INTL Region In Focus: The Sahel, it's issues with terrorism, it's coups and it's future

[jward]

africa, and the Sahel in particular, have seen the most rapid growth in extremist activity in recent years. As France transitions out, the counterterrorism efforts are likely to suffer, it is likely to grow exponentially worse. This, along with the burgeoning # of coups ocuring in the area, seem to justify one of those dreaded deep dive focuses/threads:

Region In Focus

The Sahel​

Islamist fighters in Mali. (Photo: Magharebia)
The Sahel has seen the most rapid growth in violent extremist activity of any region in Africa over the past two years. The region is also a nexus of criminal networks and illicit trafficking and has experienced a rise in farmer-herder violence. The Sahel, moreover, has the fastest population growth rate on the continent, despite being among the poorest and facing some of the most fragile environmental conditions. Consequently, migrants from the Sahel constitute a significant share of those trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. All the while, emerging democratic institutions are trying to gain traction in the region. Here is a selection of Africa Center work on the region.

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Burkina Faso Crisis Continues to Spiral
August 29, 2023

Following two military coups d’état in 2022, militant Islamist groups in Burkina Faso have moved to encircle Ouagadougou leaving a trail of unprecedented violence in their wake.

Burkina Faso Crisis Continues to Spiral – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Following two military coups d’état in 2022, militant Islamist groups in Burkina Faso have moved to encircle Ouagadougou leaving a trail of violence.

africacenter.org

African Militant Islamist Group-Linked Fatalities at All-Time High
July 31, 2023

A 50-percent spike in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia over the past year has eclipsed the previous high in 2015 when Boko Haram was at its most lethal phase.

African Militant Islamist Group-Linked Fatalities at All-Time High – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

A 50 percent spike in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia over the past year.

africacenter.org

Attempted Coup in Niger: Backgrounder
July 27, 2023

The attempted military coup in Niger threatens to undermine the relative progress the country has made under its civilian democratic leaders and amplifies Niger’s risks for insecurity, economic crises, and political instability.

Attempted Coup in Niger: Backgrounder

The attempted military coup in Niger threatens to undermine the relative progress the country has made under its civilian democratic leaders.

africacenter.org

Mali Catastrophe Accelerating under Junta Rule
July 10, 2023

The threat of militant Islamist groups is spreading to all parts of Mali as the military junta stakes its claim to stay in power indefinitely.

Mali Catastrophe Accelerating under Junta Rule – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The threat of militant Islamist groups is spreading to all parts of Mali as the military junta stakes its claim to stay in power indefinitely.

africacenter.org

Malian Military Junta Scuttles Security Partnerships while Militant Violence Surges
February 27, 2023

The military junta in Mali has alienated regional and international security partners amid escalating violence by militant Islamist groups, leading to a spike in civilian fatalities.
Map of Militant Islamist Group Activity in 2022

Mali Junta Scuttles Security Partnerships while Violence Surges

The military junta in Mali has alienated regional and international security partners amid escalating violence by militant Islamist groups.

africacenter.org

Fatalities from Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Surge by Nearly 50 Percent
February 6, 2023

Continuing a decade-long upward trend, violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa increased by 22 percent while fatalities surged by 48 percent over the past year.
“Non-Transition” Orchestrated by Chad’s Military Government Goes Awry

Fatalities from Islamist Violence in Africa Up Nearly 50%

Continuing a decade-long trend, Islamist violence in Africa increased by 22 percent while fatalities surged by 48 percent over the past year.

africacenter.org

“Transition” Orchestrated by Chad’s Military Goes Awry
By Daniel Eizenga
November 15, 2022

The violent crackdown on the peaceful opposition in Chad exposes the coercive intimidation behind the military junta’s unwillingness to facilitate a genuine democratic transition.
Understanding Burkina Faso’s Latest Coup

“Transition” Orchestrated by Chad’s Military Goes Awry – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The violent crackdown on the peaceful opposition in Chad exposes the the junta’s unwillingness to facilitate a democratic transition.

africacenter.org

Understanding Burkina Faso’s Latest Coup
October 28, 2022

Two coups d’état in 9 months mark the latest inflection point in Burkina Faso’s political instability, causing heightened uncertainty as the country faces an escalating militant Islamist threat.
Five Zones of Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel

Understanding Burkina Faso’s Latest Coup

Two coups d’état in 9 months have causing heightened uncertainty as Burkina Faso faces an escalating militant Islamist threat.

africacenter.org

Five Zones of Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel
September 26, 2022

The deterioration of the security environment in the western Sahel is marked by an array of differing actors, drivers, and motivations, calling for contextualized responses.
Mali’s Militant Islamist Insurgency at Bamako’s Doorstep

Five Zones of Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel

The spike in violence in the western Sahel is marked by differing actors, drivers, and motivations, calling for contextualized responses.

africacenter.org

Mali’s Militant Islamist Insurgency at Bamako’s Doorstep
August 29, 2022

Militant Islamist group violence is accelerating in Mali, advancing a complex insurgency in north, central, and increasingly southern Mali that further threatens the country’s stability.
ASB41EN Strengthening Sahelian Counterinsurgency Capacity

Mali’s Militant Islamist Insurgency at Bamako’s Doorstep – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Militant Islamist group violence is accelerating in Mali, advancing a complex insurgency in north, central, and increasingly southern Mali that further threatens the country’s stability.

africacenter.org

Strengthening Sahelian Counterinsurgency Strategy
By Michael Shurkin
July 25, 2022

Adapting Sahelian force structures to lighter, more mobile, and integrated units will better support the population-centric COIN practices needed to reverse the escalating trajectory of violent extremist attacks.

Strengthening Sahelian Counterinsurgency Strategy – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Lighter, more mobile, and integrated units will better support counterinsurgency practices needed to reverse extremist attacks in the Sahel.

africacenter.org

Record 36 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced
July 19, 2022

Conflict continues to drive Africa’s record levels of population displacement. Africa’s 36 million forcibly displaced persons represent 44 percent of the global total.

Record 36 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Conflict continues to drive Africa’s record levels of population displacement. Africa’s 36 million forcibly displaced persons represent 44 percent of the global total.

africacenter.org

Mapping Disinformation in Africa
April 26, 2022

Russia has pioneered a model of disinformation to gain political influence in Africa that is now being replicated by other actors across the continent.

Mapping Disinformation in Africa – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Russia has pioneered a model of disinformation to gain political influence in Africa that is now being replicated by other actors across the continent.

africacenter.org

Debunking the Malian Junta’s Claims
April 12, 2022

Mali’s military coup has thrust the country into a deeper security crisis as the junta quashes dissent and resists a democratic transition.

Debunking the Malian Junta’s Claims – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Mali’s military coup has thrust the country into a deeper security crisis as the junta quashes dissent and resists a democratic transition.

africacenter.org

The Growing Threat of Violent Extremism in Coastal West Africa
By Leif Brottem
March 15, 2022

Sahelian militant Islamist groups are threatening border areas of littoral states where grievances held by pastoralist communities may provide an entry point for extremist interests.

The Growing Threat of Violent Extremism in Coastal West Africa – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Sahelian militant Islamist groups are threatening border areas of littoral states where grievances held by pastoralist communities may provide an entry point for extremist interests.

africacenter.org

Trajectories of Violence Against Civilians by Africa’s Militant Islamist Groups
By Anouar Boukhars
February 8, 2022

Extremist group violence against civilians is driven by context-specific factors—outgroup grievances, intimidation to control territory, and a response to heavy-handed security responses—that require enhanced community-level mitigation and military professionalism.
Surge in Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel Dominates Africa’s Fight against Extremists

Trajectories of Violence Against Civilians by Africa’s Militant Islamist Groups – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Extremist group violence against civilians is driven by context-specific factors—outgroup grievances, intimidation to control territory, and a response to heavy-handed security responses—that require enhanced community-level mitigation and military professionalism.

africacenter.org

Surge in Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel Dominates Africa’s Fight against Extremists
January 24, 2022

A 70-percent annual increase in violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel propelled a new record of extremist violence in Africa in 2021.
A Crucial Moment in Chad’s Transition

Surge in Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel Dominates Africa’s Fight against Extremists – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

A 70-percent annual increase in violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel propelled a new record of violent extremist violence in Africa in 2021.

africacenter.org

A Crucial Moment in Chad’s Transition
By Daniel Eizenga
December 17, 2021

Chad's national dialogue will not achieve stability or peace as long as those who support civilian rule and civilian transition continue to be excluded from the transition.

