Like a good whiskey, this Stratfor story starts slow ... it's worth reading it through to the end ... it's about Bush's administration reaching for a wedge to drive between Russia and China ... and if this analysis is near correct, it'll be one hugely expensive wedge indeed...
How expensive, you ask? Paraphrasing this story:
* US and Western investment and technology transfers to Russia without Western financial controls and dwarfing anything we saw Clinton/Brown & company ... do with China ...
* US recognition that Russia has unchallenged influence among the states of the former Soviet Union (certainly including the hyper oil & gas-rich Caucases) ...
* No further expansion of Nato, and the acceptance of limits on Nato military installations in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic ...
Question: If nothing else, under the logic of mastroika, is it conceivable that this "arrangement" won't be announced shortly after that Summit?
Question: Conversely, if after that Summit Russia continues to refuse to play ball, especially vis-a-vis that 1972 ABM Treaty, what might that tell us?
Under Fair Use from The Online Asia Times, via Daily News @ Yahoo.com...
RIO
June 1, 2001
Central Asia/Russia
<a href="http://www.dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010601/ts/bush_china_trade_dc_2.html">US aims to derail Russia-China force</a>
STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
May 31, 2001
Summary
In advance of a planned June 16 summit between US President George W Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Slovenia, the American administration has begun a diplomatic initiative with Russia to offer significant financial and technical inducements in exchange for Moscow's agreement for both sides to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, thereby giving the Pentagon a green light to proceed with developing a national missile defense system.
Analysis
Over the recent Memorial Day weekend, anonymous US officials told The New York Times, CNN and other media that the offer will include a range of arms purchases, military aid and joint anti-missile exercises as well as purchases of the Russian S-300 ground-to-air missile. No specific dollar figure was given.
On the surface, the US offer appears designed to reduce Russian fears about expanded missile defenses while providing an infusion of hard currency that the Russian economy desperately needs. But close analysis of US diplomatic maneuvers suggests a geopolitical objective that goes far beyond the specific issue of developing missile defenses: a US-Russian strategic partnership against China.
While the Bush administration clearly wants to build both national and theater ballistic-missile defense systems, the real issue is not about missile defense. Rather, it [/b]is about the ability of Washington to entice Moscow to cooperate on security issues[/b]. That is because the deeper US objective is to derail a potential Russian-Chinese partnership against US interests that, if formalized, could tilt the balance of power in Eurasia against the United States.
It was no surprise that the immediate Russian response to the weekend news stories was, "Nyet." But the denial was not absolute. In comments reported by The New York Times, Russian Defense Minister Sergei B Ivanov appeared to leave the door open for formal negotiations.
This is not the first time an American president has attempted to woo Moscow through sharing missile defense technology. Former president Ronald Reagan first tried this 15 years ago. During the early stages of the Strategic Defense Initiative debate, Reagan offered to share US missile defense technology with the Soviets. Of course, they rejected the proposal; the offer would have made Soviet defenses somewhat dependent on US technology.
While the Bush offer may appear to mirror Reagan's proposal, the specific reference to the S-300 missiles strikes a false chord. This missile technology is fairly obsolete, and the US intelligence community no doubt has had ample opportunity to collect technical intelligence on it. This suggests a deeper motivation behind the White House offer and the skeptical Russian response.
The world today is in a three-player game. Ever since the Communist Party seized power in China, a three-sided array of partnerships and rivalry has constantly shifted and re-formed as circumstances have unfolded between Russia, China, and the United States.
In the past year, a new rift has developed between the United States and China. Beijing is substantially weaker than Washington in virtually all ways. Russia, whose interests also have diverged from the United States, has a natural tendency to ally with China, underscoring a well-established dynamic in the three-player game in which the two weaker powers tend to cooperate to limit the power of the dominant player.
In that vein, Russian acceptance of missile-defense sharing would make Moscow a more senior, but still junior, partner in the joint security apparatus. The problem with this is: one, the benefits of Russian subordination to the United States are far from clear, and two, Russian officials will not buy the idea that the Bush proposal would lead to a long-term US dependency on Russian technology. For the Russians, this is not even close to being an enticing offer.
However, Moscow will certainly see this as an opening bid by the Bush administration for Russian alignment with the United States against China. So the deeper question is what price will Russia put on not aligning with China against the United States?
The price will be high:
* Massive US and Western investment and technology transfers to Russia without Western financial controls of the system;
* US recognition that Russia has unchallenged influence among the states of the former Soviet Union, and;
* No further expansion of Nato, and the acceptance of limits on Nato military installations in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
So as Bush and Putin prepare for their first summit, both are well aware that the offer on sharing missile-defense technology is a non-starter. But they also know that this open discussions on the entire US-Russian relationship.
We are once again struck by the incredible usefulness of the missile defense initiative. Even if the system is never built and never works, the plans have been a marvelous cover for a crucial diplomatic initiative that is creating opportunities for the United States and Russia to ventilate about important issues running far deeper than the strict subject of strategic missile defenses.
