WAR 07-30-2022-to-08-05-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(260) 06-18-2022-to-06-24-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(261) 06-25-2022-to-07-01-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(262) 07-23-2022-to-07-29-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

the Kherson offensive has momentum View: https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1552526084821893120 If the Ukainians can win back this territory it could be a turning point in this year.

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

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WAR - China Signals a Military Response to a Taiwan Visit by Pelosi

:hmm: View: https://mobile.twitter.com/dlscIosetv/status/1553441685002244098? Very, very, interesting. That might explain what I saw on ADS-B Exchange a few hour ago. I was looking for the speaker's plane inbound to Hawaii. Earlier reports said she was on a U.S. military Boeing C-40C. I did...

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean

View: https://mobile.twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1547833862268469250?cxt=HHwWhICqvc2sgfsqAAAA

www.timebomb2000.com

ALERT - The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

China Tried To Build Spy Network Inside The Fed, Threatened To Kidnap Fed Economist BY TYLER DURDEN ZERO HEDGE TUESDAY, JUL 26, 2022 - 10:45 AM China tried to place "a network of informants inside the Federal Reserve system" over the course of a decade, according to a stunning new article out...

www.timebomb2000.com

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Posted for fair use.....

After Ukraine, Should East Asia Go Nuclear?

In the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, the future of the East Asian security order will likely be turbulent, and nuclear weapons are going to play an important role.

nationalinterest.org

July 30, 2022 Topic: Nuclear Proliferation Region: Asia Tags: Nuclear ProliferationRussia-Ukraine WarNuclear WeaponsUkraineJapanSouth KoreaTaiwanChinaNorth Korea

After Ukraine, Should East Asia Go Nuclear?

In the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, the future of the East Asian security order will likely be turbulent, and nuclear weapons are going to play an important role.

by Ramakrishna Pathanaboina Sanjeet Kashyap

ussia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended European geopolitics and marked the return of great power competition. However, the ramifications of the invasion will be global in scope as policymakers carefully learn from the Ukrainian experience. With the rise of China as a peer competitor to the United States and its recent aggressive turn towards military coercion, East Asian states have reason to worry.

The nuclear dimension of the war in Ukraine, in particular, is important because of the existential concern at stake. Chinese policymakers would certainly pay attention to U.S. reluctance to intervene militarily due to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. They might conclude that a conventional invasion of Taiwan—coupled with nuclear saber-rattling—will likewise prevent direct U.S. involvement in another regional conflict.

On the other hand, as many commentators have pointed out, the war has also revived the possibility of nuclear proliferation as smaller states recognize Ukraine’s mistake in giving up its inherited nuclear stockpile. Further, the failure of the United States and the United Kingdom to enforce the assurances of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty has dented the credibility of great powers to shield their smaller allies against nuclear-armed rivals.

In this context, facing nuclear-armed adversaries in China and North Korea, East Asian states such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan might re-evaluate their decisions to forsake nuclear deterrence and rely solely on the U.S. security architecture. Today, the uncertain geopolitical environment in East Asia stems from China’s military advantages and increasingly aggressive intentions; the relative decline, domestic fracture, and entrapment of the United States in Europe; and a clear recognition of the Chinese threat in domestic public opinion surveys.

Despite the strength of the international nonproliferation regime, including economic sanctions and the possibility of preventive military action, security considerations dictate that East Asian states would do well to take the nuclear turn in the short to medium term.

Nuclear Deterrence and Non-Existential Threats

The utility of nuclear weapons in deterring existential threats is well-recognized. As Ukraine faces an existential threat from Russia today, the folly of abandoning its nukes has become clear. However, it is also true that the possession of nuclear weapons does not preclude conflict at the conventional and sub-conventional levels. Nuclear-armed states have historically faced aggression and even defeat at hands of non-nuclear weapons states. The limited utility of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts then becomes the basis of the claim that the East Asian states should not pursue nuclear weapons.

While backed by the empirical record, this argument ignores the potential deterrence effect that nuclear weapons can have on conventional conflicts. In the case of a conventional conflict involving rival nuclear powers, the possibility of escalation to nuclear use cannot be ignored in making calculations at the conventional level. In this sense, the presence of nuclear deterrence can have a mollifying impact in preventing reckless aggression, even when conflict remains conventional. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, President John F. Kennedy was so worried by the prospect of inadvertent nuclear escalation that he sidelined hawkish officials and cautiously implemented the naval blockade of Cuba.

Further, the argument that there is no existential threat to East Asian states needs to be tested. In the case of Taiwan, there exists a clear existential threat in the form of conventionally superior and nuclear-armed China which threatens its territorial integrity. South Korea and Japan do not face the prospect of an imminent conventional invasion from a proximate superior adversary but both have to deal with two nuclear-armed adversaries, North Korea and China.

Hence, all three states inhabit an acute security environment which should make them consider the nuclear option to deter unwarranted aggression and coercion. China’s military modernization, bolstered by increased defense spending; the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities, new aircraft carriers, a blue water navy, and new nuclear silos; and the augmentation of cyber warfare capabilities, does not bode well for its neighbors. China is likely to use its conventional superiority to make an aggressive attempt at achieving regional hegemony.

Extended Deterrence and U.S. Credibility

The nuclear option for deterring China can work in two ways for East Asian states. The easier option is to continue extended deterrence under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan and South Korea are treaty allies of the United States and have a guaranteed measure of protection in case of nuclear escalation. Taiwan’s relationship with the United States is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act which does not automatically warrant the use of nuclear weapons on the part of the United States to protect it. The second option for these states is to activate their own nuclear weapon programs and develop an independent deterrent. In the past, both Taiwan and South Korea have sought the bomb only to abandon their programs under U.S. pressure.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

There are several thorny issues that East Asian states will have to deal with when deciding to go nuclear. Apart from both the U.S. extension of the nuclear umbrella to meet their security needs and its opposition to nuclear proliferation, the strength of the nonproliferation regime, including economic sanctions and the threat of preventive military action from the adversary during the window of vulnerability, poses significant costs for the proliferators.

In the case of Taiwan, the logic of the nuclear umbrella does not apply and the threat posed by China is existential, even if an invasion is an unlikely prospect for now. Despite the logic of the stopping power of water and the military balance favoring the defender, China’s improved capabilities will make it exceedingly difficult for Taiwan to deter a conventional amphibious invasion from the mainland. Hence, there exists a compelling case for Taiwan to develop its own nukes.