A Crucial Moment in Chad’s Transition – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

At the end of last month, Chad’s military junta, the Conseil Militaire de Transition (CMT), declared a general amnesty for nearly 300 individuals charged

africacenter.org

What the Post-Coup Agreement Means for Sudan’s Democratic Transition
By Joseph Siegle
November 24, 2021

Sudan’s democratic transition is under duress as the military seeks validation for its hold on power via the reinstatement of a figurehead civilian prime minister.
Russia's Wagner Play Undermines the Transition in Mali

What the Post-Coup Agreement Means for Sudan’s Democratic Transition – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Sudan’s democratic transition is under duress as the military seeks validation for its hold on power via the reinstatement of a figurehead civilian prime minister.

africacenter.org

Russia’s Wagner Play Undermines the Transition in Mali
By Joseph Siegle and Daniel Eizenga
September 23, 2021

The prospective deployment of Russia’s Wagner mercenaries should not be confused with addressing Mali’s security situation but is a means of expanding Russian influence while propping up the military junta.
The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa

Russia's Wagner Play Undermines the Transition in Mali – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Français | العربية Reports that Mali’s military junta has negotiated a prospective deal to bring in 1,000 Russian mercenaries from the notorious Wagner

africacenter.org

The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa
By Leif Brottem
July 12, 2021

The rise of farmer-herder violence in Africa is more pernicious than fatality figures alone since it is often amplified by the emotionally potent issues of ethnicity, religion, culture, and land.
Chad’s Ongoing Instability, the Legacy of Idriss Déby

The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The rise of farmer-herder violence in Africa is more pernicious than fatality figures alone since it is often amplified by the emotionally potent issues of ethnicity, religion, culture, and land.

africacenter.org

Chad’s Ongoing Instability, the Legacy of Idriss Déby
By Daniel Eizenga
May 3, 2021

Idriss Déby’s death is an outcome of the ongoing instability perpetuated by his regime. The subsequent military coup d’état led by the late president’s son risks deepening political violence in this geographically strategic country.
Spike in Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Underscores Shifting Security Landscape

Chad’s Ongoing Instability, the Legacy of Idriss Déby – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Idriss Déby’s death is an outcome of the instability perpetuated by his regime. The subsequent coup led by his son risks deepening violence.

africacenter.org

Spike in Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Underscores Shifting Security Landscape
January 29, 2021

A surge of violent events by militant Islamist groups in Africa, led by escalations in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, sets record and widens instability.
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara Expanding Its Threat and Reach in the Sahel

Spike in Militant Islamist Violence in Africa – Africa Center

Violent events by African Islamist groups have surged, led by escalations in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.

africacenter.org

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara Expanding Its Threat and Reach in the Sahel
December 18, 2020

Violence linked to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) more than doubled in the past year. Concentrated along the Burkina Faso-Niger-Mali border areas, ISGS events target civilians nearly half the time.
The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara Expanding Its Threat and Reach in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Violence linked to the ISGS more than doubled in the past year, concentrated along the Burkina Faso-Niger-Mali borders and targeting civilians nearly half the time.

africacenter.org

The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups
in the Sahel
By Daniel Eizenga and Wendy Williams
December 1, 2020

Composed of distinct operational entities, the militant Islamist group coalition Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen serves the role of obscuring the operations of its component parts in the Sahel, thereby inhibiting a more robust response.
The Legacy of Military Governance in Mali
The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups
in the Sahel

The Legacy of Military Governance in Mali
September 25, 2020

After leading a coup against a democratically elected government, junta leader Colonel Assimi Goïta has attempted to rehabilitate the image of military government in Mali.

The Legacy of Military Governance in Mali – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

A military coup on August 18 led by Colonel Assimi Goïta has again pulled Mali into the orbit of military rule. This builds on a long legacy. Mali has had

africacenter.org

Mali: Beware the ‘Popular’ Coup
By Joseph Siegle and Daniel Eizenga
August 30, 2020

Rationalizing a coup because people are in the streets overlooks the reality that nearly every coup is greeted enthusiastically by some. ‘Popular support’ for the coup in Mali has masked a politicized military, opportunistic opposition figures, and Russian meddling.
Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Mauritania

Mali: Beware the ‘Popular’ Coup – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Thousands of cheering Malians came out onto the streets to show their support for the August 18 military coup against democratically-elected president

africacenter.org

 

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Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Mauritania
By Anouar Boukhars
June 16, 2020

Mauritania’s security reforms, including training, enhanced mobility, Special Forces, prudent procurement, and community engagement have strengthened its capability to confront violent extremist groups.

Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Mauritania – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Security reforms in Mauritania, from prudent procurement to community engagement, has strengthened its ability to counter violent extremism.

africacenter.org

Understanding Fulani Perspectives on the Sahel Crisis
By Modibo Ghaly Cissé
April 22, 2020

The disproportionate representation of Fulani in militant Islamist groups in the Sahel has led to the stigmatization of the entire Fulani community. Reversing this will require renewed outreach and trust-building between Fulani leaders, government authorities, and neighboring communities.
Chadian soldiers in Bosso, Niger

Understanding Fulani Perspectives on the Sahel Crisis – Africa Center

The number of Fulani in militant groups in the Sahel has led to stigmatization of the Fulani community. Trust-building among Fulani leaders, government authorities, and neighboring communities will be needed to reverse this.

africacenter.org

Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram
By Daniel Eizenga
April 20, 2020

A rise in Boko Haram and ISWA attacks in Chad has been met with a military surge to clear the area. Enduring success will require a sustained presence and an intensified regional commitment.

Chad and the Escalating Fight against Boko Haram – Africa Center

Boko Haram and ISWA attacks in Chad have been met with a military surge. Enduring success will require sustained presence and regional commitment.

africacenter.org

How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel
By Laurence-Aïda Ammour
February 26, 2020

Rising violence by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel is straining intercommunal tensions, threatening the foundations of social cohesion in the region.
Mali soldiers in Gao

How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Rising violence by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel is straining intercommunal tensions, threatening the foundations of social cohesion in the region.

africacenter.org

Responding to the Rise in Violent Extremism in the Sahel
By Pauline Le Roux
December 2, 2019

Reversing the escalating violence of militant Islamist groups in the Sahel will require an enhanced security presence coupled with more sustained outreach to local communities.

How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Rising violence by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel is straining intercommunal tensions, threatening the foundations of social cohesion in the region.

africacenter.org

Strategies for Peace and Security in the Sahel
September 27, 2019

The Sahel is the African region that has seen the most rapid growth in violent extremist activity over the past 2 years. Ambassadors of the G-5 Sahel countries and leading experts examine the drivers and responses to the region's security challenges.
Réduire la violence entre agriculteurs et éleveurs au Mali

Strategies for Peace and Security in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Sahel is the African region that has seen the most rapid growth in violent extremist activity over the past 2 years. Ambassadors of the G-5 Sahel countries and leading experts examine the drivers and responses to the region's security challenges.

africacenter.org

Mitigating Farmer-Herder Violence in Mali
August 8, 2019

The confluence between farmer-herder violence, ethnicity, and extremist groups requires a multitiered response emphasizing a people-centric approach.
Ansaroul Islam militants in northern Burkina Faso, date unknown. (Image: Screen capture from video obtained by Héni Nsaibia from source in Mali)

Mitigating Farmer-Herder Violence in Mali

The confluence between farmer-herder violence, ethnicity, and extremist groups requires a multi-tiered response emphasizing a people-centric approach.

africacenter.org

Ansaroul Islam: The Rise and Decline of a Militant Islamist Group in the Sahel
By Pauline Le Roux
July 29, 2019

Burkina Faso’s first militant Islamist group, Ansaroul Islam, has faced setbacks, pointing to the weaknesses of violent extremist organizations lacking deep local support and facing sustained pressure.

Ansaroul Islam: The Rise and Decline of a Militant Islamist Group in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Burkina Faso’s militant Islamist group Ansaroul Islam has faced setbacks, pointing to the weaknesses of extremist organizations lacking local support and facing sustained pressure.

africacenter.org

Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
By Pauline Le Roux
June 10, 2019

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has pursued breadth rather than depth of engagement in its rapid rise along the Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso borders.
EU Security Strategy in Sahel Focused on Security-Development Nexus

Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has pursued breadth rather than depth of engagement in its rapid rise along the Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso borders.

africacenter.org

EU Security Strategy in Sahel Focused on Security-Development Nexus
March 7, 2019

EU Special Representative to the Sahel Angel Losada Fernandez discusses Europe's security strategy in the region, which focuses on integrating development, security, and governance in coordination with African actors on the ground, in this interview with the Africa Center.
Security Responses in Sahel Map

EU Security Strategy in Sahel Focused on Security-Development Nexus – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

EU Special Representative to the Sahel Angel Losada Fernanadez discusses Europe's security strategy in the region, which focuses on integrating development, security, and governance in coordination with African actors on the ground, in this interview with the Africa Center.

africacenter.org

A Review of Major Regional Security Efforts in the Sahel
March 4, 2019

Increased attacks from militant Islamist groups in the Sahel coupled with cross-border challenges such as trafficking, migration, and displacement have prompted a series of regional and international security responses.
Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat

A Review of Major Regional Security Efforts in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

An escalation of attacks from militant Islamist groups in the Sahel coupled with cross-border challenges such as narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, migration, and population displacement have prompted a series of regional and international security responses.

africacenter.org

Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat
By Pauline Le Roux
February 22, 2019

The Macina Liberation Front has opportunistically played on perceptions of ethnic, economic, religious, and political marginalization to become one of the most active militant Islamist groups in Mali.
The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel

Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Macina Liberation Front has opportunistically played on perceptions of ethnic, economic, religious, and political marginalization to become one of the most active militant Islamist groups in Mali.

africacenter.org

The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel
February 15, 2019

The escalation of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel reflects an array of diverse actors operating within distinct geographic concentrations.
Progress and Setbacks in the Fight against African Militant Islamist Groups in 2018

The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The escalation of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel reflects an array of diverse actors operating within distinct geographic concentrations.

africacenter.org

Progress and Setbacks in the Fight against African Militant Islamist Groups in 2018
January 25, 2019

