WAR 06-02-2018-to-06-08-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(323) 05-12-2018-to-05-18-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...5-18-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(324) 05-19-2018-to-05-25-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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(325) 05-26-2018-to-06-01-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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Sorry all, got home last night from work and just passed out (ETA: and not with any "liquid help" either)....HC

Posted by Lilbitsnana earlier this morning.... http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...*WINDS****of****WAR****&p=6897114#post6897114

Adding here because I didn't see a new weekly thread yet


parallel universe
Retweeted
The Spectator Index
þ @spectatorindex
2m2 minutes ago

BREAKING: Iranian military jet has crashed in Isfahan Province, Iran.


ETA:


Abas Aslani
þ @AbasAslani
30m30 minutes ago

An F-7 fighter has crashed in #Iran’s province of #Isfahan. Both pilots have ejected before the crash & are now alive.



Kian Sharifi
þ @TheKianSharifi
38m38 minutes ago

Kian Sharifi Retweeted ÎÈÑ�ÒÇÑی ÊÓäیã

A fighter jet in #Iran with two on board crashed earlier today in Isfahan Province. Both passengers have reportedly survived. Tasnim news agency says it was a practice flight.
 
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...tary-trained-gang-members-criminal-insurgents

Gangs and the Military Note 2: Military-trained Gang Members as Criminal Insurgents

by Carter F. Smith | Thu, 05/31/2018 - 1:21pm | 0 comments

Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) have received military training such as tactics, weapons, explosives, or equipment, and the use of distinctive military skills. Gangs with military-trained members often pose an ongoing and persistent military and political threat. At least one tenth of one percent of the U.S. population is an MTGM, and there are between 150,000 and 500,000 MTGMs. That number demonstrates an alarming domestic and national security threat that includes a number of potentially significant implications for government leaders in the U.S., and in other countries where third generation (3GEN) Gangs or Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are prevalent. The intersection of MTGMs and criminal insurgencies threatens national security and communities, undermining the economic and political foundations of local and state government. These criminal organizations often behave like insurgents, engaging in governance to support the illicit marketplace or acting in police or social roles in the community. Counterinsurgency strategies, including cultural awareness should be implemented alongside traditional anti-gang measures.

Introduction
“Delfino” was chosen by the Mexican army to join its elite unit, the airborne special forces group known as Grupos Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales (Group of Special Forces of the High Command, or GAFE), where he specialized as a sniper. Ten years later, he was recruited again by La Familia Michoacana - the predecessor organization to his current organization, a Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) called Los Caballeros Templarios, or the Knights Templar.[1] After specializing as a sniper, Delfino deployed for counterinsurgency operations on the Guatemalan border in southern Mexico in 1994.[2] He later engaged in counter-narcotics operations in Lázaro Cárdenas, where his unit chased speedboats bringing cocaine from South America. Before long, Delfino accepted a job offer to apply what he had learned in the military in service to the DTO. The Templars are fighting to retain territory and have joined forces with a former rival DTO, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación–CJNG). According to Mexico’s defense ministry, about 1,383 elite soldiers deserted between 1994 and 2015, a key factor in transforming the DTOs in Mexico. Members of those units received training in counter-terrorism, counterintelligence, interrogation and strategy from French, Israeli and US advisers while in the Mexican military, and then applied those skills during their service to the cartels. Delfino is an example of an MTGM used by a 3GEN Gang or DTO to enhance their effectiveness and dangerousness.

Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) display indicators that they received military training such as tactics, weapons, explosives, or equipment, and the use of distinctive military skills. Military tactics include the techniques and strategies taught in a variety of military occupational specialties. Gangs with military-trained members have far more potential to pose an ongoing and persistent military or political threat. The intersection of MTGMs and criminal insurgencies add to the level of dangerousness in a community. The presence of 3GEN Gangs adds even more. These groups threaten national security and the social fabric of our communities. They also threaten the economic and political foundational underpinnings of local and state government.

The Zetas, another Mexican DTO, serve as an example of a group of MTGMs operating as (with the potential of) a criminal insurgency. The Zetas are made up of (and founded by) former members of the Mexican Special Military Forces. Their military training has caused rival groups to improve their own recruiting and training. While not as directly connected, the MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) also has some MTGM connections. MS-13 are one of the 3GEN Gangs.

Military Trained Gang Members
A Military-Trained Gang Member (MTGM) is a street gang, prison gang, Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMG), or Domestic Terrorist Extremist group member per the applicable jurisdiction’s definition, with military training or experience, as perceived by a reasonable, typical, police officer.[3] MTGMs display indicators that they received military training either directly or indirectly. Indicators of military training include the use of military tactics, weapons, explosives, or equipment to conduct gang activity, and the use of distinctive military skills, particularly if gang members are trained in weapons, tactics, and planning, and then pass the instruction on to other gang members. Military tactics include the techniques and strategies taught in a variety of military occupational specialties, ranging from tactical assault to organizational leadership strategies.[4] Gangs with military-trained members have far more potential to pose an ongoing and persistent military or political threat.

A conservatively estimated one tenth of one percent of the U.S. population is an MTGM (roughly 300,000, as there are between 150,000 and 500,000 according to Smith, GATM Note 1).[5] That number of MTGMs demonstrates an alarming domestic and national security threat that includes a number of potentially significant implications for government leaders in the U.S., and in other countries where 3GEN Gangs are prevalent. MTGMs pose a serious threat to law enforcement and to the public.[6] They learn combat tactics in the military, then return home to utilize those skills against rival gangs or law enforcement. The authors of the 2009 NGIC report observed that “gang members with military training posed a unique threat to law enforcement personnel.”[7]

The Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIO) — the Army Criminal Investigations Command (CID), Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) — have identified military personnel with gang membership or affiliation in every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.[8] The Fiscal Year 2016 Gang and Domestic Extremist Activity Threat Assessment (GDEATA) by the U.S. Army CID was the most recent official report available.[9] There has never been a longitudinal analysis of efforts, failures, and successes from year to year made public by the CID, yet the reports have been produced since 2005.

Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s NGIC and the CID regularly address the phenomenon of MTGMs. The NGIC recently released their 2017 National Gang Report, in which analysts reported Mexican DTOs (including the Zetas) have the greatest impact on drug trafficking in the United States.[10] They annually transport multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs across the United States southwest border.[11] Figure 1 shows the areas of influence of the major Mexican DTOs (AKA transnational criminal organizations–TCOs).

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Figure 1: Mexican DTOs/TCOs in United States

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration: (U) United States: Areas of Major Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations; DEA-DCT-DIR-065-15, July 2015.
Etter and Lehmuth observed there was a time when Mexican drug cartels transferred their shipments at the U.S.-Mexican border, and another organization smuggled the products further into the U.S. Many cartels had operations throughout North America, including all regions of the U.S.[12]

Insurgents
An effective response to counterinsurgency was a major adjustment for the U.S. military once the decision was made to focus on the War on Terrorism. Previously, the default posture was a response to Cold War era threats such as those posed by the former Soviet Union and its allies. That adversary never offered much of an insurgency threat, so a major retooling of strategy was required. Responses to insurgency are not typically intuitive, as the strategy is different than what is used by other adversaries. Insurgency is not terrorism, nor is it necessarily criminal activity. Insurgency is more an attempt to resist against the established government control to effect real change. Insurgency is a rebellion against political authority, using subversion and violence with a specific aim.

The idea of gangs as insurgents is not new. In 1993, Major David Hogg examined the possibility of deploying the military against street gangs in the U.S. He specifically deconstructed the framework and habits of members of the Crips street gang and noted that street gangs were more of a “preservationist insurgency.”[13] He identified the primary goals of street gangs as acquiring monetary profit and providing security. Their violent actions toward other gangs and members of the community he termed urban terrorism. Hogg determined that street gangs were neither a military or political threat, though they were a threat to governance, and concluded that threat did not warrant military intervention.

While it was clear Hogg had sufficiently researched street gangs at the time, it was also clear the gangs he addressed were those in the First Generation, not the more advanced Third Generation (3GEN) gangs likely to be MTGMs. First generation gangs are primarily turf gangs, some of which evolve into drug gangs or entrepreneurial organizations with a market-orientation, becoming part of the second generation. Some second-generation gangs decide to enhance their position, and transition to the third generation. Gangs in the third generation include those with a mix of political and mercenary elements that operate or are at least capable of operating in the global community.[14] Figure 2 depicts the continuum along which the generations lie. All three generations of gangs are capable of generating serious domestic instability and insecurity.

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Figure 2. Characteristics of Street Gang Generations

Source: John P. Sullivan “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels and Netwarriors,” Crime & Justice International, Vol. 13, No. 9.2, October/November 1997 and John P. Sullivan, “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net Warriors.” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 95-108; Table 1 at p. 96.

The 3GEN Gangs operate in a global environment, and are highly organized and sophisticated. [15] Gang members in such advanced criminal organizations often use tactics that only the military can teach.[16] Authors of the 2009 National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) report identified those gangs as national-level street gangs, which may have established cells in foreign countries that assist the gangs operating in the United States in developing associations with global drug trafficking and other criminal organizations.[17]

Dr. Max Manwaring, professor of military strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, found that both 3GEN Gangs and insurgents try to control government.[18] All three generations of gangs are able to cause serious domestic instability and insecurity, but 3GEN Gangs can generate the economic and military power on a level with many nation-states.[19]. With a propensity for indiscriminate violence, intimidation, and coercion, they are both a regional and transnational gang phenomenon, and pose a significant national security threat.[20] Wilson and Sullivan found 3GEN Gangs shared many of the characteristics of insurgents.[21]

Criminal Insurgents[22]
The Zetas were created by a group of deserters from the Mexican Special Military Forces. In the late 1990s dozens of Mexican Army commandos left military service to join the Zetas. Many of them had been part of the GAFE.[23] They started as a security force for the Gulf Cartel, a multi-national DTO. The Zetas brought military tactics like ambushes, defensive positions, and small unit exercises to the organized criminal groups in Mexico.[24] Military training was the key to the Zetas’ success, and the increase in military discipline, professionalism, and violence they brought to the criminal world of the DTOs caused rival groups to improve their recruiting and training.

The Zetas have created a brutal mystique, making their name synonymous with violence and fear across the Americas. In addition to drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, and murder, their skills included conducting raids and ambushes, and military tactics to engage in close quarters battle with state security forces.[25] In February 2010, the Zetas broke away from the Cártel del Golfo (Gulf Cartel) and formed their own criminal organization. The Zetas have lost some control of territory in recent years because of a turf war with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). According to the National Gang Intelligence Center, many US street gangs have maintained direct ties with Mexican drug cartels, including Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel and La Familia Michoacana (and presumably with their successor group, Los Caballeros Templarios) to purchase drugs.

The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang was started by Salvadoran refugees in Los Angeles in the late 1980s as a defense against aggressive and established L.A. street gangs. The name Mara Salvatrucha, according to some accounts, comes from the La Mara street gang in San Salvador and the ‘Salvatrucha’ guerrillas (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) who fought in the civil war in El Salvador from 1981–1992.[26] During the Salvadoran Civil War, many children as young as 14 were inducted into either the guerrilla or government forces, which gave some of the original MS-13 members paramilitary training. The war also led to masses of refugees fleeing the war looking for work and safety. The war displaced an estimated 1 million Salvadorans, many of whom came to the United States either legally or illegally.[27]

Members of the MS-13 gang have been convicted in various US jurisdictions for racketeering; conspiracy; child prostitution; drug, gun, and human trafficking; gruesome and brutal murders; and vandalizing the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in New Haven, Connecticut with “MS-13” and “kill whites” in orange spray paint. The gang has a violent reputation and is known for using a machete to maim, disfigure, and kill their victims.

As Hogg noted, insurgents, unlike anarchists, typically seek to affect and provide some level and form of governance. As Manwaring observed, insurgents also try to control established government. Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown suggested traditional criminal organizations often take on the trappings of governance, behaving like insurgents sometimes do.[28] The example used was the Italian Mafia, but the analysis fit many of today’s insurgents, including DTOs and some 3GEN Gangs. They don’t declare a war against the state, they don’t want to topple the state, but they provide security, norms, and enforce contracts. They tax individuals and organizations (extort money); and they often influence or control politicians and government officials.

Governance was also among the reasons for the intentional segregation and (quite effective) criminal enterprise of the world’s prison gangs, according to Skarbek. Prison gangs unify and align by race (black, white, and brown) to provide governance, which is required in all societies, especially those with an open and active marketplace, such as those where illegal trafficking of drugs, guns, or persons is conducted.[29] As the legitimate institution cannot offer the governance necessary, prison gangs do it. Governance theory suggests that to limit the effects of prison gangs, conditions that caused the environment in which they grow must be changed and substitutions for their inherited functions must be found. The same solution might be proposed for insurgents.

The combination of MTGMs and 3GEN Gangs provides a unique synthesis of skill sets that significantly add to the level of dangerous in a community. When we add criminal insurgencies to the mix, the combination is deadly.[30] In addition to threatening national security, these groups threaten the social fabric of our communities, as well as the economic and political foundational underpinnings of local and state government. Figure 3 depicts the increased level of dangerousness for street gangs with MTGMs and with 3GEN MTGMs.

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Figure 3: MTGM Continuum of Dangerousness

Countering Insurgencies
A counterinsurgency (COIN) is a coordinated political, security, economic, and informational effort that reinforces governmental legitimacy while reducing the influence of insurgents over the population. COIN operations using non-military means are often the most effective as they seek to find the root cause(s) of the insurgency. Central to a COIN operation (at least in the beginning) is intelligence gathering and analysis.[31]

Unlike conventional warfare, COIN puts military forces in an enabling and supportive role.[32] COIN requires approaches to be adaptable and agile, focused on the population more than the adversary. The goal is to reinforce the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgent influence. The COIN model used by the U.S. State Department has several functional components:

  • The political function, using a framework of political reconciliation and reform of governance.
  • The economic function, providing essential services and stimulating long term economic growth.
  • The security function, developing both the nation’s military force and security sector, including the related legal framework, civilian oversight mechanisms and the judicial system.
  • The information function, including intelligence and influence that aligns with the strategic narrative.[33]

The more advanced contemporary street gangs have been strategically infiltrating our military communities since the late 1980s. At the end of the 1990s, the FBI attributed much of the increase in gang member migration to the military, in addition to civilian job transfers. When acknowledged and active gang members can join the military, they are treated just like other service members. There are no debriefings, no watch lists, and no warnings to local military law enforcement. Countering insurgent gangs with military training requires an informed perspective and persistent application.

Gangs are recognized as a coercive force, according to the Army Field Manuel on COIN, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), 2006.5.[34] As with other groups categorized as such (paramilitary units, tribal militias, and organizational security personnel), gangs should be seriously considered as potential insurgents or adversaries during all military operations—both during peacetime and during conflict. Criminal organizations such as street gangs, mafias, or cartels may assist insurgent groups in any number of ways, including intimidating government leaders, conducting assassinations and kidnappings, initiating violence, strikes, riots, and smuggling weapons. Many insurgencies degenerate into criminality when primary movements disintegrate, or the root cause is addressed.[35] The manual suggested counter intuitively that insurgent disintegration was desirable. It resulted in a downgrade of the threat, since insurgency was a security threat and criminality was (simply) a law-and-order problem.

The typical police perspective, that of law enforcement and order maintenance, tends to be similar to the role filled by our soldiers when conducting COIN operations. By application, COIN operations are long-term, and the foundation that is laid during the initial phases must be solid. Only by engaging and interacting with the population in an appropriately respectful manner can a proper foundation for continued relations be laid. The practice of cultural awareness provides for such an engagement.

Part of the COIN effort involves applying intercultural skills. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Michael Rothstein, while at the Air War College, identified the need to develop those skills in military leadership. He identified intercultural skills as the primary set of skills and knowledge necessary for professional and personal interaction with people of other cultures. He divided intercultural skills into three subsets; cultural awareness, regional understanding, and foreign language competency.[36] He defined cultural awareness as “the ability to understand and appreciate differences among cultures and to be sensitive to the unique challenges cultural differences can create.” LTC Rothstein observed that many Americans do not appreciate the culture of others because they don’t understand or appreciate their own. Other military scholars have addressed the importance of cultural awareness by the military, too.

Marine Colonel Michael Melillo, a field artillery officer who was the Chief, Operations and Training Branch, at the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, noted that Americans had difficulty with cultural awareness because they were part of a culture that ignored the needs of irregular warfare.[37] As a remedy, he suggested transforming the cultural resistance to nontraditional wars. Manwaring suggested the solution was to avoid the tendency toward “providing traditional military solutions to conventional military problems.”[38]

Cultural awareness provides an understanding of the social networks, politics, and traditions of a location; it also provides an understanding of the nuances, behavioral customs, and rules for common interaction. By observing those less-visible subtleties, what was different might be more important to take note of than what was missing. For example, if a certain citizen (Mr. A) was suspected of collaborating with insurgents and he was seen talking to Mr. B, that might be unusual if it occurred in a manner or location where the two would not otherwise meet or converse. The penalty for not applying cultural awareness in a policing operation involving MTGMs may be the loss of intelligence or the loss of evidence.

The use of cultural awareness when addressing military-trained gang members (MTGMs) might allow for a better understanding of potential solutions to the problem. It might also result in a ‘relatability’ between the investigator and the gang member that could prove invaluable for gathering additional intelligence to ensure appropriate anti-gang strategies were in place. The penalty for not applying cultural awareness in a counterinsurgency operation is either the loss of the population’s trust or the fostering of an environment in which the insurgent forces can grow.[39]

MTGMs as Criminal Insurgents
Imagination isn’t necessary to see the threat posed MTGMs in organized insurgencies. As with their membership in basic street gangs, the level of leadership, strategy, and dangerousness is increased. To oppose these groups, governments must use coordinated, evidence-based strategies, including a focus on public relations. These groups are well versed in appealing to the people, and whether the media reports developments or not, the people in the community will choose sides.

The NGIC’s 2017 National Gang Report noted that Mexican DTOs (including the Zetas) have the greatest impact on drug trafficking in the United States[40]. The NGIC report included information on the street gang – DTO relationships (including 3GEN Gangs) in U.S. states, identified in Table 1.

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Table 1. Street Gang and Cartel Associations by State

In April 2018, Guatemalan Infantry colonel Ariel Salvador de Leon was found to have upper-level MS-13 connections. Col. de Leon had been in the Kaibil (Guatemalan special forces) and was trained by the U.S. Southern Command in Honduras and El Salvador border security operations. The one-time Ministry of Defense vice-director was arrested for helping a cell of MS-13 launder money. De Leon was arrested as part of the Regional Shield II operation, targeting gang leaders who extorted business owners.[41]

Imagine a 3GEN Gang or DTO with a propaganda team that practices techniques learned in the military. Too much of a stretch of the imagination? These groups already have drones and practice counter-drone operations. Should we be concerned if they have access to robots or start using augmented reality goggles as they use swarming and other asymmetrical non-traditional warfighting tactics against the local police? Advanced 3GEN Gangs and DTOs are capable of so much more than their less dangerous brethren in crime. Adding military training and discipline to the mix does nothing but add fuel to the fire. Are we prepared for the level of violence these groups can inflict?

