passin' thru
So..not entirely new "news"...

Jeff M. Smith


Which politician leaked this a few months back and everyone was like, "Don't worry, he's crazy."
Christopher Clary


I think many people said, "He either revealed a secret or he had VERY out of date information." I think still unclear what he--or more likely his staffer--knew when the tweet went out but neither is a good look.

Steven Stashwick

Replying to
It was Cornyn, and the tweet claimed 30k troops in Taiwan, not 30. And as@MicahZenko pointed out, it's more that these troops were "unnoticed" than "secret" because their presence has been listed on public DoD personnel reports: https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports

10:03 AM · Oct 7, 2021·Twitter for Android


Has No Life - Lives on TB
China invading or attacking Taiwan becomes more believable every day.

The imbecile in the White House will do nothing.
Exactly !!!

His only actions will be to order the US forces to stand down, then to order himself ice cream.

All according to his orders from the CCP.


Has No Life - Lives on TB
Doomer Doug will confirm the US NAVY NUKE SUB did not, repeat did not hit my avatar, bro GODZILLA TWO. My GODZILLA avatar is alive and well. Who knows what our woke, incompetent navy sub, with its transexual co, and bisexual, binary gender neutral, exec, plus the transvesite crew hit. :dstrs:
You forgot jabbed crew :D


passin' thru
GODZILLA? I thought that was some super dooper fancy shcmancy Military Man style suit.
.. I so dumb LOL

Doomer Doug will confirm the US NAVY NUKE SUB did not, repeat did not hit my avatar, bro GODZILLA TWO. My GODZILLA avatar is alive and well. Who knows what our woke, incompetent navy sub, with its transexual co, and bisexual, binary gender neutral, exec, plus the transvesite crew hit. :dstrs:


passin' thru
China Fires Back at Reports of U.S. Commandos in Taiwan
‘See whether the PLA will launch a targeted air strike to eliminate those U.S. invaders!’ the chief of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda outlet threatened on Thursday.

By Paul D. Shinkman
Oct. 7, 2021, at 12:33 p.m.

U.S. News & World Report
China Fires Back at Reports of U.S. Troops in Taiwan
[IMG alt="FILE - In this Feb. 14, 2019, file photo, Chinese staffers adjust the U.S. and Chinese flags before the opening session of trade negotiations between U.S. and Chinese trade representatives at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing. In a relationship as fraught as America's and China's, just an agreement that talks were productive was a sign of progress. Nine months into Joe Biden's presidency, the two sides finally appear to be trying to ease tensions that date from the Trump administration — though U.S. complaints about Chinese policies on trade, Taiwan and other issues are little diminished. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File)
China has previously indicated it would retaliate swiftly and immediately to any indication the U.S. had deployed military forces to Taiwan. (Mark Schiefelbein/AP-File)
Leaders in China almost immediately expressed outrage Thursday at a new report indicating the U.S. has secretly stationed forces on Taiwan in an attempt to bolster the island nation's defenses against the increasing likelihood of an attack from the mainland.
China Tests Taiwan, U.S. With Warplane Flights ]

The Wall Street Journal first reported that a small unit of special operations forces have been based in Taiwan for at least a year to train local military forces – a move China has previously said would violate contentious agreements between Washington and Beijing that have maintained a fragile security understanding regarding Taiwan for decades. Asian outlets first reported last year the possible presence of Marines there.
"Why just two dozen members? Why secretly? The US should send 240 servicemen publicly, in US military uniform, and make public where they are stationed," Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of China's English language Global Times, considered a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote in a tweet accompanying the Journal's article. He added of China's military, "See whether the PLA will launch a targeted air strike to eliminate those US invaders!"
Political Cartoons

