ALERT RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Bogey

Bogey

“Where liberty dwells, there is my country.”
danielboon said:
82nd airborne to deploy to Europe in 72 hours https://mobile.twitter.com/EndGameWW3
Click to expand...

To add a little meat to the potatoes ...

Biden administration identifying troops for possible deployment to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions :: WRAL.com

Sources: Fort Bragg troops deploying to Europe in next 72 hours amid Russia-Ukraine tensions
By Barbara Starr and Jeremy Herb, CNN & Gilbert Baez, WRAL Fayetteville reporter

CNN — Up to 8,500 US troops have been put on heightened alert for a possible deployment to Eastern Europe as Russian troops mass on Ukraine's border, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Monday.

But, sources have told WRAL News' Fayetteville reporter, Gilbert Baez, that Fort Bragg troops will be going to Europe. The public affairs officers for Fort Bragg's 18th Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division said the White House will have to confirm any deployments.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin issued the prepare to deploy orders at the direction of President Joe Biden. Kirby said no final decision to deploy the troops had been made.

Earlier on Monday CNN reported the Biden administration was in in the final stages of identifying specific military units it wants to send to Eastern Europe, according to multiple US and defense officials.

Biden discussed options for bolstering US troop levels in the Baltics and Eastern Europe with his top military officials during a briefing at Camp David on Saturday, according to a senior official ...



There is more at the link but mostly a rehash of what is already out there.
 
Bogey

Bogey

“Where liberty dwells, there is my country.”
Laurane said:
Peter Schweizer's book "Red Handed" has all the dirt on Bidens, Bushs, and Trudeau......Amazon.com
Click to expand...

Yeah, very telling, but perceived by the non-thinking as just another hit job meant to damage anyone anti-Trump for one. Secondly, as good of a job Peter S. did, I doubt he got the entire scoop.
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) is requesting the Biden administration brief senators amid escalating tensions with Russia over its military buildup along the Ukrainian border.
A source familiar with the matter confirmed that Schumer had asked for an all-Senate briefing with the administration for next week, when senators — who are currently dispersed across the country — will return from their current one-week break.

Schumer's request for administration officials to meet with the Senate comes after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) sent a separate request earlier Monday for a briefing for all House members.
The requests from Democratic leadership come as the Biden administration is rushing to put pressure on Moscow amid growing concerns over a possible Russian military incursion in Ukraine. Russia previously invaded and annexed Ukraine's Crimean region in 2014, which sparked international sanctions.
The State Department on Sunday night announced that it had ordered the evacuation of family members of U.S. government employees in Ukraine and the Pentagon said on Monday that it is readying up to 8,500 troops to potentially deploy to Eastern Europe.

White House press secretary Jen Psaki indicated earlier Monday that the administration would comply with briefing requests from Congress.
“We have been in close consultation with members in leadership from the beginning,” Psaki told reporters when asked about the request from Pelosi. “I am sure we are working to meet the request and needs of members.”
Top lawmakers have also been speaking with administration officials as the Biden administration has prepared potential next steps.

Senate GOP Leader Mitch McConnell (Ky.) told CNN on Monday that he had spoken with White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan about acting before a potential Russia incursion and that he was "encouraged" that Biden "is considering doing things immediately."
"I'm encouraged by what seems to be leaking out of the President's weekend meetings about what he may be on the verge of doing and we’ve encouraged him to go ahead and do it,” McConnell said.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) is also negotiating with Republicans as they try to get a deal on sanctions legislation. Menendez led Democrats in introducing a bill earlier this month that will slap sanctions on Russia if it invades Ukraine, but some Republicans want to impose some sanctions before that takes place, believing that it could help better deter Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“We are working as we speak with various Republican colleagues who have their own ideas as to how to deter Putin,” Menendez said during an MSNBC interview late last week, adding that the endgame is to “speak with one voice and send a very clear message that we stand with Ukraine.”
Schumer requests Senate briefing on Ukraine amid Russia tensions
Tags Mitch McConnell Charles Schumer Robert Menendez Vladimir Putin Jake Sullivan Nancy Pelosi Jen Psaki Bob Menendez
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
Pentagon Puts 8,500 Troops On ‘Heightened Alert’ Over Russian Threat To Ukraine
By Tara Copp Senior Pentagon Reporter, Defense One


Airman 1st Class Olabode Igandan palletizes ammunition, weapons, and other equipment bound for Ukraine at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, Jan. 21, 2022.

