WAR 10-16-2021-to-10-22-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(492) 09-25-2021-to-10-01-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(493) 10-02-2021-to-10-08-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(494) 10-09-2021-to-10-15-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Hypersonics Among New Tech on Display at Army's 2021 Annual Meeting and Exposition

AUSA 21 also included updates on augmented reality technology and unmanned systems.

nationalinterest.org

October 16, 2021 Topic: Hypersonic Weapons Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: Hypersonic WeaponsAUSA 2021AUSARoboticsLong Range Hypersonic Weapon
Hypersonics Among New Tech on Display at Army's 2021 Annual Meeting and Exposition
AUSA 21 also included updates on augmented reality technology and unmanned systems.
by Mark Episkopos

The U.S. Army’s 2021 Annual Meeting and Exposition (AUSA 2021) delivered several revelations on the Army’s procurement and modernization plans. Here are some highlights from the event, which concluded on October 13 in Washington, D.C.

Hypersonics
Discussions about hypersonic capabilities occupied a large portion of the three-day event. Army officials said the military is prioritizing the fast, cost-efficient production of several hypersonic weapons systems.

Lt. Gen. L. Neil Thurgood, Director of Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Space, and Rapid Acquisition, said the Army and Navy are moving at an unprecedented speed to acquire battle-ready hypersonic weapons technology. The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) and Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic systems share the same booster stack and glide body, allowing for technical cooperation between the two services.

Heidi Shyu, the new undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said the military is taking steps to lay the long-term groundwork for financially sustainable hypersonic programs. That includes investing in “affordable hypersonics materials and processes to drive down costs.” The LRHW is scheduled for prototype deployment in 2023, with the CPS to follow in 2025. U.S. defense partners are also interested in cooperating on hypersonic technology. Shyu told reporters that Japan’s Defense Ministry has expressed interest in hypersonics as well as other technologies.

“They’re interested in hypersonics, they’re interested in quantum; and out of the wide spectrum of their interests we agreed to have a follow-up meeting to try to flesh out, out of their multitude of interest areas, how shall we move forward in co-development,” Shyu said. She also said Japan is already cooperating with Washington on one defense program, though no details were offered.

Augmented Reality
Jane’s reported that the Army has paused plans to outfit soldiers with a militarised version of Microsoft’s HoloLens 2 augmented reality (AR) system, putting the fate of the $21.9 billion contract in question.

Brig. Gen. William Glaser, director of the Synthetic Training Environment Cross-Functional Team, said the Army is “essentially doing a reset of that programme, figuring out what is the appropriate timeline and where is the technology.”

A subsequent Jane’s report indicated that the Army is working with Microsoft to “mature” certain aspects of the technology, pushing field tests of the system as far back as May 2022 and first operational deployments to September of that year.

Robotics
The military’s growing emphasis on systems and doctrines involving the use of unmanned systems was also apparent. Ghost Robotics unveiled the latest version of its “robot dog,” a quadrupedal unmanned ground vehicle armed with a Creedmoor assault rifle. Powered by artificial intelligence (AI), the robot dog is able to autonomously detect, lock onto, and engage threats at an effective range of 1,200 meters.

Kaman Air Vehicles showcased its new Kargo drone-- an autonomous heavy-lift quadcopter capable of carrying a 363 kg payload. The Army’s expanded investments into unmanned technologies accompany a broader push for artificial intelligence modernization, with top cybersecurity officials at the Pentagon warning that the U.S. is dangerously lagging its Chinese competitor in the global AI and machine learning race.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

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[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Texas National Guard Soldiers Fired Upon By Cartel Gunmen From Mexico – Report – Texas Breaking News

texasbreaking.com

Image Credit: The National Guard/Flickr
NEWS
Texas National Guard Soldiers Fired Upon By Cartel Gunmen From Mexico – Report

By Paul
Published 1 day ago

Contents [hide]

• Heavily Armed Groups Becoming A Common Sight
• Border Is Known For Illegal Crossing, Cartel Activity

Suspected cartel gunmen from Mexico shot at the Texas National Guard soldiers on the southern border on Thursday. The soldiers were in the Roma, Texas border when two shots were fired from across the border.