China has previously indicated it would retaliate swiftly and immediately to any indication the U.S. had deployed military forces to Taiwan. When Sen. John Cornyn, Texas Republican, claimed without explanation in August that the U.S. had roughly 30,000 forces on Taiwan, state news in Beijing fired back that, if true, the Chinese military would "crush them by force."
What have previously been downplayed as idle threats have taken on new potency in recent days, following China's steady deployment of aircraft into Taiwan's air defense zone on an unprecedented scale. Dozens of warplanes entered Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone – technically outside the island's self-described airspace – on Friday and Saturday, the date of China's annual celebration marking the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, followed by more than 50 on Monday, almost doubling the scale of its largest previous provocation in June.
The latest round of threats comes at a particularly contentious time for relations between China and the U.S., which in many ways have arrived at an all time low following the combative economic and diplomatic policies of the Trump administration and Beijing's increased aggressiveness in recent months. U.S. defense officials earlier this year warned that China may try to invade Taiwan in as little as six years, seizing territory it claims as a renegade province of the mainland. Pentagon planners have begun referring to the island as "Fortress Taiwan."
China Threatens New Western Alliance ]
Since the latest aerial incursions, Taiwan's defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, has said a full-scale attack may now come as soon as 2025.
It was not immediately clear whether the latest news would affect some signs of thawing in relations between the Biden administration and President Xi Jinping's government. Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, met with his Chinese counterparts in Zurich, Switzerland earlier this week, their first gathering since tense talks in Anchorage, Alaska in March.
Beijing subsequently described the latest talks as "productive" and said they "can bear fruits."
President Joe Biden announced this week he had agreed to a virtual meeting with Xi before the end of the year.

Tags: China, Taiwan, United States, military, world, world news


passin' thru
Satellite images show China deployed fighter jets designed for electronic warfare to airbases near Taiwan

Ties with China are at the worst they’ve been in 40 years, Taiwan Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-Cheng says

Maroosha Muzaffar
9 hours ago

<p>File photo. Visitors view the Chinese military's J-16D electronic warfare airplane, left, and the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft at right during 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition on 29 September in Zhuhai in southern China's Guangdong province</p>

File photo. Visitors view the Chinese military's J-16D electronic warfare airplane, left, and the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft at right during 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition on 29 September in Zhuhai in southern China's Guangdong province
(Associated Press)

China’s military is expanding its airbases near Taiwan by deploying its new fighter jets, which are designed for electronic warfare, according to satellite imagery and a People’s Liberation Army source.
China has sent a record number of warplanes, 148 in just the past week, to the island’s air defence identification zone as part of its strategy to ramp up its military intimidation of the self-ruling democracy and test its air defences.

On Monday, a record 56 Chinese warplanes intruded into Taiwan’s airspace, prompting Taipei’s defence ministry to scramble its air defence system and issue warnings. The show of force marked the fourth straight day of intrusions by aircraft belonging to the People’s Liberation Army. Taiwan has described these incursions as “irresponsible provocative actions”, while the US, Japan and Australia urged China to end its military threats.

The satellite image showing China’s airbases near eastern Taiwan was released by Canada-based Kanwa Defence Review and it shows a J-16D fighter jet being housed at an airbase in Jiangxi province, China.
Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the defence magazine, said the satellite imagery showed the J-16D had been deployed to the Xiangtang airbase in Nanchang, Jiangxi, in May. One satellite image showed hangars at the airbase that can accommodate advanced fighter jets like the J-16D.
A separate image from January showed another airbase in Changxing county, Zhejiang province, being expanded with new hangars and other infrastructure being built.

Both airbases are run by the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command, according to South China Morning Post.
“All the airbases along the southeast coast are being expanded and upgraded to house more fighter jets as more and more large-scale air incursions are in the pipeline,” Mr Chang said. “The deployment of 52 aircraft [in the first sortie] on Monday shows the PLA’s aviation combat strength. I expect more types of PLA aircraft will be sent in future, with the biggest sorties involving more than 100 [planes].”
A PLA source in Beijing, China, on the condition of anonymity, confirmed to South China Morning Post that the J-16D fighter jet had been deployed to an eastern airbase near Taiwan. He said that the military activity near Taiwan was “part of combat-readiness training”.
“The escalation of air incursions from the PLA means more fighters from Taiwan need to carry out scramble missions, which increases the chance of collision because there aren’t any rules of engagement,” Mr Chang added.
US President Joe Biden on Wednesday said that he had spoken to Chinese President Xi Jinping about Taiwan.

Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-Cheng told the island’s parliament that tensions with China were at their worst in 40 years. He also warned that Beijing could have the ability to mount a full-scale invasion of the democratic island by 2025.
Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, has also called China’s recent actions around Taiwan “provocative” and warned of the risks of “miscalculation”.

More about
TaiwanPeople's Liberation Army

Doomer Doug

TB Fanatic
Oh boy, our woke leaders have escalated from unacceptable to deeply concerned. The nasty e mail is being written right now. :eleph:

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Too close for comfort
China is ratcheting up military pressure on Taiwan

Its aerial sorties near the island are increasing the risk of a crisis

Oct 7th 2021
The Economist

It was a deliberate provocation, patriotically timed. On October 1st, the country’s national day, China flew 38 aircraft, including fighter jets and bombers, towards Taiwan (one type, the j-16, is pictured). They entered the island’s Air Defence Identification Zone (adiz), a buffer region where intrusions often prompt military alerts. It was the year’s daily record. Over the next three days China sent another 111 planes. In response, Taiwan scrambled jets, broadcast warnings and tracked the Chinese aircraft with missile systems. The island’s defence minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, called it “the toughest situation I have seen in more than 40 years of my military life”.

The skies around Taiwan were quieter as The Economist went to press. On October 6th China flew no military planes through the adiz. So far none of the flights has crossed into Taiwan’s territorial airspace, which extends 12 nautical miles (about 22km) from the island. The intruders typically fly 35 nautical miles or more from the Taiwanese coast. But American officials clearly share Mr Chiu’s anxiety. On October 6th America’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, called on China to halt its “provocative” activity near Taiwan. Also that day, Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, conveyed America’s concern at a meeting in Switzerland with Yang Jiechi, China’s most senior diplomat and a member of the ruling Politburo.

China is unabashed. Its state media have described the sorties as a demonstration of the country’s ability to conduct “a wartime air attack”. In recent years China has been ratcheting up displays of its growing military capability, especially at sea and in the air, as a warning to Taiwan. Its message is that if the island refuses to accept China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, China may use force. Mr Chiu, a retired general, told Taiwan’s parliament on October 6th that China would be able to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2025, at a cost that the Communist Party in Beijing may consider bearable.

Taiwan’s adiz extends over a part of China’s coast, so it is not surprising that Chinese military aircraft often fly into it (see map). But China has taken to probing parts of the adiz that are much closer to the island, skirting around the south-western end of what is known as the “median line”, an informal boundary in the Taiwan Strait midway between the island and the mainland. China now conducts such flights near southern Taiwan almost every day. They could be intended to wear down Taiwan’s defences (its air force is much smaller than China’s) and condition it into treating big sorties as normal in order to make it easier for China to disguise the early phase of an attack as an exercise.

Assessing China’s intentions is extremely difficult. It is fond of sabre-rattling when it believes that Taiwan is moving too close to asserting permanent separation from China, or when America cosies up to the island. Recent sorties may relate to such developments. Earlier this year the Biden administration secured public statements of support for Taiwan from the European Union, the g7, Japan and South Korea. September was an especially irksome month: Taiwan sought entry to a trans-Pacific free-trade group just after China had made the same request and American and British naval ships sailed through the Taiwan Strait. On September 15th America, Britain and Australia agreed to a security partnership, aukus, that is viewed in Beijing as an alliance aimed at keeping China in check. In the days that followed, China ramped up its flights into Taiwan’s adiz.

If China’s planes were to edge closer to airspace over the island itself, it is unclear how Taiwan would respond. Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s president, has said that Taiwanese pilots should not be the ones to shoot first—at least not without explicit orders. Taiwan’s latest Quadrennial Defence Review, produced this year, was vague about this, saying only that the island’s responses should get stronger the closer that Chinese aircraft get to the island.

Some analysts wonder whether a Taiwanese fighter would be authorised to fire anything more than a warning shot, even if a Chinese plane were to fly over Taiwanese land. In a forthcoming article, two think-tankers in America, Bonny Lin of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations, note Taiwanese press reports which say that Taiwan may have divided its airspace into three zones of engagement: a “surveillance zone” of 30 nautical miles, a “warning zone” of 24 nautical miles and a “destruction zone” of 12 nautical miles. Ms Lin and Mr Sacks say that if any engagement were to lead to the death of a pilot, even accidentally, “both sides would be ill-equipped” to keep tensions under control.

