continued
Take an attempted Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This action alone would send extremely worrying signals to Tokyo about Beijing’s intent and self-restraint, and, if successful, could facilitate a Chinese attack on Japanese territory or supply chains. Such a scenario would doubtless put the Self-Defense Forces on high alert. However, absent a causal and temporal link between the attack on Taiwan and an attack on Japan — such as clear indications that China intended to attack Japan from Taiwanese territory once it gained control — it would be difficult to argue that a Japanese use of force in defense of Taiwan was necessary to protect Japan from attack. Even use of force for the defense of Japan itself, as noted earlier, would only be allowed if China initiated an attack on Japan, not merely because it might now be in a better position to initiate one.
Imagine, instead, if there were clear information or intelligence that China planned to use the invasion of Taiwan as a necessary part of a
sequenced attack on Taiwan and Japan — one focused, perhaps, on the Chinese-claimed and Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, or even on other islands in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture. In such a scenario, an attack on Taiwan could constitute, in effect, the initiation of an attack on Japan, closely connecting an armed attack against Taiwan with a direct threat to Japan’s survival. The defense of Taiwan could thus be seen as integral to the defense of Japan. Although variations on the situation might also qualify, this is the basic scenario under which a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely present a survival-threatening situation for Japan.
If China were to opt to blockade Taiwan, it might also be possible to apply the survival-threatening situation designation, but again, likely only in a very narrow range of circumstances. First, Japan would need to consider the blockade to constitute an armed attack — for example, in the
gravity of its scale and effects on Taiwan. Second, per the guidance of the advisory panel, the blockade would need to critically impact Japan or its citizens, perhaps by strongly harming Japan’s economy. For Japan to need to use force to defend
Taiwan due to such effects, however, the blockade would need to critically impact Japan
through its impact on Taiwan specifically. Since
Taiwan is Japan’s fourth-largest export marketand eighth-largest import territory of origin, this could be plausible if a blockade were to go on long enough. Again, there could be variations to this scenario, but very few exist that would meet the pass-through criterion.
All in all, the potential cases under which an attack on Taiwan would threaten Japan’s survival in accordance with relevant security laws appear very limited. There is one caveat here worth exploring. The advisory panel also suggested that a case might be a made for a survival-threatening situation if the “international order itself could be significantly affected” as the result of an attack on a foreign country. This notion could introduce some flexibility for Japanese decision-makers. China’s successful reunification with Taiwan by force would certainly affect the regional order and, in turn, U.S. power in the region. There may be debate within Japan about whether such a scenario would significantly impact the international order itself, however.
Ultimately, Tokyo is unlikely to authorize use of force in defense of Taiwan unless it feels it absolutely must, because this will bring it into direct conflict with China. However, the lack of specificity still leaves a range of scenarios for U.S. military planners to consider and/or eliminate, even leaving aside the question of the international order. Moreover, an understanding of both Japanese law and Japanese interpretations of international law is required, making this a complex task.
When an Attack on Taiwan Could Develop to Threaten Japan’s Security
If a contingency involving Taiwan did not rise to the level of a survival-threatening situation, it would nonetheless present serious concerns and risks for Japan. This is where the important influence situation designation comes in. The examples of a potential important influence situation provided by the Abe government and the advisory panel are again telling and boil down to U.S. forces responding to an attack by one regional country against another.
One example involves “a situation where an armed attack against another country occurs in Japan’s neighboring area and the United States is exercising the right of collective self-defense in support of said country,” and “if such a situation is left untouched, the conflict would enlarge, and eventually, Japan itself would be affected by the conflict.” This example presents circumstances very similar to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Although all the available examples of an important influence situation involve an actual armed attack on a third country, the occurrence of an armed attack is not an explicit requirement to define such a situation, so it is likely that a blockade of Taiwan would qualify, even one not devastating enough to constitute an armed attack. This is useful when considering that a quasi-blockade or “quarantine” limited to military materiel may be a more effective strategy for China than a full blockade, according to a
special report from the Council on Foreign Relations. It is certainly plausible that a blockade or quarantine of Taiwan would fit the criteria for a situation that, if left unaddressed, could develop to threaten Japan’s security.
