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PHILIPPINES

France taking sides with Philippines vis-a-vis China​

France an active participant in US-Philippine Balikatan joint exercises while seeking visiting forces agreement and submarine sales

By RICHARD JAVAD HEYDARIAN
APRIL 29, 2024

MANILA – Enter France as the latest Western power to side with the Philippines in its bubbling dispute with China in the South China Sea.

While this year’s US-Philippine Balikatan (shoulder to shoulder) joint military exercises are notable for their sheer size with over 17,000 participating troops, state-of-the-art missile system tests and drills provocatively near Taiwan, France’s presence at the war games has been less noticed.

The French Navy’s flagship warship, Vendemiaire, sailed alongside Philippine and US counterparts – the Philippine Navy’s BRP Davao del Sur (LD-602) and BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS-16) and the US Navy’s USS Harpers Ferry – as part of the multilateral maritime exercise (MME) under Balikatan Exercises 2024.

At the same time, France announced that it will soon kickstart high-stakes negotiations for a Visiting Forces Agreement-style deal with the Philippines to regularize and expand joint drills in the near future.

Moreover, the European power is also offering advanced weapons systems, including a potential multi-billion submarine deal, amid the Philippines’ massive military modernization program.

Although a US treaty ally, the Philippines is proactively diversifying its defense relations by cultivating ties with a wide network of partners from the Indo-Pacific to Europe to enhance its strategic autonomy and build up its laggard maritime security capabilities.

The US remains the Philippines’ leading defense partner and its only treaty ally. Earlier this month, US President Joe Biden reiterated Washington’s commitment to come to the Philippines’ rescue in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea under the terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr recently joined his Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida for the inaugural Japan-Philippine-US (JAPHUS) trilateral summit in Washington. Both the US and Japan vowed to expand their defense aid and make new strategic investments in the Philippines at the meeting.

The Philippines is fast emerging as a critical component of America’s “integrated deterrence” strategy in Asia, hence the geographically expansive and sophisticated Balikatan joint drills in the South China Sea and around the Bashi Channel near Taiwan.

Filipino policymakers, however, are also keenly aware that the Biden administration is committed to multiple allies and partners across various theaters, from Eastern Europe to the Middle East.

The US Senate recently passed a US$95 billion emergency package with earmarks for Ukraine ($60 billion), Israel ($17 billion) and Taiwan ($8 billion). Although US military financing to the Philippines is set to more than quadruple to around $500 million, it still represents a tiny percentage of US defense aid to other security partners.

And it’s not clear when, if ever, the Philippines will also get American-made and desperately needed modern fighter jets and weapons systems, which even non-allies such as Jordan, Pakistan and Egypt have received. Given the sheer scale of the military challenge posed by China in nearby waters, the amount of US aid to the Philippines remains woefully inadequate.

Natural partners

Over the past decade, the Philippines and Europe have emerged as like-minded partners. As the sole liberal democracy in Southeast Asia, which has notably stood by the West amid conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, the Philippines broadly shares Europe’s strategic outlook and value system.

Even more crucially, the two sides have also steadily recognized each others’ strategic significance. For its part, the European Union and post-Brexit Britain have stepped up their regional diplomacy through the pursuit of free trade agreements and defense cooperation with a host of Asian powers, most notably India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and Vietnam.

Britain became the first European country to join the Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade deal while the European Union has finalized free trade deals with multiple regional economies.


The European powers have also been active on the defense front, with all three major European powers, in addition to the Netherlands and Italy, recently conducting patrols across the Indo-Pacific.

During a 2018 trip to the region, French President Emmanuel Macron openly called for a “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis”, which he said will “be respected by China as an equal partner”, underscoring Europe’s commitment to proactive strategic presence in the region.

France also became the first European country to appoint a special envoy in the Indo-Pacific and, along with Germany, issued its own “Indo-Pacific” strategy in the late 2010s, which served as a blueprint for the broader European Union’s foreign policy in Asia.

At times, France has pushed the China envelope with the naval frigate Vendemiaire passing through the Taiwan straits in Europe’s own version of “freedom of navigation operations.” Britain has also regularly deployed warships to the Indo-Pacific, most notably the HMS Queen Elizabeth at the height of the pandemic, for joint drills and freedom of navigation patrols.

Although the Philippines had contentious relations with Europe during the Rodrigo Duterte presidency, particularly over human rights and democracy issues, the three major European powers of Britain, France and Germany – the so-called “E3” – consistently backed Southeast Asian nations on their South China Sea disputes vis-à-vis China, often in tandem and/or in joint statements.


In the past two years, the EU and Britain have actively courted the Marcos Jr administration, which has adopted a friendlier stance toward traditional partners while standing up to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Last year, EU chief Ursula von der Leyen made a historic visit to Manila to “accelerate a new era of cooperation” in order to jointly preserve “the international rules-based order.” During her visit, she openly criticized China both for the latter’s alleged assistance to Russia in the Ukraine conflict but also, referring to the South China Sea disputes, China’s “more assertive stance in your region [Southeast Asia].”

Accordingly, she vowed to “strengthen cooperation with the Philippines on maritime security” by focusing on, inter alia, “the capacity of your National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) and your Coast Guard.”

Also last year, Britain dispatched for the first time an observer to the Balikatan exercises, underscoring the European power’s commitment to upgrading bilateral defense cooperation.

With the Philippines undergoing a once-in-a-generation military modernization program, Europe is also positioning itself as a major potential supplier of advanced weapons systems.

Most notably, France Naval Group, manufacturer of the Scorpene diesel-electric submarine, has offered to not only build submarines and a Philippine submarine force but also provide the basic infrastructure for the operation of advanced naval assets.

Other European nations such as Spain, which had a three-centuries-old colony in the Philippines, have also offered major submarine and warship packages.

In a bid to enhance their interoperability and signal a united front, France joined this month’s Balikatan exercises through trilateral naval drills with the Philippines and US, including maritime search and rescue operations, gunnery exercises and division tactics.

