INTL Recipe for Disaster: Israel & Pakistan’s Sea-Based Nukes

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
posted for fair use...

http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/31/recipe-for-disaster-israel-pakistans-sea-based-nukes/?all=true

Recipe for Disaster: Israel & Pakistan’s Sea-Based Nukes

SecuritySouth AsiaPakistan
May 31, 2013

By Iskander Rehman


Both Israel and Pakistan look to the sea to provide strategic depth. It’s a quest that could undermine stability.

800px-PNS_Ghazi_134_DN-SC-92-03633-443x299.jpeg



New Year, New Problem? Pakistan’s Tactical Nukes
Why Israel Won’t Go It Alone
India’s Misunderstood Israel Policy
Pakistan’s Nuclear-Capable Missile
Does India Want Stable Pakistan?​


The policy of a nation, Napoleon once quipped, can be read in its geography. For much of human history, the verity of such an assertion would have appeared self-evident. After all, what is geostrategy if not a state’s chosen response to a preexisting spatial reality? For many thinkers of the early modern era, a country’s geographical position shaped its strategic behavior, whether in times of peace or war. Maritime powers, some have noted, appear both more democratic and inclined to pursue alliances than their territorially obsessed continental counterparts. Amidst the swirling tides of global geopolitics, geography formed a key fundamental — an enduring physical truth — providing a degree of structure and continuity to otherwise arcane national strategies.

The dawn of the nuclear age, however, greatly eroded the importance attached to the study of maps. Nuclear weapons, with their terrifying and seemingly indiscriminate power for destruction, seemed to render cartographic musings somewhat irrelevant. In an era where the devastating effects of a single bomb could extend over land and sea, casting their radioactive shadow over bustling cities and sleepy hamlets alike; what did it matter whether a nation was urban or rural, maritime or continental?

The assumption that geographical factors play only a minor role in the formulation of nuclear strategy is, however, deeply flawed. Territorial insecurity and the attendant quest for strategic depth are profoundly embedded within the nuclear strategies of small to medium-sized powers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the evolving naval nuclear postures of two nations, which would seem, at first glance, to have little in common: Pakistan and Israel. Indeed, irrespective of numerous sizable differences — both in terms of institutional history and strategic culture — the nuclear force structures adopted by both countries’ small navies are disturbingly similar. In both cases, the perceived pressures of geography have played an enormous role in the conceptualization of naval nuclear deterrence.

Continental Suffocation, Maritime Oxygenation

Both Israel and Pakistan have decided to field tactical nuclear weapons aboard their small flotillas of diesel-electric submarines. While Pakistan is a declared nuclear power and Israel has opted to pursue a policy of nuclear ambiguity for the past four decades, both nations’ military thinkers echo each other in their frequent referrals to the sea as a source of strategic depth. This shared emphasis stems, in large part, from their growing sense of continental claustrophia. Both countries are territorially shallow, and resulting sentiments of vulnerability have helped shape and sustain already potent senses of embattlement.

Israel’s Naval Nuclear Option

For strategists in Jerusalem, apprehensions over the widening demographic divide between Israel and its more populous Arab neighbors has been compounded by the severe political turmoil and uncertainty in the wider Middle East. In particular, there is growing concern that further waves of upheaval in the Arab world could produce a regional climate more staunchly hostile to Israeli interests. In addition to the potential existential threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, Israeli planners must also confront a rapidly changing conventional military environment – one in which the shallowness of Israeli territory increasingly acts as a major liability. Whereas in earlier years Israel’s very compactness generated certain operational benefits — by enabling its armed forces to maneuver with fluidity within interior lines – the diffusion of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and precision strike systems amongst Israel’s prospective antagonists has largely negated any such advantage. Hybrid and non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah increasingly have the aptitude to “see deep and shoot deep,” while Iran continues to acquire a bristling array of ballistic missiles aimed at Israel. The Israeli Defense Force’s stationary bases and airfields are thus increasingly exposed to missile attacks. Hezbollah, for instance, is estimated to be sitting on a steadily growing stockpile of more than 40,000 rockets and missiles. In previous conflicts, Israel could rely on its command of the skies as a means of offsetting its numerically superior foes. In the long run though, the difficulties inherent in prosecuting hybrid actors concealed within crowded urban environments, along with the densification of cheaper and more capable anti-aircraft systems, are liable to impede the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action. In sum, Israel’s continental exiguity acts as a growing constraint on its ability to guarantee the safety of its citizens from both conventional and nuclear attack.