Fox News said that fortunately, there were no injuries reported. The Texas Rangers is now investigating the incident.

Heavily Armed Groups Becoming A Common Sight
They concluded that the incident might have been related to cartel gunmen because heavily armed groups along the Texas-Mexico border are becoming a more common sight. Last week, officials told Fox News that suspected cartel members involved in human smuggling taunted National Guard soldiers across the Rio Grande. They wore tactical gear and were armed with AK-47s.

Fox News said that it is not clear which drug cartel is responsible for the recent incident, but the area is known as a bloody turf war between the Gulf Cartel and the Northeast Cartel. The shooting also occurred in the same area where Fox News saw tracers from a suspected cartel machine gun.

Image Credit: Picryl

Border Is Known For Illegal Crossing, Cartel Activity
Fox News said that the Roma, Texas, border is one of the busiest borders where illegal crossing and cartel activities occur. Because of this, Texas Republican Governor Greg Abbott deployed more guard soldiers to the Roma, Texas border in recent weeks.

The shooting reports came as migrants continued to flock to the Mexico-Texas borders. Weeks ago, the administration had to deport many Haitian migrants who camped at the Del Rio, Texas border via a makeshift camp. There are reports that more Haitians will be marching back to the border later this month.

Abbott and other Republican governors have criticized United States President Joe Biden for creating a humanitarian crisis because of rolling back the immigration policies of former President Donald Trump.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

‘Escalating Into A Firing War’: Texas Gov. Abbott Says ‘Aggressive’ Mexican Cartels Shooting At National Guard

Republican Texas Gov. Greg Abbott said Sunday that the border crisis is escalating into a border war as Mexican cartels shoot at National Guard soldiers.

dailycaller.com

NATIONAL SECURITY
‘Escalating Into A Firing War’: Texas Gov. Abbott Says ‘Aggressive’ Mexican Cartels Shooting At National Guard

DAVID KRAYDEN
OTTAWA BUREAU CHIEF
October 17, 202112:58 PM ET

Republican Texas Gov. Greg Abbott said Sunday that the border crisis is escalating into a border war as “aggressive” Mexican cartels shoot at National Guard soldiers at the southern border.
WATCH:

“I have to tell you there’s something that’s happening that’s getting even worse and that’s the cartels are getting even more aggressive and the cartels on the Mexican side of the border, they’re beginning to open fire on the National Guard that Texas has down on the border to secure the border,” Abbott told Fox News’ “Sunday Morning Futures.” This is escalating into a firing war on each side of the border where Texas and our National Guard are having to defend themselves and defend the state of Texas.”

“Everyone saw what happened in Del Rio with regard to the Haitians that came in there,” the governor continued, as he said the current “hottest point” along the Texas border is “in Roma … and that’s the area where the cartels on the Mexican side of the border are shooting at the National Guard on the Texas side of the border. And so what Texas is having to do, we’re having to step up and guard multiple points across the entire border.” (RELATED: ‘All They Had To Do Was Leave It Alone’: Trump Blasts Biden For Undoing His Progress At The Border)


The governor said the situation cannot compare to October 2020. “Listen, a year ago, of course, was still during the Trump administration and the Trump administration had put in place all the policies that led it to the greatest reduction in cross-border crossings,” he said, adding that “now, we’re seeing the highest number of cross-border crossings and it’s all because of the catastrophic open border policies by the Biden administration and we’re seeing more and more people come in.”

Democratic Laredo, Texas, Mayor Pete Saenz said in September that border security was effective under Trump. (RELATED; ‘I This This Is Illegal: Sen Kennedy Says Fox News’ Drones Grounded To Hide ‘Lunacy’ Of ‘Open Border”)

Immigrants walk towards a U.S. border checkpoint after they crossed the Rio Grande from Mexico on Aug. 14 in Roma, Texas. (John Moore/Getty Images)

Brandon Judd, president of the National Border Patrol Council, said in April, “Nobody has done more to enrich organized crime than President Biden.”