“They have lined up training activities. In fact, upon reaching [our] eastern coast in Palawan, they will start division tactics [training]. They will be sailing together [across] east coast then [head] up north up to Mindoro Strait [then enter] the [South China] Sea,” Philippine military spokesman Ariel Coloma told reporters in a mixture of Filipino and English.

The three navies will break out for separate exercises following their joint drills in the South China Sea, Coloma said. Crucially, the Philippines’ BRP Ramon Alcarazand the French frigateVendemiaireare set to conduct separate bilateral drills outside of the Philippine-US Balikatan exercises.


According to French Ambassador to the Philippines Marie Fontanel, the two sides have also set to begin, based on a prior agreement last December, to negotiate a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which could dramatically accelerate bilateral security cooperation.

“We will have an opportunity in May to maybe start officially the negotiations or, at least, discuss the modalities,” the French ambassador said during a news conference with French Ambassador to the Indo-Pacific Marc Abensour, who had also visited the Philippines on the sidelines of the Balikatan exercises.

Other European powers such as Britain and Germany could soon follow suit, thus potentially expanding the Philippines’ network of allies along with the US and Australia, both of which already have VFA-style deals with the Southeast Asian nation.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Richeydarian
 

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New: Philippine ships “encountered dangerous maneuvers & obstruction from 4x China Coast Guard & 6x Chinese Maritime Militia vessels.”

The CCG “employed jet stream water cannons, targeting the PCG vessel from both sides, resulting in damage.”@jaytaryela
View: https://twitter.com/ianellisjones/status/1785159582978810049



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CCG's brutish water cannon attack and ramming action again captured in full view, this time off Scarborough Shoal.
View: https://twitter.com/CollinSLKoh/status/1785152988434288974
 
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#US, #Australia, #Japan vow ‘coordinated security assistance’ to #Philippines

The United States, Australia and Japan have agreed to provide “coordinated security assistance” to the Philippines to strengthen the country’s military capabilities in the face of China’s growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea.

The defense ministers of the four countries—Gilberto Teodoro Jr. of the Philippines, Lloyd Austin III of the United States, Richard Marles of Australia and Minoru Kihara of Japan—met at the US Indo-Pacific Command headquarters at Camp H.M. Smith in Hawaii on Thursday to discuss ways to maintain stability and security in the region.

Austin held separate meetings with his Japanese and Australian counterparts, then all three of them together, before they met with Teodoro.

“We’re looking to conduct more maritime exercises and activities among our four countries. We also want to pursue coordinated security assistance to the Philippines that will boost interoperability and help the Philippines achieve its defense modernization goals,” Austin said at a press conference.

Historic joint sail

The meeting came a few weeks after the navies of the four countries made their historic quadrilateral joint sail in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, where China has sweeping claims.

A 2016 arbitral ruling voided those expansive claims but Beijing has refused to recognize the decision.

The inaugural meeting of the four nations’ top defense officials took place on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June last year. At the time, Undersecretary Carlito Galvez Jr. represented the Philippines and Hamada Yasukazu represented Japan.

Marles said they discussed “increased tempo of defense exercises based on the reciprocal access agreements, the status of forces agreements” between their countries.

Solon vows anti-corruption measures once NFA allowed to sell rice anewSolon vows anti-corruption measures once NFA allowed to sell rice anew

Kihara said it was important to work together “while the security environment around us is facing even harsher challenges.”

For his part, Teodoro said the meeting expressed a unified message “in the face of a unilateral declaration by a single theater actor,” without referring to China by name.

Tensions have risen between the Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea. Earlier this week, Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannons at Philippine Coast Guard and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessels near Bajo de Masinloc (Panatag or Scarborough Shoal), damaging both.

‘Irresponsible behavior’

Austin criticized China’s “irresponsible behavior” that “disregards international law.”

But he and Teodoro refused to say how and when the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between their countries could be invoked.

The 1951 MDT binds the two countries to defend each other in case of an external attack. Austin reiterated the United States’ “ironclad” commitment to the treaty.

Teodoro said hypothetical talks on the MDT were “counterproductive.”

“It is an agreement and it will be a political decision at the end of the day,” he added.

Teodoro said that “our job as (defense) secretaries is to make sure that there are no situations, through capability building and deterrence, that an MDT situation would arise.”

‘Twin anchors’

In Manila, Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo on Thursday said the government’s foreign policy in the South China Sea was “built on the twin anchors” of the 2016 arbitral award and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).

“We categorically reject the excessive claims and aggressive actions by the People’s Republic of China in the WPS, for they stand in stark opposition to the rule of law and the very principles that ensure peace and stability in our region,” he said.

The arbitral ruling and the Unclos are the “bedrock” on which the country had strengthened its maritime security cooperation with other nations, Manalo said, citing support from the United States, Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and India, and the European Union.

“This reality, that we do not stand alone, is a novel one. Not so long ago, we were derided for filing protest note after protest note when our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction were violated. Now, we have many others joining their voices to ours,” he said.

Manalo rejected China’s claim that the Philippines was just a “pawn” of the United States in the South China Sea.

Observers say that this propaganda theme has been reechoed by Beijing and its supporters to diminish the legitimacy of Manila’s protests against Chinese activities in the West Philippine Sea by portraying the Philippines as a US “vassal.”

“Involvement in this maritime and territorial struggle of global importance is happening at the behest of the Philippines—we are not bystanders to [the] situation,” Manalo said in a speech during a national security workshop organized by the Presidential Communications Office.

Manipulative

In March, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning accused the US of using the Philippines as a “pawn to stir up trouble in the South China Sea.”

“The Philippines should not let itself be at the mercy of the United States,” she said.

Manalo said that such a statement was “designed to manipulate people into being disengaged” from the maritime dispute with China.