The pertinent aspect of an important influence situation with respect to Japanese support activities, however, is that it requires a U.S. response to support. The nature and circumstances of that response would likely be determinative. This is particularly relevant because Japanese and U.S. interpretations of collective self-defense and the
legal use of force differ. It is unlikely that Japan would be able to provide support activities for a U.S. response that it did not see as consistent with international law. Take, for example, a Chinese quarantine of Taiwan. If the United States were to respond to the quarantine by dispatching warships to the area to monitor the situation, Japan could likely refuel or supply these ships or provide other relevant support activities.
In contrast, imagine a quarantine case in which the United States decided to respond with force. If Japan did not categorize the quarantine as serious enough to constitute an armed attack, Tokyo might not consider a U.S. use of force in defense of Taiwan as a legitimate example of
collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, constraining its ability to act. It is, of course, unclear that the United States itself would respond with force in such a scenario, but the case is meant to illustrate conditionalities at play in Japanese support authorities. It also shows that the important influence situation designation is not wholly free from the issue of Taiwan’s status as a foreign country, even though the language in the law does not reference the term. Here, Taiwan’s status would certainly play into the perceived legality of a U.S. use of force under international law.
Ultimately, an important influence situation designation is more flexible than a survival-threatening situation designation, and thus more likely to apply to a Taiwan contingency. However, the relevant variable for an important influence situation is the nature not only of the threat itself, but also of the U.S. response. In this regard, the more information Japan has about U.S. intentions and options, the better clarity it can generate about its own possible responses.
Providing Needed Clarity
The ambiguities and conditionalities surrounding the applicability of the survival-threatening situation and important influence situation designations to Taiwan point to the need for U.S. and Japanese officials to think through the many potential scenarios in a Taiwan contingency and clarify to each other, privately, their potential responses. This would not require either partner to commit itself to any specific course of action. It would simply clarify which response options are actually on the table and how such options may be both shaped and constrained. According to
government sources, Japan is already conducting an internal review of its options for a Taiwan contingency, a necessary first step for such consultation.
If it is not already doing so, Japan should also seek internal legal clarity on whether and under what circumstances Taiwan could count as a foreign country for the purposes of Japanese security law. Sharing this information privately with the United States and seeking U.S. views on the same would be a useful follow-up action. Understandably, Japan may want to condition its views on Taiwan’s status based on how other members of the international community proceed. Such nuances could be included in Japanese information sharing with the United States.
Additionally, a Taiwan contingency is likely to require quick thinking and decision-making. This will be important not only for U.S.-Japanese coordination, but also for Japan domestically. Most of the authorities granted to the Self-Defense Forces in 2016 remain unutilized and the internal coordination processes required legally for their deployment untested. To this end, it may be useful for Japanese authorities to translate the results of their own Taiwan review and any subsequent consultations with the United States into an internal exercise to ensure that national and local officials are able to act quickly and seamlessly. Relatedly, the Japanese government should work to increase the understanding of Diet members regarding various potential Taiwan scenarios, given the Diet’s approval role.
Some might argue that the lack of clarity surrounding Japan’s designations of survival-threatening situations and important influence situations is helpful as a form of deterrence. If the issue were simply about Japan’s intentions, as in the case of permission regarding U.S. use of bases for a military defense of Taiwan, such an argument might hold water. However, in the case of Japan’s legal authorities for addressing a Taiwan contingency, the key question relates to Japan’s options rather than its intentions. By creating a space for confusion by U.S. military planners and Japan’s own decision-makers, the ambiguities and conditionalities related to the application of these designations to Taiwan undermine deterrence and give China an advantage that these allies need not concede. Remedying this confusion will help strengthen deterrence and ensure that a Taiwan contingency remains purely hypothetical.
Image:
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Natalie M. Byers
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A Chinese military intervention against Taiwan represents a major security threat for Japan. So it is not surprising that a Japanese poll found 74 percent
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