Summary
MTGMs pose a real threat in our communities. The majority of the population does not realize they exist, nor are they aware of the seriousness of the threat to the safety of the community. This note was intended to examine the synergy of advanced criminal gangs and an insurgent strategy in our society and encourage scholars, practitioners, and government leaders to conduct or support research concerning this issue and find strategies to control the problem or mitigate the effects.

Additional Reading
Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (2013). Studies in Gangs and Cartels. London: Routledge.
National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2005-2017). National gang reports 2005-2017. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center.
Carter F. Smith (2017). Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training . Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), 2006.5

End Notes
[1] Ernst Falco (2018). “‘The training stays with you’: the elite Mexican soldiers recruited by cartels.” The Guardian, 10 February; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/10/mexico-drug-cartels-soldiers-military .
[2] Ibid.
[3] Carter F. Smith (2017). Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Carter F. Smith (2018). “Gangs and the Military (GATM) Note 1: The Increased Threat of Third Generation Gangs with Military-Trained Gang Members.” Small Wars Journal, 18 April; http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...-third-generation-gangs-military-trained-gang.
[6] National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC] (2015). National Gang Report - 2015. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center; https://www.fbi.gov/resources/library/gang-reports
[7] National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC] (2009). National Gang Report - 2009. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, (p.13); https://www.fbi.gov/resources/library/gang-reports .
[8] Ibid.
[9] U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command (2017). Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16) Gang and Domestic Extremist Activity Threat Assessment (GDEATA).
[10] National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC] (2017). National Gang Report - 2017. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center; https://www.fbi.gov/resources/library/gang-reports .
[11] Ibid.
[12] Gregg S. Etter and Erica L. Lehmuth (2013). “The Mexican Drug Wars: Organized Crime, Narco-Terrorism, Insurgency or Asymmetric Warfare?” Journal of Gang Research, Summer, 20(4), pp. 1–34, 2013. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profil...errorism-Insurgency-or-Asymmetric-Warfare.pdf
[13] David R. Hogg (1993). A Military Campaign Against Gangs: Internal Security Operations in the United States by Active Duty Forces. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, (DTIC ADA274041). Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA274041 .
[14] John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker (2007). “Third generation gang studies: An introduction.” Journal of Gang Research, 14(4), pp. 1-10. Retrieved from http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_fac_pub/136/ .
[15] Ibid.
[16] Smith, GATM Note 1.
[17] NGIC, 2009.
[18] Max G. Manwaring (2005). Street gangs: The new urban insurgency. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 March; http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ .
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] G.I.Wilson and John P. Sullivan (2007). “On gangs, crime and terrorism,” Defense and the National Interest. Retrieved from http://d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/wilson_sullivan_gangs_terrorism.pdf .
[22] For a discussion of ‘criminal insurgency’ see John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker (2011). “Rethinking insurgency: criminality, spirituality, and societal warfare in the Americas.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 22, Issue 5, pp. 742-763; https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.625720 .
[23] Smith, 2017.
[24] John P. Sullivan and Samuel Logan (2010). “Los Zetas: Massacres, Assassinations and Infantry Tactics.” The Counter Terrorist, October/November, pp. 44-57. Retrieved from https://issuu.com/sbradman/docs/dec10jan11.final .
[25] Sullivan and Logan, 2010.
[26] Smith, 2017.
[27] Celinda Franco (2008). The MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs—Emerging Transnational Gang Threats. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress (RL34233). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34233.pdf
[28] Octavian Manea (2013). “ Gangs, Slums, Megacities and the Utility of Population-Centric COIN: Interview with Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown,” Small Wars Journal, 5 October; http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...es-and-the-utility-of-population-centric-coin.
[29] David Skarbek (2014). The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System. New York: Oxford University Press; http://www.davidskarbek.com/book.html .
[30] See Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (2007). “Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects.” Small Wars Journal, 30 April; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/iraq-the-americas-3-gen-gangs-lessons-and-prospects
for an early discussion of the convergence of gangs and military operations.
[31] Robert R. Tomes, (2004). “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters (Spring), pp. 16–28; http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/04spring/tomes.pdf .
[32] U.S. State Department. (2009) U.S. government counterinsurgency guide. United States government interagency counterinsurgency initiative. Washington, D.C: State Department; https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf
[33] Ibid.
[34] Field Manual (FM) 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (May 2014). Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf .
[35] Ibid.
[36] Michael D. Rothstein, M.D., LTC (2006). “Fire, ready, aim: Developing intercultural skills during officer formal education.” Montgomery, AL: Air War College, Air University., September 29. Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/.../rothstein psp.doc .
[37] Michael R. Melillo, (2006). “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities.” Parameters (Autumn), pp. 22–35; http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/06autumn/melillo.pdf
[38] Manwaring, 2005.
[39] Ibid.
[40] NGIC, 2017.
[41] TeleSUR. (2018). “Guatemalan General Leading US Training Arrested for MS-13.” teleSUR, 22 April; https://www.telesurtv.net/english/n...Laundering-Money-for-MS-13-20180422-0015.html .


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About the Author(s)

Carter F. Smith
Carter F. Smith, J. D., Ph.D. is the Graduate Coordinator for the Department of Criminal Justice Administration at Middle Tennessee State University, in Murfreesboro, TN. As a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, Carter was involved in military and federal law enforcement for over twenty years and identified the growing gang problem in the military community in the early 1990s, later starting the Army’s first Gang & Extremist investigations team at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Carter received a Ph.D. from Northcentral University after completing his dissertation on military-trained gang members. He received a law degree from Southern Illinois University. Carter has provided training on Gangs and their impact on the community to many gatherings and conferences, including those sponsored by the Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Mid-Atlantic, Mississippi, North Carolina, Northwest, Oklahoma, Southern California, Southern Nevada, and Tennessee Gang Investigators Associations, the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, the National Crime Prevention Council, the Regional Organized Crime Information Center, the National Gang Crime Research Center, the Southern Criminal Justice Association, the Department of Justice and the U.S. Army. He has written many articles, consulted with several media outlets, written two textbooks on gangs, and has appeared twice in the History Channel’s Gangland series. He was a founding (and still serving) board member of the Tennessee Gang Investigators Association, a recipient of the Army CID Command Special Agent of the Year award and is a three-time recipient of the Frederic Milton Thrasher Award of the National Gang Crime Research Center. Carter recently published the book Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.stripes.com/news/pacifi...south-china-sea-island-weaponization-1.530658

Mattis slams China on South China Sea island weaponization

By LOLITA C. BALDOR | Associated Press | Published: June 1, 2018

SINGAPORE — China's placement of weapons systems on manmade islands in the South China Sea is designed to intimidate and coerce others in the region, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said Saturday, laying out a sharp criticism of Beijing at an international security forum and threatening larger consequences if militarization continues.

He warned that America's recent move to disinvite China from a multinational naval exercise this summer was an "initial response" to the militarization of the islands. It was, he said, a "relatively small consequence, I believe there are much larger consequences in the future."

China relying on muscle to use weapons to pursue goals not favored by international tribunals " is not a way to make long-term collaboration the rule of the road in a region that's important to China's future," Mattis said, when asked to elaborate more on the consequences. "There are consequences that will continue to come home to roost, so to speak, with China, if they don't find a way to work more collaboratively with all of the nations who have interests."

The U.S., he said, remains committed to ensuring free and open transit in the region. And he said he doesn't believe that China's actions will pay off. Militarizing the islands, Mattis said, will not enhance China's standing in the world.

"Despite China's claims to the contrary, the placement of these weapons systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion," Mattis said, referring to the recent deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers and other equipment on the Spratly Islands, and the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island.

Mattis also struck at one of the key, longstanding disputes between the U.S. and China, telling the conference that America will continue to provide defense equipment and services to Taiwan and oppose any effort to alter the status quo. China claims the self-governing island as its own territory to be brought under its control by force if necessary.

But in a quick pivot, he said the U.S. welcomes cooperation with China "wherever possible," and announced that he has accepted Beijing's invitation to visit there soon. It remains to be seen if that invitation will stand after this conference.
Mattis' comments triggered an equally pointed reaction from a Chinese official at the meeting.

Senior Col. Zhao Xiaozhuo said a U.S. move a couple years ago to send two warships into China's "territorial waters" was a violation of law, and an "obvious provocation to China's national security and territorial integrity."

Mattis responded that the question reflected a fundamental disconnect with the way international tribunals have spoken on the matter.

"We do not see it as a militarization by going through what has traditionally been an international water space," said Mattis of the U.S. ship movements through the South China Sea. "What we see it as, is a reaffirmation of the rules-based order."

As expected, the Pentagon chief gave only a brief mention of the ongoing negotiations for an historic summit later this month between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump announced Friday that the nuclear-weapons summit he had canceled with North Korea's Kim Jong Un is back on. The summit is expected to be here in Singapore.

Mattis said the Pentagon will "hold the line" and support the diplomatic effort to secure the "complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

The Pentagon leader's comments at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue came in the wake of a tumultuous few weeks between the U.S. and China.

Last week the U.S. withdrew an invitation for Beijing to participate the exercise known as Rim of the Pacific. China had participated in the exercise known as Rim of the Pacific in 2014 and 2016.

The Pentagon said the decision to disinvite the Chinese Navy was triggered by what it called strong evidence that China has deployed weapons systems on the islands, and called on China to remove them. China says it is within its rights to build up defenses on islands in the South China Sea that it believes are its sovereign territory.

China's activities, Mattis said in his speech Saturday, stand "in stark contrast to the openness of what our strategy promotes; It calls into question China's broader goals."

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, who was attending the conference, said China is alienating other nations and nations must band together and say the actions are unacceptable.

The U.S. response to China's weaponization of the islands continued on Sunday, as two U.S. warships sailed close to the Paracel Islands, which lie north of the Spratlys. It was the latest freedom of navigation operation designed to challenge Beijing's claims. China protested the maneuver.

In recent years, the U.S. had sought to stabilize military relations with China, but the militarization of the islands has been a persistent point of conflict. Many nations fear that Beijing will use the construction on the islands to extend its military reach and potentially try to restrict navigation in the South China Sea.

China's delegation at the conference is being led by Lt. Gen. He Lei, vice president of the People's Liberation Army's Academy of Military Science. China has not sent high-level officials to the three-day meeting, in an apparent attempt to deflect attention from its campaign to expand its sovereignty across virtually the entire South China Sea.

Mattis made clear that the U.S. does not expect nations to choose between the U.S. and China, adding that Beijing should have a voice in shaping the region, while allies have a voice in shaping China's role.

The U.S., he said, "will continue to pursue a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China, cooperation when possible, and competing vigorously where we must."
 

Housecarl

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https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/russia-playbook-making-israel-iran-happy.html

Russia / Mideast

Moscow updates playbook on making Israel, Iran happy

Maxim A. Suchkov
June 1, 2018

MOSCOW — Russian and Israeli officials met this week in Moscow to discuss Israel’s concerns over the extent of Iran’s current and future presence in Syria.

Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman and other top Israeli officials met May 31 with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. The primary focus of the visit was the situation in Syria and specifically, in Liberman’s words, “the entrenchment of Iran and its proxies” there.

Since the May 17 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad when Putin mentioned the potential for a quick withdrawal of foreign forces from Syria, high-level Russian officials have reiterated this argument on numerous occasions, with some directly pointing to pro-Iranian forces. This ignited speculation over Russia’s apparent change in mood regarding Iran.

The frequent contact between the Russians and Israelis in recent weeks further triggered rumors of a “secret Russian-Israeli deal” to push pro-Iranian militias from southern Syria. Paradoxically, these claims are often accompanied by a recognition of Russia’s virtual inability to accomplish that.

The Shoigu-Liberman encounter indeed came amid a flurry of talks among Russia, the United States, Israel and Jordan on the future of the southwestern de-escalation zone in Syria. Anyone watching this scene unfold from Tehran might easily get the impression that Russia has sold out Iran to Israel and the United States. However, one should be careful to read between the lines in Moscow’s statements and, most importantly, to study its actions.

Shoigu started the meeting with Liberman, which lasted a little more than an hour and a half, by praising Damascus’ recent successes: “The environment in the areas controlled now by the Syrian authorities is being improved to receive refugees and establish life in peace.”

Assad has sought to launch an offensive against opposition forces in Daraa province, but recently Israel and the United States objected, in large part over concerns about the presence of Iranian and allied Shiite militia in the area. Moscow is working to resolve the issue, first by trying to convince the Israelis of Assad’s need for that offensive (similar talks with the Americans are expected soon) and, second, by negotiating terms of the potential departure of the pro-Iranian forces.

Both themes are closely linked: Israel discourages the Daraa operation, given the leverage Israel has in the area over Syrian security, and given its fear of losing that leverage should pro-Iranian militias and Hezbollah win the territory from the opposition. If, however, there are guarantees that Iran won’t have a military presence in southern Syria or participate in any military operation by the Syrian army there, Israel might not impede the offensive.

Al-Monitor reported earlier that Iranian Ambassador to Jordan Mojtaba Ferdosipour had stated Iran’s support for the de-escalation. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s sources told Russian media that, should the Syrian government accept “a potential Russian request” to exclude Hezbollah and other Shiite militias from the Daraa offensive, Hezbollah leadership may also agree to leave.

In this case, an alternative solution to this dilemma discussed with and seemingly accepted by both Israel and Hezbollah is to deploy Russian military police in the area. This could be a suitable fix, at least temporarily. Yet a lot depends on which conditions are going to be implemented. There’s a “peaceful scenario” in which the police would be deployed in exchange for the opposition laying down arms and surrendering the area to government forces. But there’s also a “forceful scenario” where the Russian military police would deploy after the Syrian army retakes control of the territory by force. Moscow has a big problem with the latter scenario’s potential to complicate Russia’s mediation efforts. The Syrian army could get stuck in the fighting on its own, with no Hezbollah or Iranian militias. Or the offensive could entail massive civilian casualties. Russia thus insists on the “peaceful scenario” as an important element for de-confliction to succeed.

Israel’s Channel 1 television reported that in a May 30 phone call, Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the possibility of keeping Iran and its allies 70-80 kilometers (40-50 miles) from the Syria-Israel border.

Tehran views Moscow’s moves with frustration, if not anger. However, they have long had different interests and policies regarding Syria. It’s understandable that these feelings are being exacerbated as Moscow engages in talks with Iran’s archrivals, because the deep-seated, historic mistrust has never evaporated. Yet Russia’s contacts with Israel do not mean that Moscow has made a U-turn in its attitude toward its critical partner in Syria: Russia’s military recognizes the role of Iran, and Hezbollah, in the Syrian war and appreciates the potential results of a joint effort.

Speaking at the Primakov Readings — a high-level, international policy conference held May 30 in Moscow — Lavrov recognized that Russia’s interests “don’t coincide 100%” with regional powers, including Iran and Israel, but stressed, “It’s [Russia’s] principle to talk to everyone without exception, especially when there are contradictions in the assessments. We disagree with assessments based on the thesis that Iran is the root of all problems in the region — in Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, in Iraq. … When we look at the regional situation with our Israeli colleagues and we outline our approach, we stress a need to engage all parties in negotiations, instead of seeking to isolate them.”

Lavrov even emphasized a resemblance in the way the United States approaches Iran and Russia: “They [the United States] say Iran has to change its behavior in the region. It’s the same thing they are telling us to do — change our own behavior everywhere before they start speaking to us normally.”

Hence, Russia, as a self-appointed but seemingly mutually accepted middleman between Israel and Iran, is engaging in talks with both sides, seeking the least painful option for both, but one that includes reasonable security concessions. If the adversaries are serious about letting Moscow mediate, they should cooperate with Russia, rather than being jealous of its contacts with both.

For this reason, Moscow doesn’t see its interaction with Israel as a “deal” in a strict sense of the word. They’re not negotiating behind Assad’s back. Both Hezbollah and the Iranians continue to be informed and consulted, and in this particular case, Russia isn’t trading Iranian interests for its own benefit. The bottom line here is Russia can’t force Iran out of southern Syria — that can only be done through talks with Tehran and Tehran’s voluntary participation, with clear incentives from Russia and, indirectly, Israel.

Despite all the complexities, the situation in southern Syria doesn’t look hopeless at this point. A far bigger challenge in this conundrum is Iran’s long-term presence in the rest of Syria. There’s an understanding in Moscow that Hezbollah may always find a reason to stay in Syria as long as its leadership feels it needs to ensure Lebanon’s security. There’s no way for Russia or any other external power to guarantee an Iran-free Syria, as there are no means of verifying Iran’s presence or its influence.

No matter how successful Israel is in destroying Iran’s military infrastructure in Syria, the back-and-forth missile strikes could turn smoldering confrontations into another regional war.

Russia seems humble in what it believes it can achieve in keeping Iran and Israel apart in the rest of Syria. Moscow sees political and geographic limits to its mediation role. Pondering this issue, a senior Russian diplomat told Al-Monitor, “Our expectations are modest. If they [Israel and Iran] really want to be at each other’s throats, there's little we can do to stop them. But we are proceeding on the premise that this isn’t what they want, and that they will embrace what we’re offering.”


Maxim A. Suchkov, Ph.D., is editor of Al-Monitor’s Russia-Mideast coverage. He is a non-resident expert at the Russian International Affairs Council and at the Valdai International Discussion Club. Formerly he was a Fulbright visiting fellow at Georgetown University (2010-11) and New York University (2015). On Twitter: @MSuchkov_ALM Email: msuchkov@al-monitor.com

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Housecarl

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https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/mindanaos-insurgencies-take-an-explosive-turn/

Mindanao’s Insurgencies Take an Explosive Turn

Under rising pressure from the military, Mindanao’s armed groups are increasingly turning to IEDs.

By Michael Hart
June 01, 2018

The triple suicide bombings targeting churches in the Indonesian city of Surabaya in mid-May focused global attention on the explosive tactics of Islamic State-linked militant groups in Southeast Asia. Yet while the scale of the attacks in Surabaya sent shockwaves through the region, 1,500 kilometers to the northeast on the Philippines’ insurgency-plagued southern island of Mindanao, IED (improvised explosive device) attacks by Islamist groups have risen steadily since the end of the Marawi siege last October.

