward a more “patriotic” stance, indicating there is space for prioritizing domestic interests with associated strategies and efforts — a development that was accelerated ahead of the 2018 parliamentary elections and more recently by the need to adopt a less Iran-oriented profile in the wake of the 2019 protests calling for limited foreign intervention and reform of the political system. While Khazali continues to call Iran “a strategic ally,” he oscillates between “pro-Iran” and “pro-Iraq” positions with the intention of having the best of both worlds, positioning himself as moderate heir to Muhandis for the PMF leadership. Such prevarication and distancing from Iran have caused other groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba, to double down on their pro-Iran stance and seek more direct confrontation with U.S.-led coalition forces through drone attacks.
A final divide results from the PMF Commission’s neglect, after the killing of Muhandis, of local groups in areas liberated from the Islamic State. Their diminished connection with the commission has caused groups like the Shabak 30th Brigade in Nineveh to join Iraq’s network of Iran-linked resistance groups as an alternative way to secure their local interests, position, and autonomy. Attacks on coalition and U.S. forces in new places have been a side effect of such local power calculations. For example, the attack on Erbil airport in October 2020 — in which six missiles were launched from an area in the Nineveh Plains controlled by the PMF — was unprecedented.
The Risk of Violence in Response to Pressure on the PMF
The fact that the PMF Commission, an organization that was created to manage a number of armed group networks, suffers from reduced legitimacy, increased internal competition, and divided loyalties creates risks. These developments reduce central control, halt professionalization efforts, and enable groups to pursue their narrow self-interests with greater autonomy. Also, when they are confronted, PMF groups have more latitude to respond with the threat or actual use of violence because the constraints on doing so have decreased. From this perspective, the response to Musleh’s arrest was a harbinger of how PMF groups might react when they feel cornered. The assassination of an intelligence officer in Baghdad on June 7 provides another example of what can happen when pressure is brought to bear on the PMF, considering that the assassination was a response to Kadhimi dispatching hundreds of intelligence officers to border crossings to curb smuggling facilitated by armed groups. As the planned October 2021 parliamentary elections approach, the risk of violence will increase.
Despite the weakening of the PMF as an organizational entity, most factions understand that their strength lies in unity and that not standing up for one another might be fatal in the long run. For example, major Shiite political figures linked to the PMF, like Ameri and Maliki, jointly lobbied behind the scenes on behalf of Musleh, facilitating his release. Despite the growing divisions between factions, the urgency of expediting Musleh’s release reflected their continuing shared interests.
Whether the result of a quid pro quo or an attempt to deescalate violent confrontations, Shiite political leaders have protected the PMF, as happened in Musleh’s case. For example, Kataib Hizballah relies on the Fateh parliamentary bloc for political benefits. In exchange Fateh, particularly Badr’s political bloc, depends on voters from across PMF factions to maintain its parliamentary majority. Hence, artificial PMF unity will likely be maintained for some time to come.
Yet, the prime minister might seek to test and puncture that unity, given that he has little to lose and much to gain from doing so. His popularity is limited, his political future uncertain, and he understands that the PMF suffers reputational losses in all public incidents of the Musleh variety, irrespective of their precise outcome. But such actions by the Iraqi state do not lead to changes in PMF behavior, as the kidnapping and physical abuse of Ali al Mikdam — an Iraqi activist critical of armed factions’ role in suppressing protests — illustrated in early July, just one month after Musleh’s release.
Bringing further pressure to bear on the PMF carries three major risks for Iraq as a whole. First, Iran might revert entirely to a strategy based on small, loyal, and well-equipped forces rather than on mass-based paramilitary mobilization that is more susceptible to popular and political pressure — Harakat al-Nujaba instead of Badr, in a sense. Iran successfully used such an approach during the height of the U.S. occupation of Iraq between 2005 and 2007 when its “Special Groups” developed a fearsome reputation for their ability to pierce U.S. armor with explosive devices specifically developed for that purpose. If this happens, it would likely make security coordination and political compromise across Iraq’s security sector more difficult.
Second, Kataib Hizballah, in particular, is well placed to expand its regional reach. Development of its capabilities over the past few years has given it a fairly sophisticated platform from which it can easily grow further. Just a few years ago, the group was limited to engaging U.S. forces in guerilla warfare. But today it controls major assets like a key Iraqi-Syrian border crossing and plays a major role in running the so-called Iranian land corridor. Kataib Hizballah’s agenda does not prioritize Iraqi national interests and its further growth would complicate U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Third, should greater pressure on the PMF translate into substantial electoral losses for PMF-linked, pro-Iran political parties while the Sadrists become more influential due to a high turnout of their reliable constituency, Iran-linked PMF groups will command less political clout to defend their interests against their primary competitor. In turn, this would likely cause these groups to resort to violence as a primary response mechanism against any prime minister who seeks to curtail their power with the backing of Sadr’s political and military wings.
What Should Be Done?
It might have been feasible to promote greater integration of the PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces through a pressure- and incentive-based strategy when the PMF was largely under the control of Muhandis. There was an integrated command in place with sufficient authority to make any course corrections or changes that were agreed with Iraq’s political factions. Today, greater pressure on the PMF risks creating more contestation and fragmentation among the paramilitary groups, which might respond with more violence. PMF leaders like Ameri and Khazali have publicly complained about such pressure in recent weeks. Ameri also emphasized that the “future of the PMF is under threat” in a recent electoral rally as a way to mobilize constituents. It has been a long time since a PMF leader issued such warnings, which indicate that the groups feel themselves to be under pressure.
Regardless of the PMF’s nefarious activities and the abuse of power by a number of its armed factions, the months leading up to the national elections are not a good time to increase pressure on the groups in the form of Musleh-type measures. It is wiser for Iraqi politicians to wait for the electoral results, work to appoint a stronger prime minister, and secure a measure of collaboration with the newly elected Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi.