“We must expose the illegality of the nine-dash line that is being used as the basis for threatening the livelihoods of our fishermen through harassment and intimidation, and for reclamation activities that degrade the environment in these vital waters. We should not allow ourselves to be painted as the aggressors or the violators,” he added.

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Clash Report
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China’s Type 003 aircraft carrier, also known as the Fujian, is the largest warship ever built by an Asian country; surpassing even the Yamato-class battleships.

— With its displacement of 80,000 tonnes, Fujian is China's newest and most advanced aircraft carrier, comparable in size to the U.S. Navy's Nimitz and Ford classes.

— Fujian is currently conducting sea trials.
 

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1) #Australian helicopter forced to take evasive action after #Chinese fighter detonates flares

⚡️In short: An Australian pilot was forced to take evasive action after a Chinese military jet detonated flares close to a Navy helicopter near South Korea.

⚡️The Defence Department has described the actions of the Chinese plane as "unsafe and unprofessional".

⚡️What's next? The Coalition has called on Defence Minister Richard Marles to raise this incident directly with his Chinese counterpart.

An Australian pilot was forced to take evasive action after a Chinese military jet detonated flares close to a Navy helicopter that was operating in international waters near South Korea.

The Defence Department has described the actions of the J-10 Chinese Air Force plane as "unsafe and unprofessional" following the incident which took place in the Yellow Sea over the weekend.

On Saturday a MH-60R Seahawk which had launched from HMAS Hobart was intercepted by the People's Liberation Army-Air Force (PLA-AF) as it was taking part in a UN mission to enforce sanctions against North Korea.

"The PLA-AF aircraft released flares along the flight path of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) helicopter," the Defence Department said in a statement on Monday night.

"This was an unsafe manoeuvre which posed a risk to the aircraft and personnel.

"While there were no injuries sustained by ADF personnel or damage caused to the MH-60R helicopter, the safety and wellbeing of our ADF personnel continues to be our utmost priority," the department added.

"Australia expects all countries, including China, to operate their militaries in a professional and safe manner."

Defence Minister Richard Marles says the Australian government has expressed its concerns directly with the Chinese government following the dangerous interception.

"The PLA Air Force plane dropped flares about 300 metres in front of the Seahawk helicopter and about 60 metres above it, requiring the helicopter to take evasive action in order to not be hit by those flares," Mr Marles said in a statement.

"The consequence of being hit by the flares would have been significant.

"Importantly, the helicopter was unaffected and all the crew are safe."

"This is a very serious incident. It was unsafe and it is completely unacceptable."

The incident occurred a day after the ABC revealed Australia's Navy Chief had recently confronted his Chinese counterpart over another incident last November where divers were injured in a sonar attack also in international waters.

Shadow Defence Minister Andrew Hastie also condemned what he described as the "provocative and dangerous interaction" of the Chinese Air Force with an Australian helicopter in the Yellow Sea.

"This builds on the pattern of aggressive behaviour from the People's Liberation Army — Navy towards the Australian Defence Force (ADF) over the past few years, including the sonar attack on RAN divers in November last year.

"We are relieved that no ADF personnel were injured by this reckless, dangerous and foolish move. It does not build trust between our nations.

"The Coalition calls on Richard Marles to stand up for our ADF personnel and raise this incident directly with his Chinese counterpart," Mr Hastie added.

 

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BREAKING: The Chinese state has hacked the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence, Sky News understands.
 

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BREAKING : #China has hacked the #UK Ministry of Defence

MPs will be told on Tuesday of a massive data breach involving the Ministry of Defence, targeting service personnel.

The government will not name the country involved, but Sky News understands this to be China.

The Chinese state is to be accused of two or three attempts at hacking MoD employees - including personnel.

The cyberattack was on a payroll system with current service personnel and some veterans. It is largely names and bank details that have been exposed.

The MoD has been working at speed over the last 72 hours to understand the scale of the hack.

This could raise questions about whether other countries with challenging relationships with China will want to share sensitive intelligence with the UK.

This comes fewer than two months after China's "state-affiliated actors" have been blamed by the government for two "malicious" cyberattack campaigns in the UK.

Making a speech in the Commons, Deputy Prime Minister Oliver Dowden revealed the two incidents involved an attack on the Electoral Commission - responsible for overseeing elections and political finance - in 2021, and targeted attacks against China-sceptic MPs.

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BREAKING: The Chinese state has hacked the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence, Sky News understands.
 

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Japan’s leader of the right-wing populist Sansei Party Sohei Kamiya responds to Biden’s claim that Japan is xenophobic: "It's not that we're xenophobic, we are being cautious after seeing your failures. You are meddling too much in our internal affairs."
 

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#SouthKorea brings hypersonic tech to the #AUKUS table in a sign Seoul is moving closer to the US and its other allies.


South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik has confirmed Seoul is in talks to take part in Pillar 2 of the defence alliance.

Analysts say South Korea could ‘bring a great deal of expertise to any collaboration’ with its hypersonic weapons knowledge.

Advanced South Korean hypersonic technology would be a “good contributor” to Aukus in standing up against China’s weapons, and Seoul’s desire to join the security pact signals it is leaning further towards the US and its other allies, analysts say.

The assessment follows confirmation from South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik that his country is in talks to take part in Aukus, and possibly join Pillar 2 of the US-led trilateral defence alliance between Australia, Britain and America.

In Melbourne on Wednesday, Shin took part in a 2+2 meeting – which are talks involving foreign and defence ministers – between Australia and South Korea.

He confirmed the two countries discussed the possibility that South Korea could contribute to the defence technology sharing pact between Australia, Britain and the US.

“During today’s meeting, we also discussed the possibility of partnering with Aukus Pillar 2,” Shin said.“We support Aukus Pillar 2 activities and we do welcome that members are considering Korea as an Aukus Pillar 2 partner.