The bombing of a cathedral in Koronadal city injured three people in late April, while an explosion in a crowded bar in Jolo left another 10 civilians wounded in early-May. These IED attacks were among the latest aimed at harming civilians in the region. The first was carried out by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) while the second occurred in a stronghold of the notorious Abu Sayyaf group.

Yet more often security forces have been the preferred target of IED blasts, launched with increased regularity not only by Islamist groups but also the communist rebels of the New People’s Army (NPA). With Mindanao under an extended period of Martial Law – which was first imposed by President Rodrigo Duterte at the height of the five-month Marawi siege – the long-troubled island’s plethora of armed groups appear to be turning to IEDs as they come under sustained pressure from military operations.

The use of IEDs is nothing new in the southern Philippines, which has a history of large-scale militant bombings. However, in the current context, an influx of foreign fighters trained in bomb-making has been amplified by insurgent groups shifting to more covert, guerrilla-style tactics in response to the ongoing crackdown by government forces in Mindanao, resulting in a surge in small-scale IED attacks.

To what extent are IEDs becoming a weapon of choice in Mindanao’s multiple insurgencies? And what is being done to mitigate the growing threat from these makeshift devices before it escalates further?

Rising IED Attacks in Mindanao Since the Marawi Siege

The use of IEDs was a key tactic employed by the ISIS-aligned Maute group as they laid siege to Marawi from May to October last year, and this trend has continued across Mindanao since the jihadist uprising was extinguished by the Philippine military. According to data obtained through local media reports, the final three months of 2017 witnessed 10 attempted IED attacks by armed groups in the region. Nine of the devices detonated, resulting in four deaths and 30 injuries. In the first three months of 2018 the number of attempted attacks almost doubled to 19, with 15 of the devices exploding as intended, killing another four people and leaving 25 wounded. So far, the trend has continued during April and May, with another 16 attempted attacks since the beginning of April maiming at least 24 people. Three groups – Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF, and the NPA – are mostly responsible.

The threat varies geographically across the island. In western provinces of Mindanao, the ISIS-aligned militants of the BIFF have carried-out the majority of IED attacks – 31 since the beginning of October. In some of the larger attacks attributed to the BIFF, on December 8 three devices exploded in separate locations across Maguindanao province, wounding a police officer and seven soldiers; while on New Year’s Eve a bomb exploded onboard a motorcycle near the entrance to a packed bar in Tacurong city, killing two civilians and leaving another 16 wounded. The region’s longer-established Islamist militants of Abu Sayyaf have also carried out IED attacks in the western maritime provinces of Basilan and Sulu.

In eastern Mindanao, the IED threat emanates primarily from the Maoist rebels of the NPA, who have waged a long-running insurgency against the government since 1969. The group has used IEDs on seven occasions so far in Mindanao this year. Whereas Abu Sayyaf and the BIFF often target civilians, the NPA uses explosive devices to ambush security patrols. In late February an IED blast killed a soldier and left two others wounded near Davao, while on March 20 three soldiers were injured after the rebels used a roadside IED to blow up a military truck in Compostela Valley. In early March the army discovered a cache of bomb-making materials in Bukidnon and later announced the seizure of 174 IEDs from the group during the first two months of 2018, evidencing the growing scale of the threat.

What explains the increasing number of IED attacks launched by armed groups in Mindanao?

An important first point to note – as mentioned earlier– is that IED attacks are not a new phenomenon in the Philippines. The country has previously been rocked by several mass-casualty attacks involving explosives, most notoriously when Abu Sayyaf bombed a passenger ferry in Manila Bay in February 2004, killing 116 people. More recently, Islamist militants bombed a busy night market in Davao city in September 2016, killing 15 and leaving more than 70 wounded. In addition to large-scale, attention-grabbing attacks targeting civilians, militant groups in the conflict-affected south – in particular Abu Sayyaf – have a history of using IEDs against the security forces. The problem was exacerbated by the influx of al-Qaeda- and Jemaah Islamiyah-affiliated militants trained in bomb-making skills during the 1990s, such as Indonesian jihadist Rahman al-Ghozi and the Malaysian expert bomb-maker, Marwan.

Influx of Foreign Fighters and the Transfer of Bomb-Making Skills

The present wave of IED attacks by Islamist groups in Mindanao can be attributed to a repeat scenario, after recent years witnessed a second influx of foreign fighters with bomb-making skills to the island from neighboring Indonesia. However, this time the wave of recruits was inspired by the modern-day successor to al-Qaeda as the leader of transnational jihadism: ISIS. As a result of the large influx of militants before the Marawi siege, IED-making skills have been transferred from fighters in the Middle East and jihadi hotspots in Southeast Asia to local militants in the maritime borderlands of the southern Philippines. Foreign fighters who joined up with the Mautes are thought to have trained members of the BIFF, which is now Islamic State’s primary vanguard in the region and poses the main IED threat.

The influx of ISIS-trained bomb-makers prior to the Marawi siege was facilitated by lax security in the porous waterways surrounding Mindanao. Jihadists were able to amass in a region already blighted by a climate of lawlessness, the presence of armed groups, and a well-developed illicit economy. These conditions fostered an ideal environment for the transfer of militants, IED components, and bomb-making skills. ISIS was likely able to further exploit these vulnerabilities by using encrypted messaging apps to disseminate bomb-making knowledge hidden from the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies.

In January, the Philippine army’s intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Fernando Trinidad, confirmed that foreign fighters remained present in Mindanao. He said these foreign fighters had trained local militants in urban warfare and the construction of IEDs. Yet such fears had already been realized last October during the final throes of the Marawi siege, when government soldiers discovered a Maute-run IED manufacturing base, indicating the extent of militant training and the mass production of IEDs on an industrial scale.

A year since the militant uprising in Marawi began, the ongoing military crackdown in Mindanao is providing ample opportunity for Islamic State’s remnants to put their newly acquired skills to the test. Pushed onto the back foot by Martial Law, groups such as Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF, and the NPA have been forced to splinter and adopt guerrilla-like tactics to an even greater extent than was already the case. Having sustained heavy losses on the battlefield and with their capability to engage in conventional ground battles against a bolstered military gradually receding, IED attacks serve as a way for increasingly desperate armed groups to make their presence felt and demonstrate that they are still alive.

How Can the Growing IED Threat Be Countered?

For the government, countering the IED threat remains a huge challenge. Local intelligence reports can help prevent a planned attack from succeeding when a device is spotted before it explodes. Since October, military bomb-disposal experts have thwarted attempted attacks after responding to call-outs and defusing or safely detonating primed devices on at least 10 occasions. The military has also seized several caches of bomb-making materials during raids on insurgent hideouts across the island.

At a wider regional level, authorities have implemented measures intended to subvert the underlying conditions enabling the transport of foreign fighters and IED components in porous maritime border areas. Since last June, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have conducted trilateral naval and air patrols over the Sulu Sea to detect and disrupt suspicious activities, including the smuggling of arms and bomb-making materials. Just a few weeks ago Malaysian soldiers arrested a man onboard a vessel found to be containing 10,000 detonator fuses, headed in the rough direction of Mindanao’s coastline.

These cooperative measures signal hope for the future. Yet the present IED threat will remain hard to mitigate and effective countermeasures difficult to implement for as long as Mindanao’s current generation of militants are able to retain and pass on their bomb-making knowledge to new recruits.

As Philippine troops continue their dual crackdown on Mindanao’s Islamist militants and communist rebels under Duterte, for the regions’ armed groups – increasingly on the retreat – IEDs are becoming a weapon of choice. As the conflicts raging in Mindanao become more asymmetric, the use of IEDs enables militants to inflict damage on the military and strike fear into communities, without incurring casualties of their own in the struggle to maintain influence and hold on to small pockets of territory.

IEDs are a particularly potent weapon in the rural jungle environments of Mindanao, where armed groups have for decades sought new means to demonstrate their survival and make their presence felt. Yet IEDs also increasingly pose a threat in urban settings such as Marawi, where the laying of IEDs became a key factor in extending the length of the siege as the Maute group became entrenched in their positions. The Philippine army has repeatedly warned of large-scale Islamist assaults using IEDs on other major cities in the region, with Davao, Cotabato, and Zamboanga mooted as potential targets.

While a repeat Marawi-type scenario can’t be ruled out, there also remains a possibility of large-scale bomb attacks similar to those seen in Indonesia. Even if these two worst-case scenarios are avoided, the proliferation of IEDs in the region remains a major concern and will further complicate the ongoing efforts of the military to extinguish Mindanao’s intractable – and increasingly explosive – insurgencies.

Michael Hart is a freelance writer and researcher focusing on civil conflict and terrorism in Southeast Asia.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com...-russia-s-ad-hoc-alliance-in-syria-unraveling

Is Iran and Russia’s Ad Hoc Alliance in Syria Unraveling?

Frida Ghitis Thursday, May 31, 2018

Now that the tide in the Syrian civil war appears to have definitely turned in favor of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, one of the key factors that will shape Syria’s future is the precise nature and durability of the relationship between the two countries that saved Assad from collapse: Iran and Russia.

Tehran and Moscow worked together to bolster Assad, but the character of their ad hoc alliance has always remained a bit of a mystery. They each, for their own purposes, wanted the regime in Damascus to survive. Beyond that, it has never been clear just how committed Russian President Vladimir Putin has been to his links with the Islamic Republic.

Recent developments, particularly regarding Israel’s concerns about Iran, have started casting some light on that question, revealing an outline of Putin’s position that is causing alarm in Tehran. Iran and Russia are already diverging. And now there are reports that Moscow has more unpleasant surprises in store for Iran.

Early on in the war raging to its north, Israel made its position clear. The Israeli Defense Forces, or IDF, would not become involved in the conflict, except to ensure that what Israel calls its red lines are not crossed. Those red lines include the introduction of advanced weapons by Hezbollah, the opening of a new front for attacks against Israel from Syria, and the establishment by Iran of a permanent military presence in Syria.

Israel repeatedly bombed Hezbollah weapons convoys and armament facilities, but when Russia entered the conflict in 2015, it raised the possibility that Russian air defenses would thwart Israel’s raids. Instead, as Assad consolidates his gains in the war and an endgame nears, Israel has become even more engaged in destroying what it views as Iranian positions that could be used to attack it. And it has done this with Russia’s acquiescence.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been meeting regularly with Putin, and there are signs that the two see eye-to-eye on key aspects of Syria’s future. That, without a doubt, is troubling news for Iran.

The most dramatic example of Russia’s willingness to see Iran’s wings in Syria clipped came three weeks ago, when Iran and Israel faced off across the Syrian border, the first direct clash by the two countries after years of rising tensions. It was May 10, just after President Donald Trump announced he was pulling the United States out of the nuclear deal with Iran. Israel accused Iran of launching a barrage of missiles across the border from Syria and unleashed a crushing response, striking dozens of Iranian targets in Syria. The IDF said it had hit logistics headquarters belonging to the Quds Force, the elite unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as weapons depots, intelligence systems and other facilities. Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned, “If there is rain on our side, there will be a flood on their side.”

The United States sided with Israel, saying Iran should refrain from further provocations. And in a rare development, the European Union did, too, declaring that “Israel has the right to defend itself,” while calling the clash “extremely worrying.”

As for Russia, it didn’t have very much to say. Netanyahu had spent 10 hours talking to Putin just before the blistering counterattack unfolded. Clearly, he had a green light. Russian air defenses did nothing to stop Israeli jets, and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow blandly urged Iran and Israel to solve their differences diplomatically.

It is clear that Syria’s war has entered a stage where the objectives of Iran and Russia—Assad’s two lifelines—are in conflict.

What looks very much like an unofficial understanding between Netanyahu and Putin could well turn into a formal agreement. Israeli television reported this week that Israel and Russia have reached a secret deal to keep Iranian forces away from the border in southern Syria. Under the purported terms of the agreement, which has not been confirmed, Israel would accept the return of the Syrian army to the border along the Golan Heights, and Russia would guarantee that no forces from Iran or its partner Shiite militia, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, would be allowed in the area. In addition, according to the report, Russia will push for all foreign forces to leave Syria, which includes Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey and the United States.

Whether or not the reported agreement is confirmed, it is clear that Syria’s war has entered a stage where the objectives of Iran and Russia—Assad’s two lifelines—are in conflict. Russia wants a stable Syria, in the hands of a strong regime that maintains good relations with Moscow and secures Russia’s access to the Mediterranean; Assad will do, but it doesn’t have to be him. Iran, for its part, wants to have a regime it can control—one that facilitates the continuing transfer of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon and creates a safe corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean. Ideally, Iran wants to build up and maintain its presence in Syria. But Israel’s rejection of that position means that Russia cannot find the stability it wants as long as Iran crosses Israel’s red lines by entrenching itself in Syria.

That problem is creating tensions between Iranian and Syrian forces. There are reports that Syrian army members are pushing to remove Iranian and Hezbollah fighters from their bases for fear that Israel will attack.

Tensions between Iran and Russia have already been rising to the surface. When Putin said earlier this month that all foreign forces should leave once Assad retakes control of the entire country, a visibly irritated spokesman at Iran’s Foreign Ministry shot back. “No one can make Iran do things,” he said, vowing “no one will extract us from Syria.”

The signs are still not conclusive that Russia has decided Iranian forces should not be allowed to remain in the country. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said this week that only Syrian army forces belong on the Syrian side of the border with Israel. That means no Hezbollah or Iranian forces standing meters away from Israelis, but it doesn’t openly reject the idea of future Iranian positions elsewhere in the country.

For now, both Moscow and Damascus still need Tehran-loyal forces, including Hezbollah and Quds Force operatives helping to fight anti-Assad rebels. While they do that, bilateral talks between Israel and Russia are continuing, revealing the limits of a partnership between Iran and Russia that is already fraying after achieving its goal of securing Assad’s survival.

Frida Ghitis is an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor. Her WPR column appears every Thursday. Follow her on Twitter at @fridaghitis.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/peace-talks-flail-colombias-eln-seeks-liberation-death/

As Peace Talks Flail, Colombia’s ELN Seeks ‘Liberation or Death’

ANALYSIS
Written by Mathew Charles - MAY 29, 2018

Peace negotiations between Colombia’s government and the ELN rebel group have reached their most precarious moment since they began last year. A wave of violence recently spurred Ecuador to back out as guarantor of the discussions. And concerns over the implementation of a 2016 peace deal with the ELN’s guerrilla cousins, the FARC, have hurt the group’s confidence in the ongoing talks. InSight Crime spoke with ELN members and residents of communities where the group operates in order to get a sense of where the shaky process might be headed.

In a secluded part of the impoverished department of Chocó in western Colombia, a guerrilla fighter cleans her weapon with pride.

“I joined the guerrilla six years ago,” says the woman, who goes by the alias “Yomira.”

“I joined to fight for the people,” she adds. “Because the truth is the people are done for. It makes me happy to join the fight.”

Yomira belongs to the powerful Western War Front of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), which patrols the jungles of Chocó.

There is a strict routine for those within the ELN’s ranks. The day begins with a 6 a.m. inspection, which is followed by classes in current affairs, Marxist ideology and explosives training. The afternoon is devoted to military exercise. The day ends at 6 p.m. with another inspection and singing of the ELN anthem, which includes a repetition of the lyrics “Not one step back! Liberation or death!”

Residents of the town of Santa Maria de la Loma de Bicordó express reluctant sympathy for the guerrillas’ cause, as well as deep-rooted fear.

“We’re poor and so these guys are the only ones who can help us. But we know they’re not our real friends,” one resident told InSight Crime. “I have a young son. I’m terrified they’ll take him and make him fight.”

There are no more than 100 people in this village. There’s no running water, and electricity is rationed. It comes on only for a few hours in the evening.

While the town is mired in poverty, the San Juan river upon which it sits is a key part of a multibillion-dollar industry. The vast waterway is a strategic route for drug traffickers, linking coca production zones to the Pacific coast from where shipments of cocaine are dispatched to international markets.

SEE ALSO: Colombia News and Profiles

The Urabeños, a powerful crime group formed by ex-paramilitary forces, controls the northern part of the San Juan river. The group’s Pacific Bloc keeps a permanent armed guard in the town of Dipurdú, just downstream from the river’s source. The camouflage and rifles of the Urabeños members are visible from passing vessels.

The central section of the river belongs to the ELN. But in the southern delta, where the river empties into the Pacific Ocean, the ELN and Urabeños are fighting for control of territory previously controlled by the largely demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).

Caught in the crossfire are the riverside communities.

“With the [FARC] peace process, we expected schools and hospitals to be built. But all we got is more violence,” said a community leader from Cabecera, who asked not to be named.

Residents’ experiences with the aftermath of the 2016 FARC peace deal have not engendered confidence about the potential of talks with the ELN.

“If peace with the FARC brought us more war, what will peace with the ELN bring us? Forget it!”

Revolutionaries vs. Reality
The ELN’s engagement in peace talks with the government suggests a willingness to eventually lay down arms. But some leaders are wary of conceding too much to the government.

An officer of the Western War Front who uses the alias “Estasio” believes the FARC negotiated a bad deal.

“They sold out on everything they believed in. The government has made a fool of them,” he said. “We won’t fall for that.”

Inspired by the Cuban revolution and the Liberation Theology promoted by some Catholic priests in the 1960s, the ELN says it is fighting for radical social reform.

“We’ve told the government before,” said a Western War Front commander who uses the alias “Uriel.” “If they want to get rid of the guerrilla, then they need to get rid of the reasons for which we exist.”

Uriel says government negotiators are rushing through the official agenda without full consideration.

“They want to jump to the last points, forgetting the first, which is for us the most important,” he said.

Video

The first topic for discussion is perhaps the most controversial of the six on the agenda. It revolves around “peacebuilding,” which the guerrillas interpret as a process of social reform.

“The ELN has repeatedly said that for them peace involves deep change. The question is how far is the government willing to go,” said Luis Celis, a former guerrilla turned peace advocate.

Estasio, the officer with the Western War Front, says he’s in the struggle for the long run.

“I’m ready to give up my arms and pay my sentence if we can achieve the change we’re fighting for,” he said, clutching his rifle. “But I’m a realist. It won’t happen yet, not with these negotiations.”

There appears little appetite for compromise. Critics are therefore suspicious. There is a concern that some elements of the ELN are prioritising their criminal interests. The lucrative drug trafficking and illegal gold mining networks in Chocó may be hard to abandon.

Peace Talks as a ‘Test’
Uriel, the ELN commander, describes the peace negotiations as a “test.”

“We are analyzing the intention of the government to see if it’s genuine,” he said. “For now, with the implementation of the agreements made in Havana with the FARC, we see that it’s not. This does not give us hope. The government is not living up to our expectations.”