Airman 1st Class Olabode Igandan palletizes ammunition, weapons, and other equipment bound for Ukraine at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, Jan. 21, 2022.

U.S. Air Force / Mauricio Campino
January 24, 2022 03:48 PM ET
Updated: 7:23 p.m. ET

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered about 8,500 U.S.-based troops on heightened alert Monday to be ready to deploy to Europe and support NATO if Russia invades Ukraine.
Some of those units—which include logistics, medical, transportation, and intelligence and surveillance support elements—could join a multinational NATO response force of about 40,000 troops. Other U.S. forces already in Europe could be sent to NATO’s eastern flank: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.

“At the direction of the President and following recommendations made by Secretary Austin, the United States has taken steps to heighten the readiness of its forces at home and abroad. So they are prepared to respond to a range of contingencies, including support to the NATO Response Force if it is activated,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said Monday.”
The call-up occurs one day after the State Department ordered all family members of U.S. diplomatic staff to leave Ukraine, citing increased indications that Russia may invade. The U.S. is sending pallets of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine to help those forces defend themselves.

Russia has amassed more than 100,000 troops along the Ukrainian border and has been conducting large military exercises in Belarus.
“It’s very clear that the Russians have no intention right now of de-escalating,” Kirby said.
He said no decision has been made to deploy the forces that are now on alert, nor where in Europe they might go.
“This is about placing units on a heightened alert,” Kirby said. “It does not mean they are going to be jumping on gray tails and leaving” right away, he said, referring to the Air Force’s airlift capabilities of forces and equipment.

The call-up builds on other Western responses to the Russian moves. Last week, the Pentagon announced that the Truman carrier strike group would be conducting large-scale naval exercises in the Mediterranean. On Monday, NATO officials said the strike group was operating under alliance command, a post-Cold War first. The United Kingdom has flown anti-tank weapons into Ukraine as well.

The U.S. already has some forces in Ukraine. For example, elements of the Florida National Guard are currently deployed there as part of a regular rotational force that trains and equips Ukrainian forces.
No Marines are among the 8,500 U.S.-based troops on heightened alert, a senior Marine Corps official said Monday.
If additional U.S. forces are needed to support NATO missions, the official said, about 5,000 Marines who will be participating in Norway’s upcoming Cold Response 22 exercise could be called upon.

“What we've told the joint force is, if it would be useful, we could deploy that force faster if needed. And we've offered that formation to be included in any force offerings that the joint force feels NATO needs to be positioned better vis-a-vis the current situation in the Ukraine,” he said.

Marines have been in Norway for about five years as part of rotational deployments to participate in exercises. American equipment is stored in Norway, allowing the U.S. to quickly deploy a large number of forces who can then retrieve the equipment and be operational, the official said.
Caitlin Kenney contributed to this report.

www.defenseone.com

Pentagon Puts 8,500 Troops On ‘Heightened Alert’ Over Russian Threat To Ukraine

The force would not seek to stop an invasion, but to protect NATO’s Eastern flank.
www.defenseone.com www.defenseone.com
 
jed turtle

jed turtle

a brother in the Lord
Warm Wisconsin

Warm Wisconsin

Easy as 3.141592653589..
Long but a great read. More at link


warontherocks.com

Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West - War on the Rocks

A large war in Europe is likely in the coming weeks. The current security architecture of the continent, the future of NATO, and America’s role in shaping
warontherocks.com


PUTIN’S WAGER IN RUSSIA’S STANDOFF WITH THE WEST
MICHAEL KOFMAN
JANUARY 24, 2022
COMMENTARY


A large war in Europe is likely in the coming weeks. The current security architecture of the continent, the future of NATO, and America’s role in shaping security outcomes there are all at stake. Beyond Europe, this conflict would have profound implications for U.S. defense strategy, and may upset America’s best-laid plans to focus on the eroding military balance with China. Ukraine, whose fate hangs in the balance, may be at the center of the crisis, but Moscow has a greater goal in mind: the revision of Europe’s security order. The Russian armed forces have conducted a substantial builduparound Ukraine, with Moscow threatening unilateral military measures if it is not able to achieve its goals at the negotiating table. President Vladimir Putin has been coy, but the threat is use of force on a large scale against Ukraine, including the possibility of regime change.

Even if force does not get Moscow any closer to the wide-reaching concessions that it seeks from the West, Russia’s leadership likely judges that it will secure its influence in the country, deny Ukraine any hope of getting into NATO, and end NATO’s defense cooperation with Ukraine.