The solution, suggests one Israeli naval officer, lies at sea – the country’s traditionally underfunded navy can play a greater role not only in dispersing the armed forces’ conventional firebases along the nation’s maritime flank – but also in ensuring nuclear survivability in the event of a large-scale atomic assault. Having almost certainly decided to place a portion of its nuclear arsenal at sea, Israel can better ensure the survivability of its second strike capability, as well as its ability to wage “broken-back” nuclear warfare from under the waves.

While Israel has never confirmed the existence of its naval nuclear deterrent, it is an open secret that, for the past decade or so, Israel has relied on its three, German-designed, Dolphin-class submarines, all of which are allegedly equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Three more submarines have been ordered from Germany, and should join the Israeli fleet in 2013, 2014, and 2017, respectively. The trio of supplementary Dolphins will be upgraded models, equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems. This should enable them to loiter in the congested waters off the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf coasts for longer periods of time. In the words of an Israeli admiral, the existence of the submarines provide a “way of guaranteeing that the enemy will not be tempted to strike preemptively with non-conventional weapons and get away scot-free.”

Pakistan’s Quest for Maritime Depth

In Pakistan, meanwhile, last year’s decision to formally establish a Naval Strategic Forces Command should not be solely construed as a tit-for-tat response to India’s own advances in the naval nuclear domain (India launched its first indigenous nuclear submarine, the INS Arihant, in 2009), but also as an attempt to add a measure of strategic depth to Islamabad’s own growing nuclear arsenal. Despite the fact that India has publicly stated that it abides by a strict No-First-Use policy, Pakistan lives under the constant fear that India, the United States or both operating in collusion could swoop in and preemptively seize or destroy the smaller nation’s arsenal.

This deep-rooted paranoia is exacerbated by the growing conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan. This asymmetry is particularly stark in the maritime sphere, as India steadily modernizes and expands its blue-water navy, and an underfunded Pakistan Navy struggles to make its case to an Army-dominated national security apparatus. There are growing concerns over Islamabad’s vulnerability to a naval blockade, given that 95 percent of its trade by volume is transported by sea.

This has led some to conclude that the country urgently needs to nuclearize its submarine fleet. When interviewed, Pakistani commanders mention the precedent set by Israel’s alleged decision to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles aboard conventional submarines, and suggest, somewhat provocatively, that Pakistan should follow suit. Another option, some have argued, would be stationing nuclear weaponry aboard surface ships and maritime-patrol aircraft. Not only would this provide the country with greater strategic depth, it would also extend some of the more dysfunctional elements of Indo-Pakistani nuclear interactions from land to sea. By threatening first nuclear use against an advancing Indian aircraft carrier strike force, Islamabad can hope to acquire escalation dominance and considerably dilute its larger neighbor’s coercive naval power.

Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons will have a major impact on the future of naval warfighting in the Indian Ocean. As veteran naval analyst Captain Wayne Hughes has noted, fleets caught under a nuclear shadow are compelled to operate under different principles. Most notably, ships must loosen up their deployment patterns and adopt more dispersed configurations in order to better shield themselves from the ripple effects of a nuclear blast. For Pakistani planners, acquiring nuclear-armed cruise missile submarines (SSG) would provide an opportunity to skew its existing power relationship with India in Pakistan’s favor, primarily by injecting a sizable degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in India’s tactical calculus, but also by preventing the Indian Navy from concentrating the bulk of its power projection platforms in one specific location.