The Western War Front has voiced outspoken opposition to what they call a “neo-liberal peace,” which it says would focus on “the silencing of weapons” and not social change. This has led to accusations of dissent within the ELN, but the guerrilla group is not a vertical structure. Each of its eight fronts is autonomous, complicating efforts to make unified decisions about the peace talks.

SEE ALSO: Coverage of ELN Peace

The Western War Front is the only one of the eight fronts not to have a seat at the negotiating table. But Uriel denies there is division within the ELN. He says internal differences have been misinterpreted and exaggerated by the media.

Celis, the fighter turned peace advocate, also warned against overplaying disagreement.

“It is too early to talk about dissent,” he said. “The negotiations are about exploration. There’s no deal on the table yet so there are bound to be varying opinions.”

Beyond a Ceasefire
The ELN announced a five-day unilateral ceasefire for the first round of Colombia’s presidential election, which took place in late May. The announcement came on the heels of the fifth round of peace dialogues, which kicked off on May 10 in Havana, Cuba. (Ecuador, the original guarantor for the talks, ended its role as host country in April after a wave of violence linked to the ELN there.)

The Colombian government has made it clear that it would prefer a permanent, bilateral ceasefire, but this will be much harder for the ELN negotiators to sell to their rank and file without any concessions from the government.

The commanders of the Western War Front say they want definitive proof of the state’s commitment to a peace that extends beyond a ceasefire and demobilization. They are adamant they want pledges on social reform and structural overhaul.

“If they want to get rid of the guerrilla, then they need to get rid of the reasons for which we exist.”

In the makeshift camp on the banks of the San Juan river, the insurgents gather for their weekly radio conference. It is a chance for the various blocs that make up the Western War Front to discuss strategy, and there is only one message. Through the hiss of the interference, the airwaves carry a bleak directive: “We have no interest in a political solution. We are absolutely not interested in demobilization.”

Uriel is adamant the Western War Front will not change its stance. “If all the enemy wants is to demobilize use, then we are wasting our time,” he says.

It gives cause for pessimism, both inside and outside the ranks of the ELN. “The future has to be about war, not peace,” says Estacio. “Our fight will continue. It must continue.”
 

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The Intel Crab Retweeted Elizabeth Tsurkov

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Elizabeth Tsurkov
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Reports by both pro-regime and opposition outlets about an explosion at the Syrian regime Jirah air base near Aleppo. Cause unknown. There appear to be soldiers killed.
 

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The Logic of Pseudo-Operations: Lessons from the Rhodesian Bush War

May 31, 2018 GSSR Africa, Intelligence, Terrorism, The Forum 0

By: Xander Causwell, Columnist

Photo by: theselousscouts.com

During the Rhodesian Bush War (1964-1979) the white minority-controlled Rhodesian government carried out a remarkably successful counterinsurgency campaign against insurgent groups representing the disenfranchised black majority by relying heavily on the use of pseudo-operations. Pseudo-operations constitute a set of tactics government-controlled paramilitary units use to infiltrate insurgent-controlled territory and networks by imitating the actions of insurgent groups. Pseudo-units may damage infrastructure, set fire to farmlands, or commit general acts of violence while disguised as insurgents. These actions often have one of two primary objectives: turn the non-combatant population within the territory against an insurgent group they once supported or enable pseudo-operators to gain enough credibility to infiltrate the actual insurgent network. Pseudo-operators thereby strive to alienate insurgents from the non-combatant population and gain human intelligence (HUMINT) on insurgent safe havens. The HUMINT garnered through pseudo-operations informs more conventional military assaults on the insurgent garrisons. Employing this operational model, Rhodesia’s Selous Scout units overcame several chronic challenges of collecting HUMINT in a counterinsurgency campaign. The ways in which the Selous Scouts, as well as a handful of other governments throughout the twentieth century, executed this strategy illustrates how well pseudo-operations can serve the HUMINT aspect of insurgency wars.

Challenges to Counterinsurgency Intelligence

Insurgent groups strive to deny state intelligence collection efforts by operating out of remote safe-havens, maintaining near-impenetrable organizational structures, and integrating seamlessly into non-combatant populations. Counterinsurgency is inherently HUMINT-intensive, and the remoteness of insurgent camps exacerbates efforts to penetrate guerrilla strongholds. Insurgent groups persist in guerrilla warfare by taking advantage of rough terrain to conceal their bases from state intelligence. Penetrating insurgent networks can reveal camp locations, which is why insurgent organizations take steps to harden those networks against penetration. For example, various insurgent leaders have sought to deter defection or betrayal through hierarchical system of sacrifice and reward.[ii] Furthermore, since insurgents can only succeed with the tacit or active support of the local population, HUMINT penetration of insurgent networks must begin with the non-combatant population.[iii] Therefore, HUMINT professionals must ferret out members of the insurgent network from among the population to minimize the possibility of further alienating non-combatants. Gaining the intelligence necessary to annihilate an insurgency requires a HUMINT regime capable of overcoming these challenges.

How Pseudo-Operations Overcame HUMINT Obstacles

Though international pressure—vis-à-vis neighboring countries who harbored and trained insurgents, United Kingdom-led economic sanctions, and a United Nations denunciation—eventually forced the Rhodesian government into negotiations with the opposition parties, the Selous Scouts’ HUMINT operations afforded the Rhodesian security forces supremacy over the theater of war inside the country. The Selous Scouts, formed out of collaboration between the Rhodesian police’s Special Branch and the government’s civilian intelligence service, operated as paramilitary units rather than as part of the military intelligence structure. Although the Scouts conducted a series of violent direct actions against insurgent camps, their main role throughout the war was to gather intelligence on those camps and alienate the rebels from the non-combatant population. After locating concentrations of rebel activity, the Selous Scout teams informed the Rhodesian military’s designated Fireforce via embedded liaison officers. The Selous Scouts’ success forced both the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army insurgent factions to operate from bases outside Rhodesia’s borders, in Zambia and Mozambique respectively. Even those external camps, however, were covertly raided by the Scouts. Toward the end of the war, the overwhelming majority of insurgent deaths at the hand of the state security forces were attributed to intelligence gained by the Selous Scouts, and the insurgent groups had been forced to operate from friendly territories outside of Rhodesia’s borders.[iv]

The Selous Scouts demonstrated that pseudo-operators can overcome HUMINT challenges through directly capturing and turning enemy insurgents. Under their founder Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, the Selous Scouts refined the practice. Daly explains that their members were trained to be resourceful trackers, capable of operating in insurgent-held territory without needing to be resupplied from their home base. Typically, the Scouts were deployed to hunt and ambush active insurgents in the bush. The insurgents who survive this initial attack were then captured and brought to the pseudo-unit’s base. While captured insurgents were treated humanely during interrogations, they were promptly made aware of their options: cooperate with the Scouts or be sent inland to face a likely death penalty. From then, the Scouts tested their turned insurgents’ loyalty in the field, and the latter were used to ferret out their previous insurgent comrades. Wherever possible, the turned insurgents’ families would be kept at the Scouts’ base to both ensure their welfare and further bind turned insurgents to the pseudo-operators. The captured insurgents were systematically incorporated into the Selous Scouts and many came to identify with the Scouts’ cause.[v]

While the Rhodesians were the first to conduct pseudo-operations in such a centralized and systematic manner, these kinds of operations were successfully employed to varying degrees in prior counterinsurgency campaigns.[vi] Frank Kitson, who ran pseudo-operations in against the Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya, expressed surprise at how easily the insurgents his team captured could be convinced to turn on the rest of the Mau Mau in response to material incentives for themselves and their families.[vii] During the Malaya rebellion, British colonial pseudo-units struck a deal with an insurgent commander that permitted government forces to enter the jungle disguised as guerrillas in order to coordinate surprise raids on other insurgent camps.[viii]

Present Utility of Pseudo-Operations

The Selous Scouts conducted impressive raids and other direct actions against the insurgent groups. However, it is their demonstrated HUMINT collection capabilities that make the model worth revisiting. Contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns must overcome the same broad challenges facing HUMINT-intensive intelligence collection. The Scouts and their predecessors developed a strategic answer to those challenges. Furthermore, modern social network analysis (SNA) techniques offer the potential to amplify the HUMINT collection efficiency of pseudo-operations against both insurgent and terrorist groups. If SNA allows security forces to reliably map insurgent networks, then pseudo-operators can target key individuals in that network to capture and turn more efficiently. Alternately, SNA can illuminate crucial connections in the network that pseudo-operators can work to disrupt, thereby disintegrating the insurgencies.[ix]


Dan Zeytoonian, Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis, Military Review (2006), 188.

[ii] Eli Berman, “The Defection Constraint,” in Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009) 29-59.

[iii] Mao Zedong, On Guerilla Warfare (Thousand Oaks: BN Publishing, 2007).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ron Reid Daly and Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, 2nd ed. (Alberton: Galago Publishing, 1982), 176-200.

[vi] Peter Baxter, Selous Scouts: Rhodesian Counter-Insurgency Specialists, Vol. 4 (Pinetown: Helion & Co., Ltd., 2011).

[vii] Lawrence E. Cline, Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from other Countries (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Matthew D. Erlacher, Fighting Dark Networks: Using Social Network Analysis to Implement the Special Operations Targeting Process for Direct and Indirect Approaches (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).
 

Lilbitsnana

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A Syrian regime airbase reportedly had an explosion go off claiming the lives of two soldiers, reports of heat causing the explosion.
 

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US citizen shot to death in Nicaragua's capital amid unrest

6 hrs ago

MANAGUA, Nicaragua — A U.S. citizen was found shot to death in the capital Saturday as violence and social unrest continue to grip Nicaragua.

The body of Sixto Henry Vera was lying in a street beside two burned vehicles with a bullet wound to the head, the state forensic medicine institute said. Employees at the Managua bar owned by Vera, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, said he left late Friday to help a friend who was being attacked.

U.S. Ambassador Laura Dogu offered condolences via Twitter on Saturday to "the family of a U.S. citizen who died," saying the death of a U.S. citizen is of "great concern" for the embassy.

Vera's death occurred at a tense time for Nicaragua. More than 110 people have been killed in the country since mid-April amid clashes between forces loyal to President Daniel Ortega and opposition groups demanding his removal.

Streets across the country are often deserted after dark as armed groups circulate in vehicles without license plates, shooting and robbing.

On Wednesday, more than a dozen people died in shootings that erupted around protests on Mothers' Day in Nicaragua. Gunmen firing into crowds sent thousands of demonstrators running for cover at the marches, which were led by mothers of victims who died in recent protests.

Civil society groups alleged the attackers were members of paramilitary groups loyal to Ortega. Government officials blamed the opposition groups who are seeking to oust Ortega.

The rise of criminal gangs has led residents in several cities to organize neighborhood watch groups with barricades. The Red Cross reported that two people manning barricades in the city of Masaya were fatally shot Saturday.

"I beg the people of my city, Masaya, to not go out onto the street and to protect themselves in their homes, the situation is very dangerous," Managua's auxiliary Roman Catholic bishop, Silvio Baez, said via Twitter.

Leading businessmen in Nicaragua have proposed moving up the presidential election that is now scheduled for 2021. Ortega has been president since 2007.
 

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Assad intends to visit N. Korea -


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Report: Assad planning visit to N. Korea
Daniel Salami|Published: 06.03.18 , 10:47

Arab media reported Sunday that Syrian President Bashar Assad said during a welcome ceremony in honor of the North Korean envoy to Syria last Wednesday that he planned to visit North Korea, adding that "Syria's government will continue supporting the North Korean regime and to deepen the friendship ties between the two countries."



First published: 06.03.18, 10:47
 

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https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-cuba-helped-make-venezuela-a-mafia-state

COMMANDANTE PERFORMANCES

How Cuba Helped Make Venezuela A Mafia State

The Castros claimed Cuba was never into drug smuggling, then they said it quit. But their own operations were nothing compared to the ones they helped facilitate in Venezuela.

CHRISTOPHER DICKEY
06.02.18 9:02 PM ET

The medals, the honors, the general’s uniform—all had been stripped away. Arnaldo Ochoa, once considered a great hero of the Cuban Revolution and its military expeditions in Africa, stood before Fidel Castro’s court in 1989 wearing a cheap plaid shirt. He looked like what he had always been, the handsome and charismatic son of Cuban peasants, a man of the people, a leader, and that may have been the real cause of his downfall. But the charges were narcotics trafficking and treason.

Ochoa’s trial was a pivotal moment in the history of Cuba and of what Washington in those days was calling “the war on drugs.” It marked the end of an era in which Fidel Castro’s dictatorship had facilitated the shipment of cocaine to the United States from the infamous cartels of Colombia, including Pablo Escobar’s operation in Medellín. And not the least of the motives attributed to the Cubans was the desire to tear at the fabric of yanqui society. These were the days of the crack cocaine epidemic shattering the peace of cities across the United States. Fueling addiction, desperation and crime while enriching the Revolution must have seemed perfectly legitimate goals to some of the Castros' cohorts, and their intelligence services did what they thought they had to do for their regime to survive on its own terms.

There in the military tribunal in Cuba all was not as it seemed.

As in any of the show trials the world has read about or witnessed, whether conducted by Stalin, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, or the Castro brothers, the defendant made an abject confession to all the charges in the court, and with pitiful vehemence exculpated his superiors: Fidel’s brother Raúl, the chief of the armed forces who had promoted Ochoa so many times, was innocent of any complicity, and so, of course, was Fidel.

The press in the United States and Europe theorized Ochoa might have been tortured or drugged. Even in the military tribunal, not-so-veiled threats were made against his family if he did not cooperate. Perhaps, as one observer put it, he believed there was some remote possibility of a pardon in exchange for his confessions, although that would have been offered only “in the darkness of his cell.”

The idea that the Castro brothers knew nothing about the drug trafficking was perfectly absurd. Cuba was a country where, as the saying goes, “not a leaf moved on a tree” unless the Castros wanted it to.

In fact the officer accused as Ochoa’s key accomplice, Antonio De la Guardia, was in charge of a special department in the Ministry of Interior, which is the center of the Cuban state security operations. His operation was known by the initials MC (for Moneda Convertible, or convertible currency) and its mission as part of the Cuban Foreign Trade Corporation (CIMEX) was to thwart the U.S. trade embargo.

According to an editorial in the official Cuban Communist Party organ Granma at the time of the trial, these modern blockade runners smuggled medicines, medical equipment, computer gear, spare parts—anything that “could be useful to the country.” To do this, MC had connections with citizens and residents in the United States, as well as boats and planes to transport the goods. This was all legitimate in the face of the “criminal blockade” by the U.S., Granma told its readers. And those who carried out these operations were “rigorously” prohibited from any involvement with anyone trafficking narcotics.

Defectors
No doubt those rules had been fudged. The drug-running took place at a moment when things were looking desperate for the Cuban Revolution. The Soviet Union was on the verge of disintegration, the Berlin Wall was about to fall, and the Kremlin no longer wanted to underwrite its obstreperous little satellite off the coast of Florida. This, while pressure from Washington about Cuba’s involvement in narcotics trafficking had been building for years.

By the early 1980s, indictments were being handed down and defectors were exposing operations one after another. In 1982, a federal grand jury in Miami indicted four Cuban officials. Among the accused, the vice-admiral in charge of the Cuban Navy, and an intelligence officer who had organized the chaotic, vindictive Mariel boatlift in 1980, exporting not only legitimate refugees but dangerous criminals to U.S. shores.

In 1987, the deputy commander of the Cuban air force defected, and focused attention on the activities of CIMEX. Another defector claimed Colombian traffickers had a fleet of 13 ships and 21 aircraft operating in Cuban territory. A third defector, a longtime Cuban intelligence operative, alleged that the “special troops” unit of the Cuban interior ministry coordinated all drug shipments. (De la Guardia had been part of the special troops.) Fidel supposedly stashed 80 percent of the hard currency in the banks of Panama, where Manuel Noriega had taken over as strongman.

In 1988, five members of a Miami-based drug ring were convicted of smuggling $10 million worth of cocaine into the U.S. through Cuba the year before, and one of the conspirators fingered De la Guardia and his operation at the Ministry of Interior’s MC department.

Raúl Castro, for his part, saw the scandal as a way to purge his enemies and potential competitors for the succession, with Ochoa first on the list.

Emilio T. Gonzales, who would serve on George W. Bush’s national security council and in the Department of Homeland Security, wrote in a 1997 paper (PDF) that with the Ochoa trial, “Fidel and Raul Castro hoped to bury long-standing allegations of Cuban drug smuggling along with their potential political rival.”

At two in the morning, July 13, 1989, just a month after the first announcement that Ochoa had been arrested, he and De la Guardia and two of their alleged fellow conspirators were taken into a field next to the Baracoa air base east of Havana and shot.

One chapter in the annals of Cuban involvement with drug runners was coming to an end, but more subtle and complex relationships would would soon begin centered on Colombia and Venezuela—two countries much bigger, more populous, and much richer than Cuba.

The Cartel of the Suns
In the years that followed the Ochoa trial, Cuba offered to cooperate with the United States fighting against drug traffickers. The Clinton administration shelved proposed indictments of the regime, and as relations gradually warmed, the U.S. would begin to liaise with Cuban authorities in the war on drugs. But at the same time the Cuban intelligence services were reaching out in other directions, to networks that would become the world’s biggest suppliers of cocaine: the narco-guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Venezuela’s security forces. Cuban counterintelligence is said to have tutored the Venezuelan spies, domestic and foreign, and helped to organize them to root out opposition to the regime of Hugo Chávez. Indeed, the Cubans taught them to do whatever might be necessary to survive.

Over time, many of Chavez’s officers would become known as the Cartel de los Soles, the Cartel of the Suns: “cartel” because of their involvement with the drug trade on a scale that nobody in 1989 could have imagined; “the suns” for the insignias on the epaulets of Venezuela’s generals.

Under Nicolás Maduro, just given a second term last month in a system-rigged re-election, Venezuela has become a full blown economic, political and criminal disaster, most likely headed for a showdown with its neighbors and with Washington. And the traffickers in the government not only continue to thrive, their corruption has become vital to the cohesion and survival of the regime.

“Their stake is very high,” says Frank O. Mora at the Cuba Research Institute of Florida International University. “They fear they are going to be persecuted if they lose power.”

Last month, the investigative news site InSight Crime published a report that bluntly labeled Venezuela “a mafia state” (PDF). Tons of pure cocaine—yes, tons—are involved in some shipments, and there are often several shipments a month. The “commissions” for facilitating the trade mount into the billions of dollars. And that doesn’t begin to include the Venezuelan kleptocracy’s looting of the state oil company or its cynical manipulation of different currency rates.