There has been no such casualty since 1958. But accidents have happened nearby. In 2001 a mid-air collision off the coast of southern China between a Chinese fighter and an American naval spy-plane killed the Chinese pilot. The crippled American plane landed at a Chinese military airbase. Ten days of tension ensued before the crew were allowed to leave. Twenty years later, such an encounter may be far harder to resolve. Relations between America and China are considerably worse. China suspended official contacts with Taiwan after Ms Tsai became president in 2016 and she failed to endorse the view of leaders in Beijing that there is only “one China”.

Should a crisis occur in Taiwan’s skies, nationalist sentiment in China could further complicate matters. Global Times, a jingoistic party tabloid in Beijing, declared in April that if Ms Tsai’s government were to continue its “hostile” behaviour (working closely with America counts as such, it suggested), China’s fighter planes would be prepared to fly across the island and disregard the “red line” relating to territorial airspace. Ms Tsai appears unfazed. In an upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, she writes that Taiwan hopes to “shoulder more responsibility by being a close political and economic partner of the United States and other like-minded countries”. She warns that people in Taiwan will “rise up should the very existence of Taiwan be under threat”. Such words will not stop the sorties, nor assuage fears that a mishap could turn into something far bloodier.

China is ratcheting up military pressure on Taiwan | The Economist


passin' thru
Taiwan says it does not seek military confrontation as tensions peak with China
Taiwan does not seek military confrontation but will do whatever it takes to defend its freedom, President Tsai Ing-wen said on Friday, amid a spike in tensions with China. On October 4, Taiwan’s defence ministry reported that a record 56 Chinese aircraft entered its air defence identification zone (ADIZ), including 52 planes during the day and an additional four on Monday night. Taiwan, which is independently governed but claimed by China as its territory, reported that around 150 Chinese air force aircraft flew into its air defence zone over a four-day period from October 1, Reuters reported.
Photo via @ReutersWorld

"Taiwan has complained for more than a year of such activities, which it views as 'grey zone warfare', designed to wear out Taiwan's armed forces and test their ability to respond. 'Taiwan does not seek military confrontation,' Tsai told a security forum in Taipei. 'It hopes for a peaceful, stable, predictable and mutually-beneficial coexistence with its neighbours. But Taiwan will also do whatever it takes to defend its freedom and democratic way of life.'" — Reuters

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB

RT: 7.48 minutes

What got my attention, was it was said that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would immediately involve an attack on the US bases in the region including Guam
Last edited:

Doomer Doug

TB Fanatic
War with China is inevitable. In fact covid is a military attack using a binary bio weapon aided by assorted TRAITORS in our ruling class.
What I don't know, can't know, only Xi the Merciless does, is whether a chinese, Taiwan/USA war is IMMINENT.
My gut tells me possibly as early as the end of this year. We shall see.
He left Pearl Harbor, San Diego, the Trident bases and nukes including EMP over CONUS.


passin' thru
Japan’s Authorities in a Taiwan Contingency: Providing Needed Clarity

Mirna Galic
October 6, 2021​

Japanese Soldier Applies Face Paint

A Chinese military intervention against Taiwan represents a major security threat for Japan. So it is not surprising that a Japanese poll found 74 percent of respondents supportive of their government engaging to advance peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Tokyo’s potential role in a military contingency involving Taiwan has also been in the spotlight, however, following increased Chinese and U.S. tensions over the island and a series of comments by senior Japanese officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso.