The unfolding events of the past year and the crescendo of the current crisis have been widely interpreted as a classic case of coercive diplomacy: threats, signals, and demands backed by a show of capability and resolve. However, it is more likely that Moscow was leaning towards a military solution. Russia’s diplomatic overture offered few prospects for success at the negotiating table. There is an eerie calm as Russian forces continue to position equipment and units around Ukraine. At this stage, Russia’s military retains operational surprise and could launch an assault on short notice. There will not be further strategic warning ahead of an offensive.

BECOME A MEMBER

Prediction is always a fraught business, but it seems plausible that Russian forces would seize Ukraine’s eastern regions, as well as the southern port city of Odessa, and encircle Kyiv. The Russian goal would be regime change, perhaps via constitutional reform, and a settlement that would secure Russian influence over Ukraine. From a position of leverage, Russia would try to attain a U.S. commitment to give it a free hand in this part of eastern Europe. With Belarus firmly in Russia’s orbit, Moscow is eyeing using force to change Ukraine’s strategic orientation in an effort to create its own cordon against Western influence. An expanded invasion of Ukraine may not herald a prolonged occupation, but Russia appears prepared for that contingency. Russian force posture can enable a range of choices, but it is difficult to see how Moscow accomplishes any lasting political gains without having to resort to maximalist options.

How to Interpret Russian Demands
This crisis is not about NATO or Ukraine, but about NATO and Ukraine. Russia wants Washington to agree to a revised European order in which Russia has a veto over security arrangements and in decisions over security outcomes. By closing NATO’s open door, and halting defense cooperation with non-members, Washington would be acknowledging that Moscow’s security considerations supersede the right of its neighbors to choose their strategic orientation, and that security in Europe must be negotiated with Moscow.

Yet Russian demands for legally binding guarantees raise questions. On the one hand, Putin has railed against successive rounds of NATO expansion, encroaching military infrastructure, military exercises, and defense cooperation with countries like Ukraine. But he has also said that he does not believe in U.S. security assurances, and according to him Washington easily withdraws from treaties with or without explanation. So, why pursue such agreements with urgency when he believes that Washington may just bin them one day anyway?
There is also the nagging problem that no U.S. Congress, or any legislature in Europe, is likely to ratify a legally binding agreement with Russia based on such demands. Perhaps Moscow still assesses that the United States and its European allies might sign politically binding agreements that fall short of a treaty. While not legally binding, such agreements would hold strategic implications for European countries that are not NATO members. Those states would find their room for maneuver shrinking and would seek to hedge or to pursue a foreign policy that includes balancing relations between Europe and Russia.

Russia’s demands for a halt to NATO expansion, a rollback of defense cooperation with non-NATO members, and a return to force posture prior to 1997 (essentially a “go back to Germany” clause) seem to have little relationship to the deadlock over Minsk II implementation. These demands won’t secure a say over Ukraine’s domestic policy, or even get Russia out of the current sanctions regime. Furthermore, why didn’t Moscow make any of these demands during the spring buildup? The timing was no less auspicious. Why wait until the end of 2021 to come up with rushed proposals and demand rapid progress?

The diplomatic effort appears improvised, while the central demands were obvious non-starters for the West. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often the last to know what is happening, was unsurprisingly surprised to find out it that was supposed to be coming up with these draft treaties in late December. Moscow has not only been asking for things that it knows it cannot attain, but it has been doing so in a manner that will ensure that it cannot attain them. Serious negotiations are usually done behind closed doors. By publicizing its demands and refusing to unbundle them in ways that might achieve compromise, Russia has made its diplomatic effort appear more performative than genuine.

Perhaps Moscow is just fishing for what it can get, but the political demands do not align with the military side of the equation. Settling for minor modifications to the already existing strategic stability agenda would appear to be a political retreat after releasing such ostentatious demands. Persistent references to internal time constraints, demanding “answers urgently,” suggest that Putin has been leaning towards using force all along. At Geneva, it became clear that Moscow views U.S. counteroffers for an expanded strategic stability agenda with much lower significance than its irreconcilable demands.

A dramatic expansion of the war is now the most probable outcome. In the spring the Russian leadership issued red lines, but if they really were interested in deterring an expansion of U.S. defense cooperation then such a demand would have been made at the June presidential summit, and they would have given the effort a bit longer than a few months to produce results.