A feasible interim strategy to keep the situation manageable is for the Iraqi government to negotiate with all armed groups, large and small, via Shiite political leaders in order to develop a temporary deal that de-escalates existing tensions. For example, armed groups could commit to stopping the targeting of protestors and assassination of activists, as well as to reducing their attacks on coalition forces. In turn, the government could commit to further harmonization of PMF and Iraqi Security Forces salaries, allow the temporary re-integration of a number of dismissed PMF members into the security forces, and permit the PMF to investigate their own members first before any arrests are made. A mutual policy of non-confrontation would likely serve both the Iraqi government and the PMF well for the months ahead.
Nancy Ezzeddine is a research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. In this role she contributes to the Middle East research program, exploring identity politics and the use of religion as means of political mobilization in the Middle East.
Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit where he leads a team that analyses the political economy of conflict in the Middle East. His own work examines the political use of armed groups in processes of state development and geopolitical conflict.
A third divide relates to the nature of the relationship between key PMF groups and Iran. While this association was always contentious for some groups, like the Sadrists, and not in dispute for others, like Kataib Hizballah, the real battle is for the “middle” of the PMF that consists of Badr and Asaib. Both are shifting their discourse toward a more “patriotic” stance, indicating there is space for prioritizing domestic interests with associated strategies and efforts — a development that was accelerated ahead of the 2018 parliamentary elections and more recently by the need to adopt a less Iran-oriented profile in the wake of the 2019 protests calling for limited foreign intervention and reform of the political system. While Khazali continues to call Iran “a strategic ally,” he oscillates between “pro-Iran” and “pro-Iraq” positions with the intention of having the best of both worlds, positioning himself as moderate heir to Muhandis for the PMF leadership. Such prevarication and distancing from Iran have caused other groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba, to double down on their pro-Iran stance and seek more direct confrontation with U.S.-led coalition forces through drone attacks.
A final divide results from the PMF Commission’s neglect, after the killing of Muhandis, of local groups in areas liberated from the Islamic State. Their diminished connection with the commission has caused groups like the Shabak 30th Brigade in Nineveh to join Iraq’s network of Iran-linked resistance groups as an alternative way to secure their local interests, position, and autonomy. Attacks on coalition and U.S. forces in new places have been a side effect of such local power calculations. For example, the attack on Erbil airport in October 2020 — in which six missiles were launched from an area in the Nineveh Plains controlled by the PMF — was unprecedented.
The Risk of Violence in Response to Pressure on the PMF
The fact that the PMF Commission, an organization that was created to manage a number of armed group networks, suffers from reduced legitimacy, increased internal competition, and divided loyalties creates risks. These developments reduce central control, halt professionalization efforts, and enable groups to pursue their narrow self-interests with greater autonomy. Also, when they are confronted, PMF groups have more latitude to respond with the threat or actual use of violence because the constraints on doing so have decreased. From this perspective, the response to Musleh’s arrest was a harbinger of how PMF groups might react when they feel cornered. The assassination of an intelligence officer in Baghdad on June 7 provides another example of what can happen when pressure is brought to bear on the PMF, considering that the assassination was a response to Kadhimi dispatching hundreds of intelligence officers to border crossings to curb smuggling facilitated by armed groups. As the planned October 2021 parliamentary elections approach, the risk of violence will increase.
Despite the weakening of the PMF as an organizational entity, most factions understand that their strength lies in unity and that not standing up for one another might be fatal in the long run. For example, major Shiite political figures linked to the PMF, like Ameri and Maliki, jointly lobbied behind the scenes on behalf of Musleh, facilitating his release. Despite the growing divisions between factions, the urgency of expediting Musleh’s release reflected their continuing shared interests.
Whether the result of a quid pro quo or an attempt to deescalate violent confrontations, Shiite political leaders have protected the PMF, as happened in Musleh’s case. For example, Kataib Hizballah relies on the Fateh parliamentary bloc for political benefits. In exchange Fateh, particularly Badr’s political bloc, depends on voters from across PMF factions to maintain its parliamentary majority. Hence, artificial PMF unity will likely be maintained for some time to come.
Yet, the prime minister might seek to test and puncture that unity, given that he has little to lose and much to gain from doing so. His popularity is limited, his political future uncertain, and he understands that the PMF suffers reputational losses in all public incidents of the Musleh variety, irrespective of their precise outcome. But such actions by the Iraqi state do not lead to changes in PMF behavior, as the kidnapping and physical abuse of Ali al Mikdam — an Iraqi activist critical of armed factions’ role in suppressing protests — illustrated in early July, just one month after Musleh’s release.
Bringing further pressure to bear on the PMF carries three major risks for Iraq as a whole. First, Iran might revert entirely to a strategy based on small, loyal, and well-equipped forces rather than on mass-based paramilitary mobilization that is more susceptible to popular and political pressure — Harakat al-Nujaba instead of Badr, in a sense. Iran successfully used such an approach during the height of the U.S. occupation of Iraq between 2005 and 2007 when its “Special Groups” developed a fearsome reputation for their ability to pierce U.S. armor with explosive devices specifically developed for that purpose. If this happens, it would likely make security coordination and political compromise across Iraq’s security sector more difficult.
Second, Kataib Hizballah, in particular, is well placed to expand its regional reach. Development of its capabilities over the past few years has given it a fairly sophisticated platform from which it can easily grow further. Just a few years ago, the group was limited to engaging U.S. forces in guerilla warfare. But today it controls major assets like a key Iraqi-Syrian border crossing and plays a major role in running the so-called Iranian land corridor. Kataib Hizballah’s agenda does not prioritize Iraqi national interests and its further growth would complicate U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Third, should greater pressure on the PMF translate into substantial electoral losses for PMF-linked, pro-Iran political parties while the Sadrists become more influential due to a high turnout of their reliable constituency, Iran-linked PMF groups will command less political clout to defend their interests against their primary competitor. In turn, this would likely cause these groups to resort to violence as a primary response mechanism against any prime minister who seeks to curtail their power with the backing of Sadr’s political and military wings.
What Should Be Done?
It might have been feasible to promote greater integration of the PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces through a pressure- and incentive-based strategy when the PMF was largely under the control of Muhandis. There was an integrated command in place with sufficient authority to make any course corrections or changes that were agreed with Iraq’s political factions. Today, greater pressure on the PMF risks creating more contestation and fragmentation among the paramilitary groups, which might respond with more violence. PMF leaders like Ameri and Khazali have publicly complained about such pressure in recent weeks. Ameri also emphasized that the “future of the PMF is under threat” in a recent electoral rally as a way to mobilize constituents. It has been a long time since a PMF leader issued such warnings, which indicate that the groups feel themselves to be under pressure.