Although Japan’s response in a Taiwan contingency would ultimately reflect the nature of the threat, the U.S. approach, and the broader international reaction, Japan’s constitution and security legislation create legal limits on Tokyo’s ability to defend Taiwan. Yet these limits remain little explored with respect to various Taiwan scenarios, within either Japanese or U.S. policy circles. Because Japan’s security legislation is so complex, particularly after changes that entered into force in 2016 to expand the authorities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a potential Japanese response to a Taiwan contingency is much less clear than it may appear on the surface.
This article briefly outlines the range of Japanese responses to a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan and then examines two sets of key authorities — those related to an “important influence situation” and to a “survival-threatening situation.” The article argues that the authorities under a survival-threatening situation are less likely to be applicable to a defense of Taiwan than recent commentary might suggest. Both the survival-threatening situation and the important influence situation, moreover, present ambiguities and conditionalities that Japanese and U.S. planners should clarify together. Doing so would eliminate potential confusion, ensuring that the U.S.-Japanese alliance can function smoothly in relation to Taiwan and thus strengthening the deterrence that is key for the peace and stability that Japan so strongly desires.

What’s On the Books
Article 9 of Japan’s constitution renounces war and the use or threat of force to settle international disputes. The use of force in self-defense is permitted in response to an armed attack against Japan (we’ll place an asterisk here and come back to it), but only if an armed attack is initiated, not merely if there is a likelihood or threat of attack. If a Chinese attack on Taiwan involved any attack on Japanese territory, from individual islands to U.S. bases, Japan could respond with force in self-defense using a spectrum of military operations. However, Japan’s use of force would be permitted only in the absence of other “appropriate means” and to the “minimum necessary extent.”

Absent a direct attack on Japan, Japanese action can take various forms, depending on the circumstances. Perhaps most pertinently, Japan would have the option to allow the United States to use U.S. bases in Japan for a military response to a Taiwan attack, based on prior consultation requirements relating to “the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan.” Historically, Japan has maintained public ambiguity about its willingness to provide acquiescence for such a request in relation to Taiwan.
Japan can also respond to an important influence situation, which comprises contingencies short of armed attack on Japan that, if left unaddressed, could develop to threaten Japan’s peace and security. In such a situation, Japan can provide support for U.S. and other forces responding to the contingency. Japanese support may include search and rescue activities, ship inspections, and logistics support, with the last encompassing such elements as use of facilities, supply chains, transportation, communication, and repair and maintenance.

Additionally, there is one scenario short of a direct armed attack against Japan where the country is permitted to use force in self-defense, per the asterisk we placed earlier. This involves the survival-threatening situation, which refers to “a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” In such a scenario, Japan could undertake similar military operations to those designed to respond to an attack against Japan, including in collaboration with the United States or other countries. This is effectively collective self-defense, but it is a narrower species of collective self-defense than traditional interpretations because Japan can only come to the defense of another nation if its own survival is directly jeopardized and not simply because that nation happens to be an ally or friend.

Both the important influence situation and survival-threatening situation designations are part of a controversial package of security legislation, passed in 2015 to attendant public protests and sharp divisions within the Diet, that entered into force in 2016. Opponents of the legislation feared it could be used to drag Japan into U.S. military adventurism. The administration of then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, meanwhile, argued that it was necessary to address changing regional and global security environments and had built-in limitations.
Realistically, the Japanese government — like any government — will try to do whatever it believes is necessary for the country’s security and build the requisite argument to back that. However, such an argument will need to pass muster with the Diet, which is required to approve military operations under the security legislation. As a result, the government will need to provide a solid legal basis and clearly identify why the specific proposed response is needed, especially if it involves a Japanese use of force. This is important given the presence of parties in the Diet with restrictive views on the use of force and collective self-defense, including the ruling party’s main coalition partner.

When an Attack on Taiwan Threatens Japan’s Survival
The applicability of the survival-threatening situation designation for a defense of Taiwan is thus interesting to examine, particularly given Aso’s direct reference to the term when he noted that “if a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation.” One significant point that remains unknown is whether Taiwan qualifies as a foreign country for the purposes of Japan’s relevant security laws, since Japan does not officially recognize Taiwan as a separate county from China, despite its relations with Taipei. How much this technicality might matter in an actual crisis likely depends on the mood in the Diet, but in Japan’s rule-conscious political culture, the question might present a legal conundrum. Leaving the issue of Taiwan’s status as a foreign country aside, the intentions behind the designation are also worth examining.
Although the specifics of when an attack on a foreign country might directly threaten Japan’s survival are not defined in relevant laws, it is telling that all the examples of the potential application of the designation provided by the Abe government and a legal advisory panel convened to examine the issue involve the United States. Because Japan’s security is so deeply linked to the protective potential of the United States, it is not difficult to see how an attack on the United States that might decrease U.S. defensive or offensive capacity could jeopardize Japan’s defenses and thereby threaten its survival. An attack on Taiwan would not impact the mechanics of Japan’s security provision in such a way.