Declines in violent activity linked to Boko Haram and al Shabaab are balanced by increases in the Sahel, generating a mixed picture of the challenge posed by militant Islamist groups in Africa.
The G5 Sahel Joint Force Gains Traction

Progress and Setbacks in the Fight against African Militant Islamist Groups in 2018 – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Declines in violent activity linked to Boko Haram and al Shabaab are balanced by increases in the Sahel, generating a mixed picture of the challenge posed by militant Islamist groups in Africa.

africacenter.org

The G5 Sahel Joint Force Gains Traction
February 9, 2018

The G5 Sahel is ramping up its joint security force in order to address the growing threat posed by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel. The Force is emerging as a focal point for transnational security efforts in the region.
A Fulani man herds cattle in northern Cameroon

The G5 Sahel Joint Force Gains Traction – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The G5 Sahel is ramping up its joint security force in order to address the growing threat posed by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel. The Force is emerging as a focal point for transnational security efforts in the region.

africacenter.org

Africa’s Pastoralists: A New Battleground for Terrorism
By Kaley Fulton and Benjamin P. Nickels
January 11, 2017

Islamist terrorist groups in the Sahel and Sahara are attempting to exploit pastoralist grievances to mobilize greater support for their agenda, write Kaley Fulton and Benjamin Nickels.
Sahrawi Insurgency Could Provide an Opening for AQIM

Africa’s Pastoralists: A New Battleground for Terrorism

Islamist terrorist groups are attempting to exploit grievances of Africa's pastoralists to mobilize support for their agenda.

africacenter.org

Sahrawi Insurgency Could Provide an Opening for AQIM
By Wendy Williams
June 15, 2016

The unfolding events between Morocco and Western Sahara could provide a sought-after opportunity for AQIM to reassert its relevance in the region.
Place nations unies, Ouagadougou

Sahrawi Insurgency Could Provide an Opening for AQIM

The unfolding events between Morocco and Western Sahara could provide a sought-after opportunity for AQIM to reassert its relevance in the region.

africacenter.org

Terrorists Strike Burkina Faso: What are the Implications?
January 25, 2016

The terrorist attack on a luxury hotel in Ouagadougou is the second time in recent months that groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have conducted attacks of this type outside their base area. Benjamin Nickels assesses the significance of these attacks and steps that might be taken by Burkinabé authorities and their partners to address future threats.
Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel Algerias Pivotal Ambivalence

Terrorists Strike Burkina Faso: What are the Implications? – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The terrorist attack on a luxury hotel in Ouagadougou is the second time in recent months, following the deadly assault on the Radisson Blu hotel in

africacenter.org

Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal Ambivalence
By Laurence Aïda Ammour
February 28, 2012

Despite growing security concerns across the Sahel and Maghreb, regional security cooperation to address these transnational threats remains fragmented. Algeria is well-positioned to play a central role in defining this cooperation, but must first reconcile the complex domestic, regional, and international considerations that shape its decision-making.
Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania

Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal Ambivalence – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Algeria faces inverse incentives to combat AQIM outside of Algiers as it gains much of its geostrategic leverage by maintaining overstated perceptions of a serious terrorism threat. The Algerian government’s limited legitimacy, primarily derived from its ability to deliver stability, constrains...

africacenter.org

Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania
By Cédric Jourde
September 30, 2011

Increasing narcotrafficking and a more active Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are elevating concerns over instability in the Sahel. However, the region’s threats are more complex than what is observable on the surface. Rather, security concerns are typically characterized by multiple, competing, and fluctuating interests at the local, national, and regional levels. Effectively responding to these threats requires in-depth understanding of the multiple contextual layers in which illicit actors operate.

The Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania

Security concerns are typically characterized by multiple, competing, and fluctuating interests at the local, national, and regional levels.

africacenter.org

West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy
By Modibo Goïta
February 28, 2011

Counterterrorism efforts among Sahelian governments remain uncoordinated and too narrowly focused to contain and confront AQIM’s long-term and sophisticated strategy in the region. To prevent AQIM from further consolidating its presence in the Sahel, regional policies must be harmonized and security forces refocused so as to minimize collateral impacts on local communities.

Region in Focus: The Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

A selection of Africa Center analysis of the ongoing security and development challenges in the Sahel, current responses, and priorities for the future.

africacenter.org

Region in Focus: The Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies

A selection of Africa Center analysis of the ongoing security and development challenges in the Sahel, current responses, and priorities for the future.

africacenter.org

 

[jward]

INTL - France warns will retaliate if its interests attacked in Niger

China to mediate in Niger crisis The Chinese government intends to mediate Niger’s crisis where the military deposed the elected president more than a month ago, according to its envoy to the West African country. Jing Feng held talks Monday with Niger’s transition Prime Minister Ali Mahamane...

www.timebomb2000.com

 

[jward]

Casus Belli
@casusbellii
8h

#BurkinaFaso
The Junta confirmed few moments ago that a coup attempt happened yesterday night.
Authorities also announced the arrest of 4 senior officers, including 2 from the gendarmerie.
Some officers are still on the run.

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Casus Belli
@casusbellii

#BurkinaFaos | The situation in Burkina Faso has become tense in recent days.
Last night, a "mood movement" swept through the capital's barracks following the death of a highly respected second lieutenant in the Burkina Faso special forces.
Tonight, anti-French propagandists with close ties to Russia are calling on civilians to take to the streets...

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Casus Belli
@casusbellii

#BurkinaFaso Rumors are now being spreaded wildely on social networks on a potential coup happening in the country.
There’s no evidence of this atm but it’s been few days that there’s local report talking about a potential discontentment of senior Burkinabè officers against the current leader Ibrahim Traore.

 

[jward]

Explained | Where is Sahel region exactly and whats the trouble there​

WION Web Team​

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Africa is often dubbed the crucible of life. Scientists say that first humans evolved here and then spread to different parts of the world. Given its central importance in the birth and development of humankind, the continent should have been one of the most important regions in the world. But colonialism, fighting between African nations, big power politics and exploitation of its natural resources have made it one of the poorest regions in the world. The conflicts and geopolitical realities in Africa still assume a certain secondary position when it comes to global news.
But recent military coups, jihadist insurgency and more have compelled everyone to focus their gaze on the African continent, particularly on the Sahel region.

Where exactly is Sahel?​

​

(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
The word Sahel, or Sahil in Arabic means coast or shore. Sahel is the vast region that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea along Sahara desert's southern rim. Thus, Sahel region is wedged between Sahara desert in the north and tropical forests and the savannah to the south. This makes climate in the Sahel tropical semi-arid.

Speaking politics​

There are several political definitions of the Sahel according to which the area comprises 12 countries and houses 400 million people. However, countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania form the core of the Sahel region. This group is also called the G5 Sahel.
Other political definitions include countries like Senegal, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea.

So what's the trouble exactly?​

The Sahel region has vast stretches of inhospitable terrain. Geographical conditions make it especially difficult to control. Think of Sahel as the African equivalent of Afghanistan in the geographical sense where gaining total control is quite a task. The central Sahel is notoriously difficult to control. A certain power vacuum thus created has made the region a hunting ground for armed groups. The rebels and jihadists who hold sway in a particular swathe of land can roam freely, even ignoring international borders between the countries.
Jihadist violence erupted after a rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. The conflict has since spread to the centre of the country, as well as to neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, claiming thousands of lives and displacing more than 3.5 million people.

Several anti-jihadist military operations were launched in Sahel, particularly by France which is a former colonial power in this region. The result of these operations has been mixed.
France's Operation Barkhane was launched in 2014. The aim was to combat and prevent the spread of jihadist groups. The headquarters of the French forces were at N'Djamena, the capital of Chad.
French forces tasted success in earlier Operation Serval during which they gained control of half of Mali from the insurgents. Operation Barkhane was launched to build upon the initial success. The scope of the operation was expanded to the Sahel region rather than just Mali.

A coup in Mali in 2021 proved to be disruptive to French operations. The military junta ruling Mali was against French presence. French President Emmanuel Macron announced in June 2021 that France will pull out its troops in a phased manner. In November 2022, Macron announced that Operation Barkhane had formally ended.
Opposition to the French presence in the Sahel is often said to be one of the main reasons for the failure of French operations. France is often described as a 'waning power' in Africa. It has also been seen that Russia has opposed French forces in Africa through its proxies.

Effects of Climate Change​

Countries in the Sahel region have a large percentage of the population under the poverty line. To add to the people's hardships, global warming is around 50 per cent greater in the Sahel. The region has suffered the worst drought anywhere on the planet.
All of these factors have resulted in devastating consequences. There has been a staggering 90 per cent decline in the surface of Lake Chad in the past 40 years. Efforts are being taken to stop the loss of the main source of fresh water to 40 million people across four countries.

Why is Sahel in news now?​

In 2020, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described the Sahel as a "microcosm of cascading global risks converging in one region."
The region, which has been a stage for conflict between big global powers, has seen three coups in three countries in a span of three years.
In 2021, the Malian coup took place just months after a previous military takeover. In 2021, the Malian Army, led by Vice President Assimi Goita, captured President Bah N'daw along with Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. Goita announced that both, N'daw and Ouane were stripped of power.