Putin may see diplomacy as a last-ditch effort to avert war, but Russia’s posture suggests that he is leaning towards a unilateral solution. While some commentators may view this as a bluff, it hard to see how Putin imagined bluffing his way to a wholesale revision of Europe’s security architecture
.
Why Now?
There are two overlapping issues: The first is Ukraine, where Russia desires to have a firm say over its foreign policy as well as aspects of its internal governance. The second is to block further NATO expansion and to roll back Ukrainian defense cooperation with NATO members. Moscow perceives its strategy in Ukraine as having generally failed, with diplomacy over the Minsk ceasefire agreement at a deadlock, while Ukraine is increasingly treated as a de facto NATO member. In statements, essays, and articles, Russian leaders have made clear over the course of 2021 that they believe that Ukraine and its territory are being used as an instrument against Russia by the United States, and if they cannot compel a policy reversal, they will seek military solutions. As Putin said in December, “if our Western colleagues continue their obviously aggressive line, we will take appropriate military-technical reciprocal measures and will have a tough response to their unfriendly steps.” What is remarkable about this crisis is how well it has been signposted over the course of 2021, with Russian political statements and military activity in close alignment.

Although the crisis has structural roots in the post-Cold War settlement, the proximate cause of this standoff is a series of political turns in 2020 and early 2021. After initially being open to dialogue, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration took a hard turn away from pursuing compromises with Moscow. Zelensky arrested Putin’s ally Viktor Medvedchuk and banned three pro-Russian television channels in the country. Putin has also railed against a discriminatory language law passed in 2019, which has just entered into force. Not only has Ukraine continued on a westward trajectory, but Zelensky has also chosen to take a hard line, and has begun to actively eliminate Russian influence in Ukraine. This turnabout dashed any hopes that Russia had of achieving a desirable political settlement and removed a path for Russia to get out from under Western sanctions. Russian officials have publicly made clear that they see no further point to negotiating with Zelensky, viewing his administration as a marionette of the United States, and have instead approached his patron — Washington.

European capitals and Washington have backed Ukraine’s position. Moscow is thus faced with a choice between accepting that Ukraine is slipping away, or escalation. Moscow judges that it has to act in order to prevent a fixed reorientation of the country and the destruction of the key pillars of its influence. Among Putin’s grievances is the belief that Ukraine will become a platform for U.S. power projection along Russia’s southwestern flank and he cannot tolerate this prospect (recalling Moscow’s fears that led it to invade Afghanistan). Last fall he remarked “what if tomorrow there are missiles near Kharkov — what should we do then? We do not go there with our missiles — but missiles are being brought to our doorstep. Of course, we have a problem here.” Whether genuine, or instrumental, Russia’s leadership have often used this threat to link Ukraine to broader grievances on European security.

Washington’s effort to launch a strategic stability dialogue has also played a role. The Biden administration sought predictability in the relationship, perhaps so it could focus on China and pressing domestic concerns. The administration was right to launch this initiative and see if Moscow was willing to engage, but as Oscar Wilde quipped, “There are only two tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.” Moscow has now made clear what the price of predictability in relations is, and it is clearly one that the United States is unwilling to pay. Given that Washington has signaled that it sees Europe as a secondary theater, the price Russia would ask was inevitably going to be high.

Russia’s elite may believe that they are in a good position to conduct a military operation and weather the storm of Western economic punishment. Having stabilized the Russian economy, established a war chest of reserves (over $620 billion), and tightened the screws on its opposition, the regime is more confident economically and politically. Moscow has greater leverage over Europe due to surging gas prices and energy supply shortages. Putin might also judge that the Biden administration is reticent about enacting the most severe financial sanctions in its arsenal because these would cause ripples in the global financial system, a rise in U.S. gasoline prices, not to mention the impact on energy prices in Europe.

It also merits considering that Russian assumptions may be colored by war optimism. Moscow might believe that much of the Ukrainian public quietly holds pro-Russian attitudes and Russian forces might be greeted as liberators. Russian elites see Ukraine as a manipulable oligarchy with corrupt elites. Such assumptions and narratives run deep in Putin’s statements and writings. The Russian elite is deeply chauvinistic and has little regard for Ukrainian military capabilities. Moscow may judge the use of force to be preferable relative to the mounting costs of inaction, and the potential risks of having to use force later. Leaders talk themselves into war, imagining that the situation is imposed upon them and rationalizing that a conflict is inevitable so it is better to fight now than later. Russia would not be the first country to invade another, misjudging the socio-political dynamics, and the costs of occupation.