For Japan and South Korea, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella has to come under question for these allies to develop their own deterrent. As others have previously argued, the United States’ reluctance to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul poses the most significant challenge to the credibility of extended deterrence. The precedent for Tokyo or Seoul to go nuclear can be found in the French decision to develop its own bomb despite being under the NATO umbrella. The French fear of U.S. abandonment in the context of Dien Bien Phu and the 1956 Suez crisis overrode their faith in NATO’s assurances.

Even if the Trump interregnum, characterized by a zero-sum attitude toward allies, is seen as an aberration, the U.S. abandonment of Afghanistan and its inability to enforce the Budapest Memorandum should make U.S. East Asian allies consider the benefits of nuclear deterrence.

On the United States’ part, the costs of extended deterrence also need to be examined. As Doug Bandow has argued, in the case of South Korea, extended deterrence made sense so long as the North Korean threat was limited to a conventional level and Pyongyang did not have intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, due to China and North Korea’s nuclear buildup, the risks to the United States have increased and are likely to put a strain on the U.S. commitment as tensions heat up in the region.

While it comes with risks, allowing U.S. allies to go nuclear might actually ease the security burden for the United States. For instance, an independent Japanese or South Korean nuclear deterrent would allow the United States to reduce its spending on the maintenance of overseas military bases and troop deployments. In the case of Taiwan, it is in the U.S. interest to allow it to go nuclear so that China is unable to break out of the first island chain, a crucial step to China’s cementing of regional hegemony.

Further, doubts over the United States’ ability to mobilize resources to conventionally balance China in the Indo-Pacific region provide another rationale for horizontal proliferation in East Asia. While the United States has partially withdrawn from the Middle East and increased its focus on the Indo-Pacific region, Russia’s invasion has dragged it into the European theater to the detriment of its East Asian allies. The war in Ukraine has indeed galvanized European states in taking more responsibility for their defense burden, but this has not translated into a drawdown of the U.S. commitment to the region. In the short run, for the next couple of years at least, the United States seems unable to get out of Europe.

Second, the severe partisan polarization of domestic politics might make it difficult for the United States to effectively mobilize resources in support of allies under duress. During the Ukraine crisis, this concern has been evident in the conservative defense of the Russian invasion and some Republican senators’ opposition to sending U.S. aid to Ukraine. This argument, however, has to be qualified by the generally hawkish attitude of Republicans and the Democratic Party’s propensity to taking a multilateral approach.

Finally, the influence of the restraint variant of grand strategy in the United States might lead to the drawdown of its direct entanglement in the region. While there exists a significant debate among restrainers on tackling the China challenge, almost all variants would involve allies picking up more burden for self-defense.

Handling Preventive NonProliferation

It will be highly unlikely, though not impossible, for East Asian states to go nuclear without the United States’ clear support. In the past, the United States has successfully pressured West Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan to commit to nonproliferation but it has also acquiesced to both Israel and Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons.

This raises the issue of identifying conditions under which the United States might allow its allies and friends to go nuclear. Scholar Jaffrey Taliaferro has identified two factors that play a major role in determining Washington’s adoption of an accommodative nonproliferation strategy towards its friends, including an unfavorable distribution of power in the ally’s geographic region and short time horizons for threats to U.S. interests in the region.

In East Asia, China’s emergence as a great power and its clear intention to be a regional hegemon amounts to an unfavorable shift in the regional balance of power for the United States. However, when it comes to the time horizon, there does not exist any immediate threat to U.S. interests, despite China’s creeping maritime aggression and bellicose rhetoric. But in negating many predictions, Vladimir Putin’s invasion shows that intention might change quickly and threats may materialize sooner than expected, a lesson that U.S. policymakers will do well to keep in mind while thinking of the time horizon.

The threat of economic sanctions and the risk of preventive strikes by China would also figure into the calculation. Economic sanctions, however, are not a costless tool of nonproliferation. The Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese economies are technologically advanced and deeply integrated into the world economy. Economic sanctions in response to proliferation activities would significantly harm core U.S. economic and strategic interests, as well as the global economy. The adverse impact on both the United States and the Global South of sanctioning Russia’s relatively less integrated economy should serve as a cautionary tale.

Further, in weakening its allies’ economies for the sin of proliferation, the United States would impede burden sharing by local powers facing China. The proliferator states would also be aware of the reality that economic sanctions have not proven to be effective instruments of statecraft.

A preventive strike by China to halt nuclear weapons development is a far more serious challenge. In 2007, for instance, Israel scrambled its fighter jets to destroy Syria’s secret nuclear facility. In contrast, South Africa successfully hid its nuclear program, while India was also able to hoodwink U.S. intelligence agencies in its successful Pokhran II tests. Moreover, as academic Michael Cohen has argued, preventive strikes may appear to be an attractive option but have rarely been deployed by civilian authorities against a proliferator adversary.

Strategies of Proliferation

Should East Asian states decide to go nuclear, technological capability is not a major impediment. Given the strong public opposition in Japan, however, it makes sense for Tokyo to continue its current strategy of insurance hedging. In the case of Korea, there exists significant public support for its own nuclear deterrent. Yet, like Japan, it should first pursue insurance hedging. Should the threat from China or North Korea magnify or U.S. credibility wane, Seoul should not hesitate in shifting to sprinting or sheltered pursuit.

Taiwan’s situation is the direst as it faces an existential threat from China and is not protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Given the absence of significant public support, Taiwan may resort to hard hedging. In the case that increased threat perceptions vis-à-vis China lead to a dramatic shift in public opinion, Taiwanese policymakers would do well to follow South Africa and hide their country’s nuclear program.

In the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, the future of the East Asian security order will likely be turbulent, and nuclear weapons are going to play an important role. China’s militaristic behavior and its nuclear modernization, as well as the credibility of U.S. commitments to its allies, are likely to play a major role in the future of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.

Ramakrishna Pathanaboina is a master’s student of International Politics at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (@ramakrishna1196).

Sanjeet Kashyap is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation, Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (@sanjeet38).

 

[Ozarkian]

Thanks for these Housecarl.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Poland's massive tank, artillery and jet deal with S. Korea comes in shadow of Ukraine war - Breaking Defense

The deal covers the purchase of 1,000 K2 tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50PL light combat aircraft, with production benefits for Poland as well.