”It was the first time Seoul had confirmed its discussion to join the alliance. Last month the Aukus defence chiefs said the three countries were considering expanding the second pillar of Aukus, naming Japan as one of the possible future member states.

Beijing has criticised Tokyo’s possible participation in Aukus, arguing that Japan should “earnestly reflect on its history of aggression, abandon the practice of forming a small military and security circle and truly pursue the path of peaceful development”.

Launched in 2021, Aukus has two key pillars: Pillar 1 supports Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines, while Pillar 2 focuses on cutting-edge technologies, including quantum computing, artificial intelligence and hypersonics.

While the first pillar is limited to the core trio with no plans for additional member states, the expansion would take place in the second pillar, where not only Japan but also South Korea, New Zealand and Canada were reportedly listed as prospective partners.

“Korea is a country with deeply impressive technology where we do have shared values,” Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said after the 2+2 meeting.

“As Aukus Pillar 2 develops, there will be opportunities in the future, and we’re seeing that play out in relation to Japan as well.”

Hypersonic technology is one of the core areas in Pillar 2 that Seoul is likely to contribute to. Hypersonic missiles travel more than five times faster than the speed of sound and approach targets from a much lower angle, making them harder to detect with conventional missile defence systems.

Only two countries – Russia and China – are reportedly operating hypersonic missiles in their militaries, while the US and its allies are still in the development phase of supersonic weapons technology.

The US cancelled its development plans for a hypersonic AGM-183A air-launched rapid response weapon in 2023 after repeated test failures, focusing instead on developing smaller hypersonic attack cruise missile systems.

South Korea has also been developing hypersonic missile technology in response to recent threats from North Korea’s continuous nuclear and ballistic missile programme that included the development of its own supersonic missile technologies.

In August 2020, then-South Korean defence minister Jeong Kyeong-doo first revealed Seoul’s development plans for hypersonic missiles. A test prototype of a South Korean hypersonic cruise missile, dubbed “Hycore” was then revealed in 2021.

Hycore will reportedly start testing this year. It is expected to have a speed of up to Mach 6.2 and start its service by the early 2030s as air-to-ground missiles on South Korea’s home-grown fighter jet KF-21 Boramae.

Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that adding South Korea’s advanced defence and high technology sector, including its developments in priority areas such as hypersonics, would be a “good contributor” to Aukus Pillar 2.

“I think an ability to collaborate on key projects in long-range strike via hypersonics, as well as counter-hypersonic defensive systems, would enable the ROK [Republic of Korea] to bring a great deal of expertise to any collaboration, and potentially open up new avenues for development,” Davis said.

“For example, one area that could be pursued beyond military technologies would be hypersonic-based rapid space access, and that would build into the critical opportunities for space collaboration between Australia and the ROK in the space sector.”

Davis stressed that a “perceived challenge from authoritarian adversaries” was the main driver making hypersonics a priority area in Aukus Pillar 2.

“[China and Russia] are more advanced in their development and deployment of such technologies and the tactical benefits of prompt strike capabilities with enhanced range, and an ability to penetrate integrated air and missile defences,” Davis said.

“It’s absolutely vital that the Aukus members and their partners such as South Korea and Japan develop both the offensive hypersonic strike capabilities to hold at risk Chinese forces at greater range, and also develop effective counter-hypersonic systems to defeat Chinese hypersonic threats.”

Since 2019, Beijing has operated the DF-17, a medium-range missile system equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). With a range of 1,600km (1,000 miles), the DF-17’s “primary purpose” is “striking foreign military bases and fleets in the western Pacific”, according to a Pentagon report in 2022.

There is also the DF-27, an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle and a range of 5,000 to 8,000km – enough to strike Hawaii from the Chinese mainland – which China has reportedly had since at least 2019.

Davis said Beijing would “strongly oppose” any move by Seoul to support or take part in the defence technology sharing partnership.

“It is certain that China will criticise and probably pressure Seoul to step back from such a move, and may try to exploit internal political dynamics in ROK,” he said.

James Lewis, a senior vice-president and director of the strategic technologies programme at the Washington-based think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said Seoul’s participation in Aukus Pillar 2 would be a way to “signal that it is moving closer to the US and its allies”.

“The Koreans probably hope that tech cooperation is less provocative. Korea is rethinking its foreign policy, and while it would prefer to not provoke China, they are not willing to be a tributary state,” Lewis said.

“It’s also a signal to China that playing the neighbourhood bully has consequences. ROK looking at Aukus is a political gesture short of military alliance but moving a step closer.

“On the technology point, the ROK is worried that it is losing its technological edge and looking for outside help to rejuvenate. Aukus might be good for that as an antidote for tech parochialism.”

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Au Contraire, Macron
Dalibor Roháč



Xi Jinping’s state visit to France this week was a perfect reflection of Europe’s conventional wisdom about China: It treats China simultaneously as “a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival.” Accordingly, Europe must employ delicate balancing acts and tact in pushing against China’s economic and trade practices, as well as against its backing for Russia in its war against Ukraine.

At the same time, Europe is far from ready for a meaningful economic “decoupling” from China. While mutual trade fell for largely technical reasons between 2022 and 2023, the two economies remain intertwined. A number of European companies have even been ramping up their investment and production in China. There is also the lingering notion that, for all its flaws, China remains an important stakeholder in the international system, and that addressing truly global challenges such as climate will be impossible without Beijing on board.

But what if reality is far less complicated than that? China’s “no-limits” partnership with Russia is making the former a co-belligerent by proxy in a major land war on European soil—one that most Europeans, including President Emmanuel Macron, see as a direct threat to the Continent’s security.

Xi’s promise in Paris to “refrain from selling any arms" to Russia and "to strictly control the exportation of double-usage goods" rings more than a bit hollow in the light of China’s actual behavior so far throughout the war. This has entailed massive deliveries of drone and missile components and other dual-use technologies, geospatial intelligence, purchases of sanctioned Russian oil—not to mention, turning a blind eye to munition exports from North Korea to Russia, which Beijing could stop in a heartbeat.