A coup in another Sahel country, Burkina Faso followed in 2022. In the month of January, the Burkina Faso military deposed President Roch Marc Christian Kabore. The coup was led by military officer Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.
Now, the president of another Sahel country was detained by the military. Deposing Niger President Mohamed Bazoum, presidential guard commander General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of a new military junta.
In a sign that the situation in the region was deteriorating, on August 1 military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso declared that any plan to intervene militarily in Niger would be construed as a 'declaration of war' against both countries. Mali and Burkina Faso said this in a joint statement.

Explained | Where is Sahel region exactly and what's the trouble there

Africa is often dubbed the crucible of life. Scientists say that first humans evolved here and then spread to different parts of the world. Given its central importance in the birth and development of humankind, the continent should have been one of the most important regions in the world. But...

www.wionews.com

 

[jward]

African Coups: Will the French Get Involved? || Peter Zeihan Zeihan on Geopolitics
592K subscribers
298,687 views Sep 28, 2023 #africa #french #coup

There's been a surge in coups throughout African countries, and there's a common thread connecting them - most are former French colonies.
Full Newsletter: 404: Page Not Found | Mailchimp...

RT<10m

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKL_TvieqBg

 

[jward]

Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
4h

In 5 days:

- #ISIS appears to have killed ~100 soldiers in #Niger in multiple, massive attacks.

- Tuareg fighters have killed 100+ soldiers in #Mali, taking a town & army base.

- #ISIS has besieged #Menaka, #Mali, while #AlQaeda is besieging #Timbuktu.

Exponential collapse.

 

[jward]

Are Sahelian states restrategizing counter-terrorism without France? [Interview]​

AfricaNews

---

On this special interview segment on Africanews, analyst Niagalé Bagayoko breaks down the stakes of an Africanization of counterterrorism efforts. The military rulers in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger recently signed a mutual defence pact. They belonged to the G5 Sahel initiative spearheaded by France.

The Sahel region accounted for more deaths from terrorism in 2022 than South Asia and the (MENA) Middle East and North Africa regions combined, the latest Global terrorism Index reported.
The region is experiencing a security, humanitarian, and political crisis.

Niagalé Bagayoko, the president of the African Security Sector Network is our guest.
Frenchs troops in Niger have started leaving the country that is one of the founding members of the G5 Sahel alliance. What's left of the ambition of the counter-terrorism force?
Niagalé Bagayoko: The 5 Sahel had a bigger ambition and was not only dedicated to security issues but sought to deliver on a development-based agenda as well. From an operational point of view, when this joint force was set up, it ran into several difficulties, not only in the field, but also from a decision-making point of view. These difficulties lead to Mali’s exit from the organisation. This handicapped the alliance and, in fact, led to a certain lethargy. Today, the central states of the Sahel have set up an alternative intervention framework. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have signed a new charter, the Alliance of the Sahel States that is clearly appears as an alternative project to the G5 Sahel. If I may, it is important to mention that the states I have just cited, had as early as 2013-2014 when they were still governed by civilian governments, they had considered an alliance in such a framework of this region of Liptako Gourma that would have been affiliated with the eponymous authority.

You’ve just mentioned the AES, the Alliance of the Sahel States that includes Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Can this force successfully meet people’s aspirations for stability and security?
Niagalé Bagayoko: The difficulty is that for eleven years now, since 2012, all the efforts made both by the Sahelian states and by their international partners have not translated into improved security, particularly for civilian populations. When we consider the 2023 figures, if we look at the figures compiled by NGO ACLED, they show a continuous deterioration of the situation. This alliance therefore risks facing the same difficulties all previous frameworks operating in the Sahelian region suffered when put to the test by a multidimensional insecurity.

The first convoys of French troops departing from Niger by road are now headed to Chad, another founding member of the G5 Sahel. They will then return to France. However, in recent weeks, voices were heard demanding the exit of French troops already stationed in Chad. How likely is it that we will see a domino effect?
Niagalé Bagayoko: The question of Chad is absolutely central in several respects. First, because Chad is originally, the oldest stationing area of French troops in the region. France is particularly attached to Chad, where it has a long tradition of presence and intervention. This has been evidenced by the unwavering support that France has given to the Military Transition Council that was set up in an unconstitutional manner and which is headed by the son of late president Déby, as part of a tradition of dynastic transition.

And we realize that it's the difference of treatment, in the way the situation in Chad and in other countries, notably Mali, has been handled, the double standard, is what has largely contributed to undermining the credibility the position of France and delegitimizing it.

Chad remains a key anchorage for France but as you have mentioned, there is contestation. However, the difference between the juntas in power in N'Djamena and the other military rulers, is that the Chadian junta has proved it was capable to fire at protesters, this is absolutely not what we have seen in other countries headed by military juntas who enjoy a popular support.

Are Sahelian states restrategizing counter-terrorism without France? [Interview] | Africanews

On this special interview segment on Africanews, analyst Niagalé Bagayoko breaks down the stakes of an Africanization of counterterrorism efforts. The military rulers in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger recently signed a mutual defence pact. They belonged to the G5 Sahel initiative spearheaded by France

www.africanews.com

 

[jward]

Vivian Salama
@vmsalama
The US now assesses that a coup has taken place in Gabon and it is suspending most US assistance. (This follows similar measures taken for Niger)

 

[jward]

don't think this is tech. part of the Sahel, but not worth a new thread. . .

Visegrád 24
@visegrad24

Massive street protests erupt in Mozambique after allegations of falsified elections

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1717961743832351018

View: https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1717961743832351018?s=20

 

[Plain Jane]

For what it's worth... H/T Vox Day

West African bloc ‘quietly’ withdraws forces deployed against Niger – media

West African regional bloc ECOWAS is reportedly demobilizing forces deployed for potential military action in Niger as member states opt out

www.rt.com

West African bloc ‘quietly’ withdraws forces deployed against Niger – media​

The decision by ECOWAS came as member states opted against military intervention, RFI reported, citing a diplomatic source

FILE PHOTO: Nigerian soldiers part of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops train on the 101st airbase in Bamako. © ERIC FEFERBERG / AFP

The West African regional bloc ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), which had threatened to use force against Niger in response to a recent coup, is now quietly demobilizing the standby forces that had been positioned for a proposed military intervention, according to French news outlet RFI.

A meeting of ECOWAS military commanders was scheduled to be held in Nigeria’s Sokoto State this week. However, it was reportedly canceled due to organizational issues. The military officers arrived in Abuja, the capital of Africa’s most populous nation and the headquarters of the regional bloc, but did not proceed to Sokoto, RFI reported on Friday.

The demobilization order was expected to be issued during the meeting but, following its cancellation, ECOWAS will now be “very discreet” in withdrawing the standby troops, a source told the French broadcaster.

ECOWAS has two options, the source added: “Say nothing and let it be seen,” or “turn around.”

The decision was made because “no one is opting for military intervention anymore,” RFI quoted a diplomat from one of the 15 ECOWAS member states as saying.

The bloc announced in August that it had set a date for sending troops into Niger if diplomatic efforts to restore the rule of President Mohamed Bazoum, who was deposed on July 26, failed. The regional authority had previously issued an ultimatum to Niamey’s new military rulers, which had expired with Bazoum still detained.

Niger’s neighbors – Nigeria, Benin and the Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire) – had earlier expressed willingness to contribute troops to the bloc’s armed mission to restore democratic order in Niger.

However, the countries that contributed troops for the mission are said to have released them and paid them planned bonuses.

Beninese soldiers stationed on the Nigerien border in the north following the July power grab, which the US labeled a coup this month, have returned to their barracks, according to the report.

Last month, Niger’s coup leaders announced the termination of a military cooperation agreement with Benin, accusing their West African neighbor of supporting an imminent cross-border invasion.

The military authorities claimed that the Beninese government had authorized the deployment of troops and war materials in support of a “aggression desired by France” and ECOWAS against Niger.
READ MORE: EU sets up sanctions for Niger coup leaders, while US wants to be ‘pragmatic’

Paris, which has been forced to cut ties with the new Nigerien authorities, had declared its backing for ECOWAS military action against the coup leaders, while denying claims that it planned to invade its former colony to free the ousted Bazoum.

The military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso have cautioned against military intervention in Niger, which they have threatened to consider an act of aggression against their own countries.

In September, the three former French colonies formed a military alliance and agreed to assist each other, individually or collectively, in the event of external aggression or internal threats to their sovereignty.

 

[jward]

Boko Haram attack on northeast Nigerian village leaves 37 dead



Extremists in northeastern Nigeria killed at least 37 villagers in two different attacks, residents said Wednesday, highlighting once again how deadly islamic extremist rebels have remained in their 14-year insurgency in the hard-hit region.

Issued on: 02/11/2023 - 03:06



The extremists targeted villagers in Yobe state’s Geidam district on Monday and Tuesday in the first attack in the state in more than a year, shooting dead 17 people at first while using a land mine to kill 20 others who had gone to attend their burial, witnesses said.

The Boko Haram Islamic extremist group launched an insurgency in northeastern Nigeria in 2009 in an effort to establish their radical interpretation of Islamic law, or Sharia, in the region. At least 35,000 people have been killed and more than 2 million displaced due to the extremist violence concentrated in Borno state, which neighbours Yobe.

Nigeria's President Bola Tinubu, who took office in May, has not succeeded in ending the nation's security crises both in the northeast and in northwest and central regions where dozens of armed groups have been killing villagers and kidnapping travelers for ransom.