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Poland’s massive tank, artillery and jet deal with S. Korea comes in shadow of Ukraine war
The deal covers the purchase of 1,000 K2 tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50PL light combat aircraft, with production benefits for Poland as well.
By BARTOSZ GŁOWACKI
on July 29, 2022 at 5:15 AM

WARSAW: In a move that both bolsters its military modernization efforts and creates a stronger geopolitical tie to the Pacific, Poland this week announced a series of major defense acquisition programs from South Korea.

The agreements — covering the purchase of 1,000 K2 tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft — will completely transform Poland’s military as it seeks to bulk up in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while also beefing up Poland’s domestic industry.

The exact cost of the agreements were not made public, but South Korean media has pegged the spend at around $14.5 billion in total. If accurate, that would be roughly the same amount of money as Poland’s entire defense spending plan for the year released in Feb. 2022. Even spread across multiple years, as this buy would be, the Korean purchases clearly represent a major investment for Warsaw — especially after a series of procurement announcements made in May.


Mariusz Błaszczak, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, officially approved the arms agreements on July 27. According to an official statement, “this is one of the most important and largest Polish defense orders in recent years. The ordered weapon systems are a real strengthening of Polish deterrence and defense potential. It will ultimately be produced with a wide participation of the Polish defense industry […]. Orders are characterized by a fast supply pace and a large transfer of technology to Poland.”

“This strengthening is extremely important in view of the situation on our eastern border,” said Błaszczak. “We do not have time, we cannot wait. We have to arm the Polish Army. Why such a weapon? Because we learn lessons from what is happening in Ukraine. We learn lessons from how the aggressor attacks, how Russia has attacked. We can see that armored forces and artillery are of great importance on the battlefield nowadays, hence the decision to strengthen this type of armed forces.”


The purchase is driven not just by fears of Russia, but also as an acknowledgement that Poland plans to continue to transfer older weapon systems to Ukraine and will need to backfill the resulting gaps.

Per the MND statement, the “main goal of these orders is to fill the gap resulting from the transfer of military equipment from the Polish Army resources to the Ukraine, including, among others: T-72 main battle tanks, and some PT-91 Twardy MBTs, 155mm self-propelled howitzers AHS Krab, by the end of 2025,” as well as growing Poland’s army.


And the industrial impact doesn’t hurt, with the ruling Peace and Justice party up for reelection next year. As part of the agreements, all three weapon systems will be domestically produced in Poland after 2026, with agreements in place to jointly-develop new tanks and howitzers for the future.

“Signing the framework agreement is indeed very important for the government of the Republic of Poland, but also for the government of South Korea, for our armaments industries, because now our countries are starting a strategic partnership and strategic cooperation. Hyundai Rotem will certainly expand this partnership with Poland, especially when it comes to locating production here in Poland with full transfer. I am convinced that both countries will be great partners in the name of the future, the more that we are expanding our cooperation to other areas,” emphasized Lee Yong-Bae, President and CEO of Hyundai Rotem.

There may be more to come: According to available information, Poland is to be interested also in development of wheeled armored personnel carriers and would potentially look to acquire the Korean-made AS21 Redback IFV, K239 Chunmoo rocket artillery system (called the K-MLRS, Korean Multiple Launch Rocket System), and the new generation Korean multi-role combat aircraft KF-21 Boramae. According to Poland’s MND “regardless of the purchase of FA-50PL, in the Polish Armed Forces Technical Modernization Plan for 2021-2035, there is still a task to the purchase of another two multirole fighter squadrons.”

“The Korean success in Poland is noteworthy because Poland is a member of NATO and could have opted for additional purchases from the U.S. or other European states,” Byron Callan, a defense industry analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, noted in an investor note this week. “We suspect that its products may be less costly and that Korea may be more willing to transfer technology. Successful export sales could further strengthen Korea’s defense industry as it also seeks to develop new products.”

Complementing the Abrams

Warsaw already has tank modernization efforts underway, with the announced acquisition of 250 American-made M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams Main Battle Tanks (planned for delivery through 2026) and 116 of the lighter M1A1 tanks (two battalions, with deliveries in 2023-2024). Now, those American tanks will be complemented by the Korean K2 Black Panther, designed by the Agency for Defense Development and manufactured by Hyundai Rotem.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1552206777458245632

View: https://twitter.com/Poland_MOD/status/1552206777458245632?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1552206777458245632%7Ctwgr%5E9e17f7023391470eda51fa81fbd8d6137b61abef%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fbreakingdefense.com%2F2022%2F07%2Fpolands-massive-tank-artillery-and-jet-deal-with-s-korea-comes-in-shadow-of-ukraine-war%2F


The South Korean tanks will be delivered in two tranches. The first tranche will cover 180 (three battalions) of newly produced K2s, delivered between 2022 and 2025. The second tranche will be more numerous – 820 tanks (14 battalions) in the K2PL standard — with deliveries starting in 2026.

That same year, a new factory in Poland will launch and co-produce the K2PL, while older K2s delivered as part of the first tranche will begin to be modified, in Poland, to the higher K2PL standard. Along with the tank package will come a collection of Korean armored recovery vehicles and armored vehicle-launched bridges, a training and logistics package, and ammunition.

In addition, the Korean tanks will be able to integrate for combat operations with Poland’s upcoming amphibious infantry fighting vehicle Borsuk (Badger). Developed by Huta Stalowa Wola, the Badger is currently undergoing testing, and if it clears all requirements the Polish army is expected to begin negotiations on procurement.

And n the future, the two nations will collaborate on the K3PL, a new Polish-Korean tank developed on the basis of the K2PL, produced in Poland and South Korea.

Filling The Artillery Gap

As with the tanks, Poland was already underway with modernization efforts for its howitzers. Currently on order are 96 of the 155 mm self-propelled AHS Krab howitzers, produced domestically by Huta Stalowa Wola. Of the 80 that have already been delivered, 18 were donated to Ukraine, and in early June another 54 were put on order. According to Błaszczak, there is a plan to order another 48 Krab systems, with delivery completed by the end of 2026.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1552208406651572224

View: https://twitter.com/Poland_MOD/status/1552208406651572224?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1552208406651572224%7Ctwgr%5E9e17f7023391470eda51fa81fbd8d6137b61abef%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fbreakingdefense.com%2F2022%2F07%2Fpolands-massive-tank-artillery-and-jet-deal-with-s-korea-comes-in-shadow-of-ukraine-war%2F


Those numbers will push Huta Stalowa Wola to its production capacity, but Poland will now get supplemental help from the K9 Thunder 155mm howitzer system, designed and developed by the Agency for Defense Development and Samsung Aerospace Industries, and now manufactured by Hanwha Defense.