Regardless of the PMF’s nefarious activities and the abuse of power by a number of its armed factions, the months leading up to the national elections are not a good time to increase pressure on the groups in the form of Musleh-type measures. It is wiser for Iraqi politicians to wait for the electoral results, work to appoint a stronger prime minister, and secure a measure of collaboration with the newly elected Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi.
A feasible interim strategy to keep the situation manageable is for the Iraqi government to negotiate with all armed groups, large and small, via Shiite political leaders in order to develop a temporary deal that de-escalates existing tensions. For example, armed groups could commit to stopping the targeting of protestors and assassination of activists, as well as to reducing their attacks on coalition forces. In turn, the government could commit to further harmonization of PMF and Iraqi Security Forces salaries, allow the temporary re-integration of a number of dismissed PMF members into the security forces, and permit the PMF to investigate their own members first before any arrests are made. A mutual policy of non-confrontation would likely serve both the Iraqi government and the PMF well for the months ahead.
Nancy Ezzeddine is a research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. In this role she contributes to the Middle East research program, exploring identity politics and the use of religion as means of political mobilization in the Middle East.
Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit where he leads a team that analyses the political economy of conflict in the Middle East. His own work examines the political use of armed groups in processes of state development and geopolitical conflict.
jward
passin' thru
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
An unnamed official in #Israel warns in @Telegraph that #Iran is increasingly emboldened, and the international community has to change the paradigm. It's true--if multilateralism is back means anything, it has to go beyond statements & meetings. 1/2Tehran senses there is nothing it can do that will make int'l community leave the table. And it keeps escalating because of this dynamic. I read this as growing Israeli frustration over the lack of a meaningful response thus far--which will figure into its next steps. 2/2
Iran ‘very close’ to point of ‘no return’ in drive for nuclear bomb, Israel warns
Senior Israeli official says Iran is emboldened by lack of action from international community
By Edward Malnick, Sunday Political Editor 7 August 2021 • 8:30pm
Ebrahim Raisi, the ‘Butcher of Tehran’, is sworn-in for his first four-year term of presidency Credit: Avalon
Iran has been emboldened by a lack of action by Britain and other countries across the world, Israel has warned, as a senior official said the state was now “very close” to a point of “no return” in its drive for a nuclear bomb....
(rest behind paywall jewlz)
www.telegraph.co.uk
@JasonMBrodsky
An unnamed official in #Israel warns in @Telegraph that #Iran is increasingly emboldened, and the international community has to change the paradigm. It's true--if multilateralism is back means anything, it has to go beyond statements & meetings. 1/2Tehran senses there is nothing it can do that will make int'l community leave the table. And it keeps escalating because of this dynamic. I read this as growing Israeli frustration over the lack of a meaningful response thus far--which will figure into its next steps. 2/2
Iran ‘very close’ to point of ‘no return’ in drive for nuclear bomb, Israel warns
Senior Israeli official says Iran is emboldened by lack of action from international community
By Edward Malnick, Sunday Political Editor 7 August 2021 • 8:30pm
Ebrahim Raisi, the ‘Butcher of Tehran’, is sworn-in for his first four-year term of presidency Credit: Avalon
Iran has been emboldened by a lack of action by Britain and other countries across the world, Israel has warned, as a senior official said the state was now “very close” to a point of “no return” in its drive for a nuclear bomb....
(rest behind paywall jewlz)
Iran ‘very close’ to point of ‘no return’ in drive for nuclear bomb, Israel warns
Senior Israeli official says Iran is emboldened by lack of action from international community
www.telegraph.co.uk
jward
passin' thru
النفير العام لحوران
@VivaRevolt
Reports that IRGC Forces have brought in Air Defense Missiles and Rockets to Al-Mayadin
5:50 PM · Aug 7, 2021·Twitter Web App
@VivaRevolt
Reports that IRGC Forces have brought in Air Defense Missiles and Rockets to Al-Mayadin
5:50 PM · Aug 7, 2021·Twitter Web App
jward
passin' thru
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
8m
For years, the elected government in Iran has struggled against the parallel state apparatus led by supreme leader Ali Khamenei. But Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency may end that struggle, Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar writes.
View: https://twitter.com/ForeignAffairs/status/1424287429066903555?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Al Arabiya English
@AlArabiya_Eng
4m
#SaudiArabia’s air defenses have intercepted and destroyed two explosive drones launched by the Iran-backed #Houthis towards Khamis Mushait, the Arab Coalition confirms. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021
@AlArabiya_Eng
4m
#SaudiArabia’s air defenses have intercepted and destroyed two explosive drones launched by the Iran-backed #Houthis towards Khamis Mushait, the Arab Coalition confirms. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021
jward
passin' thru
Seth Frantzman
@sfrantzman
It's like a meeting of the Five Families in Godfather, but it was the Houthis, PMU, Hamas, Hezbollah, IRGC...
View: https://twitter.com/sfrantzman/status/1424333249560580097?s=20
@sfrantzman
It's like a meeting of the Five Families in Godfather, but it was the Houthis, PMU, Hamas, Hezbollah, IRGC...
View: https://twitter.com/sfrantzman/status/1424333249560580097?s=20
jward
passin' thru
"..alternative to appeasement is appeasement.."