The first attack occurred in the remote Gurokayeya village in Geidam when gunmen opened fire on some villagers late Monday, killing 17 of them, according to Shaibu Babagana, a resident in the area. At least 20 villagers who had gone to attend their burial were then killed on Tuesday when they drove into a land mine that exploded, Babagana added.

Idris Geidam, another resident, said those killed were more than 40. Authorities could not provide the official death toll, as is sometimes the case following such attacks.

“This is one of the most horrific attacks by Boko Haram in recent times. For a burial group to be attacked shortly after the loss of their loved ones is beyond horrific,” Geidam said.

The Yobe state government on Wednesday summoned an emergency security meeting over the attacks which it blamed on extremists that entered the state from the neighboring Borno.

“The security agencies have deployed security men to the area and we are studying a report on the infiltration in an effort to stave off future occurrences,” Abdulsalam Dahiru, a Yobe government security aide, told reporters.

Boko Haram attack on northeast Nigerian village leaves 37 dead

Extremists in northeastern Nigeria killed at least 37 villagers in two different attacks, residents said Wednesday, highlighting once again how deadly islamic extremist rebels have remained in their…

www.france24.com

 

[jward]

Walid Phares
@WalidPhares

Reports from West #Darfur received today unveil that 773 African civilians including mostly teenagers, but women and elderly as well, have been massacred by the Jihadi #Janjaweed in the #Geneina area. Reports talks about hundreds burned and many detained and brutalized on their way for exodus. The Janjaweed are allies to a network of militias in the Middle East and North Africa that includes #Hamas and #Hezbollah. Voices from Darfur are urging the US and Europe, as well as the Arab League to intervene at once.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1721684021262823436

View: https://twitter.com/WalidPhares/status/1721684021262823436?s=20

 

[jward]

Cameron Hudson
@_hudsonc

Last G5 Sahel members Chad, Mauritania acknowledge alliance is a spent force. Regrettably for these populations, there seems to be no serious discussion about what comes next.

---

Last G5 Sahel members Chad, Mauritania acknowledge alliance is a spent force​

---

The two remaining members of West Africa's G5 alliance on Wednesday said they were paving the way to dissolving the anti-jihadist grouping, after the other three founding countries left.
Issued on: 06/12/2023 - 11:41

1 min
Chad and Mauritania "take note and respect the sovereign decision" of Burkina Faso and Niger to leave the alliance, following in the footsteps of Mali, the two countries said in a statement.
They "will implement all necessary measures in accordance with the G5 founding convention, notably Article 20," they said.

The article says that the alliance can be dissolved at the request of at least three member states.
The G5 was created in 2014 but has secured only meagre results.

In 2017, leaders of the five countries agreed to deploy a joint anti-terror task force backed by France.
But the military rulers of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have all accused Paris of having an outsize role after years of French deployments on their territories.
Burkina Faso and Niger said in a statement on Saturday that they had decided "to quit all instances of the G5 Sahel, including the joint force".

"The organisation is failing to achieve its objectives," they said.
"Worse, the legitimate ambitions of our countries, of making the G5 Sahel a zone of security and development, are hindered by institutional red tape from a previous era, which convinces us that our process of independence and dignity is not compatible with G5 participation in its current form."

Since the creation of the joint anti-terror force, violence has continued to spread, leaving thousands of civilians and fighters dead and displacing millions.
It has also contributed to political instability in the region, which has seen a succession of military coups.
(AFP)

Last G5 Sahel members Chad, Mauritania acknowledge alliance is a spent force

The two remaining members of West Africa's G5 alliance on Wednesday said they were paving the way to dissolving the anti-jihadist grouping, after the other three founding countries left.

www.france24.com

 

[jward]

.

 

[Plain Jane]

Niger’s junta revokes key security agreements with EU and turns to Russia for defense partnership

Niger’s junta has scrapped two key military agreements that the West African nation signed with the European Union to help fight violence in Africa’s Sahel region.

apnews.com

• Niger’s junta revokes key security agreements with EU and turns to Russia for defense partnership

FILE - Nigeriens, some holding Russian flags, participate in a march called by supporters of coup leader Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani in Niamey, Niger, on July 30, 2023. Three West African nations led by military juntas met this week to strengthen a newly formed alliance described by some analysts on Friday as an attempt to legitimize their military governments amid coup-related sanctions and strained relations with neighbors. In his first foreign trip since the July coup that brought him into power, Niger’s junta leader, Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani held separate meetings Thursday Nov. 23, 2023 with his Mali and Burkina Faso counterparts. (AP Photo/Sam Mednick, File)
Read More
BY CHINEDU ASADU
Updated 6:23 PM EST, December 4, 2023
Share
ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — Niger’s junta on Monday scrapped two key military agreements that the West African nation signed with the European Union to help fight the violence in Africa’s Sahel region as the country’s army leaders and a senior Russian defense official discussed military cooperation.

Before the coup that deposed the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, Niger had been the West and Europe’s last major security partner in the Sahel, the vast region south of the Sahara Desert that Islamic extremist groups have turned into the global terror hot spot.
In a memo, Niger’s foreign affairs ministry said the government has decided to “withdraw the privileges and immunities granted” under the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger that was launched in February and consequently “has no legal obligation” related to that partnership.


It also dismissed the EU Civilian Capacity-Building Mission established in 2012 to strengthen Niger’s internal security sector, effectively revoking its approval for the missions.

The developments are the latest in growing political tensions between Niger and the EU since the July coup.


In a rare visit on Sunday, a Russian delegation led by Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense Lounous-Bek Evkourov met with Niger’s junta leader, Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani, and Minister of State for National Defense Salifou Mody. The two sides held more meetings on Monday to discuss military and defense issues.

“At the center of the discussions is the strengthening of cooperation between the two countries in the field of defense,” Niger’s defense ministry said in a statement, hinting at formal political ties with Moscow, which has no embassy or military personnel in the country.

Most of Niger’s foreign economic and security allies have sanctioned the country, including France, which had 1,500 troops operating in Niger. All of them have been asked to leave.

Analysts say that although regional and international sanctions to force the junta to reverse its coup have squeezed the country, they have also emboldened the military government as it consolidates its hold on power and seeks new partnerships.

Russia has been active in parts of Africa through its private mercenary Wagner Group, from the Central African Republic, where the mercenary forces have helped provide security services to the government, to Mali, where they are partnering with the army in battling armed rebels and where the Evkourov-led delegation also visited.

The Wagner group was one of the first sources of help that the military leaders in Niger reached out to for support as they faced a possible military intervention from West Africa’s regional bloc of ECOWAS in a bid to reverse the coup.

____​

 

[jward]

 

[jward]

S p r i n t e r
@Sprinter99800

The end of French colonization

The last French soldiers leave Niger. The equipment has already been taken out, all that remains is to escort out the remaining manpower.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1738943163878809793

View: https://twitter.com/Sprinter99800/status/1738943163878809793?s=20

 

[jward]

nypost.com
Nigeria massacre sees over 100 Christians dead: 'Killed for sport'
Fox News


A never-ending massacre of Christians being “killed for sport” is reportedly happening in Nigeria, yet the world appears to be largely deaf to the matter.

While much of the world this week has been celebrating a beginning – Christmas, the birth of Jesus Christ – in Nigeria they are mourning the end of life – the deaths of more than 100 Christians – as the world remains virtually silent.

Armed bandits ran amok, according to Amnesty International, in some 20 communities across central Nigeria, killing more than 140. In a country where accurate statistics are traditionally hard to come by, some sources have put the death toll closer to 200.

The Christians were killed in a wide swath across an invisible line that separates the mostly Muslim north and the predominately Christian south in the country’s Plateau State. According to multiple sources, Christians represent 46% of Nigeria’s population.

“There was yet another Christmas massacre of Christians in Nigeria yesterday. The world is — silent. Just unbelievable,” tweeted leading evangelist the Rev. Johnnie Moore on X, formerly Twitter.

This image grab made from an AFPTV video taken in Maiyanga village, in Bokkos local government, on December 27, 2023 shows families burying in a mass grave their relatives killed in deadly attacks conducted by armed groups in Nigeria's central Plateau State
Families bury the dead in a mass grave after deadly attacks in Nigeria’s central plateau region. AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images

More than 52,000 Christians “have been butchered or hacked to death for being Christians” since 2009 in Nigeria, according to Intersociety, a civil society group based in Onitsha.

“The U.S. Mission in Nigeria condemned the recent attacks in Plateau State and expressed heartfelt condolences for the tragic loss of life,” a U.S. State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital in response to a question. Calling for accountability, the spokesperson added, “We are deeply concerned by the violence, and we are monitoring the situation.”

“Not a day goes by when Christians are not terrorized in western Africa in the most grotesque ways imaginable,” he continued. “Christians are killed for sport, especially Christian children. For every massacre which you hear about there are probably ten others which happened in the shadows. The death tolls are routinely in the hundreds.”

“Entire villages are burnt and pillaged. Thousands of churches have been destroyed. Children and women are hunted. Countless Christians have been kidnapped. I met one pastor whose two previous churches were burned down. Yet, he stayed in harm’s way because he was determined to be a light in the darkness, even if it [costs] him his life, and it probably will.”