Warsaw is planning for a first tranche of 48 K9A1 weapons, mostly newly produced, which will come with K10 ARV Fully-automated Robotic Ammunition Resupply Vehicles and K11 C2 vehicles as well as a training and logistics package, ammunition supply and technical support from the manufacturers.

The first 18 howitzers will be delivered from South Korea in 2022, and the remaining 30 will come in 2023. The K9A1, which is the older Korean design, will be modernized to the Polish K9PL standard after 2026, which requires integration with Polish communication systems and Poland’s Integrated Combat Management System known as Topaz.

The second planned tranche will be a massive order of 624 howitzers, equipped with the Topaz system. Deliveries of this tranche are expected to start from 2024, coming from South Korea facilities, but starting in 2026 a new Howitzer factory in Poland will begin producing the weapon as well; after that point, Poland will begin receiving both home-grown and Korean-produced K9 systems.

A future K9PLA3 howitzer design will see R&D begin in the 2025-2026 timeframe, based on user experience of both the K9PL and Krab. This version is to be produced in Poland and South Korea and would enter service in 2030s.

Successors For Soviet Aircraft

The Polish Air Force fleet will be beefed up with 48 Korea Aerospace Industries FA-50PL light combat aircraft. (Breaking Defense reported that the South Koreans were meeting with Poland on a potential FA-50 sale in April.) The first 12 aircraft in Block 10 standard, equipped with British IFF Mark XIIA Mod 5/S, will be delivered to Poland in mid-2023.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

According to current plans, the next batch of 36 aircraft is planned to start delivery in 2025 and will be completed in two to three years. These aircraft will resemble Block 20 configuration, equipped with AESA radar, Sniper targeting pod, and Link 16 datalink, and will be armed with AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. In the future, Polish FA-50s will be integrated with high-end air-to-air weapons, potentially the US-made AIM-120 AMRAAM.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1552210966812704769

View: https://twitter.com/Poland_MOD/status/1552210966812704769?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1552210966812704769%7Ctwgr%5E9e17f7023391470eda51fa81fbd8d6137b61abef%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fbreakingdefense.com%2F2022%2F07%2Fpolands-massive-tank-artillery-and-jet-deal-with-s-korea-comes-in-shadow-of-ukraine-war%2F


An Armament Agency of MND spokesman stated “we already have a specific configuration of aircraft that will be delivered from 2025, but this is not the last word, because the contractual agreement has not yet been concluded (it should be understood that the integration of further equipment can be taken into account later).” It is expected that a training center with simulators will be built in Poland and a MRO center will be established around 2026.

Getting the FA-50 into Poland has been a longstanding effort from Korea. The jet was offered to Poland twice (as the T-50P, tailored to Polish requirements) in tenders for new training aircraft in 2010 and 2012. Eventually Poland choose the M-346 Master as the replacement of obsolete TS-11 Iskra, and currently the Polish Air Force has 12 M-346 (dubbed “Bielik,” or “White-Tailed Eagle”) as part of the 41st Training Air Base in Dęblin. In late 2018, Warsaw announced the purchase of four additional M-346s, with Leonardo committed to deliver these aircraft by the end of October 2022.

But, according to Błaszczak, “currently used M-346 have too low availability rate – I signaled this matter to my Italian counterpart several times. That is why we decided on the FA-50, which will allow us to increase the number of cadets who will train at the Polish Air Force University as well as performing some NATO missions.”

It appears Poland will use the Korean-made jets not just as trainers, but as light attack aircraft that could be the successor of its one squadron of Su-22M4/UM3K Fitters and two squads of MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum, a pair of Soviet-era jets. In turn, the FA-50s will have to work together with the existing F-16 fighters currently in use.

“When it comes to interoperability with aircraft that are and will be in the Polish Air Force, [FA-50] integration will be maintained. The FA-50 aircraft will be integrated in the system with our F-16, and when it comes to infrastructure, this infrastructure that we have is enough to adapt these aircraft smoothly to our air forces.’ Inspector of the Polish Air Force Maj. Gen. Jacek Pszczoła said before the deal was announced.

“The Koreans assure us that the F-16 pilot needs six hours to start flying FA-50 solo,” Pszczoła added. This would also translate into lower costs of pilot training. “We intend to transfer pilots through the FA-50 to F-16 or F-35 and the training costs will be twice lower. The skills acquired on FA-50 will be used as much as possible when training on F-16 or in the future on F-35” he said.

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[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

How the Jihadist Threat Against India Has Evolved Since the US Withdrawal From Afghanistan

Following the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Nupur Sharma’s remarks denigrating the Prophet Muhammad, several Muslim countries in Asia registered strong protests against India (The Hindu, June 6). The Indian Muslim community also protested in several cities, resulting in a...

jamestown.org

How the Jihadist Threat Against India Has Evolved Since the US Withdrawal From Afghanistan
By: Abdul Basit
July 29, 2022 12:08 PM Age: 1 day

Following the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Nupur Sharma’s remarks denigrating the Prophet Muhammad, several Muslim countries in Asia registered strong protests against India (The Hindu, June 6). The Indian Muslim community also protested in several cities, resulting in a tense communal environment (Hindustan Times, June 11). Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) tried to exploit India’s communal fault lines as a result. Both groups threatened revenge attacks in a bid to attract fresh recruits and make inroads in India (Zee News, June 16). Indeed, ISKP targeted a Sikh Gurdwara in Karte Parwan, Kabul, in a “revenge” gun-and-bomb attack on June 20, killing two people and injuring seven others (The Hindu, June 19).

In recent years, AQIS and ISKP have been trying to outdo each other in the discursive space over India by reaching out to different demographic groups of the Indian Muslim community. However, Indian Muslims, despite prevalent tensions, have frustrated the efforts of these groups to win recruits or spread their networks (Observer Research Foundation, August 21, 2020). For instance, AQIS and ISKP are continuously commenting on salient political events in India, such as the ban on wearing the hijab in educational institutions in Karnataka, Nupur Sharma’s insulting remarks against the Prophet, and the situation in Kashmir. However, AQIS and ISKP’s renewed focus on India has not found much traction in India, where communal tensions continue to revolve around local dynamics.