Even the design of Xi’s trip to Europe seemed calibrated to signal his disdain. Xi snubbed Brussels and thus forced the Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, to herself make the trip to Paris to assist in a trilateral meeting at the Elysée. In contrast, by adding stops in Belgrade and Budapest, two capitals that have played less than constructive roles in European politics and in maintaining regional stability, China’s dictator is putting his disregard for his French hosts and their partners and allies on full display.

By playing along, President Macron is undoing some of the successes of his earlier charm offensive in Eastern Europe. Since the the beginning of the war, the French leader has has used much tougher rhetoric toward Russiathan before, though not always matched by deeds, whether in terms of military assistance to Kyiv or in terms of France’s military build-up.

For a number of Eastern European governments, such as Lithuania or the Czech Republic, distrust of Beijing has become integral to their own positioning on the global stage. Supportive gestures towards Taiwan and restrictions on Chinese technology have also bought these countries a significant amount of goodwill and access in Washington, which they see as the main guarantor of their own security. French displays of goodwill toward China will not come across as reassuring in Prague or Vilnius.

To be fair, the Lithuanian and Czech strategy is itself not without risks. While it is commonly assumed that U.S. foreign policy will be defined by America’s geopolitical competition with China, the debate over Ukraine assistance has demonstrated just how ephemeral the geopolitical commitments of many U.S. politicians are, including of the former U.S. president. Trump likes to talk tough about China but his policies were oftentimes much softer. As my American Enterprise Institute colleague Derek Scissors notes, it is entirely conceivable that Trump will seek yet another “deal” with “his friend” Xi, rather than follow a consistent strategy to weaken China. If Trump is threatening to impose a 60 percent tariff now, “why didn’t he in 2018? Why not as a response to COVID? If a 60 percent tariff is needed, what does that say about Trump’s tariff when he signed a trade deal with China they almost immediately broke?”

Even among the highest intellectual echelons of Trump-era policymaking regarding China, one can now hear qualifications to the idea that the United States ought to jump to Taiwan’s defenses. As Elbridge Colby tweeted recently, “Americans are war-weary and more skeptical of military interventions. Taiwan matters a great deal to Americans. But it’s not existential and it’s remote to most.”

It is thus perfectly imaginable, from the perspective of Macron and other China doves in Europe, that taking America’s side more decisively may be a losing proposition. The EU would absorb the cost of its “decoupling” and other disruptions without any guarantee of ever capitalizing on its putative benefits, especially if the next administration ends up being as mercurial as the one that ran the U.S. government between 2016 and 2021.

For this reason alone, it is hard to lambast Macron’s controversial statement last year about the risk of Europe’s being dragged like a “vassal” into a conflict that is “not its own.” Of course, Europeans should not blindly follow Washington’s lead on China or on other matters. Their China policy should reflect their interests, particularly at a time of great uncertainty over the role that the United States will play on the global stage.

Nevertheless, Europe’s own interests are much clearer than the awkward, convoluted balancing between “competition,” “rivalry,” and “partnership” seems to suggest. With its role in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, China is effectively waging a proxy war against Europe. Instead of rolling out sanctions against Chinese entities directly involved in the “no limits” partnership, the negotiations in Paris seemed pre-occupied with dissuading the Chinese from restrictions on imports of … cognac.

It is simply not the case that Europe has no leverage over the Chinese. Beijing does need the EU look the other way in the case of its hostile takeover of Taiwan or in other prospective conflicts with the United States. The current situation suggests that Xi is simply taking for granted that Europe will remain too divided and too weak to matter in such situations. But that’s hardly a win for the notion of Europe’s strategic autonomy.

The point is not Europe’s belligerence toward China for its own sake or to please Washington—or even for the sake of higher causes such as human rights and Beijing’s treatment of minorities. Rather, the EU is failing a far more basic test of standing up for its own, narrow interests.

The problem, of course, extends to economic questions. Europeans are not victims without agency in the story of the impending demise of Europe’s automobile industry at the hands of Chinese EVs. The looming threat is a direct result of prioritizing other matters—specifically, decarbonization—at the expense of relatively straightforward geopolitical considerations. Change the policy by abandoning the hyper-ambitious emissions targets that are unlikely to make a dent in global climate change without other large global actors playing along, and China’s glut of EVs might start looking more like a liability than an asset.

Europe has its issues—from slow economic growth and complacent politics, to an insufficient defense industrial base, to questions about the future strength of America’s security umbrella. But the largest of its problems is a lack of self-confidence and the willingness to act from a position of strength, especially on matters that are vitally important to the Continent’s future. Unless that changes, not only through rhetoric but also through concrete policies, Xi’s arrogance and his support for Europe’s adversaries will only escalate.

Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a contributing editor with American Purpose.

Image: A French flag on the exterior of a building. (Unsplash: Lisadelarte)
 

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@ianellisjones
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China accomplished what it set out to do in February — normalize military activity around & within Kinmen’s waters, operating with near impunity & establishing a permanent presence at Taiwan’s strategic frontline island.

Gradually, then suddenly — the Kinmen Crisis

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jward

passin' thru
Philippine coast guard won't allow China reclamation at disputed shoal, official says
Reuters

~1 minute

MANILA, May 13 (Reuters) - The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is committed to sustain a presence in a disputed area of the South China Sea to ensure China does not carrying our reclamation activities at the Sabina Shoal, its spokesperson said on Monday.

The PCG said on Saturday it has deployed ships to Sabina Shoal, where it accused China of building an artificial island, amid an escalating maritime row.
 

jward

passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Defense
@IndoPac_Info
#Philippines Coast Guard vows ‘prolonged presence’ in Sabina Shoal amid #Chinese sightings


The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said Saturday it would maintain a “prolonged presence” in Escoda Shoal, commonly known as Sabina Shoal, following the sightings of Chinese vessels and the discovery of dumped crushed corals in the feature.