In the chapter of the InSight Crime report dealing with the Cartel of the Suns, investigators name 30 people alleged to be involved, mainly because they have been the object of U.S. federal indictments or Treasury Department sanctions, or both. About half the names are from the intelligence services or the police, organizations advised and in some cases virtually run by Cuban counterintelligence operatives.

“Of course,” says Mora, “the Cubans know that there are generals and others involved in the trafficking of drugs. Are they involved? I would guess not. But they turn a blind eye because that in some way keeps the place together.”

Hugo and Fidel
Lt. Col. Hugo Chávez first tried to seize power in Venezuela in a failed coup in 1992. Released from prison in 1994, he was welcomed to Cuba by Fidel Castro himself. Chávez had “no money, no political experience, no organized support, and, it seemed, not much of a future,” Rory Carroll writes in Commandante: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. But as a former aide to Chávez told Carroll, Fidel “sniffed him right out. He recognized Chávez’s potential straightaway.”

“Castro personally attended to Chávez for the entire visit,” writes Carroll. “The pair bonded over Baskin-Robbins and marathon talks where they compared life arcs: both rural boys, talented pitchers who traded professional baseball dreams for politics and insurrection.”

Chávez built his left-wing populist political movement around the idealized memory of El Libertador, Simón Bolívar, who fought to free Latin America from Spain early in the 19th century. In today’s context, one might even say the thrust of the Chávez campaign and the core ideology of his government was to make Bolívar great again. He promised to end corruption and distribute the country’s vast oil wealth to the poor. And he won. The next time he returned to Cuba, in 1999, was as president-elect of Venezuela. Later, Fidel visited him there. They were, said Chávez, “swimming together toward the same sea of happiness.”

So too, at the time, was the FARC in neighboring Colombia. It had a permanent liaison office in Havana, as did the other major Colombian guerrilla organization, the National Liberation Army (ELN). And both had major stakes in the cocaine trade. And as the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported in an exhaustive study of 30,000 FARC documents captured by the Colombians in 2008, when Chávez became president there was “a wholesale transformation of Venezuelan security policy, particularly regarding the Colombian–Venezuelan border and Colombian insurgents.”

Cuban Clients
There were differences, to be sure. Populists do not make good communists, and the FARC leaders found Chávez ideologically unreliable: “One day he says he is a Marxist, the next that Christianity is what must guide the construction of socialism, today he said in his [TV] program that Trotskyism must do that, in short he has an enormous muddle in his head that nobody understands.”

In 2002, when Chávez moved to take complete control of the powerful state oil company — this in a country that has the world’s largest proven reserves — he faced a counter-coup and almost lost power. But his nemesis overplayed his hand, people rallied to Chávez’s defense, and he returned to power. Before that, as Carroll notes, the “situation room” beneath Chávez’s office had been manned by Venezuelans who tracked developments throughout the country. After 2002, the Cubans took over in the situation room, the central intelligence node for the Venezuelan president.

A bloody shootout between FARC guerrillas and Venezuelan troops near the frontier led to a break in relations, but the Cubans eventually helped to smooth things over. As the IISS analysis notes, in 2006 Cuban intelligence was reporting to the Venezuelans and the guerrillas as well that the Colombian government, the U.S., and Colombian right-wing paramilitaries were plotting to take over the contested border province of Zulia and secede. That probably was not true, but Chávez, concerned that it might be, moved to shore things up with the FARC.

Meanwhile, as Cuban influence on Chávez’s security establishment increased, so did common crime and narcotics smuggling. A Cuban-style program to arm and train popular militias, known as collectivos, eventually put more guns into the hands of more criminals.

The great leap into narco-trafficking came in 2005, when Chávez ended what cooperation had existed with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, accusing it of spying. He also withdrew from the Joint Interagency Task Force East monitoring flights and ships in the Caribbean and along the northern shore of South America. The activities of the informal Cartel of the Suns picked up dramatically. A few months later a DC-9 based in Florida but flying out of Venezuela landed in Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico, after numerous changes to its flight plan. It had 5.5 tons of cocaine aboard, ostensibly bound for the Sinaloa cartel of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

Naming Names
Walid Makled Garcia, a fat-faced Syrian-born thug known as “El Turco” or “El Arabe,” emerged in the middle of the 2000s as a broker between Venezuela’s senior figures and the FARC. The deal he promised was protection for shipments of cocaine, and because he controlled several airports and a major seaport, that was fairly easy for him to do. But as the profile of Makled by Insight Crime points out, he ran afoul of Chávez and his people when his family decided to go into politics. Then he was accused of ordering the murder of a journalist and of a veterinarian whose farm was next to his. And after Venezuela issued a warrant, Makled actually was arrested in Colombia in 2009—at which point, as gangsters used to say, he started to sing.

Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, declared that “even among global narcotics traffickers, Makled Garcia is a king among kingpins.” And for a while, as indictments and Treasury Department sanctions multiplied, it looked as if Makled’s information might help the U.S. roll up the Cartel of the Suns. But no.

The failure to shut down the organization became obvious when 1.3 tons of pure cocaine in unregistered bags showed up on the baggage carousel at Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris in 2013. The flight had come direct from Caracas, and the cargo, it would seem, had been mishandled.

Chávez, who died of cancer in 2013 after months of treatment in Cuba, took no substantive action against the accused traffickers in his government, and as the United States tried to put pressure on them with indictments and sanctions, Chavez’s successor, Maduro, promoted them. Néstor Reverol Torres was the head of the national anti-narcotics bureau when Makled said he was on the take. Today Reverol Torres is the interior minister. Tareck Al Aissami was interior minister when Makled leveled his accusations, now he is vice president.

These characters now have such grim reputations that they are among those accused of command responsibility for torture in a brief to be presented to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. That comes on top of a letter sent to the court on May 30 by Luis Almagro, secretary general of the Organization of American States, stating that “there is no recourse for justice in Venezuela,” and noting “evidence that points to the systematic, tactical and strategic used of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as tools to terrorize the Venezuelan people.”

Mr. Big?
The Daily Beast’s correspondent reports from Caracas that the name most Venezuelans are likely to associate with the Cartel de los Soles is Diosdado Cabello, the former head of the national assembly. He remains a familiar face, not least because every day he’s on the air haranguing his enemies and hyping his ideas, an aspiring caudillo in the age of YouTube.

Diosdado wears his hair cropped short, military-style on his square cranium, and sports plain green fatigues. There are no suns on his epaulets—but then again, he doesn’t need them. His close ties to Chávez dated back to before the attempted coup in 1992. He held several ministerial portfolios, and was even president himself for a few hours in the confusion during the 2002 counter-coup. Many thought he would succeed to the presidency for good, but when Chávez departed for Cuba and what turned out to be his last surgical procedure in 2013, he surprised the nation by naming the former bus driver and foreign minister Nicolás Maduro as the president in waiting.

The army didn’t like that. Many of the generals—the suns—refused to salute a civilian commander. But Cabello realized he might be better off behind the throne than on it. He calmed things down so he could dedicate himself to his business, allegedly including the drug business, without having to worry about ruling a country.

What Cabello hadn’t counted on was the defection to the United States of a man who knew many, if not all, of his secrets.

Leamsy Salazar had been one of the bodyguards closest Hugo Chávez in a security detail that the Cubans would have trained, and after the commandante’s death he served on Diosdado Cabello’s security staff. According to statements Salazar provided to the U.S. government in exchange for access to the witness protection program, Cabello is the head of the Cartel de los Soles.

Salazar went over to the DEA in January 2015. In November that same year two nephews of Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores were picked up in Haiti with a large shipment of cocaine. At their trial, the prosecutor presented a recording where one of the nephews refers to Cabello as “the most powerful man in Venezuela” and “a guarantee for the business.”

Cabello claimed earlier this year on his TV show that he would “leave Venezuela if a single [corrupt] dollar is found under his name.” Those dollars may be harder to find since last month, when the U.S. Treasury placed sanctions on Cabello, his wife, his brother and his “front man.”

“The Venezuelan people suffer under corrupt politicians who tighten their grip on power while lining their own pockets,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement that minced no words. “We are imposing costs on figures like Diosdado Cabello who exploit their official positions to engage in narcotics trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement of state funds, and other corrupt activities. This Administration is committed to holding those accountable who violate the trust of the Venezuelan people, and we will continue to block attempts to abuse the U.S. financial system.”

Smooth Operator
If Diosdado Cabello is the boss of the cartel, Vice President Tareck El Aissami is the businessman, and the one in charge of public relations. He’s handsome, well-tailored, slickly coiffed and only 43 years old. His Syrian-Lebanese family background allegedly has allowed him to link up easily with organizations in the Middle East such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the close relations of the Venezuelan government with countries like Iran and Cuba supposedly made it easy for the young revolutionary to build a sophisticated network for illegal activities. But allegations that he or anyone else in the regime might collaborate with Al Qaeda or ISIS for an attack on the United States are a stretch, and the U.S. government—which clearly wants this regime to be over—has not reached that far.

The accusations about El Aissami’s ties to the Cartel of the Suns are pointed enough. Days after he was named vice president in early 2017, the Treasury Department slapped him with sanctions for his activities in his previous positions as interior minister and governor of Aragua state.

El Aissami “oversaw or partially owned narcotics shipments of over 1,000 kilograms from Venezuela on multiple occasions, including those with the final destinations of Mexico and the United States,” said the Treasury Department statement. “He also facilitated, coordinated, and protected other narcotics traffickers operating in Venezuela. Specifically, El Aissami received payment for the facilitation of drug shipments belonging to Venezuelan drug kingpin Walid Makled Garcia. El Aissami also is linked to coordinating drug shipments to Los Zetas, a violent Mexican drug cartel, as well as providing protection to Colombian drug lord Daniel Barrera Barrera and Venezuelan drug trafficker Hermagoras Gonzalez Polanco.”

Our correspondent in Caracas, who thought it wise not to be named, says “there is still a lot to discover regarding the Cartel of the Suns. Their complex structure and huge logistic capacity makes it very difficult for the international authorities to track them and to punish them. Their close relation to the Venezuelan government makes it impossible to conduct any serious investigation against them in Venezuelan territory, and linking them to any illegal activity might be severely punished."

“Because it is made up of the main figures of the so-called Socialist Revolution of the 21st century," said the correspondent, "the Suns’ Cartel operates with complete freedom in Venezuela without paying attention to the severe economic and humanitarian crisis this country goes through. This is why they are so fervent about defending the revolution no matter the cost. For them, staying in power has become a matter of life and death.”

For the Venezuelan people, meanwhile, daily life has become a trial that seems never to end.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/britain-says-militant-islamist-threat-stay-high-may-105059944.html

Britain says militant Islamist threat to stay high and may rise further

Reuters - June 3, 2018

LONDON (Reuters) - The threat posed by Islamist militants to Britain is expected to remain high for the next two years and could even rise, the interior ministry said on Sunday, on the first anniversary of an attack that killed eight people in central London.

The current threat level to Britain is assessed as severe, meaning an attack is highly likely. The government said it had foiled 25 Islamist militant plots since June 2013 - 12 of those since March 2017 - and was currently handling over 500 live operations.

Britain will publish a revised counter-terrorism strategy on Monday designed to cope with what it said was a shift in the threats the country faces as militants of all ideologies adopt new tactics.

"In summary we expect the threat from Islamist terrorism to remain at its current, heightened level for at least the next two years, and that it may increase further," the ministry said in a statement.

The threat level was raised to "critical", its highest, twice in 2017.

A review found existing counter-terrorism policy was well-organized and comprehensive, but suggested ways it could be improved.

"The threat from terrorism is constantly evolving. Globally, terrorist groups and networks of all ideologies continue to develop organically, exploiting social media, technology and science to further their aims and ambitions," the ministry said.

The statement said the threat from "extreme right-wing terrorism" was also growing and four plots had been disrupted since March last year.

Interior minister Sajid Javid will speak at a memorial service for those killed in the London Bridge attack when three men drove a van into pedestrians and then stabbed passers-by in the popular nightlife area.

"The government is absolutely committed to doing everything possible to tackle the terrorist threat. It is my first priority every day in this job," he will say, according to the department.

The revised strategy will try to develop police and security services data analysis capability, coordinate more closely between intelligence agencies and police on specific suspects, and look in more detail at the activity of right wing groups.

It is due to be announced in full on Monday.

(Reporting by William James; Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky)

78 reactions
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/06/03/us-led-nato-exercise-starts-in-baltics-poland/

US-led NATO exercise starts in Baltics, Poland

By: The Associated Press  
2 hours ago

VILNIUS, Lithuania — A major U.S.-led military exercise with 18,000 soldiers from 19 primarily NATO countries has kicked off in the alliance’s eastern flank involving Poland and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

The U.S. Army Europe said Sunday the Saber Strike 18 drill is spread around the region until June 15 as “a demonstration of the commitment and solidarity of the Alliance” at the time when Russia’s military maneuvers are increasingly worrying nearby NATO members.

Why Poland wants a permanent US military base, and is willing to pay $2 billion for it
Poland wants a full U.S. armor division to help deter Russian aggression.

By: Kyle Rempfer

It stressed, however, that Saber Strike “is not a provocation of Russia.”

NATO has deployed some 6,000 troops in the Baltics and Poland.

In the face of Russian aggression, NATO’s battle groups are in place, learning in Europe
A year after NATO leaders agreed to increase their forces on the eastern edge of Europe, multiple battle groups are in place in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

By: Todd South

Lithuania’s defense ministry also announced the start of the country’s largest-ever national drill, “Thunder Storm,” with some 9,000 troops.

Non-NATO member Israel will be taking part in Saber Strike for the first time.
 

Lilbitsnana

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Intel Doge
‏ @IntelDoge
10m10 minutes ago

Israeli presence spotted over the Lebanese-Syrian border putting #Damascus on high alert.
 

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The Intel Crab Retweeted
Reuters Top News
‏Verified account @Reuters
3h3 hours ago

North Korea's top three military officials replaced, U.S. official says


posted for fair use and discussion
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...=topNews&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social

une 3, 2018 / 4:51 PM / Updated 2 hours ago
North Korea's top three military officials replaced, U.S. official says

Reuters Staff

4 Min Read

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - North Korea’s top three military officials have been removed from their posts, a senior U.S. official said on Sunday, as U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un prepare to meet on June 12 in Singapore.
FILE PHOTO: A North Korean flag flies on a mast at the Permanent Mission of North Korea in Geneva October 2, 2014. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse/File Photo

The U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, was commenting on a report by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency that all three of the North’s top military officials were believed to have been replaced.

Trump on Friday revived the summit after canceling it a week earlier. The United States is seeking a negotiated end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

U.S. officials believe there was some dissension in the military about Kim’s approaches to South Korea and the United States.

The U.S. official did not identify the three military officials. Yonhap identified them as defense chief Pak Yong Sik; Ri Myong Su, chief of the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) general staff; and Kim Jong Gak, director of the KPA’s General Political Bureau.

Trump wants North Korea to “denuclearize,” meaning to get rid of its nuclear arsenal, in return for relief from economic sanctions. North Korea’s leadership is believed to regard nuclear weapons as crucial to its survival.

Citing an unnamed intelligence official, Yonhap said No Kwang Chol, first vice minister of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, had replaced Pak Yong Sik as defense chief, while Ri Myong Su was replaced by his deputy, Ri Yong Gil.

The White House, State Department, CIA and Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not immediately respond to requests for official comment.

South Korea’s unification and defense ministries declined to confirm the report, while an official at the Unification Ministry said the government was watching the leadership situation in the North very closely.

All of the newly promoted officials are younger than their predecessors, according to Yonhap, especially Ri Yong Gil, 63, who is 21 years younger than Ri Myong Su.

“This points to two things: the consolidation of Kim Jong Un’s power as the sole leader of North Korea and strengthened cooperation between the North’s party and military as the country works towards further economic development,” said Yang Moo-jin, professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.

“They’re all young but capable people,” Yang added.

Army General Kim Su Gil’s replacement of Kim Jong Gak as director of the KPA’s General Political Bureau was confirmed in a North Korean state media report last month when Kim Su Gil accompanied North Korea’s Kim Jong Un on a field guidance trip to a beach tourist zone with other officials.

Lower-level U.S.-North Korean talks to prepare for the summit are continuing but have made only “halting progress,” according to a second U.S. official briefed on the discussions.

That official said U.S. negotiators’ efforts to press for definitions of immediate, comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization by North Korea had run into opposition from the White House.

In a remarkable shift in tone eight days after canceling the summit, citing Pyongyang’s “open hostility,” Trump welcomed North Korea’s former intelligence chief, Kim Yong Chol, to the White House on Friday, afterward exchanging smiles and handshakes.
 

Housecarl

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And if you thought the concern over North Korea and Iran was urgent....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.rferl.org/a/everybody-i...-battle-with-extreme-censorship/29268374.html

PAKISTAN

'Everybody Is Scared': Pakistani Media Fighting -- And Losing -- Battle With 'Extreme' Censorship

June 03, 2018 09:31 GMT
Daud Khattak
Frud Bezhan

Military rule, religious extremism, and war have long made Pakistan one of the world's toughest beats for journalists.

But Pakistani reporters say free media is now being shackled like never before, as veteran reporters have been leaving after experiencing threats, the nation's most popular TV station was forced off the air, and nationwide distribution of Pakistan's oldest newspaper has been halted.

The developments are threatening the independence of the already depleted ranks of free-press torchbearers, who have come under pressure from the all-powerful army, hard-line religious groups, and militant groups.

Threats, Kidnapping
Prominent Pakistani journalist Taha Siddiqui left Pakistan in January, shortly after armed men beat, threatened, and attempted to kidnap him in broad daylight as he took a taxi to the airport in the capital, Islamabad.

"The army and intelligence agencies were threatening me and I suspect the people who tried to kidnap me were from the army," says Siddiqui, speaking to RFE/RL from Paris, where he has relocated. "They do not like investigative reporting that uncovers the wrongdoings of those institutions."

A well-known reporter, the 33-year-old's work has appeared in The New York Times, The Guardian, and other Western media outlets. In 2014, he was awarded the Albert Londres Prize, the French equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize, for his coverage of Pakistan.

Siddiqui is known in his homeland for his critical reporting on the military, which has an oversized role in domestic and foreign affairs in the South Asian country.

The Islamabad bureau chief for India's World Is One News channel, Siddiqui says he was questioned and warned by the army after a 2015 article he wrote for The New York Times about torture and abuse at army-run detention centers. He followed that up with another critical story about the army confiscating land from farmers for a military-owned housing scheme.

He says he was warned by intelligence officers that he was "writing against the country's interests and we will make a fake drugs case against you."

The Pakistani military and its notorious intelligence services have long been accused of stifling independent media and silencing opposition through intimidation, censorship, and even assassination.