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
17m
Bloomberg reports the U.S. is starting to eye alternatives to the #Iran JCPOA, including the interim step of limited sanctions relief for Iran freezing its most provocative proliferation work. 1/2 #OOTT
"The challenge faced by U.S. negotiators, the people said, is that the Biden administration has been unable to exploit the leverage it has from sanctions to stop #Iran from breaching terms of the deal"--how about actually enforcing the sanctions? (see China). 2/2
View: https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1424671623827935238?s=20
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
17m
Bloomberg reports the U.S. is starting to eye alternatives to the #Iran JCPOA, including the interim step of limited sanctions relief for Iran freezing its most provocative proliferation work. 1/2 #OOTT
"The challenge faced by U.S. negotiators, the people said, is that the Biden administration has been unable to exploit the leverage it has from sanctions to stop #Iran from breaching terms of the deal"--how about actually enforcing the sanctions? (see China). 2/2
View: https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1424671623827935238?s=20
northern watch
TB Fanatic
danielboon
TB Fanatic
War is coming soon
Last edited:
Heck, it's been here for decades, it's just been actively ignored by TPTB....
danielboon
TB Fanatic
INDEED
Posted for fair use.....
www.jpost.com
Iran's Raisi sets sight on Palestinians, Yemen and Iraq - analysis
Iran has a tendency to use proxies, pushing others to defend and die for it in its regional wars. That is why Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis and Yemenites all are pushed by Iran to fight.
By SETH J. FRANTZMAN
AUGUST 9, 2021 15:42
The Iranian-backed Houthis have suffered some setbacks in the battle for Marib in Yemen. Meanwhile, it looks like there is increased attention on their drone attacks and an Iranian drone attack on a ship off Oman.
For the new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, these will be part of his first moves in the region. He will be shoring up support for Hamas and also may travel to Baghdad.
We can determine some of Raisi’s objectives by looking at Iranian media connected to the IRGC. The media outlets claim Marib will soon be taken by the Houthis. That would be a setback for Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, Hamas had a delegation in Iran for Raisi’s inauguration. The Houthi leadership has accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of being “tools of the United States.” Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was quoted by Iran’s Tasnim News Agency as saying, “The Palestinian resistance is on the side of Iran.”
This is an attempt by Iran to increasingly influence and control the Palestinians and use them to attack Israel. Tehran already did this in May and will likely prod the Palestinians toward more attacks.
Iran likes to use proxies and have others die for it in its regional wars. That is why Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis and Yemenites all are pushed by Iran to fight, while Iran’s regime strangles its own people at home and profits off all the instability, terrorism and suffering.
There is no country Iran is involved in that has become wealthier and more stable as a result. Most places where Iran empowers militias, such as Iraq, barely have electricity, and Lebanon is bankrupt.
Iraq’s foreign minister is coming to Iran soon, according to Iranian media outlets. Iraq also may soon host Raisi during his first foreign trip, Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency reported. According to this report “the Iraqi foreign minister also invited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to attend this important security meeting with officials from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.”
The meeting may take place in Iraq, and if the Iranian president attends, this would be an important regional meeting. According to this narrative, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi wants to solidify Iraq’s role in the region. Iraq has also had discussions with Egypt and Jordan about regional security and normalizing more regional ties with Syria.
If Iraq were to host the Saudis, Turkey and Iran, as well as representatives of Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and the EU, this would be a major milestone. It remains to be seen what will happen.
The inclusion of Syria would be a major signal to the region. Iran wants the US to leave Iraq, and this would also bolster attempts by Turkey, Iran and others to remove the US from Syria.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s recent speech has been heavily quoted by Tasnim. This is because he is trying to redraw the deterrence equation with Israel and pretend Hezbollah is equal to Israel.
Hezbollah has taken over much of Lebanon and now conducts its foreign policy. Nasrallah wants to demonstrate to Israel that Hezbollah’s recent rocket fire can deter the IDF from escalating the situation.
_________________________________________
Posted for fair use.....
www.jpost.com
Iran’s pre-emption doctrine against Israel, UK, US - analysis
Heat up northern Israel, to show it can strike anywhere it wants if it is pressed about the tanker attack.
By SETH J. FRANTZMAN
AUGUST 9, 2021 21:11
Iran is putting in place a new doctrine designed to pre-empt any response to its attack on a ship off the coast of Oman.
In the last week and a half, after a tanker named the Mercer Street was first attacked on July 29, before two of its crew were killed on July 30, Iran has been singled out as a culprit. The US and UK have accused Iran and there has been tough talk. Then, suddenly, rockets were fired at Israel last week.
This was Iran’s pre-emption. Heat up northern Israel, to show it can strike anywhere it wants if it is pressed about the tanker attack.
It’s important to listen to Iran’s logic and narrative here. Iran has laid that out through media messaging and speeches by its proxies, as well as in meetings with key Hamas, Hezbollah and other terror leaders during the inauguration of its new president Ebrahim Raisi. The IRGC head Hossein Salami and key official Ali Shamkhani attended various meetings and it appears the messaging was put out at the same time.
What was the message? Iran said via Al-Alam TV and Press TV that the strike off the coast of Oman was retaliation. It claimed it was retaliating for previous Israeli attacks. That means Iran felt it had evened the score. Tough talk from the US, UK and Israel thus put Iran on edge. It has warned the UK and Israel. It may have warned the US via other channels. It appears, according to a report that the US pressured Israel not to alter the rules of engagement against Hezbollah ahead of another round of Iran nuclear talks next month” the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper reported, citing a senior diplomatic source.
This is important because it means Iran was able to put Hamas and Hezbollah in play, and possibly units based in Iraq, as well as Iraqi-based militias and the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, as part of a concerted regional effort. If Iran feels pressured in the Gulf, then it may strike elsewhere. But this is not just about striking. They are pushing Hezbollah and Hamas and other frontline actors to create complexity, deterrence and unpredictable results for Israel in the wake of the tanker attack.
French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Iran’s President Raisi, according to reports on Monday. "The Islamic Republic is very serious about providing security and maintaining deterrence in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman Region," Raisi told the French. What does this mean? We heard that also in Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s recent speech. On August 7 he said that Hezbollah responded to Israeli artillery and airstrikes. “This was to reinforce the old equation of deterrence, and not create a new one as some have said.” But what about the fact that Hezbollah had enabled areas it controls to be used for rocket fire on Israel on Wednesday, August 4. Hezbollah had started this round, in a sense. But it also openly said it would continue it, rocket for rocket, against Israel.
On August 1, IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kohavi concluded a conversation with his British counterpart, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Sir Nick Carter. “The two discussed recent events in the region and common challenges faced by both countries,” a statement read. It appears Iran put in place a pre-emption doctrine over the next 48 hours after that. Then on Friday the 6 of August, Hezbollah fired a salvo of rockets into an uninhabited border area of Israel.