The PCG, under the instruction of PCG Commandant Admiral Ronnie Gavan, deployed BRP Teresa Magbanua on April 15 after receiving an intelligence report that the Chinese were conducting unauthorized marine research in the feature.

In the Saturday News Forum in Quezon City, PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea, Commodore Jay Tarriela, said this is the PCG’s “longest” deployment on record in the West Philippine Sea, with BRP Cabra and BRP Malabrigo also conducting rotational deployment from the shoal to Rozul Reef.

In its initial dives to assess the shoal, Tarriela said, the PCG found that some of its sand bars have expanded in size due to the dumped corals.

The two research vessels, he said, circle the entire feature and deploy the service boats that ferry different types of instruments and divers to the seabed.

“We are thinking that they are actually measuring something here in Escoda Shoal, and they have been providing the data to the mother boats,” Tarriela said.

Throughout BRP Teresa Magbanua’s stay, the PCG also spotted People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy vessels with bow numbers 622, 537, and 570, as well as a PLA Navy helicopter loitering in the area.

Also sighted were Chinese Coast Guard vessels 4402, 21555, 21556, and 3303, alongside more than 30 other Chinese maritime militia vessels monitoring the PCG’s movement.

“These are the same vessels that they are deploying in Ayungin Shoal, but again, let me stress the fact that Ayungin Shoal ay mas malayo pa sa Sabina Shoal, yet these vessels are getting nearer sa atin at nagpapalagi na sila ngayon sa Sabina Shoal,” Tarriela said.

Sabina Shoal is about 75 nautical miles away from mainland Palawan and is situated well within the country’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Tarriela explained that the PCG could technically take into custody these researchers for conducting unauthorized activities within the country’s waters but is unable to do so due to incessant interference from the Chinese Coast Guard.

“Every time they deploy their service boats who will bring divers to the seabed, the PCG would also bring rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB),” he shared.

“By the time we reach the service boats of these marine scientists, nagde-deploy na rin ang China ng limang RHIB para harangan ang PCG. In terms of the resources and the forces that they can deploy, obviously, that answers your question.”

Tarriela, however, said the current deployment of BRP Teresa Magbanua is proving to be effective in deterring what he believes is China’s attempt at “small-scale reclamation.”

“The main objective of our prolonged presence in Sabina Shoal is to prevent the Chinese government in carrying out their illegal action of reclamation and possible reclamation in Sabina Shoal. And for 26 days, we have been very successful in doing that,” he said.
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1790336972885836073
 

jward

passin' thru

nknews.org
Kim Jong Un lauds tactical weapon ‘breakthrough’ to aid war preparations | NK News


New missile system the latest progress in DPRK military production scheme set to conclude by year’s end

Kim Jong Un walks past transporter erector launchers as part of an inspection of a new "tactical missile weapon system" on May 14, 2024 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (May 15, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected a new “tactical missile weapon system” for the Korean People’s Army (KPA) as it prepares for war, state media reported Wednesday.

Kim linked the military “breakthrough” to an overall production plan North Korea’s armed forces are supposed to complete by the end of the year. KPA artillery units “tasked with an important firing duty” will reportedly receive the new weapon system.

The Rodong Sinmun added that the DPRK’s defense industry enterprises under the Second Economic Commission tasked with overseas sales of military equipment have fulfilled the production plan for the first half of 2024.

The missile launchers produced in that period will be deployed and used by the KPA “Western Operations Group,” the paper reported. State media did not specify the name and type of the new missile system or the factories charged with its production.

Photos released by the Rodong Sinmun feature Kim Jong Un touring what appears to be a large hangar with multiple transporter erector launchers likely produced at the facility.

Kim Jong Un and top military officials are inspecting transporter erector launchers linked to the DPRK’s plan of producing a “new tactical missile weapon system” on May 14, 2024 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (May 15, 2024)

On his inspection tour Tuesday, Kim Jong Un was accompanied by key military brass, including KPA marshal Pak Jong Chon, director of the party’s munitions industry department Jo Chun Ryong and DPRK defense chief Kang Sun Nam.

The report follows Kim Jong Un’s visit to the production site of the newly “modernized” 240mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), which is also supervised by the Second Economic Commission, the agency that manages weapons production and directs foreign sales through the sanctioned Korea Mining Development and Trading Corporation.

Experts told NK News at the time that North Korea is seeking to export the system abroad to countries like Iran or Russia, using the MLRS’s precision and fire capabilities as a likely selling point.

Edited by Arius Derr
 

jward

passin' thru
China's Mysterious Stealthy Warship Has Headed Out To Sea
Joseph Trevithick, Oliver Parken



A new stealthy Chinese corvette or light frigate has ostensibly made its maiden voyage. The ship's design has some broad similarities to Sweden's radar-evading Visby class corvettes, including a main gun that sits concealed inside low observable cupola when not in use, but is larger by all indications. How fast work on this vessel seems to be progressing also speaks to the scale and scope of China's shipbuilding capacity, something that presents huge challenges for even the country's most well-equipped competitors, principally the United States. Just two weeks ago, China's first indigenously-designed carrier, which features catapults and other major enhancements, also set out on its inaugural sea trials.

Images of the ship at sea emerged on social media over the weekend. Exactly when the ship left port, where it has sailed, and whether it has already returned to port, are unclear.