This image grab made from an AFPTV video taken in Maiyanga village on December 26, 2023 shows an aerial view of destroyed homes after armed groups conducted a series of deadly attacks in Nigeria's central Plateau State.
An aerial view of destroyed homes after the attack. AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images

“There is a new, deadlier threat that can threaten both Christians and Muslims: the threat of jihadists,” Walid Phares told Fox News Digital. Phares is a political analyst who has studied jihadists in Africa and the Middle East for several decades and has written several books on the topic, most notably “The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad.”

“Indoctrinated by the Muslim Brotherhood and trained by al Qaeda Africa, the Boko Haram from north Nigeria are gradually becoming the country’s ISIS,” Phares said. “They repress moderate Muslims and massacre Christians. Boko Haram attacks the Christians in the Plateau [State] area in the center to remove them and seize their lands.”

“The single worst place in the world to be a Christian is in western Africa, particularly in parts of Nigeria,” the Rev. Johnnie Moore told Fox News Digital. Moore is a former commissioner for the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, president of the Congress of Christian Leaders, and co-author of “The Next Jihad.”

“When ISIS was at its height in Iraq and Syria in 2015, terrorists in one single state in Nigeria killed more Christians than all of those killed by the ISIS caliphate in Syria and in Iraq combined,” Moore told Fox News Digital.

This image grab made from an AFPTV video taken in Maiyanga village, in Bokkos local government, on December 27, 2023 shows families burying in a mass grave their relatives killed in deadly attacks conducted by armed groups in Nigeria's central Plateau State.
More than 52,000 Christians “have been butchered or hacked to death for being Christians” since 2009 in Nigeria, according to Intersociety. AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images

“There is an economic factor in the conflict, but economics are omnipresent in all similar conflicts, so this cannot explain the violence in the same way as the jihadi ideology explains it. The goal of the Nigerian jihadists is to expulse the Christians towards the south, then to eliminate them.”

Moore added, “There have been hotspots of jihadist activity in Africa for a generation, but what we are seeing now is that these hotspots are converging into a piecemeal Islamic State, which exhibits all the brutality we witnessed in Israel on Oct. 7 and in Iraq and Syria 10 years ago.”

Eyewitnesses said that when the Christmas attacks started, it took up to 12 hours for help to arrive. The former Nigerian chief of army staff, Ty Danjuma, said this was because government troops were working with the attackers.

“The armed forces are not neutral, they collude with the bandits that kill Nigerians,” he told an applauding crowd this week. “They [the army] facilitate their movements, they cover them. If you are depending on the armed forces to stop the killings, you will die one by one.”

People inspect ruins
Security inspects the scene of a bomb blast likely to have been carried out by Boko Haram. AFP/Getty Images

The State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital, “No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, and we cannot confirm the perpetrators’ motivations. Religious freedom is a key U.S. foreign policy priority and plays a prominent role in our continued engagement with the Nigerian government. We continue to have concerns about religious freedom in Nigeria, and we will continue to work with the Government of Nigeria to address religious freedom issues and to ensure all human rights are protected, including the freedom of religion or belief.”

Critics say the administration should do more. Earlier this month, 29 religious freedom activists urged members of the Congress to demand the Biden administration redesignate Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” in the State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report, which is a list of the world’s worst violators of religious freedom. The Trump administration had Nigeria placed on the list in 2020, but the Biden administration took the country off the list despite protests from human-rights groups.

Nigeria’s Intersociety group stated recently that more than 34,000 moderate Muslims have also been killed in Nigeria since 2009. But Phares said there could be hope for peace, but there must be action now.

“There are multiple Muslim communities who reject jihadism and seek coexistence. After [the] ethnic cleansing of the Christians, the jihadists [in Nigeria] will turn against moderate and reformist Muslims, as in Afghanistan or in Iran. The U.S., EU and the U.N. must create a platform for Muslim moderates and Christians in Nigeria and provide support to civil society. Nigeria could be fixed.”

Moore called for immediate action to stop the killings: “More can be done. More must be done, now. The handwriting isn’t just on the wall, it is everywhere.”

Nigeria massacre sees over 100 Christians dead: ‘Killed for sport’

More than 52,000 Christians “have been butchered or hacked to death for being Christians” since 2009 in Nigeria, according to Intersociety, a civil society group based in Onitsha.

nypost.com

 

[Knoxville's Joker]

This is all a rebuke of European control and a direct result of what happens in Ukraine.

 

[jward]

IISS News
@IISS_org

Sub-Saharan Africa is now the region with the greatest annual number of terrorist attacks globally.

Read the Regional Spotlight of our latest Armed Conflict Survey and find out more about the changing nature of Sub-Saharan jihadism: Armed Conflict Survey 2023: From Global Jihad to Local Insurgencies

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1741781082826027142

View: https://twitter.com/IISS_org/status/1741781082826027142?s=20

Armed Conflict Survey 2023: From Global Jihad to Local Insurgencies

For more than a decade the Islamist insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa has seemed unstoppable. 2022 saw another uptick in jihadist violence across the continent.

www.iiss.org

 

[jward]

From Global Jihad to Local Insurgencies: the Changing Nature of Sub-Saharan Jihadism​

For more than a decade the Islamist insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa has seemed unstoppable. 2022 saw another uptick in jihadist violence across the continent.

Fatalities increased by 48% compared to the previous year, while violent incidents increased by 22%.1 The annual number of attacks in the region have doubled since 2016, and Sub-Saharan Africa is now the region with the greatest annual number of terrorist attacks globally (see Figure 1).2 However, the jihadist insurrections in Sub-Saharan Africa are also evolving. They have become much more localised, building on local grievances and becoming intertwined with community and ethnic conflicts. The international dimension of jihadism has practically disappeared in the region and connections between insurgent groups remain limited to some sub-regional collaborations. Jihadist groups’ increasing involvement in local conflicts and the protector role that they play for various communities have made them resilient and more popular than the government in some places. However, their increasing reliance on local funding (e.g., via extortion) often puts them at odds with the local population, as illustrated by the backlash against al-Shabaab in Somalia.

While Islamic militants are widespread across the continent in areas with Muslim populations, organised violent groups are concentrated in specific areas in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, northern Mozambique and North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Countries neighbouring these areas are also impacted by cross-border militant activities, including the use of their territories for recruitment and the smuggling of arms and other illicit goods for revenue-generating purposes. This is the case notably for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in East Africa and Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo in West Africa.

Figure 1: Violent events by jihadist non-state armed groups, 1 May 2022–30 June 2023

The state of play of Sub-Saharan jihadism​

The Sahel
In the Sahel, jihadist insurgency impacts primarily Mali, Burkina Faso and, to a lesser extent, Niger. The epicentre of the conflict is the tri-border area between the three countries, the Liptako-Gourma region. However, central Mali and northern Burkina Faso are now seeing some of the worst violence following the departure of French troops from both countries. The Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM) is the main jihadist group operating in this region. It is an association of five major organisations and smaller factions, and the leader is Iyad Ag Ghaly, a long-time Tuareg militant who fought the Malian government as one of the leaders of the 1990s Tuareg insurrection. He is also the leader of Ansar Dine, which is a movement principally comprised of Tuareg militants. However, the most active jihadist non-state armed group (NSAG) in Mali today is Katibat Macina (one of JNIM’s factions), which is led by Amadou Koufa. The group is responsible for the insurrection in central Mali and for the main incursions into neighbouring countries. In Burkina Faso, the insurgency is now mainly in the hands of Ansarul Islam, a group very close to Katibat Macina. Islamic State Sahel Province is also increasing its activities in this region and is now in open conflict with JNIM.

Lake Chad Basin
The jihadist insurrection in the Lake Chad Basin is mostly centred on Nigeria, but Cameroon, Chad and Niger are also impacted. Ansaru and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are the two dominant groups in the region. This insurrection began in 2009 and is now stable, with the number of terrorist events and fatalities in 2022 remaining largely the same as in 2021, but it is still very violent. In Nigeria, it is particularly affecting the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yabe. However, it is also increasingly mixed up with the activities of several non-jihadist militias that are involved in banditry, kidnapping and cattle rustling and local community conflicts that are currently active in most of northern Nigeria. These militias are now more lethal than jihadist groups.

Somalia
Somalia has experienced an increase in violence in the last year, essentially linked to a successful counter-offensive against the main jihadist group, al-Shabaab. The ongoing offensive is a well-coordinated effort by clan militias (who are leading the fight), the Somali National Army, federal and state forces, and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. They are also supported by special forces from Western countries. Despite important territorial gains made by militias and the government since the beginning of 2022, al-Shabaab’s fighting capability is still considerable, and there are concerns that it maintains the ability to strike back. A critical issue is how to re-establish a state presence in newly liberated areas that have been controlled by the group for decades.

Mozambique
Northern Mozambique saw a recrudescence of militant activities in rural areas in 2022, after a decrease in violence following the 2021 separate interventions by Rwandan and South African troops, who managed to push out militants from major cities in the oil region of Cabo Delgado. The number of violent incidents linked to militant jihadists groups – mostly Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASJ, locally known as ‘al-Shabaab’), which has claimed allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) – has increased. This has prompted concerns that the insurrection is expanding again in rural areas and to other regions.