Indeed, an attack on the United States in a Taiwan contingency may be more likely to spur a survival-threatening situation designation than an attack on Taiwan itself. For example, U.S. ships under missile attack by Chinese forces could request Japanese assistance — a scenario similar to one the advisory panel contemplated (in the general case) in its justification of the need for collective self-defense permissions. Abe himself warned that a failure to protect U.S. ships when requested could unravel the very fabric of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance upon which the country’s security rests. The likelihood of such an outcome would obviously depend on the nature and severity of the specific case, but the example underscores the U.S.-centric focus the Abe administration seemingly intended for designating a survival-threatening situation.
Regardless of the original intent, the language describing a survival-threatening situation is flexible enough to apply directly to Taiwan if the Japanese cabinet determined such a course to be necessary. As noted, however, a solid case would be needed to secure Diet approval for military operations under the law. According to guidance suggested by the advisory panel, the clearest case could be made if there were a high probability that an attack on Taiwan would lead to a direct attack against Japan. Although such a scenario may appear open-ended, only a few specific cases would likely qualify without ambiguity. Examples help illustrate the point.


passin' thru

Take an attempted Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This action alone would send extremely worrying signals to Tokyo about Beijing’s intent and self-restraint, and, if successful, could facilitate a Chinese attack on Japanese territory or supply chains. Such a scenario would doubtless put the Self-Defense Forces on high alert. However, absent a causal and temporal link between the attack on Taiwan and an attack on Japan — such as clear indications that China intended to attack Japan from Taiwanese territory once it gained control — it would be difficult to argue that a Japanese use of force in defense of Taiwan was necessary to protect Japan from attack. Even use of force for the defense of Japan itself, as noted earlier, would only be allowed if China initiated an attack on Japan, not merely because it might now be in a better position to initiate one.
Imagine, instead, if there were clear information or intelligence that China planned to use the invasion of Taiwan as a necessary part of a sequenced attack on Taiwan and Japan — one focused, perhaps, on the Chinese-claimed and Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, or even on other islands in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture. In such a scenario, an attack on Taiwan could constitute, in effect, the initiation of an attack on Japan, closely connecting an armed attack against Taiwan with a direct threat to Japan’s survival. The defense of Taiwan could thus be seen as integral to the defense of Japan. Although variations on the situation might also qualify, this is the basic scenario under which a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely present a survival-threatening situation for Japan.

If China were to opt to blockade Taiwan, it might also be possible to apply the survival-threatening situation designation, but again, likely only in a very narrow range of circumstances. First, Japan would need to consider the blockade to constitute an armed attack — for example, in the gravity of its scale and effects on Taiwan. Second, per the guidance of the advisory panel, the blockade would need to critically impact Japan or its citizens, perhaps by strongly harming Japan’s economy. For Japan to need to use force to defend Taiwan due to such effects, however, the blockade would need to critically impact Japan through its impact on Taiwan specifically. Since Taiwan is Japan’s fourth-largest export marketand eighth-largest import territory of origin, this could be plausible if a blockade were to go on long enough. Again, there could be variations to this scenario, but very few exist that would meet the pass-through criterion.

All in all, the potential cases under which an attack on Taiwan would threaten Japan’s survival in accordance with relevant security laws appear very limited. There is one caveat here worth exploring. The advisory panel also suggested that a case might be a made for a survival-threatening situation if the “international order itself could be significantly affected” as the result of an attack on a foreign country. This notion could introduce some flexibility for Japanese decision-makers. China’s successful reunification with Taiwan by force would certainly affect the regional order and, in turn, U.S. power in the region. There may be debate within Japan about whether such a scenario would significantly impact the international order itself, however.
Ultimately, Tokyo is unlikely to authorize use of force in defense of Taiwan unless it feels it absolutely must, because this will bring it into direct conflict with China. However, the lack of specificity still leaves a range of scenarios for U.S. military planners to consider and/or eliminate, even leaving aside the question of the international order. Moreover, an understanding of both Japanese law and Japanese interpretations of international law is required, making this a complex task.