The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Jihadists’ India Obsession

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, both AQIS and ISKP have increased their India-focused propaganda. Both groups are trying to capitalize on Indian Muslim political grievances, which have increased in the past few years, to gain sympathizers.

AQIS Efforts to Grow in India

The US exit from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power have rejuvenated global jihadist propaganda against India. AQIS started positioning itself as an anti-India group when the US-Taliban deal was signed in Doha in February 2020. In March 2020, AQIS changed the name of its monthly Urdu-language propaganda magazine from Nawa-i-Afghan Jihad to Nawa-i-Ghazw-e-Hind (changing “Afghanistan” to “India”) on the grounds that the war in Afghanistan was won after the announcement of the US withdrawal, and it was time to focus on India (The Print, May 30).

Since then, India has prominently featured in both al-Qaeda and AQIS propaganda material and videos of Ayman al-Zawahiri. For instance, al-Zawahiri’s April 6 video criticized the hijab ban in Karnataka. Furthermore, he praised the hijab-wearing student Muskan Khan, who defied a bullying Hindu mob that was wearing saffron scarves and chanting the Hindutva slogan “Jai Shri Ram” through raising her fist and shouting “Allahu Akbar!” (The Print, April 6). Al-Zawahiri urged Indian Muslims to “avoid being deceived by the pagan Hindu democracy of India which, to begin with, was never more than a tool to oppress Muslims.” He stated, “It is exactly the same tool of deception the true nature of which was exposed by France, Holland and Switzerland when they banned the Hijab while allowing nudity” (WION, April 6).

ISKP’s India-Centric Propaganda

Similarly, ISKP has expanded the scope and intensity of its anti-India propaganda in recent years, but a particular surge is discernible following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan (Terrorism Monitor, May 6). For instance, before the Karte Parwan Gurdwara attack in Kabul, ISKP warned in a video that it would carry out attacks in major Indian cities to avenge Sharma’s insulting remarks against the Prophet. The video also featured some ISKP attacks, such as the August 2021 suicide attack on the Kabul Airport and the March 2020 suicide attack on Rai Sahib Gurdwara in Kabul (YouTube/ Swarajya, June 16). After the Gurdwara attack, a pro-Islamic State (IS) social media channel released a three-minute video titled “Khorasan Province: the Graveyard of Murtadeen (Apostates).” The video maintained that ISKP’s attack on the Gurdwara targeted Hindus and Sikhs as revenge (WION, June 19). Similarly, ISKP has published a 50-page document on Nupur Sharma’s controversial statement (The Indian Express, June 15).

Just before AQIS decided to change the name of Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad to Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind, Islamic State in Hind Province (ISHP) released an India-focused English language magazine Sawt al-Hind (the Voice of Hind). The magazine focused on growing Islamophobia in India, human rights violations in Kashmir, and oppression against Indian Muslims (Observer Research Foundation, January 6). After that, ISKP also launched an English-language magazine, the Voice of Khorasan.

ISKP’s propaganda, including the Voice of Khorasan, is translated into Hindi and Malayalam, among other regional languages. The translation of ISKP’s propaganda in Malayalam was done under a well-thought-out strategy. It aims to target the South Indian state of Kerala, where ISKP made inroads in 2015–2016 (Terrorism Monitor, May 6). Several families from Kerala traveled to Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province to join ISKP. Likewise, ISKP has been vocal in its criticism of the Taliban for accepting humanitarian assistance from India, meeting Indian officials in Kabul, and assuring India of complete security to reopen the Indian embassy (Hindustan Times, June 16).

India’s Significance for Global Jihadist Groups’ Regional Franchises

Both AQIS and ISKP, in addition to latching onto sensitive issues concerning the Indian Muslim community, have tried to justify their India focus under the Ghazwa-e-Hind (Conquest of India) narrative (The Print, October 19, 2019). Other anti-Indian militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), have also used the same narrative. However, AQIS and ISKP spearheaded the exploitation of this jihadist doctrine in the post-US withdrawal scenario from Afghanistan (Economic Times, March 3, 2019).

Similar to ensuring a footprint in the Middle East (home to Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina) to justify the claim to the global Islamic caliphate, ISKP and AQIS need to have some form of presence in India to rationalize the Ghazwa-e-Hind doctrine. India is home to 200 million Muslims, who are at the receiving end of the Hindu nationalist BJP’s discriminatory policies (Centre for Land Warfare Studies, January 31, 2021). Hence, it is important for both AQIS and ISKP to be vocal about developments concerning the Indian Muslim community and to try to create inroads in the country. Separately, India is South Asia’s largest state and shares borders with almost all South Asian countries. Any claim of a presence by ISKP and AQIS in South Asia without a footprint in India would be unfounded.

Another linked but separate aspect of AQIS’s and ISKP’s obsession with India is the search for a great villain or enemy state after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Since 9/11, the US presence in Afghanistan was the main driving factor for radicalized would-be-jihadists in different parts of the world. Prior to 9/11, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan worked as a main catalyst for the jihadist recruitment. The presence of an overwhelming enemy like India in a regional jihadist theater helps global jihadists groups maintain their cohesion, justify their violence, and fuel their recruitment and funding (Observer Research Foundation, January 11).

Conclusion

Thus far, AQIS and ISKP’s efforts have been frustrated by the Indian Muslim community’s lukewarm response. In contrast, the two groups have created deeper networks inside Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Local issues such as the demolition of the Babri Mosque in 1992 and the 2002 Muslim pogrom in Gujarat have radicalized sections of the Indian Muslim community and resulted in the formation of outfits like the Indian Mujahideen (Terrorism Monitor, May 6). However, global jihadist groups have struggled to capture the imagination of the Indian Muslim community. Likewise, these jihadist groups have struggled in Kashmir where local jihadist groups dominate the rebel landscape.

The preference of the Indian Muslim community to look for political avenues available within the Indian democratic and constitutional framework has undermined AQIS’s and ISKP’s efforts to grow in India. The Indian counter-terrorism authorities’ efficacy in pre-empting AQIS’s and ISKP’s overtures also account for these groups’ failure to create a foothold in the country. However, in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment and with a prevailing polarized communal environment in India, this dynamic can change for the worst. As long as the grievances persist, the potential for these groups to spread their tentacles to India will remain.