'Muzzling Of Debate'
Pakistani media have come under unprecedented pressure in recent months.

Since May 15, the distribution of the country's oldest newspaper, Dawn, has been disrupted across most of the country. The disruption came days after Dawn published an interview with ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in which the former premier criticized the army and alleged it was backing militants who carried out the deadly attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008.

On April 1, Geo TV, part of Pakistan's largest commercial media group, Jang, was taken off the air in many parts of the country. The ban only ended a month later after talks between the military and the network's chiefs, who reportedly pledged to make sure the network’s coverage does not cross the military’s line.

Meanwhile, prominent Pakistani columnists have had articles rejected by news outlets. Pakistani journalist Syed Talat Hussain wrote on Twitter on May 28 that his regular column was rejected for its content.

Syed Talat Hussain

@TalatHussain12
The News did not publish my regular column today. I had declined to incorporate changes in the article conveyed by the editorial staff. Ironically the article talks about, among other things, a thickening web of systematic censorship and manipulation in Pakistan. Here it is:

1:13 AM - May 28, 2018
1,729
1,163 people are talking about this

Pakistani writers have also seen the quashing of articles that cover antigovernment protests by the Pashtun ethnic minority, toward which the army has been accused of forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and discrimination. Journalist Mosharraf Zaidi said on April 17 that his story about the Pashtun Protection Movement was rejected.

Mosharraf Zaidi

@mosharrafzaidi
For the first time in over a decade, @thenews_intl has refused to publish my column.

This unnecessary muzzling of debate is not healthy.

Strong nations cultivate robust debate. Weak ones fear it.

Pakistan is stronger than it is being allowed to be.

1:30 AM - Apr 17, 2018
1,271
1,118 people are talking about this

'Extreme Level Of Censorship'
Some journalists have resorted to self-censorship to keep their jobs and remain safe.

"Everyone is exercising self-censorship and even I was doing the same," says Siddiqui. "Only those media and journalists who toe the line or observe self-censorship can survive and continue their professional work without threat."

Pakistan ranks 139th out of 180 countries listed on the World Press Freedom Index 2017, compiled by Reporters Without Borders, and threats to journalists are growing.

Raza Rumi, a TV anchor and respected reporter, narrowly escaped death when gunmen opened fire on his car in an attack that killed his driver in March 2014.

He is an outspoken critic of militant groups in Pakistan and the army's alleged support for militant groups in neighboring India and Afghanistan.

Shortly after the assassination attempt, Rumi moved to the United States, where he has continued his career as an editor for Pakistan's Daily Times.

"There is an extreme level of censorship being applied to media," says Rumi, who is based in New York. "There are no formal directives, but everybody has seen the fate of two major media outlets, Geo and Dawn, and everybody is scared of crossing the line."

Rumi is planning to visit Pakistan again for the first time since the attack on his life. But he insists he cannot work as a reporter in Pakistan in the current climate.

"I'm scared and do not feel very comfortable," he says. "The killers of my driver have been detained but not punished yet."

Fear of retribution even haunts journalists who have fled Pakistan.

Cyril Almeida, a leading columnist and assistant editor at Dawn, was barred from leaving the country in 2016 shortly after he wrote an article about a rift between the government and the military. He left for New York when the government order was lifted weeks later.


Daud Khattak
Daud Khattak is a senior editor for RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal.

Frud Bezhan
Frud Bezhan covers Afghanistan and the broader South Asia and Middle East region.

BezhanF@rferl.org
 

Housecarl

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From a couple of days ago....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/389628-china-pushing-new-generation-of-nuclear-weapons-report

China pushing new generation of nuclear weapons: report

BY ELLEN MITCHELL - 05/28/18 02:41 PM EDT
245 Comments

China is reportedly stepping up its development of next-generation nuclear weapons, holding tests to simulate blasts more often than the United States is.

The United States carries out less than one such test a month on average, while China’s average is five tests a month.

China conducted about 200 nuclear blast simulations between September 2014 and December 2017, according to the China Academy of Engineering Physics, a major Chinese weapons research institute.

The United States, in comparison, carried out only 50 such tests between 2012 and 2017, according to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, an American federal research facility in California used to aid national security.

Experts warned The South China Morning Post that as China, the United States and Russia separately seek more targeted nuclear weapons to deter against potential threats, the risk of a nuclear conflict increases.

The White House has pushed a $1.2 trillion plan to upgrade its nuclear stockpile, while the Pentagon In January unveiled its Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for developing smaller, low-yield nuclear weapons to deter Russia and China.

Pentagon officials have said the United States wants aggressive nations to believe it might actually use such weapons.

“We need to ensure we have a credible nuclear deterrent, and we are confident that we are prepared to ... defend this nation no matter what,” Pentagon chief spokeswoman Dana White said in February.

Congress followed up with authorization to fund such weapons in separate versions of its annual defense policy bill.

The Senate Armed Services Committee's version of a $716 billion National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal 2019 — moved to the full Senate last week — supports the administration’s request for $65 million to develop a low-yield nuclear warhead.

The House’s version of the NDAA, passed by the full chamber last week, also authorizes $65 million for the new low-yield nuclear weapon, to be launched from submarines.

But after the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review was released, Chinese state-run paper Global Times published an editorial that stated China would seriously consider going public with its low-yield nuclear weapons program in response to a new nuclear arms race.

An international ban imposed in the 1990s prevents nuclear weapons from being tested — though North Korea has not followed the agreement.

In place of the real tests, Chinese scientists instead use high-powered gas guns that fire projectiles in the country’s main nuclear design facilities under mountains in Mianyang, southwestern Sichuan province.

China is currently creating new tactical nuclear weapons meant for close-range battles.
 

Housecarl

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Merde....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thehill.com/policy/internati...itary-assistance-to-help-seize-key-yemen-port

US mulling direct military assistance to help seize key Yemen port: report

BY JULIA MANCHESTER - 06/03/18 07:39 PM EDT
869 Comments

The U.S. is considering giving direct military support to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in an effort to capture a key port in Yemen from Houthi rebels, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The UAE has reportedly asked the U.S. for assistance in helping the Saudi-led coalition retake Hodeidah, which provides support to the whole of Yemen.

U.S. officials told the Journal that the Saudis and the UAE will not act until they receive U.S. support, but Washington worries about the toll such a move could take on the war-torn country.

“We continue to have a lot of concerns about a Hodeidah operation,” a high-ranking official told the Journal. “We are not 100% comfortable that, even if the coalition did launch an attack, that they would be able to do it cleanly and avoid a catastrophic incident.”

Administration officials familiar with the situation in Yemen are planning to meet on Monday to discuss next steps, according to the newspaper.

The coalition also decided that UAE forces would not interfere in the port in the near future so the United Nations envoy can begin peace efforts in the country's civil war, the Journal reported.

The U.S. already supports the Saudi campaign with billions of dollars in arms, intelligence and logistics such as air refueling.

U.S. lawmakers have not warmed to the idea of additional involvement in Yemen.

The House last year passed a nonbinding resolution that called U.S. military involvement in the war unauthorized, while the Senate recently blocked a resolution that would have put an end to U.S. military support for the campaign.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well this is going to give Xi and his guys indigestion....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...nanmen-anniversary/ar-AAycmC7?ocid=spartandhp

Reuters

U.S. urges China to come clean on Tiananmen anniversary

2 hrs ago

The United States urges China to make a full public account of those killed, detained or who went missing during a crackdown on student-led pro-democracy protests in and around Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said.

The Chinese government sent tanks to quell the June 4, 1989 protests, and has never released a death toll. Estimates from human rights groups and witnesses range from several hundred to several thousand.

The Tiananmen crackdown is a taboo subject in China and 29 years later it remains a point of contention between China and many Western countries.

In a statement on Sunday the recently appointed Pompeo said he remembered "the tragic loss of innocent lives".

"As Liu Xiaobo wrote in his 2010 Nobel Peace Prize speech, delivered in absentia, 'the ghosts of June 4th have not yet been laid to rest'," Pompeo said referring to the Chinese dissident who died last year while still in custody.

"We join others in the international community in urging the Chinese government to make a full public accounting of those killed, detained or missing," Pompeo added.

China's Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment and there was no mention of the day in state media.

However, Hu Xijin, editor of nationalistic tabloid the Global Times, called Pompeo's statement a "meaningless stunt" that "represents a wish of the Western world to meddle in China's political process".

The Chinese Communist Party no longer mentions the Tiananmen incident in order to help Chinese society move on, which it has successfully done, Hu added, writing in English on Twitter, which is blocked in China.

Tens of thousands of people are expected to gather later in the day in Hong Kong to mark the anniversary, the only place in China where such large-scale public commemorations happen.

On Tiananmen Square, security was tight as is usual for the anniversary, with no signs of any protests or other memorial events.

Foreigners' passports were checked by Chinese police at a checkpoint nearly a kilometer from the square. A Reuters reporter was turned away and told that unapproved "interview activities" were forbidden in the square on Monday.

In their annual open letter, the Tiananmen Mothers, who represent the families of those who died, said the government was guilty of serious disrespect by ignoring their requests for redress.

"Such a powerful proletarian dictatorship apparatus is afraid of us: the old, the sick, and the weakest and most vulnerable of our society," they wrote in a letter addressed to Chinese President Xi Jinping.

In Taiwan, the democratic and self-ruled island China claims as its own, former president Ma Ying-jeou said in a statement it was important to face up to history to help heal the families' wounds.

"Only by doing this can the Chinese communists be seen by the world as a real great power," wrote Ma, under whose administration ties with China dramatically improved.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard and Christian Shepherd; Editing by Michael Perry; Additional reporting by Jess Macy Yu in TAIPEI; Editing by Ryan Woo and Michael Perry)
 

Lilbitsnana

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Brad
‏ @usafshortwave
4m4 minutes ago

Brad Retweeted Kurdistan 24 English

Uh oh...

Brad added,
Kurdistan 24 English
Verified account @K24English
#BREAKING: Explosion near joint US-France military base in #Syria's Ain al-Issa town, Kurdistan 24 Correspondent reported.
#TwitterKurds #France #Washington
 

Lilbitsnana

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This is the one mentioned in post above


Brad
‏ @usafshortwave
15m15 minutes ago

Report: blast kills one near U.S. coalition base in Syria



posted for fair use and discussion
https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Report-blast-kills-one-near-US-coalition-base-in-Syria-559102

Report: blast kills one near U.S. coalition base in Syria
By REUTERS
June 4, 2018 11:43

Breaking news

Breaking news. (photo credit: JPOST STAFF)

BEIRUT - The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that a bomb blast in northern Syria targeted a military vehicle on Monday on the road from Ain Issa to a military base where some of the US-led coalition against Islamic State are based.

The blast killed at least one person and injured others of unknown nationality, the Britain-based war monitor reported, in an area controlled by the coalition-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, an alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-shabab-extremists/ar-AAydDYM?ocid=spartandhp


US says airstrike in Somalia kills 27 al-Shabab extremists

1 hr ago


AP - MOGADISHU, Somalia — The U.S. military says it has carried out an airstrike in northern Somalia that killed 27 al-Shabab extremists.

The statement issued Monday by the U.S. Africa command said it assesses that no civilians were killed in the attack on Sunday about 26 miles southwest of Bosasso, the commercial capital of the semiautonomous Puntland state. The area has recently seen attacks on local forces by extremists aligned with the Islamic State group.

The Trump administration approved expanded military operations against extremists in Somalia, including al-Shabab, which is linked to al-Qaida and was blamed for the truck bombing in Mogadishu in October that killed more than 500 people.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-b...ancing-deterrence-in-the-new-cold-war-part-ii

Israel’s Nuclear Strategy: Enhancing Deterrence in the New Cold War (Part II)

Louis René Beres June 5, 2018

"Oh ship of state, new waves push you out to sea...."
—Horace, Odes

This article will continue the examination of Israel's nuclear strategy begun with “Israel’s Nuclear Strategy: Enhancing Deterrence in the new Cold War.” Specifically, Part II will address Israel’s core nuclear deterrence posture. In Part I, we posited the prospective importance of any re-born superpower rivalry upon this posture. Most critically, Israel's nuclear strategy will depend, in meaningful measure, upon the expected rationality and irrationality of its friends and foes, and upon a broad variety of plausible synergies between allied and adversarial actions. Recalling Thomas Hobbes' 17th-century prophetic description of a "state of war" not just "actual fighting," but also a "known disposition thereto," Part I ended with specific and informed references to certain considered modifications of Israel's deliberate nuclear ambiguity, and also to its need for further expansion and codification of formal nuclear military doctrine.

There is more. To best understand the utility of Israeli strategic nuclear doctrine and posture, analysts must first identify the various core foundations of Israeli nuclear deterrence. These foundations concern prospective attackers' perceptions of Israel's nuclear capability and Israel's willingness to use this capability. Any selective telegraphing of Israel's strategic nuclear doctrine could potentially enhance Israel's nuclear deterrence posture by heightening enemy perceptions of Israel's nuclear forces and by its announced willingness to use these forces in reprisal for certain first-strike and/or retaliatory attacks.

To deter an enemy attack, or a post-preemption retaliation, Israel must always prevent a rational aggressor, by threat of an unacceptably damaging retaliation or counter-retaliation, from deciding to strike. Here, Israel's national security would be sought by convincing the potential rational attacker that the costs of any considered attack will always exceed the expected benefits. Assuming Israel's state enemies (1) value self-preservation most highly; and (2) choose rationally between alternative options, they will always refrain from an attack that is believed both willing and able to deliver an unacceptably destructive response.

These enemy states might also be deterred by the plausible prospect of a more limited Israeli attack, one that would be directed only at national leaders. In the usual parlance adopted by military and intelligence communities, this particular prospect refers to more-or-less credible threats of regime targeting.

Always, two factors must combine to communicate such essential belief. First, in terms of capability, there are two critical components: payload and delivery system. It must be successfully communicated to any calculating attacker that Israel's firepower, and its means of delivering that firepower, are invariably capable of inflicting unacceptable levels of destruction. This means that Israel's retaliatory or counter-retaliatory forces must always appear sufficiently invulnerable to enemy first-strikes, and also aptly elusive to penetrate the prospective attacker's active and civil defenses.

It may or may not need to be communicated to a potential attacker that such firepower and delivery vehicles are superior to those of the relevant adversary. Deterrence, Israel's planners must continuously bear in mind, is never about victory. The capacity to deter may or may not be as great as the capacity to win. As a suitable current example, Israeli planners could think about North Korea and the United States. In this increasingly problematic dyad of international adversaries, the Americans are in fact clearly superior in all of the usual expressions of battle-readiness, but the North Koreans could still be able to inflict terrible damage to American military forces and even, perhaps, to portions of the American mainland. And this is to say nothing about parallel damages that might be brought to US allies in South Korea or Japan.

With Israel's strategic nuclear forces and doctrine kept locked in the basement, enemy states could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-preemption reprisal would be cost-effective. But were relevant Israeli doctrine made more plainly obvious to enemy states contemplating an attack—obvious in that Israel's nuclear assets seemingly met both payload and delivery system objectives—Israel's nuclear forces could then better serve their existential security functions.

The second factor of nuclear doctrine for Israel concerns willingness. Can Israel convince any potential nuclear attackers that it possesses the resolve to deliver an appropriately destructive retaliation, and/or counter retaliation? Again, the answer to this core question lies largely in doctrine, that is, in Israel's demonstrated strength of commitment to actually carry out such an attack, and in the nuclear ordnance that would presumably be available to its forces. Here, too, continued ambiguity over nuclear doctrine could wrongfully create the impression of an unwilling Israel. Conversely, any doctrinal movement toward some level of disclosure could meaningfully heighten the impression that Israel was in fact willing to follow-through on its now explicit nuclear threats.

There are persuasive connections between any incrementally more open or disclosed Israeli strategic nuclear doctrine, and certain enemy state perceptions of Israeli nuclear deterrence. One such connection centers on the expected relationship between prospectively greater openness and the perceived vulnerability of Israeli strategic nuclear forces to preemptive destruction. Another such connection concerns the relation between greater openness and the perceived capacity of Israel's nuclear forces to reliably penetrate the offending state's active defenses.

To be deterred by Israel, a newly-nuclear Iran or any other newly nuclear adversary would need to believe that at least a critical number of Israel's retaliatory forces would successfully survive any first-strike, and that these forces could not subsequently be stopped from hitting their pre-designated targets. Regarding the presumed survivability component of such adversarial belief, reliable sea-basing by Israel could prove an especially relevant case in point.

Carefully articulated, expanding doctrinal openness, or partial nuclear disclosure, could represent a distinctly rational option for Israel, at least to the extent that pertinent enemy states were made appropriately aware of Israel's relevant nuclear capabilities. The presumed operational benefits of any such expanding doctrinal openness would accrue from deliberate flows of information about assorted matters of dispersion, multiplication, and hardening of its strategic nuclear weapon systems, and about certain other technical features of these systems. Most importantly, doctrinally controlled and orderly flows of information could serve to remove any lingering adversary state doubts about Israel's strategic nuclear force capabilities and also its plausible intentions. Left unchallenged, such doubts could literally and lethally undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence.

No military doctrine can ever fully anticipate the actual pace of combat activity, or, as a corollary, the precise reactions of individual human commanders under fire.


A key problem in purposefully refining Israeli strategic nuclear policy on deliberate ambiguity issues has to do with what the Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, famously calls friction. No military doctrine can ever fully anticipate the actual pace of combat activity, or, as a corollary, the precise reactions of individual human commanders under fire. It follows that Israel's nuclear doctrine must somehow be encouraged to combine adequate tactical flexibility with a selective doctrinal openness. To understand exactly how such seemingly contradictory objectives can be reconciled in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv now presents a distinctly primary intellectual challenge to Israel's national command authority.

In the end, Israeli planners must think about plausible paths to a nuclear war that also include relevant risks of inadvertent or accidental nuclear war. It is entirely possible—even plausible—that risks of any deliberate nuclear war involving Israel would be very small, but that the Jewish State might still be more-or-less vulnerable to such a war occasioned by a mechanical/electrical/computer malfunction on one side or another, and/or by assorted decision errors in related reasoning which would present themselves as catastrophic miscalculations. To properly assess the different but intersecting risks between a deliberate nuclear war and an inadvertent or accidental nuclear war must be seen in Jerusalem as an absolutely overriding obligation. Significantly, these risks could exist independently of one another, and could be impacted in various ways by Cold War II alignments.

There is one more core conceptual distinction that warrants mention at this concluding point. It references the distinction between inadvertent and accidental nuclear war. By definition, any accidental nuclear war would need to be inadvertent. Conversely, however, an inadvertent nuclear war would not necessarily be accidental. False warnings, for example, which could be generated by various types of technical malfunction or sparked by third-party hacking--which may manifest as a real dynamic of Cold War II--would not be included under causes of an unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war. Instead, they would represent cautionary narratives of an accidental nuclear war.