Nasrallah gave his speech the next day. This is clear, coordinated messaging. Iran has been seeking to deter, to be unpredictable and to put its frontline units, which are its proxies and allies and partners in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, into play. This is a new pre-emption doctrine in a sense. Iran wants to present Israel with a multiplicity of threats and frontlines.
It also unveiled this in May during the leadup to the Gaza conflict. It threatened Israel and had its proxies give speeches in hours before Quds Day and after, all directed at challenging Israel. Then Hamas launched some 4,000 rockets in 10 days and Iran openly supported this and its media celebrated what it thought was an attempt to test Israel. Iran also launched a drone into Israeli airspace on May 18, likely guiding it from Syria. On May 17, the IDF said it detected “six failed launches attempts were identified from Lebanon that did not cross into Israeli territory.” On May 19, more rockets were fired from Lebanon toward Israel as the Israel-Hamas conflict winded down.
What this shows is a more complex Iranian response and likely an illustration of more to come. Iran wants to put in play this pre-emption doctrine. It wants to distract the US, UK and Israel from the incident off Oman and the emerging reports that Washington and London back a response and that London may respond somewhere.
Iran's Raisi sets sight on Palestinians, Yemen and Iraq -analysis
Iran has a tendency to use proxies, pushing others to defend and die for it in its regional wars. That is why Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis and Yemenites all are pushed by Iran to fight.
www.jpost.com
Iran's Raisi sets sight on Palestinians, Yemen and Iraq - analysis
Iran has a tendency to use proxies, pushing others to defend and die for it in its regional wars. That is why Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis and Yemenites all are pushed by Iran to fight.
By SETH J. FRANTZMAN
AUGUST 9, 2021 15:42
The Iranian-backed Houthis have suffered some setbacks in the battle for Marib in Yemen. Meanwhile, it looks like there is increased attention on their drone attacks and an Iranian drone attack on a ship off Oman.
For the new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, these will be part of his first moves in the region. He will be shoring up support for Hamas and also may travel to Baghdad.
We can determine some of Raisi’s objectives by looking at Iranian media connected to the IRGC. The media outlets claim Marib will soon be taken by the Houthis. That would be a setback for Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, Hamas had a delegation in Iran for Raisi’s inauguration. The Houthi leadership has accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of being “tools of the United States.” Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was quoted by Iran’s Tasnim News Agency as saying, “The Palestinian resistance is on the side of Iran.”
This is an attempt by Iran to increasingly influence and control the Palestinians and use them to attack Israel. Tehran already did this in May and will likely prod the Palestinians toward more attacks.
Iran likes to use proxies and have others die for it in its regional wars. That is why Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis and Yemenites all are pushed by Iran to fight, while Iran’s regime strangles its own people at home and profits off all the instability, terrorism and suffering.
There is no country Iran is involved in that has become wealthier and more stable as a result. Most places where Iran empowers militias, such as Iraq, barely have electricity, and Lebanon is bankrupt.
Iraq’s foreign minister is coming to Iran soon, according to Iranian media outlets. Iraq also may soon host Raisi during his first foreign trip, Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency reported. According to this report “the Iraqi foreign minister also invited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to attend this important security meeting with officials from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.”
The meeting may take place in Iraq, and if the Iranian president attends, this would be an important regional meeting. According to this narrative, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi wants to solidify Iraq’s role in the region. Iraq has also had discussions with Egypt and Jordan about regional security and normalizing more regional ties with Syria.
If Iraq were to host the Saudis, Turkey and Iran, as well as representatives of Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and the EU, this would be a major milestone. It remains to be seen what will happen.
The inclusion of Syria would be a major signal to the region. Iran wants the US to leave Iraq, and this would also bolster attempts by Turkey, Iran and others to remove the US from Syria.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s recent speech has been heavily quoted by Tasnim. This is because he is trying to redraw the deterrence equation with Israel and pretend Hezbollah is equal to Israel.
Hezbollah has taken over much of Lebanon and now conducts its foreign policy. Nasrallah wants to demonstrate to Israel that Hezbollah’s recent rocket fire can deter the IDF from escalating the situation.
_________________________________________
Posted for fair use.....
Iran’s pre-emption doctrine against Israel, UK, US - analysis
Heat up northern Israel, to show it can strike anywhere it wants if it is pressed about the tanker attack.
www.jpost.com
Iran’s pre-emption doctrine against Israel, UK, US - analysis
Heat up northern Israel, to show it can strike anywhere it wants if it is pressed about the tanker attack.
By SETH J. FRANTZMAN
AUGUST 9, 2021 21:11
Iran is putting in place a new doctrine designed to pre-empt any response to its attack on a ship off the coast of Oman.
In the last week and a half, after a tanker named the Mercer Street was first attacked on July 29, before two of its crew were killed on July 30, Iran has been singled out as a culprit. The US and UK have accused Iran and there has been tough talk. Then, suddenly, rockets were fired at Israel last week.
This was Iran’s pre-emption. Heat up northern Israel, to show it can strike anywhere it wants if it is pressed about the tanker attack.
It’s important to listen to Iran’s logic and narrative here. Iran has laid that out through media messaging and speeches by its proxies, as well as in meetings with key Hamas, Hezbollah and other terror leaders during the inauguration of its new president Ebrahim Raisi. The IRGC head Hossein Salami and key official Ali Shamkhani attended various meetings and it appears the messaging was put out at the same time.
What was the message? Iran said via Al-Alam TV and Press TV that the strike off the coast of Oman was retaliation. It claimed it was retaliating for previous Israeli attacks. That means Iran felt it had evened the score. Tough talk from the US, UK and Israel thus put Iran on edge. It has warned the UK and Israel. It may have warned the US via other channels. It appears, according to a report that the US pressured Israel not to alter the rules of engagement against Hezbollah ahead of another round of Iran nuclear talks next month” the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper reported, citing a senior diplomatic source.