Abdul Basit is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His research focuses on jihadist militancy and extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

 

[Housecarl]

ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Has anyone ever thought..... We're from the government and we're here to .....help, protect, oversee, take care of........ .....as a good thing?

www.timebomb2000.com

OK then

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1555655351650992128

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https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/100000-north-korean-soldiers-could-be-sent-to-bolster-putins-forces-fighting-ukraine/news-story/1126782c8c5e6fe08a8ad2d9fa38dff0

100,000 North Korean soldiers could be sent to bolster Putin’s forces fighting Ukraine
An army of soldiers from one of the world’s most authoritarian nations could be sent to bolster Vladimir Putin’s forces fighting in Ukraine.
Will Stewart

3 min read
August 5, 2022 - 6:21PM

Up to 100,000 North Korean soldiers could be sent to bolster Vladimir Putin’s forces fighting Ukraine, according to Russian reports.

A leading defence expert in Moscow, reserve colonel Igor Korotchenko, told state TV: “We shouldn’t be shy in accepting the hand extended to us by Kim Jong-un.”

North Korea has made it clear through “diplomatic channels” that as well as providing builders to repair war damage, it is ready to supply a vast fighting force, reported Regnum news agency.

They would be deployed to the forces of the separatist pro-Putin Donetsk People’s Republic [DPR] and Luhansk People’s Republic [LPR], both of which Kim has recently recognised as independent countries.

“The country is ready to transfer up to 100,000 of its soldiers to Donbas,” said the report by the pro-Kremlin news agency.

“Pyongyang will be able to transfer its tactical units to Donbas.”

In return, grain and energy would be supplied to Kim’s stricken economy.
The claim was seized on by Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of Russia’s National Defence journal on Rossiya 1 channel, who said: “There are reports that 100,000 North Korean volunteers are prepared to come and take part in the conflict.”

He was challenged on whether they could be volunteers from North Korea where total obedience is required.

But he said North Korean people were “resilient and undemanding” and “the most important thing is they are motivated”.

He told viewers: “We shouldn’t be shy in accepting the hand extended to us by Kim Jung-un….

“If North Korean volunteers with their artillery systems, wealth of experience with counter battery warfare and large calibre multiple launch rocket systems, made in North Korea, want to participate in the conflict, well let’s give the green light to their volunteer impulse.”

He said: “If North Korea expresses a desire to meet its international duty to fight against Ukrainian fascism, we should let them.”

It was the “sovereign right of the DPR and LPR to sign the relevant agreements”.
Meanwhile Russia should end its participation in international sanctions against Kim’s regime, he claimed.

The claim over North Koreans comes as Russia is desperately seeking to boost its frontline forces by recruiting prisoners in exchange for waiving their jail sentences.

A Dad’s Army of men in their 50s and 60s is also being recruited with the offer of pay higher than many receive in Putin’s moribund economy.

Korotchenko is known for his fierce pro-Putin rhetoric.

Recently he urged Putin to bomb Kyiv with a Kalibr cruise missile inscribed ‘Hasta la vista baby!’ during any Boris Johnson farewell visit - not to “murder” the UK prime minister but in a show of strength.

Russians should feel “no shame” of its ambition of obliterating Ukraine as an independent state, he also said recently.

Such an objective was “absolutely healthy”, he said.

“It was said here that Russia is trying to wipe Ukraine off the geopolitical map of the world,” he said.

“It isn’t quite that.

“We are wiping an anti-Russia project off the geopolitical map of the world….”
Ukraine had “never existed” as a truly independent state in the past, he claimed.

“It is an artificial ‘formation’ which was born thanks to the national policy conducted after 1917 by the Bolsheviks,” he said.

But now it had become “a springboard for a strike against Russia”.

Its political elite “have no right to exist from the point of national interests of our country”.

The West “will not be able to influence the decisiveness of the leadership of our country and our people to make it so that such a threat from the territory now called Ukraine never exists.”

Originally published as 100,000 North Korean soldiers could be sent to bolster Putin’s forces fighting Ukraine

 

[Housecarl]

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UN experts report North Korea is testing nuclear triggers

U.N. experts report that North Korea is testing “nuclear triggering devices” and that its preparations for another nuclear test were at a final stage in June, quoting information from unnamed countries. The panel of experts said in new excerpts from their latest report obtained Friday by The...

news.yahoo.com

UN experts report North Korea is testing nuclear triggers
EDITH M. LEDERER
Fri, August 5, 2022 at 12:14 PM·5 min read

UNITED NATIONS (AP) — U.N. experts report that North Korea is testing “nuclear triggering devices” and that its preparations for another nuclear test were at a final stage in June, quoting information from unnamed countries.

The panel of experts said in new excerpts from their latest report obtained Friday by The Associated Press that they have been “unable to identify the test locations and dates” for the tests of nuclear triggering devices reported by one U.N. member state.

In excerpts obtained Thursday, the experts said North Korea is paving the way for additional nuclear tests with new preparations at its northeastern test site and continues to develop its capability to produce a key ingredient for nuclear weapons.

In the new excerpt, the panel said: “As of early June, two member states assessed that the preparation for nuclear tests was at a final stage.”

On other issues, the panel said in Thursday's excerpts that North Korea conducted two major hacks this year, resulting in the theft of cryptocurrency assets worth “hundreds of millions of dollars.” Pyongyang also continues illicitly importing oil and exporting coal in violation of U.N. sanctions, using the same companies, networks and vessels, it said.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence officials have said they detected North Korean efforts to prepare its northeastern Punggye-ri testing ground for another nuclear test. It would be the North’s seventh since 2006 and the first since September 2017, when it claimed to have detonated a thermonuclear bomb to fit on its intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The panel of experts’ report to the U.N. Security Council provides some details of the work being carried out at the site by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the country’s official name.

The experts said they observed that the DPRK started re-excavation work in March at the entrance to Tunnel 3 at Punggye-ri “and reconstructed support buildings originally dismantled in May 2018.”

“Satellite imagery showed increased numbers of vehicle tracks around this secondary entrance from mid-February 2022, followed by construction of a new building adjacent to the entrance at the beginning of March,” the panel said. “A pile of lumber, for possible use in the construction of the tunnel structure, was also detected around the same time.”