Most critical among the plausible causes of an inadvertent nuclear war would be errors in calculation by one, both, or several sides. The most blatant example would involve misjudgments of either enemy intent or enemy capacity that would emerge and propagate as any particular crisis would escalate. Moreover such misjudgments would possibly stem from an understandable desire by one or several parties to achieve escalation dominance.

Always, in any such projected crisis condition, all rational sides would likely strive for escalation dominance without too severely risking total or even near-total destruction. Where one or several adversaries would not actually be rational, all the usual deterrence bets would plainly be off. Where one or several sides would not be identified as rational by Israel, Jerusalem would then need to input various unorthodox sorts of security options, including some that could derive in whole or in part from particular Cold War II alignments.

Still other causes of an inadvertent nuclear war involving Israel could include flawed interpretations of computer-generated nuclear attack warnings; an unequal willingness among adversaries to risk a catastrophic war; overconfidence in deterrence and or defense capabilities on one or several sides; adversarial regime changes; outright revolution or coup d' etat among adversaries, and certain poorly-conceived pre-delegations of nuclear launch authority among apparent foes.

Serious problems of overconfidence could be aggravated by successful tests of a nation's active missile defense operations, whether by Israel itself, or by any of its relevant adversaries. These problems could also be encouraged by any too-optimistic assessments of Cold War II alliance guarantees. An example might be an intra-crisis judgment in Jerusalem that Washington stands firmly behind its every move during the ongoing crisis, up to and including forms of reprisal that are more imagined that genuine. Reciprocally conceivable is that an enemy of Israel could similarly mistake the seriousness and commitment of its own preferred Cold War II guarantor, whether identifiably Russian or American.

A potential source of an inadvertent nuclear war during Cold War II could be a backfire effect from strategies of pretended irrationality. A rational enemy of Israel that had managed to convince Jerusalem of its own decisional irrationality could spark an otherwise avoidable Israeli military preemption. Conversely, an enemy leadership that had begun to take seriously any hint of decisional irrationality in Jerusalem could then be frightened into striking first.

Regarding this second scenario, it might also be remembered that many years back General Moshe Dayan, then Israel's Minister of Defense, had argued expressly, "Israel must be seen as a mad dog, too dangerous to bother."

Although not readily discernible or predictable, these significant impacts upon enemy rationality could themselves be derived from the ever-changing dynamics of Cold War II. A pertinent future example of what is being described here would be any strategic nuclear decisions in Tehran that are based in whole or in part upon that enemy country's particular interpretations or assessments of Cold War II.

With still largely unpredictable enlargements of Cold War II, Israeli decision-makers must systematically prepare for the progressively higher seas of Horace. To avoid being pushed out to sea, they will first have to prepare for conceivably unprecedented levels of world systemic upheaval and transformation, and for seemingly unfathomable levels of decisional complexity. In some cases, these decision-maker calculations will even have to assume varying levels of enemy irrationality that obtain among both state and sub-state adversaries.

Accordingly, for Israel, ultimate survival tasks will necessarily be profoundly intellectual or analytic, and require utterly durable victories of "mind over mind" as well as more traditional ones of mind over matter.[1] These victories, in turn, will depend upon prior capacities to fully understand the prospectively many-sided elements of Cold War II. In principle, at least, such prior capacities could lead Israel to seriously consider certain preemption options.

In Jerusalem, there will surely be Horatian new waves pushing the Israeli ship of state out to sea, but these waves could still remain subject to purposeful national control. Among many other things already mentioned and examined above, what will be required is a determined willingness to face the endlessly bewildering complexities in world politics with more than just a perfunctory nod to Cold War II. Looking ahead, this starkly resurrected expression of superpower bipolarity will provide a genuinely core context within which everything else must inevitably transpire.

Louis René Beres is the author of many books and monographs dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war. His twelfth and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy. He has lectured widely on law and strategy issues at both United States and Israeli military and intelligence institutions.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Anna Ahronheim
‏Verified account @AAhronheim
11m11 minutes ago

#BREAKING: #Israel's Shin Bet has thwarted terror cell guided by terror operative in #Syria whose targets included PM Netanyahu, #Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat, #Canadian security delegation & #US consulate building
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
updated article


posted for fair use and discussion
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/isra...g-attacks-on-netanyahu-other-senior-officials


Israel busts terror cell plotting attacks on Netanyahu, other senior officials

06/05/2018
2:19:16 AM
Updated on
06/05/2018
3:40:48 AM
Written by
i24NEWS

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, center, listens to Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat during a special cabinet meeting to mark Jerusalem Day in Ein Lavan, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, Thursday, June 2, 2016.
Abir Sultan/Pool Photo via AP

Israel's Shin Bet security agency revealed on Tuesday that it busted a Syrian-directed terror cell in east Jerusalem that had been plotting attacks targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials.

Muhammad Jamal Rashdah, 30, from the Shu’fat refugee camp in East Jerusalem was arrested on April 24. In the weeks following, the Shin Bet arrested two further suspects who remained anonymous.

Rashdah planned to carry out “significant terrorist attacks against a variety of targets” which included the prime minister as well as Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat, according to the Shin Bet. He had previously been imprisoned for terrorist activities.

The suspect, who is said to be in possession of an Israeli ID card, also intended to carry out out attacks against a delegation of Canadian security representatives residing in Jerusalem to train the Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank, as well as against buildings belonging to the American consulate.

According to the Shin Bet, Rashdah had begun gathering intelligence about his targets and had already taken a number of preliminary steps to advance his efforts.

Jack Guez (AFP/File) Israel's Shin Bet domestic security agency abuses Palestinians under interrogation in a manner so systematic it points to official endorsement, two Israeli NGOs say in a report
Jack Guez (AFP/File)

Nir Barkat lauded the security agency as the "best in the world." In a statement released following the revelations he said, "throughout their handling of this threat, I was updated and knew that the Shin Bet was in the picture and that the police were in the field. I could trust in them and sleep soundly and securely."

A spokesperson for the security service, cited by the Times of Israel, said Rashdeh received his orders from members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command.

The PFLP-GC is a Syria-based terrorist group that backs Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In the 1970's and 80's, it was linked to a number of violent terror incidents in Israel including the "Avivim school bus massacre" where 9 children and 3 adults were killed.

In the 1980's the organization began working clandestinely with Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed group in Lebanon, but reemerged during the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

“The arrest of the suspects thwarted significant terrorist activity that the cell sought to advance,” the security service statement said.

Indictments were filed against the three suspects on May 27 but the case was under a gag-order until Tuesday.

(More to follow)
 
Last edited:

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
i24NEWS English
‏Verified account @i24NEWS_EN
3h3 hours ago

#Iran says to inform UN nuclear watchdog of uranium enrichment reactivation http://i24ne.ws/hPYE30kl9Yr




i24NEWS English
‏Verified account @i24NEWS_EN
11m11 minutes ago

#BREAKING: Iran has notified UN nuclear watchdog it will add centrifuges, vice president says http://i24ne.ws/tpyr30klhvX






posted for fair use and discussion
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/inte...-180605-iran-to-reactivate-uranium-enrichment


Iran says to inform UN nuclear watchdog of uranium enrichment reactivation

06/04/2018
10:14:17 PM
Updated on
06/05/2018
3:29:43 AM
Written by
i24NEWS

In this picture released by official website of the office of the Iranian supreme leader, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stands as army air force and air defense staff salute at the start of their meeting in Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Feb. 8, 2018. A
Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP

Tehran will inform the United Nations nuclear watchdog on Tuesday that it intends to kickstart the process of increasing its uranium enrichment capacity, the spokesman of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization told the country's official ISNA news agenc
y.

“In a letter that will be handed over to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ... Iran will announce that the process of increasing the capacity to produce ... UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) ... will start on Tuesday,” Behrouz Kamalvandi was quoted as saying, according to a translation by the Reuters news agency.

With partners in Berlin, Paris and London still reeling from US President Donald Trump's decision last month to exit the hard-fought 2015 accord, Kamalvandi said that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had ordered preparations to begin increasing uranium enrichment should the accord fall apart.

“[Khamenei] meant that we should accelerate some process ... linked to our nuclear work capacity to move forward faster in case needed,” Kamalvandi said.

Joe Klamar (AFP/File) "The agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003," the IAEA (pictured here) said in
Joe Klamar (AFP/File)

Germany, France and Britain are three of the signatories of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between world powers and Iran, aimed at keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In the face of the US retreat, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Theresa May have all strongly defended the agreement as the best way to head off a regional arms race and have vowed with Russia and China, the two other signatory countries to the deal, to keep it alive.

The EU also has commercial interests tied up in the deal. European firms, especially those from France and Germany, rushed to invest in Iran following the 2015 accord, under which Tehran agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for an end to punishing international sanctions.

Hoping to protect their interests, the Europeans have proposed hammering out a supplementary deal with Tehran covering its ballistic missile program as well as its interventions in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

Jack GUEZ (AFP) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a speech on Iran's nuclear programme in Tel Aviv on April 30, 2018
Jack GUEZ (AFP)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long railed against the deal, on Monday embarked on a three-day visit to Berlin, Paris, and London where he hopes to up pressure on Merkel, Macron, and May to withdraw from the deal.

Ahead of Netanyahu's visits, Israel reportedly shared with German, French, and British security agencies some of the top-secret files obtained by his country pertaining to an alleged secret Iranian nuclear weapons program, including one document which formally transfers responsibility for the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium to Iran’s defense ministry.

Israel hopes that evidence from the secret nuclear archive will bolster Netanyahu's efforts to persuade his European counterparts to quit the deal, which Israel argues is invalid because it was based on the falsehood that Iran had never pursued a nuclear weapons program.

Israel is considered the leading military power in the Middle East and believed to be the only country in the region to possess nuclear weapons.

Israel itself maintains a policy of nondisclosure with regards to its nuclear capabilities, neither confirming nor denying whether it possessive nuclear arms.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
oreusser
‏ @AllyOfTruth
6m6 minutes ago

Unconfirmed: #Russia-n forces have left areas near the #Lebanon-#Syria border around #Qusayr and were replaced by #SAA 11th division forces after #Hezbollah forces left the region earlier


^^^^Russian forces had been reported as moving in to that area yesterday? (recently anyway)
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
i24NEWS English
‏Verified account @i24NEWS_EN
7m


#BREAKING: Netanyahu says Iran uranium enrichment plan aims to destroy Israel




Sputnik
‏Verified account @SputnikInt
3m3 minutes ago

#Iran's leader explained how he wanted to destroy #Israel — with unlimited uranium enrichment to create a nuclear arsenal - @netanyahu http://sptnkne.ws/hFZk


posted for fair use and discussion
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/...&utm_content=hFZk&utm_campaign=URL_shortening

BREAKING:

Netanyahu: Iran Wants Nuclear Arsenal to Destroy Israel

Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations in New York (September 27, 2012).
Netanyahu: Iran Wants Nuclear Arsenal to Destroy Israel
© AFP 2018 / Don Emmert
Middle East
14:13 05.06.2018(updated 14:39 05.06.2018) Get short URL
306

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has commented on the recent Tehran's announcement about its start of increased uranium enrichment, vowing to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

"Two days ago Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of Iran, said he intends to destroy Israel. Yesterday, he explained how he wants to do it — with unlimited uranium enrichment to create a nuclear arsenal," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated.

The Israeli top official noted that Israel wouldn't let "Iran to obtain nuclear weapons".

The comment followed the announcement by Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman for Iran's nuclear agency, saying that Iran has informed the UN nuclear watchdog about its works aimed to increase the country's nuclear enrichment capacity within the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

DETAILS TO FOLLOW
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
updated info

posted for fair use

https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/inte...-180605-iran-to-reactivate-uranium-enrichment


Iran informs UN nuclear watchdog it will hike uranium enrichment capacity
06/04/2018
10:14:17 PM
Updated on
06/05/2018
6:01:44 AM
Written by
i24NEWS
Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, said Tehran wants to buy 950 tonnes of uranium concentrate from Kazakhstan "within three years"
Michal Cizek (AFP/File)

Iran has notified the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has launched a plan to increase its uranium enrichment capacity, nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi said Tuesday.

"A letter was submitted to the agency yesterday regarding the start of certain activities," said Salehi, a vice president and head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.

The defiant move comes as European powers scramble to preserve the hard-fought 2015 accord over Iran's nuclear program following US President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the deal last month.

Salehi said that work has begun on the infrastructure for building advanced centrifuges at the Natanz facility, but vowed that the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities would remain within the framework of the crumbling agreement.

"If conditions allow, maybe tomorrow night at Natanz, we can announce the opening of the center for production of new centrifuges" for uranium enrichment, he said, quoted by conservative news agency Fars.

"What we are doing does not violate the (2015 nuclear) agreement," he said, noting that this was just the start of the production process and "does not mean that we will start assembling the centrifuges".

Under the 2015 agreement, Iran can build parts for the centrifuges as long as it does not put them into operation within the first decade.

Salehi also emphasized that these moves "do not mean the negotiations [with Europe] have failed."

Joe Klamar (AFP/File) "The agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003," the IAEA (pictured here) said in
Joe Klamar (AFP/File)

Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi had earlier told the official ISNA news agency that Tehran intended to inform the IAEA "that the process of increasing the capacity to produce ... UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) ... will start on Tuesday.”

With partners in Berlin, Paris and London still reeling from US President Donald Trump's decision last month to exit the hard-fought 2015 accord, Kamalvandi said that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had ordered preparations to begin increasing uranium enrichment should the accord fall apart.

Khamenei on Monday warned European leaders to drop their "dream" of Tehran continuing to curb its nuclear program despite renewed economic sanctions.

Germany, France and Britain are three of the signatories of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between world powers and Iran, aimed at keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In the face of the US retreat, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Theresa May have all strongly defended the agreement as the best way to head off a regional arms race and have vowed with Russia and China, the two other signatory countries to the deal, to keep it alive.

The EU also has commercial interests tied up in the deal. European firms, especially those from France and Germany, rushed to invest in Iran following the 2015 accord, under which Tehran agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for an end to punishing international sanctions.

Hoping to protect their interests, the Europeans have proposed hammering out a supplementary deal with Tehran covering its ballistic missile program as well as its interventions in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long railed against the deal, on Monday embarked on a three-day visit to Berlin, Paris, and London where he hopes to up pressure on Merkel, Macron, and May to withdraw from the deal.

Jack GUEZ (AFP) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a speech on Iran's nuclear programme in Tel Aviv on April 30, 2018
Jack GUEZ (AFP)

Ahead of Netanyahu's visits, Israel reportedly shared with German, French, and British security agencies some of the top-secret files obtained by his country pertaining to an alleged secret Iranian nuclear weapons program, including one document which formally transfers responsibility for the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium to Iran’s defense ministry.

Israel hopes that evidence from the secret nuclear archive will bolster Netanyahu's efforts to persuade his European counterparts to quit the deal, which Israel argues is invalid because it was based on the falsehood that Iran had never pursued a nuclear weapons program.

Israel's intelligence minister Yisrael Katz called Tuesday for the formulation of a military coalition against Iran should the Islamic Republic defy world powers and resume enriching military-grade uranium.

"If the Iranians don't surrender now, and try to return" to unsupervised uranium enrichment, "there should be a clear statement by the President of the United States and all of the Western coalition," Katz told Israeli public broadcaster Kan, adding that "the Arabs and Israel surely would be there too."

Katz said that the message should be that "if the Iranians return" to enriching uranium that could enable them to build a nuclear bomb, "a military coalition will be formed against them."

Israel is considered the leading military power in the Middle East and believed to be the only country in the region to possess nuclear weapons.

Israel itself maintains a policy of nondisclosure with regards to its nuclear capabilities, neither confirming nor denying whether it possessive nuclear arms.

AFP contributed to this report.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
ELINT News
‏ @ELINTNews
2m2 minutes ago

ELINT News Retweeted TØM CΛT

#UPDATE: HUGE news if true- US base at At-Tanf in eastern Syria in talks to be shutdown

ELINT News added,
TØM CΛT
@TomtheBasedCat
Preliminary reports suggest that Coalition has agreed to dismantle and shut down the base at Tanf.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Intel Doge
‏ @IntelDoge
40m40 minutes ago

The NY Post reports Dennis Rodman will be at the US/N.Korea summit and could potentially play a role in negotiations.


Intel Doge
‏ @IntelDoge
46m46 minutes ago

Intel Doge Retweeted Breaking911

ITS HAPPENING! I KNEW DENNIS WOULD BE USED SOMEHOW ��

Intel Doge added,
Breaking911
@Breaking911
JUST IN: Dennis Rodman will be in Singapore for Trump-Kim summit & ‘could even play some sort of role in the negotiations’ - NY Post
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Intel Doge
‏ @IntelDoge
3m3 minutes ago

Syrian Defense Force's in Raqqa are currently in alert for unknown reasons, shots have been heard in the city, and coalition warplanes are reportedly airborne and flying over the city. via @Raqqa_SL
 

Shacknasty Shagrat

Has No Life - Lives on TB
There are reports that it was a Shia mosque that was destroyed.
SS


The Intel Crab Retweeted
Barzan Sadiq

3h3 hours ago

#BREAKING
Huge blast rocks As-Sadr city, #Baghdad.
...
The Intel Crab Retweeted
Steve Herman
‏Verified account @W7VOA
2h2 hours ago

The blast was a a terrorist act against citizens, according to #Iraq interior ministry, which says there are casualties.


https://twitter.com/intelcrab?lang=en
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
massive Jordanian protests and government upheaval; protesters now chanting warnings to King
Started by Lilbitsnana‎, Today 02:29 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...aval-protesters-now-chanting-warnings-to-King

The Four Horsemen - 06/04 to 06/11
Started by Ragnarok‎, 06-04-2018 02:20 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?537301-The-Four-Horsemen-06-04-to-06-11

Main Israel/Hamas thread, Significant Gaza Escalation In Progress - 5/29/2018
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Gaza-Escalation-In-Progress-5-29-2018/page128

-----------------------------

Turkey Turns On Its Christians
Started by northern watch‎, Today 12:00 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?537402-Turkey-Turns-On-Its-Christians

Ongoing Military Conflict In Syria
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?534447-Ongoing-Military-Conflict-In-Syria/page75

TURKEY'S ERDOGAN INVADES NORTHERN SYRIA PART TWO 4-8-2018
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...NVADES-NORTHERN-SYRIA-PART-TWO-4-8-2018/page3

--------

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/us-turkey-reconciliation-pompeo.html

TURKEY PULSE

Ankara hypes US-Turkey deal on Manbij

READ IN: Türkçe
Amberin Zaman (Turkey Pulse) June 5, 2018

A long sought thaw in US-Turkish relations appears within reach following yesterday's talks in Washington between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Answering reporters’ questions in the Turkish city of Antalya today, an upbeat Cavusoglu elaborated on an agreement reached between the NATO allies on Manbij, a mainly Arab town in northern Syria. Manbij has been an abiding source of friction because of Kurdish influence over its administration. Cavusoglu termed the deal “an opportunity to put our damaged relations back on track.”