When an Attack on Taiwan Could Develop to Threaten Japan’s Security
If a contingency involving Taiwan did not rise to the level of a survival-threatening situation, it would nonetheless present serious concerns and risks for Japan. This is where the important influence situation designation comes in. The examples of a potential important influence situation provided by the Abe government and the advisory panel are again telling and boil down to U.S. forces responding to an attack by one regional country against another. One example involves “a situation where an armed attack against another country occurs in Japan’s neighboring area and the United States is exercising the right of collective self-defense in support of said country,” and “if such a situation is left untouched, the conflict would enlarge, and eventually, Japan itself would be affected by the conflict.” This example presents circumstances very similar to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Although all the available examples of an important influence situation involve an actual armed attack on a third country, the occurrence of an armed attack is not an explicit requirement to define such a situation, so it is likely that a blockade of Taiwan would qualify, even one not devastating enough to constitute an armed attack. This is useful when considering that a quasi-blockade or “quarantine” limited to military materiel may be a more effective strategy for China than a full blockade, according to a special report from the Council on Foreign Relations. It is certainly plausible that a blockade or quarantine of Taiwan would fit the criteria for a situation that, if left unaddressed, could develop to threaten Japan’s security.
The pertinent aspect of an important influence situation with respect to Japanese support activities, however, is that it requires a U.S. response to support. The nature and circumstances of that response would likely be determinative. This is particularly relevant because Japanese and U.S. interpretations of collective self-defense and the legal use of force differ. It is unlikely that Japan would be able to provide support activities for a U.S. response that it did not see as consistent with international law. Take, for example, a Chinese quarantine of Taiwan. If the United States were to respond to the quarantine by dispatching warships to the area to monitor the situation, Japan could likely refuel or supply these ships or provide other relevant support activities.

In contrast, imagine a quarantine case in which the United States decided to respond with force. If Japan did not categorize the quarantine as serious enough to constitute an armed attack, Tokyo might not consider a U.S. use of force in defense of Taiwan as a legitimate example of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, constraining its ability to act. It is, of course, unclear that the United States itself would respond with force in such a scenario, but the case is meant to illustrate conditionalities at play in Japanese support authorities. It also shows that the important influence situation designation is not wholly free from the issue of Taiwan’s status as a foreign country, even though the language in the law does not reference the term. Here, Taiwan’s status would certainly play into the perceived legality of a U.S. use of force under international law.
Ultimately, an important influence situation designation is more flexible than a survival-threatening situation designation, and thus more likely to apply to a Taiwan contingency. However, the relevant variable for an important influence situation is the nature not only of the threat itself, but also of the U.S. response. In this regard, the more information Japan has about U.S. intentions and options, the better clarity it can generate about its own possible responses.

Providing Needed Clarity
The ambiguities and conditionalities surrounding the applicability of the survival-threatening situation and important influence situation designations to Taiwan point to the need for U.S. and Japanese officials to think through the many potential scenarios in a Taiwan contingency and clarify to each other, privately, their potential responses. This would not require either partner to commit itself to any specific course of action. It would simply clarify which response options are actually on the table and how such options may be both shaped and constrained. According to government sources, Japan is already conducting an internal review of its options for a Taiwan contingency, a necessary first step for such consultation.
If it is not already doing so, Japan should also seek internal legal clarity on whether and under what circumstances Taiwan could count as a foreign country for the purposes of Japanese security law. Sharing this information privately with the United States and seeking U.S. views on the same would be a useful follow-up action. Understandably, Japan may want to condition its views on Taiwan’s status based on how other members of the international community proceed. Such nuances could be included in Japanese information sharing with the United States.