The Damaging Effects of Continental Claustrophobia for Nuclear Stability

Needless to say, the strategic side-effects of both Israel and Pakistan’s continental claustrophobia have the potential to be highly destabilizing. Mounting concerns over a perceived lack of strategic depth have led to a privileging of offensive naval nuclear strategies, which fuse dual-use systems and doctrinal opacity with forward postures. In the event of a conflict, there would be no way for their adversaries to ascertain whether Pakistani or Israeli subsurface vessels are nuclear-armed or not. In addition to the radioactive “fog of war” that would float over naval combat operations, there are certain risks tied to both navies’ conventional ways of war that would likely carry over to their nuclear posture in times of crisis.

In an environment already marked by dual-use, it would be injudicious to assume that conventional and nuclear dynamics will evolve within tightly sealed vacuums. Both the Pakistani and Israeli navies have learnt to offset their numerical inferiority in times of war by engaging in daring asymmetrical maneuvers— Pakistan through the offensive deployment of its submarines, and Israel through the use of naval commandos and missile strikes. Notwithstanding manifold differences in terms of tactical approaches, offense has often been perceived as the best form of defense for small navies laboring under overwhelming odds.

In effect, weaker naval powers have, throughout history, manifested their desire to alleviate their vulnerability by engaging in acts of deception or preemptive attrition. Military historians and political scientists have demonstrated the extent to which it can be arduous for a military organization steeped in a specific operational culture to espouse an entirely different set of procedures and tactics under wartime conditions. While it has been reported that the elite crews aboard each Israeli nuclear-armed submarine have been subjected to a rigorous battery of psychological tests and are cognizant of the responsibilities that come with their nuclear role, the Pakistan Navy’s future command and control arrangements remain alarmingly obscure. If the same Pakistani naval officers charged with the conduct of conventional operations against the Indian fleet suddenly find themselves entrusted with strategic weapons, their organizational predisposition for “offensive defense” could be a recipe for disaster. The scattering of nuclear assets at sea, particularly aboard surface ships, also heightens the risks of a nuclear weapon being intercepted by a malevolent non-state actor, an already perennial concern when discussing Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal.

The Overriding Importance of Geography in Nuclear Strategy

Geography remains one of the most important determinants of a country’s nuclear strategy. Whether a country feels territorially secure or insecure has an immense impact on the shape and form of its deterrent. For relatively small coastal states such as Pakistan and Israel, the quest for maritime depth has given birth to naval nuclear force structures with the potential to undermine stability during a crisis regardless of the legitimacy or strength of some of their strategic concerns. While it remains unclear what can be done to alleviate both states’ sense of existential vulnerability, appreciating the extent to which a feeling of territorial claustrophobia undergirds much of their elites’ strategic culture could enable a better understanding of their nuclear trajectories.

Iskander Rehman is an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow.

Photo Credit: Wikicommons
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Good catch Lilbitsnana.

Hummm....It isn't just Pakistan but India and the PRC that are going this route as well. Considering the instability issues within Pakistan and the real lack of depth for conventional defense in Israel, the terms "crisis" and "stability" in both their cases are mutually excluding.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-arti...on/2013/May/opinion_May53.xml&section=opinion

Need for nuclear dialogue

Dr Maleeha Lodhi (World View) / 31 May 2013

In a speech last month in Delhi, a distinguished former foreign secretary of India, Shyam Saran, made several pronouncements about the evolution of his country’s nuclear policy and the current status of its nuclear deterrent.

He cast these remarks as his personal views. But Saran is current chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board. Many in India and outside saw his statements as articulating official policy while maintaining deniability. The Times of India, for example, said Saran was “placing on record India’s official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi”. And Islamabad asked Delhi for an official clarification.