Cavusoglu said provisions of the plan would likely be fulfilled in less than six months but that the real test of the United States’ commitment to it rested in its implementation. The terms include a full withdrawal of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from the city and assurances they will be shorn of any weapons provided to them by the US-led coalition for the fight against the Islamic State (IS). Likewise, the civilian authorities are expected to be purged of pro-YPG elements, clearing the path for Turkish forces to monitor the area jointly with their US partners. Cavusoglu stressed the accord was “beyond a legal document" and "a road map that will affect relations between [our] two countries.”

The YPG appeared to be cooperating. In a statement, the group said its “military advisers” would leave Manbij, but that they would “heed the call when necessary to offer support and help to the people of Manbij should it be needed.”

Turkey’s state-run Anadolu News Agency, however, appeared to contest the YPG’s statement, reporting, “Local sources told Anadolu Agency on Tuesday that YPG/PKK terrorists were still hiding out both in the city center and in outlying districts.”

The decision to cooperate in Manbij follows months of aggressive lobbying by Turkey for the United States to axe its alliance with the YPG because of its close links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK has been waging a bloody campaign for self-rule inside Turkey since 1984 and is formally designated as a terrorist group by the State Department. Turkey’s demands escalated to threats to take military action against the YPG despite the presence of US special forces in the areas under its control.

Turkey’s military invasion of Afrin earlier this year proved the threat isn't more hollow rhetoric. Paired with Turkey’s growing cooperation with Russia, Afrin may well have helped tip the balance in favor of those administration officials, particularly in the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, who have long argued that partnership with the YPG ought not come at the expense of strategic ties with a critical regional ally. With the fight against IS gradually winding down and President Donald Trump opposed to a prolonged American presence in Syria, the YPG’s star appears to be fading despite the best efforts of its diehard fans within the US Central Command.

The YPG is the most reliable and effective force within the Syrian Democratic Forces, which groups Kurds and Arabs fighting IS together with the US-led coalition. Some administration officials continue to air skepticism about how or whether the Manbij agreement could work on the ground. The local population remains especially leery of any return of Turkey’s Free Syrian Army allies, who governed the town before IS took over. Residents interviewed by Al-Monitor in September said the period was marked by violence, looting and corruption.

Cavusoglu alluded to disagreements in the administration today, saying, “There were different statements coming from different departments and this disturbed us, [but Pompeo] was CIA director and he understands our sensitivities very well.”

Signs are that the SDF does, too. An SDF official in northern Syria contacted via WhatsApp told Al-Monitor, “We have already been making some changes to de-escalate tensions with Turkey.” These efforts include scaling down the presence of PKK “advisers” and removing banners and other symbols evoking the PKK and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan in Arab-dominated areas. “We wish to pursue our partnership with America,” he said. But he acknowledged that the ground was shifting. “The [American] commanders here tell us they want to continue with us but that it's the White House, not them, making all the decisions.”

Found in:PKK, YPG, MEVLUT CAVUSOGLU, MIKE POMPEO, TURKISH INFLUENCE IN SYRIA, US-TURKISH RELATIONS, MANBIJ

Amberin Zaman is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse who has covered Turkey, the Kurds and Armenia for The Washington Post, The Daily Telegraph, The Los Angeles Times and the Voice of America. She served as The Economist's Turkey correspondent between 1999 and 2016. She was a columnist for the liberal daily Taraf and the mainstream daily Haberturk before switching to the independent Turkish online news portal Diken in 2015. On Twitter: @amberinzaman
 
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Housecarl

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https://mwi.usma.edu/guerrilla-maneuver-warfare-look-talibans-growing-combat-capability/

FROM GUERRILLA TO MANEUVER WARFARE: A LOOK AT THE TALIBAN’S GROWING COMBAT CAPABILITY

Alec Worsnop | June 6, 2018

The growing territorial reach exercised by the Taliban poses a notable threat to the stability of the Afghan government. The insurgents’ persistence and adaptability points to an underappreciated trend. While guerrilla warfare has been consistently identified as a way for less powerful actors to counter much stronger fighting forces, treating the tactic as a “primitive’” weapon of the weak underestimates the complexity involved in fighting guerrilla wars, let alone transitioning into movement warfare. Guerrilla warfare requires reliable small units that can fire and maneuver to retain the tactical offensive against much stronger foes.

Beyond the role of social networks or material resources such as weapons, my research points to the importance of well-designed training programs in crafting such insurgent military power. While some have begun to probe the role of training in re-socializing insurgent fighters, training also plays a fundamental role in developing military skill. What is more, insurgents with explicit training regimens are positioned to adapt and transition to new methods of warfare. As discussed below, there is evidence that the Taliban is already beginning to take the steps necessary to re-orient the group’s forces for the type of movement warfare they employed in the 1990s to take Afghanistan in a military storm.

Militarily successful insurgents engage in complex operations. For example, ambushes require careful planning to identify vulnerable targets or chokepoints and then a well-staged division of labor that allows an attacking element to move forward and quickly withdraw, with the assistance of suppressing fire from other squads and sometimes the use of explosives as a diversionary tactic or as part of the assault. This demands dispersed small units that are well trained and prepared for the challenges—and instability—of combat. This need will come as no surprise to US military combat planners and trainers. As S.L.A. Marshall identified in Men Against Fire, the transition from close-order formations to dispersion of units and a reliance on fire and maneuver means that “the mechanisms of the new warfare . . . are ever at the mercy of training methods which will stimulate the solider to express his intelligence and spirit.” Despite the similar requirements for small-unit skill and dynamism among insurgents, reporting and analysis on these actors—which tends to treat all insurgent or terrorist groups as “like” entities—rarely recognizes variation in training regimens and preparation.

What does successful insurgent training entail? Building on the same basic principles of many Western militaries, my research, focusing on organizations in Iraq (2003–present) and Vietnam (1940–1975), finds that successful insurgent training is (1) consistent, (2) realistic, and (3) focused on generating capable small-unit leaders. Consistent training means that at least a core program is required for all new recruits. This provides soldiers with skills, such as weapons handling and camouflage, and builds physical and mental fitness that prepares them to endure intense physical and emotional stress. This ensures that soldiers have a shared vocabulary, set of operational concepts, and competencies, and understanding of the chain of command. While this training may be carried out in as little as weeks, often it is on the order of months.

Beyond consistency, successful training is realistic. Such training includes repetitive collective exercises across teams and units, making the tasks that fighters will be ordered to execute in the field second nature. It includes real-world conditions such as nighttime movements, movement under exhaustion, and adverse weather. This prepares soldiers to fall back on their training during periods of stress and confusion. As a Viet Cong cadre told US interrogators: “Hard field training saved blood in combat.”

Finally, successful training focuses on generating capable small-unit leaders who motivate soldiers during combat and in its aftermath. As US combat thinkers have emphasized, such leaders “master the fundamental skills they are developing in soldiers,” preparing them to plan and manage effective operations. This sustained role for leaders is important because much combat learning happens “on the job” as new recruits join seasoned units.

Such training supports so-called Combat Darwinism—well-trained units survive, gaining greater skill and experience that helps to sustain morale in the face of challenging conditions. Moreover, it is a core component of “force generation” whereby insurgents are able to make up for battlefield losses by turning new recruits into combat-capable fighters. Such force generation separates rebel groups that might have access to similar weaponry and resources. While many of the Sunni insurgents in post-2003 Iraq drew upon vast weapons caches left behind by the Iraqi army, only some translated these resources into successful action on the battlefield that could be sustained over time. I find evidence that the training regimes, and cadre they produced, played a major role in separating successful groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic Army in Iraq, and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia, from their Sunni competitors.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s military training been a central component of its increasingly robust military power. Drawing on its experience in the 1990s and the need for tactical adaptation after 2006, it has relied on military training to generate force and respond to battlefield developments. Multiple reports underscore the range of Taliban training camps and the importance they place upon them, with nearly all new recruits consistently funneled through training programs. At least sixteen camps have been mentioned in Taliban social media (though the full number is more likely in the dozens), with some supposedly having the capacity to train upwards of 2,000 fighters. These camps, along with mobile training teams, provide training to most new recruits and support the re-training of deployed units—interviews with Taliban fighters in Helmand indicate that such re-training may occur as often as every four months and last 15–20 days. This is a marked change from the post-2006 period when Afghan national security forces’ weaknesses required less of a focus on military proficiency.

This consistent training regimen is realistic. It covers small-arms proficiency, the use of mortars and other explosives, military grammar, and guerrilla tactics, including the employment of IEDs, small-arms fire, use of explosives in support of ambushes, and firing from moving vehicles. In other words, it focuses on honing the skills that are actually employed by the Taliban in combat.

Finally, there is a focus on training and deploying cadre who can lead units and maintain professionalism among fighting units that mix new recruits and veterans. As a Taliban cadre relayed to Antonio Giustozzi, he and his fellow cadre recognize that “training is very important. We spend most of our time training new Taliban. It wasn’t like this before, anyone could join without any proper training.” There is evidence that cadre have been successful in imparting the importance of military proficiency. In interviews with thirty-nine Taliban fighters in Helmand, Giustozzi and Theo Farrell found that two-thirds saw training as very important and only a “handful” did not see an important role for training.

The results have been stark. After action reports from Helmand in 2011 reported that Taliban units were conducting complex ambushes that demonstrated “fire control,” “fire discipline,” “interlocking fields of fire,” “combined arms,” “fire and maneuver,” “anti-armor tactics,” “cover and concealment,” and “defense in depth.” More recently, well-trained Taliban special operations “Red Units” have demonstrated even greater tactical capability, and are often being used in concert with regular troops as a force multiplier. Their capability is demonstrated by coordinated nighttime operations that threaten the extent to which United States and Afghan Special Forces “own the night.”

Beyond helping us to understand increasing Taliban capabilities, this tactical adaptation, implemented through training, underscores the potential for the Taliban to employ new forms of combat. What separated the Taliban from other mujahedeen in the 1990s was its ability to consistently conduct large-unit operations by moving quickly and combining arms with the use of “technicals”—essentially pickups with machine guns or heavy weapons bolted onto the back. This was supported by a required two months of small- and large-unit training, often led by Pakistani advisors. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan with the employment of “blitzkrieg” conventional tactics, with the use of technicals in place of armor. In these operations, the Taliban demonstrated military skill that notably outmatched their competitors. As an analyst noted at the time, it was an “avowedly military affair.”

Indeed, the Taliban today have massed in increasingly large formations, often as a part of combined arms attacks. As of 2010, this was already apparent to some US military observers. Noting the limited utility of artillery in countering some Taliban movements, Maj. Joseph Jackson observed that “insurgent tactics now include firing volleys of rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, and missiles from the back of trucks to allow insurgent groups to maneuver to disrupt coalition forces and seize key objectives such as remote outposts and towns.” As they gain greater territorial sanctuary and can harden large training camps, they will be able to transition to larger-unit training. The main check on such large-scale operations, as was the case in countering the Islamic State in Iraq, will continue to be US air power.

These lessons can be applied to counterinsurgency operations as well. When the United States and others attempt to strengthen proxy forces in locations such as Syria and Yemen, weapons and resources must always be matched by dedicated training. Iran’s careful support of organizations in Lebanon and Iraq highly values the role of intense, and realistic, military training, often provided to cadre in a train-the-trainers fashion. Thus, while insurgency is a mix of the political and kinetic, a focus on training regimens would more fully shape our understanding of the military capabilities of violent movements.


Alec Worsnop is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland–College Park and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute. His research into civil war, military organization and effectiveness, and civil-military relations has appeared in Security Studies and Political Science Research and Methods. Previously, he worked for a USAID implementing partner, developing and managing assistance programs for Afghanistan and the Middle East.
This is an unofficial expression of opinion; the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of West Point, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any agency of the US government.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/irans-hegemonic-quest

Iran’s Hegemonic Quest

JUNE 6, 2018 | THE CIPHER BRIEF

The Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization is putting the IAEA on notice that Tehran is likely to begin producing centrifuges that are used to enrich uranium.

According to the Fars news agency, Ali Akbar Salehi says the move does not violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Agreement, which allows Tehran to build the parts needed to enrich uranium, but Iran is not allowed to put centrifuges into operation.

The move highlights potential fallout from the announcement last month that the U.S. will withdraw from the JCPOA.

To understand what this means, it’s important to note Iran’s hegemonic quest and how this move could be moving Tehran closer to its broader regional goals.

Bottom Line: The Iranian regime has adopted an aggressive foreign policy doctrine, claiming to serve as the defender of the world’s Shiite Muslim minority sect while concurrently pursuing hegemonic status in the Middle East. Through its strategic use of proxy warfare, Tehran has extended its regional influence, with what has been characterized as a longer-term objective of carving out an Iranian-led Shia crescent across the Middle East.

Background: Iran’s contemporary foreign policy approach is shaped by a worldview introduced by the 1979 Islamic revolution.

  • Iran’s hardline Shia regime rode a tidal wave of popular support into power during the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Mass demonstrations in February 1979 led to the fall of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Iran leader known as the Shah, and the return of exiled cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who claimed the title of Supreme Leader in December 1979 and served in that capacity until his death in June 1989.
  • Ayatollah Ali Khamenei succeeded Khomeini as Iran’s Supreme Leader in June 1989 and has since served as the country’s most powerful figure.
  • Other key figures in the Iranian regime include President Hassan Rouhani, who was reelected to a second four-year term in May after campaigning on the success of the Iran nuclear agreement. In addition, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif helped negotiate the Iran nuclear deal and Maj. Gen. Qasem Soulemani is the head of the elite Quds Force, which operates as the external wing of Iran’s ideologically driven, preeminent paramilitary force known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or the “guardians” of the revolution.

Issue: Through its strong support of proxy groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the Iranian government has asserted itself in the domestic affairs of several Middle Eastern countries, destabilizing central governments across the region.

  • “The Islamic Republic of Iran remains an enduring threat to U.S. national interests because of Iranian support to anti-US terrorist groups and militants, the Assad regime, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and because of Iran’s development of advanced military capabilities.” – 2018 World Wide Threat Assessment
  • Lebanon: Iran’s most notorious proxy group, Hezbollah, meaning “Party of God,” is based in southern Lebanon and was designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in October 1997. The movement has received significant funds and weapons from Tehran, which are often transferred through Syrian territory.
  • Syria: Throughout the Syrian civil war, Iran and Hezbollah have stood behind Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his forces, sending in military units to help combat rebel offensives. Tehran has also used Syria as a strategic passage route to ship weapons and cash to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
  • Iraq: Iranian-aligned Shia militias comprised of more than 60,000 troops, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), played an important role in ousting the Islamic State (ISIS) from Iraq. The PMF were formed in June 2014 when several pro-Iranian militia groups – including the Badr Organization, the Hezbollah Brigades, the Martyrs of Sayyid Brigades, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Jund al-Imam – joined together to form a unified front to battle ISIS. Although the Iraqi government now provides funding and has nominal control of the PMF, the militias maintain close ties to top Iranian commanders – most notoriously, the IRGC’s Qasem Souleimani.
  • Yemen: Iran has been accused of supplying weapons and finances to Houthi rebels who launched a bloody insurgency in August 2014 against Yemen’s internationally recognized government. In December 2018, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley displayed an array of singed missile remnants and other parts that she said constituted “concrete” evidence that Iran had illegally supplied weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen in direct violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231.
  • Iran’s naval activity also presents a threat to U.S. geostrategic interests in the region by seeking to inhibit U.S. freedom of navigation and engaging in potentially escalatory encounters with U.S naval vessels in critical waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway for some 30 percent of the world’s oil supply. The actors primarily responsible are the IRGC’s Navy, and to a lesser extent, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, both of which seek to modernize through the development of armed drones, ballistic missiles, advanced naval mines, unmanned explosive boats, submarines, torpedoes and anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.

Norm Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI

“The Iranians have enhanced their strategic posture throughout the Middle East by developing a Shia militancy numbering in the tens of thousands and capable of fighting with Iran’s support in different countries and against different adversaries at the same time. Within a space of only a handful of years, Iran has gone from a regional pariah to claiming that it should have a role in the destinies of four Arab capitals. Iran also remains a state sponsor of terrorism, detains a growing number of Americans on ludicrous charges, openly claims to target its unreasonably large missile force against American bases in the region, sponsors most of the terrorist groups in the region and supports a war criminal in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad who uses chemical weapons against his own people. Recently, the world has watched as Iran openly oppressed its own people.”

James Jeffrey, Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey

“It’s Iran’s firm intention to lock Iraq into its growing regional empire as a second Lebanon by using the same Hezbollah-like tactics and relying on local surrogates more loyal to Iran than Baghdad to undermine an independent Iraqi State. If this occurs, the impact on the United States’ position in the region would be devastating. In essence, it could put the lie to Trump’s ‘anti-Iran’ policy by turning a country with two-thirds of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves and the second largest oil production in the region – as well as a population larger than that of Saudi Arabia’s – over to “the enemy” after the U.S. intervened repeatedly to save it from Saddam Hussein, pro-Iranian militias, al Qaeda and of course ISIS.”

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Guy C. Swan III, Former Chief of Staff and Director of Operations, Multi-National Force Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom

“Iran will always have an influential role in Iraq. However, the level of influence and what form it takes going forward will be the issue. The U.S. and other coalition partners will have to balance that influence to enable Iraq to sustain a level of independence as it looks to the post-ISIS period. The Iraqi government reluctantly accommodated the Iranians, especially the Shia-dominated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), in order to defeat ISIS. The continued presence of these forces must be dealt with either through integration into Iraqi government forces or by disbanding.”

Admiral (ret.) Jonathan Greenert, Former Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy

“The greatest threats Iran’s navy poses are perhaps: long- and medium-range ballistic missiles, mining the Strait of Hormuz or attacking Saudi Arabia’s oil fields in the Arabian Gulf to the east.”


The Cipher Brief’s Bennett Seftel and Suzanne Kelly contributed to this report. Read more on Iran’s Hegemonic Quest and how the Trump Administration is poised to address it in The Cipher Brief’s 2018 Threat Report.

HEZBOLLAH IRAN IRAQ JAMES JEFFREY JCPOA LEBANON NORM ROULE NUCLEAR SYRIA

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