It added that, “Piles of soil from the tunnel excavation around the entrance were observed during this period.”

“Work at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site paves the way for additional nuclear tests for the development of nuclear weapons,” the experts said, adding that this is an objective stated at the Eighth Congress of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021.

Robert Floyd, head of the U.N. nuclear test ban treaty organization, told a U.N. press conference Friday that its monitoring facilities detected the six previous DPRK nuclear tests. “If there is a seventh time, I’m very confident our system will pick it up, we’ll characterize it, and that information then gets shared with the states of the world,” he said.

Floyd is attending the high-level conference reviewing the landmark Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which began Monday and ends on Aug. 26. Under the NPT's provisions, the five original nuclear powers -- the United States, China, Russia (then the Soviet Union), Britain and France -- agreed to negotiate toward eliminating their arsenals someday and nations without nuclear weapons promised not to acquire them in exchange for a guarantee to be able to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Floyd raised the question of whether the possibility of a seventh DPRK nuclear test will strengthen or weaken nonproliferation and disarmament arrangements, “and the appetite of states to see these things come into place.”

“I wonder as to how much that is actually feeding into the tone that we’ve heard this week during the review conference, where there was quite a deal of accommodation of various positions,” he said.

“I wonder whether the states are recognizing at a time such as this it is really important to be able to strengthen the NPT and to come together around some of these very important issues, rather than, `Oh, this is a reason we should abandon such an important thing as the cornerstone of nuclear architecture,'” Floyd said.

In another aspect of the DPRK’s nuclear program, analysts said satellite images last September showed that North Korea was expanding a uranium enrichment plant at its main Yongbyon nuclear complex, a sign that it wanted to boost production of the key bomb material.

The U.N. experts said in the new report: “DPRK continued to develop its capability for the production of nuclear fissile materials at the Yongbyon site.”

Nuclear negotiations between the United States and North Korea have stalled since 2019 over disagreements over the DPRK demand to lift crippling U.S.-led sanctions and Washington’s demand for significant steps by Pyongyang toward nuclear disarmament.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has expanded his ballistic missile program amid the diplomatic pause, and analysts say another nuclear test would escalate his brinkmanship aimed at cementing the North’s status as a nuclear power, and negotiating economic and security concessions from a position of strength.

The panel of experts said the DPRK continued to accelerate its missile programs, launching 31 missiles “combining ballistic and guidance technologies,” including six ICBMs and two “explicitly described as ballistic weapons.” It said the DPRK also claimed to have advanced its development of “tactical nuclear weapons.”

 

[Housecarl]

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Aim Higher: The U.S.-Philippine Alliance Can Do More - War on the Rocks

Over its 70-year lifespan, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has proven itself to be among the most adept survivors in world affairs. Despite frequent periods

warontherocks.com

AIM HIGHER: THE U.S.-PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE CAN DO MORE
GREGORY H. WINGER AND JULIO S. AMADOR III
AUGUST 3, 2022
COMMENTARY

Over its 70-year lifespan, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has proven itself to be among the most adept survivors in world affairs. Despite frequent periods of discord, the alliance has successfully undergone several evolutions and remained a regional fixture across multiple geopolitical eras. Recent assessments have centered on the electoral victory of Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Jr. and how he will affect the alliance as president. However, the focus on the Marcos family belies the perils faced by the U.S.-Philippine alliance. Specifically, the partnership’s success in withstanding the open hostility of President Rodrigo Duterte has bred a self-defeating complacency about the alliance that threatens its utility.

To address strategic competition with China and emerging threats like cybersecurity, the alliance needs to develop new capacities for common defense based on integrated alliance efforts. This is not just a question of military capabilities, but the political and institutional maturation of the alliance into a truly mutual security partnership. The alliance is capable of such an evolution, but to date both Washington and Manila have been loath to invest the time, resources, and political capital necessary to make this prospect a reality. Ultimately, whether the partnership is allowed to succumb to its own malaise is a decision, not an inevitability.

Survival Is Insufficient

The Duterte presidency was the most challenging period in the U.S.-Philippine alliance since the 1992 base closures. Duterte held a deep, personal animosity toward the United States and repeatedly assailed the alliance throughout his tenure. He repeatedly threatened to abrogate essential agreements like the Visiting Forces Agreement and undermined key alliance activities. Despite the damage inflicted during the Duterte presidency, the alliance is arguably stronger now than when he assumed office. Not only has Duterte’s reproachment with China foundered, but alliance operations like the building of cooperative security locations have made significant progress.

This outcome was not the case of Duterte or Beijing failing, but rather the alliance itself succeeding. Alliance supporters in both governments, and especially within the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Department of National Defense, rallied to support the partnership and sustain bilateral activities. From military assistance during the siege of Marawi to disaster response and COVID-19 relief, the alliance repeatedly and successfully demonstrated that the pact has not outlived its usefulness and remains a vibrant partnership. While many candidates in the recent presidential election recycled Duterte’s rhetoric of an “independent” Philippine foreign policy, no major candidate echoed his attacks on Washington or calls to renounce the alliance.

Unfortunately, the alliance’s success in rebuffing the dangers posed by an adversarial president has become its own hazard. Surviving the Duterte presidency was essential, but it also engendered complacency. There is much to do in order to make the U.S.-Philippine alliance fit for a 21st-century purpose. Since the 1992, the alliance has subsisted on regularized defense diplomacy activities and informal institutions. This approach has been successful at fashioning an elastic alliance that can survive frequent political maelstroms and conduct non-traditional security missions. However, the current alliance model has failed to build the political consensus and institutional capacity necessary to respond to strategic threats like China or actualize an integrated defense posture.

Toward a 21st-Century Alliance

Both the United States and the Philippines have increasingly come to recognize China as their primary military threat. Duterte’s appeasement strategy toward Beijing failed to yield either significant development aid or meaningful concessions in the South China Sea. Instead, China’s continued antagonism within the South China Sea despite Duterte’s friendliness demonstrated that the Chinese and Philippine positions in the maritime dispute are irreconcilable, with China being unwilling to alter its territorial claims to amicably resolve the issue. This realization has been captured within Philippine national security dialogue, which has increasingly stressed the need to develop a credible military deterrent.