Eastern Congo
Conflict has been spreading across the eastern DRC since 2022, and jihadist groups play a role in this new phase. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a key actor in the conflict, started in Uganda as an ultra-conservative Muslim rebel movement. Later it was pushed out of Uganda by the national army and is now based in the Rwenzori Mountains in eastern DRC, collaborating with other Islamist insurgent groups in the region. The ADF pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2017. ISIS started claiming ADF attacks in 2019, and in 2020 the ADF adopted the name of Islamic State Central Africa Province, also known as Wilayat Wasat Afriqiyya.

Sub-Saharan jihadism: localised with diverse strategies​

Claims of allegiance to al-Qaeda or ISIS hide the fact that insurgent groups in Sub-Saharan Africa are essentially local insurgencies, which receive little or no external support. In fact, while most jihadist groups claim a transnational allegiance, there is very little evidence that al-Qaeda or ISIS has any capacity to provide meaningful support to these self-proclaimed franchises. These jihadist groups are, instead, largely self-financed. Some collaboration exists at the sub-regional level; for example, the ADF allegedly helped train ASJ fighters in Mozambique. However, these networks of collaboration are now very limited compared to their previous strength.

Sub-Saharan jihadist groups have adopted somewhat different strategies in the use of violence against local populations. ISIS affiliates are remarkably violent and brutal, leading a war against what they consider apostate regimes and other Muslim sects, like the Shia. However, their use of terrorist tactics creates profound resentment and does not allow them to establish themselves in communities in a sustainable way. Al-Qaeda affiliates tend to be less violent and more pragmatic, especially now that they have abandoned international jihadism and are aiming to control territory by offering an alternative local governance system – one that is allegedly more in line with Islamic law and principles compared to the state’s system. The group often collaborates tactically with non-religious armed movements and has indicated its willingness to negotiate with the state. Al-Qaeda affiliates’ approaches increasingly resemble the strategy of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the later years of its insurrection. Most NSAGs remain loosely institutionalised and relatively fragmented, with many splinter groups operating with little direction from the leadership. ISIS and al-Qaeda franchises are also increasingly at odds with each other. Notoriously, an ISWAP splinter group is now fighting against JNIM and various other militias in northern Mali.

Jihadism and local grievances​

Since most jihadist groups have largely abandoned international goals and connections, they have become increasingly involved in local conflicts and exploiting local tensions. Most of the conflicts in the regions where they operate are centred around access to and the management of natural resources, amid faltering governance responses by states. These conflicts have been exacerbated significantly by accelerating climate change.

In the Sahel, the pastoralist–agriculturalist divide has been traditionally and structurally adversarial. Many Fulani communities practise transhumance herding and must move southward due to droughts, which have become a constant occurrence in northern Sahel. At the same time, many agriculturists are moving into traditional grazing areas. Thus, the jihadist insurgency is building on decades of tensions over access to land. Agriculturists belong to ethnic groups that are also dominant among the urban and political elites, who have little incentive to resolve these tensions. For instance, some countries have introduced transhumance bans that have significantly worsened herders’ plight. Salafi jihadists are sometimes viewed as protectors of the Fulani population and their traditional land rights, including in the areas bordering Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. This situation has been exacerbated in the Sahel by the creation of ethnic militias that have been responsible for massacres and perpetrated violence against certain ethnicities, such as the Fulani.

Jihadists are also involved in smaller intercommunal conflicts. In northern Ghana, for example, JNIM is an actor in the Mamprusi–Kusasi conflict (which is fuelled by long-standing tensions between different ethnic groups in the town of Bawku). In Somalia, al-Shabaab had originally garnered popular support by establishing an alternative governance system rooted in justice and conflict resolution, outside of clan rivalry. The group had promoted a narrative of equity that resonated with minor clans and youth who felt marginalised by major-clan leadership. In Mozambique, the ethnic component of the conflict in Cabo Delgado is key, as Muslim Mwani people have felt disfranchised since the country’s independence. Large gas resources have been discovered in the north of the country, but the northern population has enjoyed no subsequent improvement in economic conditions. This has further fuelled grievances against the state.

To survive without external financing, insurgent groups have developed elaborate methods of local fundraising. For instance, Somalia’s al-Shabaab has added to its traditional revenues from road taxes by managing sections of the charcoal trade and taxing cattle export and new building constructions throughout the country. It has also penetrated various state institutions, establishing an elaborate network of corruption. It is estimated that in 2022 al-Shabaab raised about US$100 million through taxes and extortion, compared to the US$250m in taxes officially collected by the government.3 In the Sahel, JNIM revenues are derived from taxation on roads, kidnapping, the protection of gold mines, vehicle theft and diverse types of smuggling (especially now that the northern border is no longer controlled by French troops) as well as direct taxation of communities. The fact that insurgent groups are mostly dependent on local fundraising encourages them to adopt a strategy of territorial control in order to generate more opportunities to extract funds.

The above developments put NSAGs increasingly at odds with local populations, as communities perceive that the cost of supporting jihadists groups is higher than the benefits such groups provide. For instance, it is widely accepted that the revolt of local clan militias in Somalia was triggered by al-Shabaab’s abuse of power and the pressure it placed on a population affected by a long-lasting and devastating drought. In the Sahel, more and more reports of abuse by militant groups are surfacing. The increasingly extractive nature of these movements is limiting their further territorial expansion as they are met with resistance from communities that see their protection as too costly. However, in some other areas, like northern Mali, abuses by national armed forces still generate popular appeal for jihadist groups, despite their increasing demands on the population.

Improved quality of governance as a way forward​

As some jihadist groups try to base their legitimacy on protecting communities from the abuse of the state or other NSAGs, the effectiveness of states’ responses to local populations’ needs and demands is becoming central to the fight against jihadist groups. Across the continent, the ability of the state to project a positive response on the ground, alleviate tensions between communities, and maintain effective and accountable security services is essential to countering insurgencies. In Mali and Burkina Faso, inexperienced military juntas have proved incapable of addressing the spike in violence which followed the French armed forces’ pull-out from both countries and the deployment of the Wagner Group in Mali. Many lessons can be learned from countries like Mauritania, which quelled a significant insurgency in the 2010s, and Niger, which has managed to keep violence levels under control despite many jihadist incursions in the west of the country.

The governance of the security sector is particularly important, given its prominence in the fight against extremists. Security forces must effectively protect the local population; be adequately trained and equipped; and be sufficiently flexible and rapid in their interventions. The examples of Mauritania and Niger show that security forces can be successful in pushing back insurgents if they are perceived as legitimate and enjoy the support of local communities. Niger, which was facing a rapidly progressing jihadist insurrection in 2021, has since drastically reassessed its approach in this sense, resulting in a significant drop in violent incidents.

Providing economic support to the population in areas that are at risk of insurgency is another important component for an effective prevention strategy. In all Sub-Saharan African countries affected by Salafi jihadism, efforts have been made by the international community to increase development aid. For instance, aid flow to Somalia increased by nearly 300% from 2000–20 and more than nine times for Niger during the same period.4 However, the increase in aid can only have an impact over the long term for two main reasons. Firstly, the areas in which jihadists operate are often arid and far away from large urban centres. Prospects for improving the local economy and availability of jobs are therefore seriously constrained by geographical conditions. Secondly, the governance structure needed to implement projects in marginalised areas is often lacking.

Previous examples demonstrate that the most effective approach in fighting insurgencies is outreach by the government to local communities and traditional authorities, and even groups involved in illicit economies, to listen to their grievances and negotiate arrangements that can improve their lives within the boundaries of the law. This type of approach has been dramatically lacking in Mali. Conversely, Niger has established agencies for this purpose, such as the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, and Mauritania has carried out considerable outreach to local communities and religious authorities. Likewise, programmes targeted at young people vulnerable to recruitment by jihadist movements have been implemented with some success in Kenya, Mauritania and Somalia. These have involved negotiating with local community groups that have ties with jihadist movements and trying to address their grievances, so that community leaders can themselves convince their youth not to join extremist groups. Establishing communication channels with some of the less extreme militant groups has also been a successful strategy in places like Niger and Mauritania.

The experiences of countries which have been successful in combatting jihadist insurgencies show that finding an effective balance between providing security, supporting local development, and negotiating with communities and some armed groups is essential. This is, however, very difficult to achieve as it requires effective institutions and political leadership – things that need to be implemented by countries themselves. It is very challenging for foreign institutions to influence such processes.

Armed Conflict Survey 2023: From Global Jihad to Local Insurgencies

For more than a decade the Islamist insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa has seemed unstoppable. 2022 saw another uptick in jihadist violence across the continent.

www.iiss.org

 

[jward]

Visegrád 24
@visegrad24

Islamist militias on the move in Nigeria.

There is a growing sense in the country that lawlessness is spreading across the land and is now reaching regions previously spared from Islamist violence.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1748955417797898557

View: https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1748955417797898557?s=20

 

[Housecarl]

The only recipe to counter these events is to support anti-corruption governments in the region and to help them field enough domestic forces to "out guerrilla the guerrillas". That is both time consuming and slow to get results, but the results obtained are longer lasting than the OOTW/LIC/COIN models the US has used in Afghanistan or Iraq where direct US and allied involvement was more focused upon "managing" the AQAM threat and not hunting it down where ever it was and killing it, even if it fled to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi or Syria.

 

[jward]

S p r i n t e r
@Sprinter99800

The first contingent of 100 members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, along with weapons and military equipment, landed today in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. It is expected that in the near future, about 300 soldiers of the Russian army will be stationed in this African country.