(c) 2000, WNI, Inc.
How expensive, you ask? Paraphrasing this story:
* US and Western investment and technology transfers to Russia without Western financial controls and dwarfing anything we saw Clinton/Brown & company ... do with China ...
* US recognition that Russia has unchallenged influence among the states of the former Soviet Union (certainly including the hyper oil & gas-rich Caucases) ...
* No further expansion of Nato, and the acceptance of limits on Nato military installations in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic ...
Question: If nothing else, under the logic of mastroika, is it conceivable that this "arrangement" won't be announced shortly after that Summit?
Question: Conversely, if after that Summit Russia continues to refuse to play ball, especially vis-a-vis that 1972 ABM Treaty, what might that tell us?
Under Fair Use from The Online Asia Times, via Daily News @ Yahoo.com...
RIO
June 1, 2001
Central Asia/Russia
<a href="http://www.dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010601/ts/bush_china_trade_dc_2.html">US aims to derail Russia-China force</a>
STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
May 31, 2001
Summary
In advance of a planned June 16 summit between US President George W Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Slovenia, the American administration has begun a diplomatic initiative with Russia to offer significant financial and technical inducements in exchange for Moscow's agreement for both sides to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, thereby giving the Pentagon a green light to proceed with developing a national missile defense system.
Analysis
Over the recent Memorial Day weekend, anonymous US officials told The New York Times, CNN and other media that the offer will include a range of arms purchases, military aid and joint anti-missile exercises as well as purchases of the Russian S-300 ground-to-air missile. No specific dollar figure was given.
On the surface, the US offer appears designed to reduce Russian fears about expanded missile defenses while providing an infusion of hard currency that the Russian economy desperately needs. But close analysis of US diplomatic maneuvers suggests a geopolitical objective that goes far beyond the specific issue of developing missile defenses: a US-Russian strategic partnership against China.
While the Bush administration clearly wants to build both national and theater ballistic-missile defense systems, the real issue is not about missile defense. Rather, it [/b]is about the ability of Washington to entice Moscow to cooperate on security issues[/b]. That is because the deeper US objective is to derail a potential Russian-Chinese partnership against US interests that, if formalized, could tilt the balance of power in Eurasia against the United States.
It was no surprise that the immediate Russian response to the weekend news stories was, "Nyet." But the denial was not absolute. In comments reported by The New York Times, Russian Defense Minister Sergei B Ivanov appeared to leave the door open for formal negotiations.
This is not the first time an American president has attempted to woo Moscow through sharing missile defense technology. Former president Ronald Reagan first tried this 15 years ago. During the early stages of the Strategic Defense Initiative debate, Reagan offered to share US missile defense technology with the Soviets. Of course, they rejected the proposal; the offer would have made Soviet defenses somewhat dependent on US technology.
While the Bush offer may appear to mirror Reagan's proposal, the specific reference to the S-300 missiles strikes a false chord. This missile technology is fairly obsolete, and the US intelligence community no doubt has had ample opportunity to collect technical intelligence on it. This suggests a deeper motivation behind the White House offer and the skeptical Russian response.
The world today is in a three-player game. Ever since the Communist Party seized power in China, a three-sided array of partnerships and rivalry has constantly shifted and re-formed as circumstances have unfolded between Russia, China, and the United States.
In the past year, a new rift has developed between the United States and China. Beijing is substantially weaker than Washington in virtually all ways. Russia, whose interests also have diverged from the United States, has a natural tendency to ally with China, underscoring a well-established dynamic in the three-player game in which the two weaker powers tend to cooperate to limit the power of the dominant player.
In that vein, Russian acceptance of missile-defense sharing would make Moscow a more senior, but still junior, partner in the joint security apparatus. The problem with this is: one, the benefits of Russian subordination to the United States are far from clear, and two, Russian officials will not buy the idea that the Bush proposal would lead to a long-term US dependency on Russian technology. For the Russians, this is not even close to being an enticing offer.
However, Moscow will certainly see this as an opening bid by the Bush administration for Russian alignment with the United States against China. So the deeper question is what price will Russia put on not aligning with China against the United States?
The price will be high:
* Massive US and Western investment and technology transfers to Russia without Western financial controls of the system;
* US recognition that Russia has unchallenged influence among the states of the former Soviet Union, and;
* No further expansion of Nato, and the acceptance of limits on Nato military installations in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
So as Bush and Putin prepare for their first summit, both are well aware that the offer on sharing missile-defense technology is a non-starter. But they also know that this open discussions on the entire US-Russian relationship.
We are once again struck by the incredible usefulness of the missile defense initiative. Even if the system is never built and never works, the plans have been a marvelous cover for a crucial diplomatic initiative that is creating opportunities for the United States and Russia to ventilate about important issues running far deeper than the strict subject of strategic missile defenses.
(c) 2000, WNI, Inc.