Can Putin Back Down?
The United States and its allies have made clear that while they are willing to discuss an expanded strategic stability agenda, they will not shut NATO’s open door, constrain military cooperation with non-member states, remove military forces and infrastructure from the territory of NATO members who have joined since 1997, or compel Ukraine to accept a form of neutrality. While a discussion on future missile placement, mutual reductions in military activity, and other measures might count as a diplomatic success for Moscow, it is unlikely that this is enough to satisfy Putin. If it were, why has he not pocketed the deal already?

After the meeting in Geneva, the United States was unable to determine if the Russian diplomatic effort was genuine or cover for a planned military operation. The head of Russia’s delegation, Sergey Ryabkov, didn’t appear to know either.
It is doubtful that the Russian leadership can back down without external and internal audience costs. Over the past month, the West has also been arming Ukraine in anticipation of a Russian attack, hardly a policy success for Moscow. If Putin backs down with nothing, the domestic and international perception will be that he was either bluffing or, even worse, was successfully deterred. Putin will end up with the worst of both worlds, seen as simultaneously aggressive and resistible. Also, while an authoritarian state may care less about domestic audience perceptions, the elites, or the so-called “selectorate,” are another matter. Authoritarian leaders like Putincan find their ability to manage political coalitions diminished if elites perceive them as reckless, incompetent, and increasingly unfit to rule. Putin certainly has options, but this is not a contest in which he can afford to back down cost-free.

A More Dangerous Mobilization
While the military deployment may appear overly visible, lacking in initiative or surprise, in fact the opposite is true. Russia is indeed assembling this force in a manner designed to conceal its operational aims. To some extent it retains surprise and initiative. The Russian military is deploying a large force slowly, and deliberately, with equipment that can be parked in the field for months. Troops can be quickly sent to these encampments, fall in on equipment, and begin dispersing. This conceals the final disposition of forces, and the timing and scope of an operation. With large numbers of Russian forces having arrived in Belarus, and more on the way, a large-scale military operation in the coming weeks seems probable.


What are Russia’s Options?
A Russian military campaign could range from standoff strikes to a largescale invasion of Ukraine’s eastern regions, the encirclement of Kyiv, and the taking of Odessa along the coast. The question is not what Russia can do militarily in Ukraine, since the answer is almost anything, but what kind of operation might attain lasting political gains. Consequently, most scenarios seem illogical and politically counterproductive.
 
Chance

Chance

Veteran Member
Remember when Hillary was running for president? (She was just a continuation of Obama's reign) The constant talk was she'll start a war with Russia. Wondered what the heck her beef with Russia was. Now it looks like she, Obama are going to get their war....

And what if Russia's troop deployment is just to contain NATO...not invade Ukraine...while Russia and China et Al real target is America.....hmmmm.
 
Hognutz

Hognutz

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Squid said:
This faux war is supposed to rally morons in fly-over country to support Biden and the democrats.

The democrats and the media really don’t understand us so it won’t work and they will hate us for not being idiots that respond like Pavlov’s dog.
Click to expand...
I don’t know, I already see some at TB2000 ready to pull a Lee Greenwood…
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
I posted this this afternoon in it's entirity up thread, and was just coming to make this note about it:
Lawrence Freedman
@LawDavF

This is the most sophisticated and informed analysis you’ll see of why we should be worried about a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. It might be right yet the political objectives still appear murky and elusive.

Replying to
@LawDavF
Excellent analysis, I disagree only with the author‘s argument that there is no relationship between Minsk II implementation and non-NATO membership (of Ukraine)…empowered special status regions would have a de facto „droit de regard“ in Ukrainian foreign policy making


Warm Wisconsin said:
Long but a great read. More at link


warontherocks.com

Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West - War on the Rocks

A large war in Europe is likely in the coming weeks. The current security architecture of the continent, the future of NATO, and America’s role in shaping
warontherocks.com


PUTIN’S WAGER IN RUSSIA’S STANDOFF WITH THE WEST
MICHAEL KOFMAN
JANUARY 24, 2022
COMMENTARY


A large war in Europe is likely in the coming weeks. The current security architecture of the continent, the future of NATO, and America’s role in shaping security outcomes there are all at stake. Beyond Europe, this conflict would have profound implications for U.S. defense strategy, and may upset America’s best-laid plans to focus on the eroding military balance with China. Ukraine, whose fate hangs in the balance, may be at the center of the crisis, but Moscow has a greater goal in mind: the revision of Europe’s security order. The Russian armed forces have conducted a substantial builduparound Ukraine, with Moscow threatening unilateral military measures if it is not able to achieve its goals at the negotiating table. President Vladimir Putin has been coy, but the threat is use of force on a large scale against Ukraine, including the possibility of regime change.