With the landing of the first contingent, the deployment of the so-called The African Corps of the Ministry of Defense of the RF, which will replace the private military companies that have been performing tasks in Africa until now. In addition to Burkina Faso, the units of the Russian army will be stationed in four other countries of the Sahel region: Libya, Mali, Niger and the Central African Republic.

 

[Plain Jane]

What is ECOWAS and why have 3 coup-hit nations quit the West Africa bloc?

Monthslong tension between three coup-hit countries in West Africa and the regional bloc known as ECOWAS boiled over when the nations announced their immediate withdrawal from the bloc, accusing it of a lack of support and “inhumane” coup-related sanctions.

apnews.com

https://apnews.com/article/mali-burkina-faso-niger-ecowas-africa-d2e8b1e5448d9a7823e6b9d3d8ec774b#

What is ECOWAS and why have 3 coup-hit nations quit the West Africa bloc?​

FILE - The defense chiefs from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries excluding Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Niger, gather for their extraordinary meeting in Accra, Ghana, Thursday, Aug. 17, 2023, to discuss the situation in Niger. Three West African nations of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have quit the regional economic bloc known as ECOWAS. Their respective juntas said in a joint statement on Sunday, Jan. 28, 2024 thatt he bloc has imposed “inhumane” sanctions to reverse the coups in their nations and has also “moved away from the ideals of its founding fathers and Pan-Africanism” after nearly 50 years of its establishment. (AP Photo/Richard Eshun Nanaresh, File)
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BY CHINEDU ASADU
Updated 3:01 AM EST, January 29, 2024
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ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — Monthslong tension between three coup-hit countries in West Africa and the regional bloc known as ECOWAS boiled over when the nations announced their immediate withdrawal from the bloc and accused it of a lack of support and “inhumane” coup-related sanctions.

In their joint statement on Sunday, the juntas of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso said that instead of helping their countries fight the security threats facing them, ECOWAS imposed “illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible” sanctions when they staged the coups “to take their destiny into their own hands.”

It’s the first time in the bloc’s nearly 50 years of existence that its members are withdrawing in such a manner. Analysts say it’s an unprecedented blow to the group and a further threat to the region’s stability.

HOW IMPORTANT IS ECOWAS?​

The 15-nation regional bloc Economic Community of West African States was established in 1975 with one goal: “To promote co-operation and integration ... in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability.”


It has since grown to become the region’s top political authority, often collaborating with states to solve domestic challenges on various fronts from politics to economy and security.

Under the current leadership of Nigeria, West Africa’s economic powerhouse, ECOWAS is needed more than ever with the region’s stability being threatened by rampant coups and security crises. It operates “in a world ... where you need to be strong in one bloc and united in solidarity,” said Babacar Ndiaye, senior fellow with the Senegal-based Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies.

The problem, though, is that some believe ECOWAS is fast losing goodwill and support from many West Africans who see it as failing to represent their interests in a region where citizens have complained of not benefitting from rich natural resources in their countries.

“When you see citizens pushing back and seeing ECOWAS as the leaders club or leaders who support each other at the detriment of citizens, it doesn’t work well,” said Oge Onubogu, director of the Africa Program at the U.S.-based Wilson Center think tank.

WHAT IS THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BLOC?​

The ECOWAS treaty provides that its member states who wish to quit the bloc shall give its leadership a one-year written notice, at the end of which “such a state shall cease to be a member of the community.”

The treaty says that during that year, the state planning to quit shall “nevertheless observe the provisions” and its obligations under the agreement. However, ECOWAS said it was yet to be notified about the three countries’ decision to quit and that for now, they “remain important members” of the body.

Analysts say ECOWAS will likely seek a continued dialogue with the juntas on how best to ensure the region’s stability while the thee nations’ military leaders focus on seeking new partnerships.
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HOW SIGNIFICANT IS SUCH A WITHDRAWAL?​

One thing is clear. Relations between ECOWAS and the three countries have deteriorated because of the bloc’s choice of sanctions as a key tool in trying to reverse the coups there.

The Alliance of Sahel States that the juntas created in November was also seen by observers as an attempt to legitimize their military governments, seek security collaborations and become increasingly independent of ECOWAS.

But withdrawing from the 49-year-old bloc in such a manner is unprecedented and seen as a “major change in the sub-region,” said Ndiaye with the Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies.

“It is the most challenging issue facing the subregion since its inception,” said Ndiaye. “All the work they have put into building a collective security mechanism is based on the protocols that posit that democracy, good governance and the rule of law will be the basis for peace and security.”

RUSSIA, PROLONGED MILITARY RULE AND OTHER POSSIBLE FALLOUTS​

ECOWAS has been leading efforts to return civilian rule to the coup-hit countries, pressuring the juntas with sanctions and rejecting lengthy transitional timetables.

The worry has been that there is little evidence to show the juntas are committed to holding democratic elections within those timelines. With Sunday’s announcement, analysts say the non-allegiance to ECOWAS may possibly delay the return of democracy in the three countries and motivate coups in others.

“If they are no longer part of the ECOWAS bloc, they don’t have to abide by previous transitional timelines promulgated as a means of easing sanctions against them,” said Ryan Cummings, director of Africa-focused security consulting company Signal Risk.

Cummings says the withdrawal might result in a new opportunity for Russia to expand its presence and interests in Africa.

The once-friendly relations between the three countries and developed nations in the West and Europe had already turned sour after the coups. Russia meanwhile has been more welcoming and continues to play into anti-French sentiment by framing itself to African nations as a country that never colonized the continent.

The Russian mercenary group Wagner has been present in Mali, where it is partnering with the army in battling armed rebels. In Burkina Faso, state media reported last week that Russian soldiers arrived to “strengthen military and strategic cooperation” between the two countries. Both Russian and Nigerien senior officials have also recently hosted each other.

“These countries have in recent months reinforced and entrenched partnerships with Russia from national security to the economy,” said Cummings with Signal Risk.

How much support they could get from Russia remains to be seen. In African countries where Wagner has been present, security crises there have persisted while the mercenary group has been accused of various rights violations.

 

[jward]

Bloomberg Politics
@bpolitic

Burkina Faso’s junta said Russian troops may join the fight against an Islamist insurgency in West Africa, a week after Moscow deployed about 100 military personnel in the country

https://x.com/bpolitics/status/1752883473407226334?s=20

 

[ainitfunny]

It appears nobody cares, jward.
You practically are talking to yourself on this thread.
Most have bigger problems to address in their own nations, close to home.
Africa is a "black hole" sucking in money and aid and giving back to the world little or nothing.

 

[Plain Jane]

Most have bigger problems to address in their own nations, close to home.
Africa is a "black hole" sucking in money and aid and giving back to the world little or nothing.

Your assertion may be true but the area is incredibly important for economic reasons.

This area is the location for a lot of rare earth minerals. While the Sahel was dominated by the former colonial powers these minerals were extracted at much below market rates. All that foreign aid was simply virtual signaling and keeping the local population in line.

The recent coups are the local populations trying to get control of this situation. The Russians are there to keep the Muslim terrorists down since the Western troops were totally ineffective at that. I believe that the ineptitude of the West is by design to perpetuate the need.

I listened to a podcast by Tom Luongo recently who posited that the West is going to have to start paying full freight for commodities coming out of Africa and the rest of the Global South because the West can no longer maintain the military capacity to keep those nations down.

Will China and Russia be more equitable for the Global South? That remains to be seen but for now these nations of the Sahel are willing to try them out at least Russia. Also look at the number of African nations along the Mediterranean and the Arab Gulf being given the opportunity to join the BRICS. And there is really nothing to stop them.

 

[ainitfunny]

Whatever raw resources are there profit entirely corrupt dictators and politicians. That has been true since the African people were liberated early on. Nearly nothing of the money made from gold, silver, diamonds, and rare earth minerals went to improve the ordinary peoples lives,(highways, schools,water service, electricity, hospitals, railroads, dams, bus service, sewage treatment,etc)

But that "government" income all went to make a very, very few Africans filthy rich! Corruption that bad in every aspect of life and a culture that tolerates it, a nd SO MANY OTHER EVILS tolerated, (I wont list them) and Islamic oppression by outright terror, and slaughter, is not a candidate for any simplistic, easy fixes.

 

[Plain Jane]

This is an update on the civil war in Sudan that broke out in Spring of 2023. The first few minutes are a recap of the history of the last several years. He is now describing the current military situation and how players like UAE, Egypt, Iran are aligning.

R/T 10:00

View: https://youtu.be/3B2l4-9uwZk?si=IvTQn99zPrGeiatM

 

[jward]

John Hudson
@John_Hudson
NEW: Kurt Campbell, the No. 2 State Department official, met with Niger’s Prime Minister today & *accepted his demand that U.S. troops withdraw from the West African country* a move the US has long resisted that will transform Washington’s counterterrorism posture in West Africa

6:29 PM · Apr 19, 2024
47.6K
Views

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John Hudson
@John_Hudson
2h

"The Prime Minister has asked us to withdraw US troops and we have agreed to do that," a senior State Department official tells me. More to come..

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Eric Schmitt
@EricSchmittNYT
3h

BREAKING - U.S. tells Niger it will withdraw 1,000 American military personnel from the West African country in the coming months. upending United States counterterrorism and security policy in the tumultuous Sahel region of Africa