Something for the naval guys ... seems as if that small stealthy unknown corvette - or light frigate-sized surface combatant - is out at sea. Based on what i found it is an undesignated “comprehensive test platform”. @AlexLuck9 @CovertShores @navalnewscom @xaviervav @horobeyo

The first clear look at this ship emerged in November 2023, in the form of a picture taken at Liaoning Shipyard, also known as Dalian Liaoning South Shipyard. Satellite imagery indicates that the vessel had been under construction there since at least August of last year, according to Tom Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) think tank.
China's mysterious stealthy ship pictured in November 2023. Unknown author/Chinese internet

In addition to the concealed main gun on the bow, the picture that appeared online last November looked to show a vertical launch system array in front of the main superstructure and a flight deck at the stern. From what we have seen to date, the ship otherwise has a design that puts a premium on low-observable (stealthy) features. These include an integrated mast structure atop the bridge and a lack of major aerials and radar-reflecting fixtures on its superstructure or deck. Smooth planar and faceted surfaces that are inward canted above the ship's waist dominate its design. This is similar to a tumblehome-like configuration which gets progressively narrower above the waterline, but in this case, the lower hull remains outwardly flared. Sweden's stealthy Visbly class corvettes and the U.S. Navy's Zumwalt class stealth destroyers feature forms of tumblehome designs.
Swedish Visbly class corvette HSwMS Karlstad and a Royal Navy Merlin helicopter take part in a surface exercise with partnering NATO warships whilst participating in BALTOPS 20, June 12, 2020. Dan Rosenbaum/MOD
USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) transits the Atlantic Ocean during acceptance trials, April 21, 2016. U.S. Navy

Size-wise, Shugart has estimated the length of the new stealthy warship to be around 97 meters (318 feet) based on comparisons to non-stealthy Type 056 corvettes — NATO reporting name Jiangdao class — also seen in the relevant satellite imagery below. The baseline Type 056 is known to be 90 meters (295 feet) long, as well as having a displacement of around 1,500 tons. Liaoning Shipyard has also produced Type 056s in the past.

What intended uses China has for its new stealthy vessel remains unclear. Andreas Rupprecht, a longtime China observer and contributor to The War Zone, wrote on X that it most likely represents an undesignated "comprehensive test platform," based on the information he found.

Shugart noted much the same in response to questions we put to him about the ship via email. "There have been rumors that this design is some kind of test platform, and that might be the case," he said. "Or it might be the PLA Navy’s next class of corvette — at this point, it’s hard to know for sure. That said, we have yet to see construction of any additional hulls of this type, whereas with the construction of the new Type 054B frigate, we quickly saw units under construction at multiple shipyards. Perhaps the PLA Navy will take a wait-and-see approach, as this is quite a different design, with what appears to be a focus on low-observability features."
A close-up of the stealthy ship's bow. Unknown author/Weibo

Regardless, a new class of stealthy corvettes would be very valuable for the PLAN, and could be used in a number of roles, particularly in littoral zones.

"Assuming this class ended up being a replacement for older Chinese corvettes, I would expect it to have a role in escort missions, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and perhaps point air defense," Shugart said. This would be broadly similar to the multi-mission capability of the aforementioned Type 056 corvettes when in service with the PLAN. In late 2021, the PLAN began transferring its 22 Type 056 corvettes, the first of which was commissioned in early 2013, to China's Coast Guard. The PLAN presently has 50 Type 056A corvettes in active service, the first of which was commissioned in late 2014, which primarily perform ASW operations.

However, unlike the Type 056, the mystery vessel's stealthy qualities could be particularly attractive for the PLAN. Still, it is important to remember that its low observable design does not make it invisible to radar; but it does make the vessel harder to spot and classify on radar at a distance. It would be especially challenging to pinpoint and engage at long ranges in littoral zones due to it appearing like, and blending in with smaller boat traffic on radar and operating among the geographic clutter.

Congested littoral zones, like those within the First Island Chain, are of critical significance to the PLAN. An area of the Pacific inside a boundary formed by the first line of archipelagos out from mainland East Asia, the First Island Chain encompasses islands Beijing lays claim to, such as the Senkakus. Moreover, the First Island Chain also stretches into the highly strategic South China Sea. Beijing has declared that the vast majority of that body of water belongs to China, and has militarized much of the region — namely via the construction of man-made island fortresses.
A Pentagon infographic showing the geographic boundaries of the First and Second Island Chains. U.S. DoD

There is also the possibility that a stealthy new corvette fleet could be used by the PLAN in a dedicated mainland coastal defense capacity; allowing other vessels, like Type 054A frigates, to conduct other blue water-type missions.

It should also be mentioned that the appearance of the stealthy corvette fits with the broader trend towards heavily armed corvettes and light frigates globally.

Whatever the case, there's little doubt that the development of the mysterious stealthy vessel has been extremely fast — even by Shugart's estimations. "The fact that the new corvette is already on sea trials constitutes an incredibly fast construction timeline. I first spotted the ship under construction in August of last year, and now we have the ship on sea trials in May, nine months later," he told us.

This is of course symptomatic of China's rapidly expanded shipbuilding capability of late. Almost a year ago, the Office of Naval Intelligence sounded the alarm that China's shipbuilding capacity is over 200 times that of the U.S. Mixed in with this, the country has been able to build increasingly more capable ships too, meaning that quality is improving, at least in some regards, with overall quantity.

In contrast to China's rapid shipbuilding, "the U.S. Navy’s new Constellation class frigate was originally scheduled to have a 48-month period from construction start to delivery, and now we have statements from the Navy of significant delays past that timeline," Shugart said.

It will be interesting to see what, if anything, comes of China's new stealthy ship. But, if the speedy construction of the vessel is anything to go by, it is likely we won't have to wait long to find out what that is.
 

jward

passin' thru
asiatimes.com
Hungary is helping Europe kiss decoupling goodbye
Gladden Pappin



With the visit of Xi Jinping to Paris and Budapest last week, it’s clear that Europe and China are not breaking up—and that France and especially Hungary are keys to a productive relationship.

Behind the Chinese president’s visit to these two EU capitals, some analysts have suggested a sinister agenda to divide Europe within itself or separate it from the United States.

But today, the only division within Europe appears to be between those who recognize that European strength depends on connectivity and those who imagine that Europe can restrict its way to strength. In that contrast, the strategic leadership now belongs to Budapest.