Even if force does not get Moscow any closer to the wide-reaching concessions that it seeks from the West, Russia’s leadership likely judges that it will secure its influence in the country, deny Ukraine any hope of getting into NATO, and end NATO’s defense cooperation with Ukraine.

The unfolding events of the past year and the crescendo of the current crisis have been widely interpreted as a classic case of coercive diplomacy: threats, signals, and demands backed by a show of capability and resolve. However, it is more likely that Moscow was leaning towards a military solution. Russia’s diplomatic overture offered few prospects for success at the negotiating table. There is an eerie calm as Russian forces continue to position equipment and units around Ukraine. At this stage, Russia’s military retains operational surprise and could launch an assault on short notice. There will not be further strategic warning ahead of an offensive.

BECOME A MEMBER

Prediction is always a fraught business, but it seems plausible that Russian forces would seize Ukraine’s eastern regions, as well as the southern port city of Odessa, and encircle Kyiv. The Russian goal would be regime change, perhaps via constitutional reform, and a settlement that would secure Russian influence over Ukraine. From a position of leverage, Russia would try to attain a U.S. commitment to give it a free hand in this part of eastern Europe. With Belarus firmly in Russia’s orbit, Moscow is eyeing using force to change Ukraine’s strategic orientation in an effort to create its own cordon against Western influence. An expanded invasion of Ukraine may not herald a prolonged occupation, but Russia appears prepared for that contingency. Russian force posture can enable a range of choices, but it is difficult to see how Moscow accomplishes any lasting political gains without having to resort to maximalist options.

How to Interpret Russian Demands
This crisis is not about NATO or Ukraine, but about NATO and Ukraine. Russia wants Washington to agree to a revised European order in which Russia has a veto over security arrangements and in decisions over security outcomes. By closing NATO’s open door, and halting defense cooperation with non-members, Washington would be acknowledging that Moscow’s security considerations supersede the right of its neighbors to choose their strategic orientation, and that security in Europe must be negotiated with Moscow.

Yet Russian demands for legally binding guarantees raise questions. On the one hand, Putin has railed against successive rounds of NATO expansion, encroaching military infrastructure, military exercises, and defense cooperation with countries like Ukraine. But he has also said that he does not believe in U.S. security assurances, and according to him Washington easily withdraws from treaties with or without explanation. So, why pursue such agreements with urgency when he believes that Washington may just bin them one day anyway?
There is also the nagging problem that no U.S. Congress, or any legislature in Europe, is likely to ratify a legally binding agreement with Russia based on such demands. Perhaps Moscow still assesses that the United States and its European allies might sign politically binding agreements that fall short of a treaty. While not legally binding, such agreements would hold strategic implications for European countries that are not NATO members. Those states would find their room for maneuver shrinking and would seek to hedge or to pursue a foreign policy that includes balancing relations between Europe and Russia.

Russia’s demands for a halt to NATO expansion, a rollback of defense cooperation with non-NATO members, and a return to force posture prior to 1997 (essentially a “go back to Germany” clause) seem to have little relationship to the deadlock over Minsk II implementation. These demands won’t secure a say over Ukraine’s domestic policy, or even get Russia out of the current sanctions regime. Furthermore, why didn’t Moscow make any of these demands during the spring buildup? The timing was no less auspicious. Why wait until the end of 2021 to come up with rushed proposals and demand rapid progress?

The diplomatic effort appears improvised, while the central demands were obvious non-starters for the West. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often the last to know what is happening, was unsurprisingly surprised to find out it that was supposed to be coming up with these draft treaties in late December. Moscow has not only been asking for things that it knows it cannot attain, but it has been doing so in a manner that will ensure that it cannot attain them. Serious negotiations are usually done behind closed doors. By publicizing its demands and refusing to unbundle them in ways that might achieve compromise, Russia has made its diplomatic effort appear more performative than genuine.