This is important because it means Iran was able to put Hamas and Hezbollah in play, and possibly units based in Iraq, as well as Iraqi-based militias and the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, as part of a concerted regional effort. If Iran feels pressured in the Gulf, then it may strike elsewhere. But this is not just about striking. They are pushing Hezbollah and Hamas and other frontline actors to create complexity, deterrence and unpredictable results for Israel in the wake of the tanker attack.
French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Iran’s President Raisi, according to reports on Monday. "The Islamic Republic is very serious about providing security and maintaining deterrence in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman Region," Raisi told the French. What does this mean? We heard that also in Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s recent speech. On August 7 he said that Hezbollah responded to Israeli artillery and airstrikes. “This was to reinforce the old equation of deterrence, and not create a new one as some have said.” But what about the fact that Hezbollah had enabled areas it controls to be used for rocket fire on Israel on Wednesday, August 4. Hezbollah had started this round, in a sense. But it also openly said it would continue it, rocket for rocket, against Israel.
On August 1, IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kohavi concluded a conversation with his British counterpart, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Sir Nick Carter. “The two discussed recent events in the region and common challenges faced by both countries,” a statement read. It appears Iran put in place a pre-emption doctrine over the next 48 hours after that. Then on Friday the 6 of August, Hezbollah fired a salvo of rockets into an uninhabited border area of Israel.
Nasrallah gave his speech the next day. This is clear, coordinated messaging. Iran has been seeking to deter, to be unpredictable and to put its frontline units, which are its proxies and allies and partners in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, into play. This is a new pre-emption doctrine in a sense. Iran wants to present Israel with a multiplicity of threats and frontlines.
It also unveiled this in May during the leadup to the Gaza conflict. It threatened Israel and had its proxies give speeches in hours before Quds Day and after, all directed at challenging Israel. Then Hamas launched some 4,000 rockets in 10 days and Iran openly supported this and its media celebrated what it thought was an attempt to test Israel. Iran also launched a drone into Israeli airspace on May 18, likely guiding it from Syria. On May 17, the IDF said it detected “six failed launches attempts were identified from Lebanon that did not cross into Israeli territory.” On May 19, more rockets were fired from Lebanon toward Israel as the Israel-Hamas conflict winded down.
What this shows is a more complex Iranian response and likely an illustration of more to come. Iran wants to put in play this pre-emption doctrine. It wants to distract the US, UK and Israel from the incident off Oman and the emerging reports that Washington and London back a response and that London may respond somewhere.
Posted for fair use.....
www.middleeastmonitor.com
Iraq PMF leader wants to replicate Iranian Revolutionary Guards model in Iraq
August 9, 2021 at 11:13 am | Published in: Iran, Iraq, Middle East, News
Leader of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, Falih Al-Fayyadh, wants to replicate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards model in Iraq, Iran's IRNA news agency reported.
"We are proud of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Revolution example, and today we consider it our duty to use the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' experience within the laws and characteristics of Iraq," Al-Fayyadh said during a meeting with the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Hossein Salami, in the Iranian capital Tehran.
"We are your supporters in the resistance front and in the continuation of this great battle," he added.
For his part, Salami valued what he called the PMF's strategic role in defeating Daesh, and the achievement of security and stability in Iraq.
General Salami also hoped that the PMF will grow as a jihadist defensive force with grand principles and deep faith.
Iraq PM: Sistani warned of using PMF for partisan projects
Iraq PMF leader wants to replicate Iranian Revolutionary Guards model in Iraq
Leader of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, Falih Al-Fayyadh, wants to replicate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards model in Iraq, Iran's IRNA news agency reported. 'We are proud o...
www.middleeastmonitor.com
Iraq PMF leader wants to replicate Iranian Revolutionary Guards model in Iraq
August 9, 2021 at 11:13 am | Published in: Iran, Iraq, Middle East, News
Leader of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, Falih Al-Fayyadh, wants to replicate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards model in Iraq, Iran's IRNA news agency reported.
"We are proud of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Revolution example, and today we consider it our duty to use the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' experience within the laws and characteristics of Iraq," Al-Fayyadh said during a meeting with the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Hossein Salami, in the Iranian capital Tehran.
"We are your supporters in the resistance front and in the continuation of this great battle," he added.
For his part, Salami valued what he called the PMF's strategic role in defeating Daesh, and the achievement of security and stability in Iraq.
General Salami also hoped that the PMF will grow as a jihadist defensive force with grand principles and deep faith.
Iraq PM: Sistani warned of using PMF for partisan projects
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Biden Nominee Claims Iran Not Pursuing Nuclear Weapons, Contrary to Evidence
Republicans sound alarm on 'reckless' nominee Corey Hinderstein
Corey Hinderstein
Jack Beyrer and Matthew Foldi
Free Beacon
August 10, 2021 5:00 am
Joe Biden’s pick to counter nuclear weapons proliferation claimed Iran does not intend to develop nuclear weapons, countering the plans of the Islamic Republic's radical clerical leaders and the latest intelligence from the government of Israel.
Biden last week nominated Corey Hinderstein for assistant secretary for defense nuclear proliferation at the Department of Energy, a vital position in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to hostile countries. Hinderstein has asserted that the country is not actively pursuing nuclear weapons, even as evidence mounts to the contrary.
Hinderstein said all steps involved in Iran's nuclear development including enriching uranium levels and building up centrifuge facilities are "reversible" in an April interview, though Israeli intelligence warns Iran is just two years away from the ability to build a nuclear weapon. Hinderstein offered a similar claim in January 2020, well after the International Atomic Energy Agency found Iranian scientists engaging in covert nuclear work. "I see no indication that Iran is rushing toward a nuclear weapon," Hinderstein, the vice president of Nuclear Threat Initiative, told CNBC News in July 2019.
Republicans in the Senate are already signaling stiff opposition to the nomination. Without their support, Hinderstein would need the support of every Democrat in the upper chamber. Hinderstein’s nomination reflects the broader tone of the Biden administration's efforts to appease Iran as it engages in talks to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump left in 2018. Earlier this year, Republicans waged an extended campaign to block Biden Pentagon nominee Colin Kahl due to his deferential views on engaging Tehran and support for a new Iran deal. Kahl was approved by just four votes after months of delays.