Additionally, a Taiwan contingency is likely to require quick thinking and decision-making. This will be important not only for U.S.-Japanese coordination, but also for Japan domestically. Most of the authorities granted to the Self-Defense Forces in 2016 remain unutilized and the internal coordination processes required legally for their deployment untested. To this end, it may be useful for Japanese authorities to translate the results of their own Taiwan review and any subsequent consultations with the United States into an internal exercise to ensure that national and local officials are able to act quickly and seamlessly. Relatedly, the Japanese government should work to increase the understanding of Diet members regarding various potential Taiwan scenarios, given the Diet’s approval role.

Some might argue that the lack of clarity surrounding Japan’s designations of survival-threatening situations and important influence situations is helpful as a form of deterrence. If the issue were simply about Japan’s intentions, as in the case of permission regarding U.S. use of bases for a military defense of Taiwan, such an argument might hold water. However, in the case of Japan’s legal authorities for addressing a Taiwan contingency, the key question relates to Japan’s options rather than its intentions. By creating a space for confusion by U.S. military planners and Japan’s own decision-makers, the ambiguities and conditionalities related to the application of these designations to Taiwan undermine deterrence and give China an advantage that these allies need not concede. Remedying this confusion will help strengthen deterrence and ensure that a Taiwan contingency remains purely hypothetical.
Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Natalie M. Byers
Posted for fair use


passin' thru
Housecarl has always warned us that it would, by default, immediately include those- and, I believe, any of our allies as well- that are in reach iirc : (

What got my attention, was it was said that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would immediately involve an attack on the US bases in the region including Guam
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passin' thru
I too think we'll see something pop somewhere before the champagne corks for the new year. But this issue shouldn't be the trigger since it's already been known and baked into the cake
..so why am I up at this hour after multicoloured dreams o' blood running in the street and guns so big and noisy I don't even recognize what they are?! :: puzzled sleepy look ::

War with China is inevitable. In fact covid is a military attack using a binary bio weapon aided by assorted TRAITORS in our ruling class.
What I don't know, can't know, only Xi the Merciless does, is whether a chinese, Taiwan/USA war is IMMINENT.
My gut tells me possibly as early as the end of this year. We shall see.
He left Pearl Harbor, San Diego, the Trident bases and nukes including EMP over CONUS.


Veteran Member
it seems to me that all these flights are just sabre rattling...until we see some clear buildup of forces, transport and logistics in the mainland across from Taiwan, i am not going to panic.

but, it is the likelihood of an 'accident' that freaks me out. ..some hyped-up PLA jet jockey goes left instead of right for one second, and, boom...

global chaos.


Senior Member
Wow, I thought Joe and his wrecking crew of handlers had things in America pretty well hosed up already.

If and when this pops and goes hot, I will miss these good old days.

With quid-pro Joe, Austin, Milley, and Jake Sullivan as our national security brain-trust, well.... hopefully my expectations are wrong.


The Dude Abides
The US will remove our 5 guys from Taiwan so China can look tough, after all, you wouldn’t want Biden and Milley leading the US during war time do you? Pull them out before someone gets hurt


passin' thru
After week of tensions, China's Xi vows 'reunification' with Taiwan
October 8, 202110:27 PM CDTLast Updated 10 minutes ago

2 minutes

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at a meeting commemorating the 110th anniversary of Xinhai Revolution at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China October 9, 2021. REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins

BEIJING, Oct 9 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed on Saturday to realise "reunification" with Taiwan, though did not directly mention the use of force, following a week of tensions with the Chinese-claimed island.
Democratically ruled Taiwan has come under increased military and political pressure from Beijing to accept its sovereignty, but Taipei has pledged to defend their freedom and that only Taiwan's people can decide their future.
Speaking at Beijing's Great Hall of the People, Xi said the Chinese people have a "glorious tradition" of opposing separatism.
"Taiwan independence separatism is the biggest obstacle to achieving the reunification of the motherland, and the most serious hidden danger to national rejuvenation," he said on the anniversary of the revolution that overthrew the last imperial dynasty in 1911.

"The historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled."
China's air force mounted four straight days of incursions into Taiwan's air defence zone from Oct. 1, involving close to 150 aircraft, though those missions have since ended.
Taiwan says it is an independent country called the Republic of China, its formal name.
Reporting by Carlos Garcia and Yew Lun Tian; Writing by Ben Blanchard; Editing by William Mallard
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.