Perhaps Moscow is just fishing for what it can get, but the political demands do not align with the military side of the equation. Settling for minor modifications to the already existing strategic stability agenda would appear to be a political retreat after releasing such ostentatious demands. Persistent references to internal time constraints, demanding “answers urgently,” suggest that Putin has been leaning towards using force all along. At Geneva, it became clear that Moscow views U.S. counteroffers for an expanded strategic stability agenda with much lower significance than its irreconcilable demands.

A dramatic expansion of the war is now the most probable outcome. In the spring the Russian leadership issued red lines, but if they really were interested in deterring an expansion of U.S. defense cooperation then such a demand would have been made at the June presidential summit, and they would have given the effort a bit longer than a few months to produce results.

Putin may see diplomacy as a last-ditch effort to avert war, but Russia’s posture suggests that he is leaning towards a unilateral solution. While some commentators may view this as a bluff, it hard to see how Putin imagined bluffing his way to a wholesale revision of Europe’s security architecture
.
Why Now?
There are two overlapping issues: The first is Ukraine, where Russia desires to have a firm say over its foreign policy as well as aspects of its internal governance. The second is to block further NATO expansion and to roll back Ukrainian defense cooperation with NATO members. Moscow perceives its strategy in Ukraine as having generally failed, with diplomacy over the Minsk ceasefire agreement at a deadlock, while Ukraine is increasingly treated as a de facto NATO member. In statements, essays, and articles, Russian leaders have made clear over the course of 2021 that they believe that Ukraine and its territory are being used as an instrument against Russia by the United States, and if they cannot compel a policy reversal, they will seek military solutions. As Putin said in December, “if our Western colleagues continue their obviously aggressive line, we will take appropriate military-technical reciprocal measures and will have a tough response to their unfriendly steps.” What is remarkable about this crisis is how well it has been signposted over the course of 2021, with Russian political statements and military activity in close alignment.

Although the crisis has structural roots in the post-Cold War settlement, the proximate cause of this standoff is a series of political turns in 2020 and early 2021. After initially being open to dialogue, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration took a hard turn away from pursuing compromises with Moscow. Zelensky arrested Putin’s ally Viktor Medvedchuk and banned three pro-Russian television channels in the country. Putin has also railed against a discriminatory language law passed in 2019, which has just entered into force. Not only has Ukraine continued on a westward trajectory, but Zelensky has also chosen to take a hard line, and has begun to actively eliminate Russian influence in Ukraine. This turnabout dashed any hopes that Russia had of achieving a desirable political settlement and removed a path for Russia to get out from under Western sanctions. Russian officials have publicly made clear that they see no further point to negotiating with Zelensky, viewing his administration as a marionette of the United States, and have instead approached his patron — Washington.

European capitals and Washington have backed Ukraine’s position. Moscow is thus faced with a choice between accepting that Ukraine is slipping away, or escalation. Moscow judges that it has to act in order to prevent a fixed reorientation of the country and the destruction of the key pillars of its influence. Among Putin’s grievances is the belief that Ukraine will become a platform for U.S. power projection along Russia’s southwestern flank and he cannot tolerate this prospect (recalling Moscow’s fears that led it to invade Afghanistan). Last fall he remarked “what if tomorrow there are missiles near Kharkov — what should we do then? We do not go there with our missiles — but missiles are being brought to our doorstep. Of course, we have a problem here.” Whether genuine, or instrumental, Russia’s leadership have often used this threat to link Ukraine to broader grievances on European security.

Washington’s effort to launch a strategic stability dialogue has also played a role. The Biden administration sought predictability in the relationship, perhaps so it could focus on China and pressing domestic concerns. The administration was right to launch this initiative and see if Moscow was willing to engage, but as Oscar Wilde quipped, “There are only two tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.” Moscow has now made clear what the price of predictability in relations is, and it is clearly one that the United States is unwilling to pay. Given that Washington has signaled that it sees Europe as a secondary theater, the price Russia would ask was inevitably going to be high.

Russia’s elite may believe that they are in a good position to conduct a military operation and weather the storm of Western economic punishment. Having stabilized the Russian economy, established a war chest of reserves (over $620 billion), and tightened the screws on its opposition, the regime is more confident economically and politically. Moscow has greater leverage over Europe due to surging gas prices and energy supply shortages. Putin might also judge that the Biden administration is reticent about enacting the most severe financial sanctions in its arsenal because these would cause ripples in the global financial system, a rise in U.S. gasoline prices, not to mention the impact on energy prices in Europe.