As Washington’s own stance toward China has hardened, the Philippines have emerged as a central link in American defense plans. The Philippine archipelago is a geographical hinge between East and Southeast Asia, and in the event of an armed conflict between the United States and China, the Philippines would be an essential staging area for U.S. forces. These considerations have become particularly acute following statements by President Joe Biden concerning the defense of Taiwan. If China were to invade Taiwan, the Philippines would likely serve a role akin to Poland in the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Luzon and the northern islands like the Batanes group serving as critical links between American allied territories and the primary theater of combat.

Alliance capabilities have not kept pace with this convergence. Through its use of grey zone tactics like maritime militias and cyber operations that occur below the threshold of an “armed attack,” China has been able to reshape security conditions in the region in ways that actively skirt the Mutual Defense Treaty and undermine the ability of the alliance to respond. Instead of fostering new alliance mechanisms to counter these grey zone tactics, bilateral discourse within the alliance has too often centered on military kit which at best paper over the policy and institutional deficiencies. Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana voiced specific frustration at the inability of the alliance to address these emerging threats in September 2021. Lorenzana called for “revisions and additions in MDT [Mutual Defense Treaty] and other relevant Philippine-U.S. defense agreement to ensure we have maximum possible cooperation and interoperability to deal with so-called ‘gray zone’ threats.”

To date, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has successfully completed two evolutions. During the Cold War, it functioned as a bifurcated security arrangement whereby the United States assumed responsibility for the external defense of the Philippines, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines focused on internal security. That era ended with the shuttering of the American bases in 1992. After 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines heralded a new version of the alliance focused on counterterrorism. This version relied on the temporary deployments of U.S. forces to the Philippines as part of joint exercises and training missions to address non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters. While there have been efforts to leverage these defense diplomacy activities to enhance external defense, such endeavors are futile without broader political and institutional engagement.

Good Policy Beats Good Rhetoric

For a mutual security arrangement to be possible, the foreign policy discourse in Manila must better reflect geopolitical conditions as well as its own national objectives. As the Duterte presidency demonstrated, championing an “independent” foreign policy makes for good political rhetoric but poor policy. Accepting Philippine alignment with the United States is not an invitation for subservience. It is instead a manifestation of the Philippines’ own national interests in promoting both a free and open Indo-Pacific as well as the rules-based international order. Moreover, it accurately recognizes that the benefits afforded to Manila by the Mutual Defense Treaty also carry responsibilities that cannot be ignored for the sake of convenience.

Manila also cannot expect Washington to take Philippine defense more seriously than it does itself. This requires spending more on its armed forces to meet the regional average and recognizing that institutional deficiencies will not be solved by merely adding different equipment. In the best traditions of the worst delivery drivers, for over 20 years Philippine defense reform has managed to be just around the corner and yet never quite arriving. Recent changes like the establishment of a fixed term for the Armed Forces of the Philippines chief of staff are essential steps to improving defense institutions. However, such reforms should extend far deeper. Notably, expanding the defense budget will not substantively improve Philippine security if the money is immediately consumed by a bloated pension system. Correcting such structural flaws requires a concerted effort from a dedicated reform commission that is empowered to implement reforms on armed forces personnel, force structure, and managerial systems, and not merely make recommendations. Currently the Philippines can only make a limited contribution to security in the Indo-Pacific. But, by modernizing its defense institutions, Manila can help make the mutual defense agreement truly mutual and bolster regional security through enhanced domain awareness and integrated deterrence.

The burden of effort does not fall on Manila alone. Recent strategic documents from the Biden administration have stressed the importance of Washington’s Indo-Pacific alliances, but have either marginalized or omitted the Philippines. Not only does this dismissiveness neglect the critical role the Philippines would play in the defense of Taiwan, it also raises a question of agency. Is the American devaluation of the alliance because Washington believes it is unimportant or rather because the alliance itself has not been made useful? We believe that it is the latter and that there remain important steps that Washington can take to revitalize the partnership beyond the usual conversation about military capabilities and capacity building.

Critically, American inaction after the failed Scarborough Shoal negotiations in 2012 significantly undermined confidence in American credibility. Subsequent affirmations of America’s “ironclad” commitments or promises like those offered by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to respond to attacks on Philippine forces are irrelevant if they are not believed. Remedying this crisis in confidence is an essential task for U.S. policymakers and a key step to countering complaints from Manila that Washington privileges non-allies like Vietnam over its own historic partner. This will require actions and not just policy pronouncements. Notably, while Pompeo reaffirmed existing American defense commitments, Washington’s reluctance to engage in a substantive review of the Mutual Defense Treaty to address grey-zone threats undermined the salience of those assurances. Moreover, while the United States does not take a stand on the competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, in the face of continued Chinese harassment of Philippine vessels, the U.S. should consider assuming, escorting, or reflagging supply efforts to the BRP Sierra Madre in line with the alliance’s mutual support commitments.

Washington should also accept that security affairs do not occur in a vacuum and the two allies should start working as true partners. When talking about Taiwan, the South China Sea, trade, and cybersecurity, Manila and Washington cannot count on ad-hoc approaches. Bilateral consultation at senior levels should be a fixture of and not an appendage to alliance management. Additionally, while the Biden administration’s bevy of regional initiatives is welcome, expecting Manila to constantly compete for the time, resources, and attention of its own treaty ally is insulting and detrimental to the alliance.

To date, Marcos has both trumpeted the importance of a productive partnership with China while simultaneously vowing to not “abandon even one square inch of [Philippine] territory.” Although Marcos’ attempt to have his cake and eat it too in foreign affairs is less threatening to the alliance than Duterte’s open animosity, this balancing act is not without costs. Marcos’ oscillating will likely fall victim to the same irreconcilabilities with Beijing that thwarted Duterte and succeed only in delaying essential reforms and providing fodder to those in Washington who believe that Manila is an unreliable ally not worth having. Instead of retreading the same ground as during the Duterte administration, both governments ought to accept that while the partnership is not always pleasant, it is mutually beneficial and in need of significant renovations to be made effective. Ultimately, the task facing leaders is not deciding whether the U.S.-Philippine alliance will survive, but whether it will matter in the coming decades.



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Gregory Winger is an assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati.

Julio S. Amador III is the president of the Foundation for the National Interest, a fully independent institution devoted to the pursuit and promotion of Philippine national interests.