In recent years, both Paris and Budapest have been advocating for a more articulate European role in the emerging multipolar world order. While France has prioritized the language of strategic autonomy, Hungary has focused on articulating a national strategy of connectivity.

On his visits to the two countries, the Chinese leader signed 18 agreements in each of the two locations. But industrial development through foreign investment—not only through China’s Belt and Road framework but from many other partners, as well—has begun to occur in Hungary on a different scale.

During the heyday of globalization in the 1990s, it was the departure of Western industry for China that became known as the “China Shock” phenomenon. But while European industry continues to lag—EU industrial production declined about 5.4% between February 2023 and 2024—Hungary has nearly doubled its FDI stock since 2010 and, according to the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, is defying regional downtrends. Inward investment is now driving reindustrialization.

Because of Hungary’s history and geographic location, it was early in spotting the trend toward bloc formation that began a few years ago. Hungary’s response was to adopt a different mindset and pursue national industrial strength on the basis of connectivity with all partners.

Connectivity isn’t about ideological alignment. It’s about leveraging Hungary’s role as an east-west crossroads to build an economy that serves the Hungarian people and fosters political and cultural exchange—whether the incoming connections are from Germany, the United States, China, South Korea or anywhere else.

On a broader scale, the connectivity model underlying Hungary’s strategy is based on the view that the intricate links that have developed between West and East shouldn’t be severed but rather leveraged.

Particularly in Europe, this now seems to be an imperative of some urgency. European economies have been stagnant since energy sanctions imperiled many manufacturers. To regain its competitive strength, Europe needs to maintain and expand its economic openness.

Hungary isn’t alone in its recognition of this. Alfred Kammer, the IMF’s European director, recently stated that “our number-one advice to Europe is, don’t become protectionist.”

Even the current Polish government recognizes this situation. In a recent speech to the Sejm, Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski called for peaceful competition between China and the United States. “We do not want to choose,” he said, “between having good relations with a major trade partner on the one hand, and the most important security provider on the other.”

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also recently pointed out that Germany, too, doesn’t want to decouple from China.

Yet without positive discussion of this on the European level, the cooling international environment around EU-China relations leads to large opportunity costs.

Recently the European Union launched a number of investigations into Chinese firms. The European Commission began an inquiry into Chinese medical device manufacturers as well as to TikTok. Its investigation into the Chinese EV industry has also been ongoing since late last year, and European officials are now expressing concerns about Chinese buses.

These measures are counterproductive, as the underlying problem concerns Europe’s own lack of competitiveness. European consumers would be happy with cheap Western-made solar panels, electric cars and wind turbines. But for Europe to exclude Chinese EVs, a devastating 55% tariff would be necessary, according to the Rhodium Group.

To place this in perspective, the aggressive EU tariff on American cars is currently 10%. Instead of competing on industrial capacity or price, the “one field where the European Union still leads the world,” as the Wall Street Journal put it recently, is now regulation. Evidently a different mindset is needed in Brussels.

The Hungarian case represents a different possibility—that warm bilateral relations can underlie projects of reindustrialization. The Hungarian strategy has involved attracting Chinese (and other) manufacturers to physical operations within the European Union, on the view that this strategy is not in conflict with promoting domestic manufacturing, but rather supportive of it.

China-Hungary industrial cooperation has focused principally on Hungary’s role in the automobile supply chain. Hungary is the location of CATL’s second European battery factory, and the southern Hungarian city of Szeged will be the site of BYD’s first European electric car factory.

After last week’s visit, it’s clear that Budapest’s path isn’t just words. In 2023, China became Hungary’s biggest single investor with almost 11 billion euros of investment, amounting to 6.5% of GDP.

During the Chinese president’s visit, Hungary announced a number of new substantive industrial projects—including a rail ring bypassing Budapest that will facilitate the westward shipment of manufactures; a high-speed connection from the Budapest airport to the city; a national network for charging electric cars; and a comprehensive agreement on nuclear cooperation.

The larger story here is that Europe needs to articulate its own interests on the international stage. If European economies followed a similar path, they could focus on their strengths while not simply hemorrhaging industrial capacity to areas beyond their shores. Neither great power—neither the United States nor China—should drive a wedge between Europe and the other.

In the changing geopolitical environment, Europe must adopt a strategy of prudent connectivity and articulate it as an important element of European strategy. Otherwise, its open economic framework will suffer as tensions between China and the United States lead to greater pressure on Europe to decouple, which would in turn injure the European economy.

Further, a shift of American military posture toward Asia could also heighten the demands on Europe to provide for its own defense. But since a decoupled Europe would be industrially weak, a connectivity strategy is also necessary to heighten Europe’s defense-industrial capability.

As I have argued elsewhere, American interests would be poorly served by attempting to pressure Europe into a course of decoupling that it could not ultimately follow. While the United States appears to be going in a more protectionist direction, Europe is not in a position to tilt toward economic warfare with China.

The path that the United States has taken in recent years emerged because of American industrial decline and the American role as a Pacific power. In order to adjudicate its own concerns effectively, though, the United States shouldn’t attempt to drag the rest of the world into tensions that few others want to participate.

In his speech alongside the Chinese president, Viktor Orban said “now we live in a multipolar world order—and one of the structural pillars of this new world order is the People’s Republic of China.”

After 30 years of globalization, the global economy is far too intertwined to be pulled apart easily. EU investigations won’t rebuild European industry but rather create a climate of suspicion that’s injurious to business development.

While the Brussels vision of Europe’s role continues to push for “de-risking” the Europe-China relationship, Budapest has embarked on an industrialization strategy aimed at contributing to national and European sovereignty.

The European decisions that follow in the coming months will tell us a lot about whether the EU wants to become a thriving economy and a pole in the multipolar world order—or wants to allow its interests to be undermined by more powerful forces.

Gladden Pappin is president of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Hungary’s foreign policy research institute of state.
 
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