It also merits considering that Russian assumptions may be colored by war optimism. Moscow might believe that much of the Ukrainian public quietly holds pro-Russian attitudes and Russian forces might be greeted as liberators. Russian elites see Ukraine as a manipulable oligarchy with corrupt elites. Such assumptions and narratives run deep in Putin’s statements and writings. The Russian elite is deeply chauvinistic and has little regard for Ukrainian military capabilities. Moscow may judge the use of force to be preferable relative to the mounting costs of inaction, and the potential risks of having to use force later. Leaders talk themselves into war, imagining that the situation is imposed upon them and rationalizing that a conflict is inevitable so it is better to fight now than later. Russia would not be the first country to invade another, misjudging the socio-political dynamics, and the costs of occupation.

Can Putin Back Down?
The United States and its allies have made clear that while they are willing to discuss an expanded strategic stability agenda, they will not shut NATO’s open door, constrain military cooperation with non-member states, remove military forces and infrastructure from the territory of NATO members who have joined since 1997, or compel Ukraine to accept a form of neutrality. While a discussion on future missile placement, mutual reductions in military activity, and other measures might count as a diplomatic success for Moscow, it is unlikely that this is enough to satisfy Putin. If it were, why has he not pocketed the deal already?

After the meeting in Geneva, the United States was unable to determine if the Russian diplomatic effort was genuine or cover for a planned military operation. The head of Russia’s delegation, Sergey Ryabkov, didn’t appear to know either.
It is doubtful that the Russian leadership can back down without external and internal audience costs. Over the past month, the West has also been arming Ukraine in anticipation of a Russian attack, hardly a policy success for Moscow. If Putin backs down with nothing, the domestic and international perception will be that he was either bluffing or, even worse, was successfully deterred. Putin will end up with the worst of both worlds, seen as simultaneously aggressive and resistible. Also, while an authoritarian state may care less about domestic audience perceptions, the elites, or the so-called “selectorate,” are another matter. Authoritarian leaders like Putincan find their ability to manage political coalitions diminished if elites perceive them as reckless, incompetent, and increasingly unfit to rule. Putin certainly has options, but this is not a contest in which he can afford to back down cost-free.

A More Dangerous Mobilization
While the military deployment may appear overly visible, lacking in initiative or surprise, in fact the opposite is true. Russia is indeed assembling this force in a manner designed to conceal its operational aims. To some extent it retains surprise and initiative. The Russian military is deploying a large force slowly, and deliberately, with equipment that can be parked in the field for months. Troops can be quickly sent to these encampments, fall in on equipment, and begin dispersing. This conceals the final disposition of forces, and the timing and scope of an operation. With large numbers of Russian forces having arrived in Belarus, and more on the way, a large-scale military operation in the coming weeks seems probable.


What are Russia’s Options?
A Russian military campaign could range from standoff strikes to a largescale invasion of Ukraine’s eastern regions, the encirclement of Kyiv, and the taking of Odessa along the coast. The question is not what Russia can do militarily in Ukraine, since the answer is almost anything, but what kind of operation might attain lasting political gains. Consequently, most scenarios seem illogical and politically counterproductive.
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Ractivist

Ractivist

Pride comes before the fall.....Pride month ended.
They have wargamed this. First strike is the place to be, they all know it....ukraine could be the diversion prior to. A whole lot weaponry is no longer at home, where the target was.....now it's all dispersed along a long border, with immediate movement available.....first strike allows for the movement of key assets just prior to the start. A thirty minute head start can move a lot of hardware, and software....the difference between them and us, they practice this stuff, they have the massive fall out shelters. We will be caught in the open.....a significant percentage will be killed off. It's there goal. Just dealing with burying the illegals would take a yeomans efforts....cannon fodder, zombies... butt ugly cometh.
 
Buick Electra

Buick Electra

TB2K Girls with Guns
Chance said:
Remember when Hillary was running for president? (She was just a continuation of Obama's reign) The constant talk was she'll start a war with Russia. Wondered what the heck her beef with Russia was. Now it looks like she, Obama are going to get their war....

And what if Russia's troop deployment is just to contain NATO...not invade Ukraine...while Russia and China et Al real target is America.....hmmmm.
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Winner, winner- Chicken dinner!!

If Russia wanted to invade Ukraine they would have done so long ago.

This is just such a "Wag The Dog" movie here! I'm sure this will be part of the cover story as to why the central banks will fail.
 
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