The most consequential part of Saran’s speech is where he presents a scenario that culminates with India engaging in “massive nuclear retaliation” against Pakistan. He posits an escalatory ladder that presumably starts with a sub-conventional event or terrorist attack, after which Pakistan tries to dissuade India from carrying out punitive conventional retaliation, by deploying its tactical nuclear weapons. India responds by using strategic weapons.

Saran warns that any nuclear attack — whether by strategic or tactical weapons — would be met by “massive retaliation” from India. “Pakistan”, he declares, should “be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons”.

Several of Saran’s assumptions are open to question. First there is a presumption that Pakistan’s decision to develop battlefield nuclear weapons represents a nuclear war-fighting option. Official spokesmen have repeatedly said that Pakistan regards the surface-to-surface solid fuel-based Hatf IX (Nasr) as primarily a weapon of deterrence. Its purpose is to reinforce deterrence and restore nuclear stability. Islamabad remains committed to its nuclear policy of achieving credible nuclear deterrence at the lowest practical level. The central tenet of its nuclear policy is for its capability to be maintained for the purpose of deterrence against aggression.

Saran’s escalatory scenario seems to suggest that India’s Cold Start Doctrine, now known as “proactive operations”, has been challenged if not blunted by Pakistan’s TNW response. That is why this emerges as the main thrust of his remarks. In doing so he also reaffirms the Indian intent to preserve the limited war option.

That Saran believes that India can or should consider a punitive war against its nuclear neighbour in retaliation for an act of terror carried out by a non-state actor is disconcerting enough. But he then warns that if Pakistan tried to deter an Indian conventional attack by its TNWs, India would retaliate with nuclear weapons. This fails to factor in Pakistan’s full spectrum capabilities to counter “massive retaliation” not to speak of its potent second-strike capability.

The rationale for Pakistan’s decision to pursue a TNW capability bears repetition to place Saran’s remarks in perspective. Pakistan perceived a number of rapid developments in the past decade to adversely affect the region’s strategic equilibrium established after the 1998 nuclear tests by both countries. They included the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and the NSG exemption under which India was assured of fuel supply by many countries. These significantly enhanced India’s ability to expand its strategic arsenal and altered Pakistan’s security calculations.

Meanwhile, the new Indian military doctrine, which came on the back of these developments, became a gamechanger. The effort to find space for limited conventional engagement below the nuclear threshold impelled Pakistan to seek a response at the tactical level in the nuclear domain. In trying to call Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff’ by operationalising proactive war-fighting strategies, these Indian moves urged Pakistan to develop TNWs to deter Cold Start and re-establish nuclear stability.

Against this backdrop what Saran now seems to be signalling is that if Pakistan thinks it can deter limited conventional war by tactical nuclear weapons, then India too can use strategic weapons in “massive retaliation”. This is dangerous talk in a situation where a delicate balance holds between the nuclear neighbours.

Nuclear powers do not define their relations by threats or bluster. The only answer to dilemmas created by the region’s nuclearisation is for both nations to engage seriously to build better understanding of each other’s nuclear policy, doctrines and postures. This means advancing the nuclear dialogue to put in place credible confidence building measures in both the strategic and conventional military spheres.

The two countries have a mutual interest in stabilising their nuclear relationship. The way forward is not by ill-thought nuclear signaling but in engaging substantively to narrow the perception gaps and address the issues that lie at the root of both countries’ security predicament.

Dr Maleeha Lodhi served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the US and United Kingdom
 

TerryK

TB Fanatic
Lilbitsnana

Pakistan and Israel's use of sea based nukes is really no different that the US, China or Russia's use of ballistic missile submarines. It is part of the nuclear triad (Land, Air and Sea based nuclear weapons). The whole purpose of the triad is to allow the nuclear deterrent to remain in case a country is attacked by an overwhelming force. The sea based part of the triad is even more important with smaller countries that could be more easily overwhelmed by even a half dozen or so nukes.

By the way, why didn't you include Britain and maybe even France in your list of countries. Britain is a relatively small country and a half dozen or so nukes could totally wipe them out also if not for their SSBNs providing a deterrent threat to any country that would try to attack them.