The Biden nominee’s comments conflict with the latest information regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz told reporters on Wednesday that Iran is only 10 weeks away from acquiring all of the military-grade materials it needs to build a nuclear weapon and called for Israel to "take military action" against Iran for its aggressive behavior. Iran itself insists that it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity, the threshold needed to build nuclear weapons.
Iranian intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi warned in February that if the White House corners Iran, it will not be responsible for any consequences, a threat that experts said suggested Iran could pursue nuclear weapons.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) told the Free Beacon Hinderstein’s nomination is "reckless" and reveals broader problems about President Biden’s dealings with the Ayatollah.
"The Biden administration has spent the last six months appeasing and dismantling pressure against the Iranian regime," Cruz said. "As a result the Ayatollah has declared open season on Americans and our allies, and is rushing toward a nuclear breakout. It's both reckless and unsurprising the administration would nominate someone who wants to look the other way at Iran's nuclear ambitions."
Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee, which must advance Hinderstein's nomination prior to a full Senate vote, have expressed concerns about her "naiveté" towards Iran.
"Ms. Hinderstein’s comments certainly show a naiveté about Iran’s intentions," Senator Joni Ernst (R., Iowa) told the Free Beacon. "Iran has shown every inclination to disrupt regional security and kill Americans and American allies, so to put Ms. Hinderstein in a position of authority that would bear on non-proliferation is a dangerous idea."
"I am concerned with Ms. Hinderstein’s recent statements on the Iran nuclear deal and the implications that could have for the national security of the U.S. and allies like Israel with her leading an agency in charge of maintaining our nuclear stockpile," Sen. Steve Daines (R., Mont.) said. "I will be thoroughly reviewing her statements and positions as the Senate considers her nomination."
Hinderstein and the Department of Energy did not return requests for comment. A State Department spokesman told the Free Beacon that the Biden administration is intent on reaching an agreement with Tehran.
Victoria Coates, a senior fellow at the Middle East-focused think tank Center for Security Policy, said Iran is clearly in pursuit of a nuclear weapon and statements to the contrary are "deeply dangerous" and "willfully blind."
"The Iranian regime is clearly demonstrating through their actions that they are still pursuing the nuclear ambitions that were documented in the AMAD archive," Coates said, referring to documents obtained by Israeli intelligence that lays out Iranian plans for a nuclear weapons program.
Bryan Leib, the executive director of Iranian Americans for Liberty, urged the Senate to reject the nomination."It was incredibly reckless for Corey Hinderstein to state in 2019 that she didn't see any indication that Iran is rushing towards a nuclear weapon," Leib said. "I urge the Senate to reject the nomination of Hinderstein because anyone who can't admit that Iran is a bad actor with malign goals has no business serving in our government."
Biden Nominee Claims Iran Not Pursuing Nuclear Weapons, Contrary to Evidence (freebeacon.com)
Republicans sound alarm on 'reckless' nominee Corey Hinderstein
Corey Hinderstein
Jack Beyrer and Matthew Foldi
Free Beacon
August 10, 2021 5:00 am
Joe Biden’s pick to counter nuclear weapons proliferation claimed Iran does not intend to develop nuclear weapons, countering the plans of the Islamic Republic's radical clerical leaders and the latest intelligence from the government of Israel.
Biden last week nominated Corey Hinderstein for assistant secretary for defense nuclear proliferation at the Department of Energy, a vital position in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to hostile countries. Hinderstein has asserted that the country is not actively pursuing nuclear weapons, even as evidence mounts to the contrary.
Hinderstein said all steps involved in Iran's nuclear development including enriching uranium levels and building up centrifuge facilities are "reversible" in an April interview, though Israeli intelligence warns Iran is just two years away from the ability to build a nuclear weapon. Hinderstein offered a similar claim in January 2020, well after the International Atomic Energy Agency found Iranian scientists engaging in covert nuclear work. "I see no indication that Iran is rushing toward a nuclear weapon," Hinderstein, the vice president of Nuclear Threat Initiative, told CNBC News in July 2019.
Republicans in the Senate are already signaling stiff opposition to the nomination. Without their support, Hinderstein would need the support of every Democrat in the upper chamber. Hinderstein’s nomination reflects the broader tone of the Biden administration's efforts to appease Iran as it engages in talks to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump left in 2018. Earlier this year, Republicans waged an extended campaign to block Biden Pentagon nominee Colin Kahl due to his deferential views on engaging Tehran and support for a new Iran deal. Kahl was approved by just four votes after months of delays.
The Biden nominee’s comments conflict with the latest information regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz told reporters on Wednesday that Iran is only 10 weeks away from acquiring all of the military-grade materials it needs to build a nuclear weapon and called for Israel to "take military action" against Iran for its aggressive behavior. Iran itself insists that it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity, the threshold needed to build nuclear weapons.
Iranian intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi warned in February that if the White House corners Iran, it will not be responsible for any consequences, a threat that experts said suggested Iran could pursue nuclear weapons.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) told the Free Beacon Hinderstein’s nomination is "reckless" and reveals broader problems about President Biden’s dealings with the Ayatollah.
"The Biden administration has spent the last six months appeasing and dismantling pressure against the Iranian regime," Cruz said. "As a result the Ayatollah has declared open season on Americans and our allies, and is rushing toward a nuclear breakout. It's both reckless and unsurprising the administration would nominate someone who wants to look the other way at Iran's nuclear ambitions."
Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee, which must advance Hinderstein's nomination prior to a full Senate vote, have expressed concerns about her "naiveté" towards Iran.
"Ms. Hinderstein’s comments certainly show a naiveté about Iran’s intentions," Senator Joni Ernst (R., Iowa) told the Free Beacon. "Iran has shown every inclination to disrupt regional security and kill Americans and American allies, so to put Ms. Hinderstein in a position of authority that would bear on non-proliferation is a dangerous idea."
"I am concerned with Ms. Hinderstein’s recent statements on the Iran nuclear deal and the implications that could have for the national security of the U.S. and allies like Israel with her leading an agency in charge of maintaining our nuclear stockpile," Sen. Steve Daines (R., Mont.) said. "I will be thoroughly reviewing her statements and positions as the Senate considers her nomination."
Hinderstein and the Department of Energy did not return requests for comment. A State Department spokesman told the Free Beacon that the Biden administration is intent on reaching an agreement with Tehran.
Victoria Coates, a senior fellow at the Middle East-focused think tank Center for Security Policy, said Iran is clearly in pursuit of a nuclear weapon and statements to the contrary are "deeply dangerous" and "willfully blind."
"The Iranian regime is clearly demonstrating through their actions that they are still pursuing the nuclear ambitions that were documented in the AMAD archive," Coates said, referring to documents obtained by Israeli intelligence that lays out Iranian plans for a nuclear weapons program.
Bryan Leib, the executive director of Iranian Americans for Liberty, urged the Senate to reject the nomination."It was incredibly reckless for Corey Hinderstein to state in 2019 that she didn't see any indication that Iran is rushing towards a nuclear weapon," Leib said. "I urge the Senate to reject the nomination of Hinderstein because anyone who can't admit that Iran is a bad actor with malign goals has no business serving in our government."
Biden Nominee Claims Iran Not Pursuing Nuclear Weapons, Contrary to Evidence (freebeacon.com)
Biden Nominee Claims Iran Not Pursuing Nuclear Weapons, Contrary to Evidence
Republicans sound alarm on 'reckless' nominee Corey Hinderstein
Corey Hinderstein
Jack Beyrer and Matthew Foldi
Free Beacon
August 10, 2021 5:00 am
Joe Biden’s pick to counter nuclear weapons proliferation claimed Iran does not intend to develop nuclear weapons, countering the plans of the Islamic Republic's radical clerical leaders and the latest intelligence from the government of Israel.
Biden last week nominated Corey Hinderstein for assistant secretary for defense nuclear proliferation at the Department of Energy, a vital position in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to hostile countries. Hinderstein has asserted that the country is not actively pursuing nuclear weapons, even as evidence mounts to the contrary.
Hinderstein said all steps involved in Iran's nuclear development including enriching uranium levels and building up centrifuge facilities are "reversible" in an April interview, though Israeli intelligence warns Iran is just two years away from the ability to build a nuclear weapon. Hinderstein offered a similar claim in January 2020, well after the International Atomic Energy Agency found Iranian scientists engaging in covert nuclear work. "I see no indication that Iran is rushing toward a nuclear weapon," Hinderstein, the vice president of Nuclear Threat Initiative, told CNBC News in July 2019.
Republicans in the Senate are already signaling stiff opposition to the nomination. Without their support, Hinderstein would need the support of every Democrat in the upper chamber. Hinderstein’s nomination reflects the broader tone of the Biden administration's efforts to appease Iran as it engages in talks to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump left in 2018. Earlier this year, Republicans waged an extended campaign to block Biden Pentagon nominee Colin Kahl due to his deferential views on engaging Tehran and support for a new Iran deal. Kahl was approved by just four votes after months of delays.
The Biden nominee’s comments conflict with the latest information regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz told reporters on Wednesday that Iran is only 10 weeks away from acquiring all of the military-grade materials it needs to build a nuclear weapon and called for Israel to "take military action" against Iran for its aggressive behavior. Iran itself insists that it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity, the threshold needed to build nuclear weapons.
Iranian intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi warned in February that if the White House corners Iran, it will not be responsible for any consequences, a threat that experts said suggested Iran could pursue nuclear weapons.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) told the Free Beacon Hinderstein’s nomination is "reckless" and reveals broader problems about President Biden’s dealings with the Ayatollah.
"The Biden administration has spent the last six months appeasing and dismantling pressure against the Iranian regime," Cruz said. "As a result the Ayatollah has declared open season on Americans and our allies, and is rushing toward a nuclear breakout. It's both reckless and unsurprising the administration would nominate someone who wants to look the other way at Iran's nuclear ambitions."
Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee, which must advance Hinderstein's nomination prior to a full Senate vote, have expressed concerns about her "naiveté" towards Iran.
"Ms. Hinderstein’s comments certainly show a naiveté about Iran’s intentions," Senator Joni Ernst (R., Iowa) told the Free Beacon. "Iran has shown every inclination to disrupt regional security and kill Americans and American allies, so to put Ms. Hinderstein in a position of authority that would bear on non-proliferation is a dangerous idea."
"I am concerned with Ms. Hinderstein’s recent statements on the Iran nuclear deal and the implications that could have for the national security of the U.S. and allies like Israel with her leading an agency in charge of maintaining our nuclear stockpile," Sen. Steve Daines (R., Mont.) said. "I will be thoroughly reviewing her statements and positions as the Senate considers her nomination."
Hinderstein and the Department of Energy did not return requests for comment. A State Department spokesman told the Free Beacon that the Biden administration is intent on reaching an agreement with Tehran.
Victoria Coates, a senior fellow at the Middle East-focused think tank Center for Security Policy, said Iran is clearly in pursuit of a nuclear weapon and statements to the contrary are "deeply dangerous" and "willfully blind."
"The Iranian regime is clearly demonstrating through their actions that they are still pursuing the nuclear ambitions that were documented in the AMAD archive," Coates said, referring to documents obtained by Israeli intelligence that lays out Iranian plans for a nuclear weapons program.
Bryan Leib, the executive director of Iranian Americans for Liberty, urged the Senate to reject the nomination."It was incredibly reckless for Corey Hinderstein to state in 2019 that she didn't see any indication that Iran is rushing towards a nuclear weapon," Leib said. "I urge the Senate to reject the nomination of Hinderstein because anyone who can't admit that Iran is a bad actor with malign goals has no business serving in our government."
Biden Nominee Claims Iran Not Pursuing Nuclear Weapons, Contrary to Evidence (freebeacon.com)
It needs to be understood that if the Israelis go after Iranian nuclear and missile sites, they won't do it with one hand tied behind their backs. They'll only get one shot at it and they will catch hell from closer in Iranian and proxy forces. The Israeli PM is doing everything short of broadcasting the strike mission orders in trying to give the other world powers fair warning of what's going to happen if they don't stop Iran first.
A maximum effort by the US can stay "conventional" and get the job done. That's not the case for the Israelis.