I am actually in favor of any country that has nukes having a sea based option. Without a reliable sea base option countries might have to go back to the highly dangerous launch on warning. Launch on warning has brought us closer to nuke war in the past than many people realize. If a country can not afford to absorb a nuclear first strike, and they have no sea based nuke option, launch on warning, or "use it or lose it" becomes their only option.

By the way, I don't think those are tactical nukes, that Israeli subs are putting to sea with. I would bet they are designed to be city busters in the same way larger countries sub based nukes are. The difference is that so far most of Israel's likely enemies are within range of cruise missiles. Hell, if I was a small country like Israel, I would even be putting some of my larger ICBMs with much greater range and throw weight, on mobile platforms such as large cargo type ships.

Eventually many of the middle east countries will end up developing or even purchasing nukes and the world will become an even more hairy place to live.
I don't think there is a way to prevent that. Almost any country with a large enough economy and industrial base has the ability to develop their own nukes.
In the future I would look for a half dozen or so South American countries as well as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and maybe Germany and a few other European countries to come up with their own nukes.
With so many countries having the capability, especially some of the more unstable countries, I believe that eventually we will end up with at least a limited nuclear war somewhere in the world. I think our biggest danger is not a country with nukes, but a terrorist group that may get a hold of a couple of nukes and the technical capability to detonate them.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Lilbitsnana

Pakistan and Israel's use of sea based nukes is really no different that the US, China or Russia's use of ballistic missile submarines. It is part of the nuclear triad (Land, Air and Sea based nuclear weapons). The whole purpose of the triad is to allow the nuclear deterrent to remain in case a country is attacked by an overwhelming force. The sea based part of the triad is even more important with smaller countries that could be more easily overwhelmed by even a half dozen or so nukes.

By the way, why didn't you include Britain and maybe even France in your list of countries. Britain is a relatively small country and a half dozen or so nukes could totally wipe them out also if not for their SSBNs providing a deterrent threat to any country that would try to attack them.

I am actually in favor of any country that has nukes having a sea based option. Without a reliable sea base option countries might have to go back to the highly dangerous launch on warning. Launch on warning has brought us closer to nuke war in the past than many people realize. If a country can not afford to absorb a nuclear first strike, and they have no sea based nuke option, launch on warning, or "use it or lose it" becomes their only option.

By the way, I don't think those are tactical nukes, that Israeli subs are putting to sea with. I would bet they are designed to be city busters in the same way larger countries sub based nukes are. The difference is that so far most of Israel's likely enemies are within range of cruise missiles. Hell, if I was a small country like Israel, I would even be putting some of my larger ICBMs with much greater range and throw weight, on mobile platforms such as large cargo type ships.

Eventually many of the middle east countries will end up developing or even purchasing nukes and the world will become an even more hairy place to live.
I don't think there is a way to prevent that. Almost any country with a large enough economy and industrial base has the ability to develop their own nukes.
In the future I would look for a half dozen or so South American countries as well as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and maybe Germany and a few other European countries to come up with their own nukes.
With so many countries having the capability, especially some of the more unstable countries, I believe that eventually we will end up with at least a limited nuclear war somewhere in the world. I think our biggest danger is not a country with nukes, but a terrorist group that may get a hold of a couple of nukes and the technical capability to detonate them.

It's an article. I posted it for others to read or not to read; I didn't even come close to writing it.

You can always contact the author on why he didn't include other countries and the rest of your points.
 

TerryK

TB Fanatic
It's an article. I posted it for others to read or not to read; I didn't even come close to writing it.

You can always contact the author on why he didn't include other countries and the rest of your points.

Nothing personal intended. Most people put a sentence or two of their own personal opinion to go along with their article.
Sorry if you took it the wrong way. I was just trying to point out a flaw in the articles reasoning and that a sea based part of a triad actually lessons the chance of an accidental nuclear exchange for all countries, both big and small because they don't have to resort to launch on warning.
 
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