The Biden administration will bring back the Remain in Mexico policy in November after a federal judge sided with a demand from Texas and Missouri that the policy be reinstated.

 

[danielboon]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1450127383843979271

View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1450127383843979271

 

[danielboon]

Russia shuts mission to NATO in spy row retaliation
Reuters



MOSCOW, Oct 18 (Reuters) - Russia said on Monday it would halt the activities of its diplomatic mission to NATO after the Western military alliance expelled eight Russians saying they were spies.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also said staff at NATO's military mission in Moscow would be stripped of their accreditation from Nov. 1, and the alliance's information office in the Russian capital would be shuttered.
"If NATO members have any urgent matters, they can contact our ambassador in Belgium on these questions," Lavrov told a news conference.
NATO said on Oct. 6 it had expelled eight members of Russia's mission to the alliance who it said were "undeclared Russian intelligence officers".

Moscow said at the time that the expulsions undermined hopes that relations with the U.S.-led alliance could normalise.
"NATO is not interested in equitable dialogue and joint work," Lavrov said on Monday, announcing the closure of the Russian mission. "If that's the case, then we don't see the need to keep pretending that changes in the foreseeable future are possible."

Banners displaying the NATO logo are placed at the entrance of the new NATO headquarters during the move to the new building, in Brussels, Belgium April 19, 2018. REUTERS/Yves Herman
NATO said on Monday it had taken note of Lavrov's comments but had received no official communication on the issues raised.
The dispute marks the latest deterioration in East-West ties that are already at post-Cold War lows.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said Russia no longer seemed willing to talk to the West.
"It's more than just regrettable, this decision taken in Moscow," he said. "It will seriously damage the relationship."
Russia accuses NATO of provocative activity close to its borders, and staged major exercises of its own in September.
The alliance says it is determined to reinforce the security of member states close to Russia following Moscow's annexation of the Crimea peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and its backing for separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Russia shuts mission to NATO in spy row retaliation

Russia said on Monday it would halt the activities of its diplomatic mission to NATO after the Western military alliance expelled eight Russians saying they were spies.

www.reuters.com

 

[danielboon]

US Says Cambodia Not Transparent About Chinese Role in Naval Base Construction
October 17, 2021 3:00 AM

• Lors Liblib
• Hul Reaksmey

Cambodia's Ministry of Defense spokesperson Chhun Socheat shows a sign donated by the US during a government organized media tour to the Ream naval base in Preah Sihanouk province on July 26, 2019.
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PHNOM PENH —
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has released a survey of new buildings and a road in Ream Naval Base in Cambodia showing that construction is continuing “amid concerns that the new facilities are being built to facilitate a Chinese military presence in Cambodia.”
The October 12 report from Washington-based CSIS showed that there were three new buildings and a new road built, among other changes, during August and September
U.S. embassy spokesperson Chad Roedemeier told VOA Khmer via an email on Thursday that the embassy is “aware of consistent, credible reporting that significant construction by the People’s Republic of China continues at Ream Naval Base.”
“The Government of Cambodia has not been fully transparent about the intent, nature, and scope of this project or the role of the PRC military, which raises concerns about intended use of the naval facility.”
The U.S. embassy spokesman went on to say that “The Cambodian people deserve to know more about the project at Ream and to have a say in this type of military agreement, which has long-term implications for their country,” adding that “any foreign military presence at Ream would run counter to Cambodia’s constitution and undermine regional security.”

Cambodian navy personnel guard a jetty in Ream naval base in Preah Sihanouk province during a government organized media tour on July 26, 2019.
Cambodian government spokesperson Phay Siphan told VOA Khmer that the CSIS study is wrong and baseless. He said the Ream base is neither for the Chinese military to use nor for any country to use as its military base.
"We confirm that the base is not built to serve the interest of China,” he said. “It's for the interest of Cambodia. And it's a world port that any country can visit officially. It's not for China to use exclusively."
Phay Siphan added that “no one has the rights to use the port as a foreign military base because the constitution does not allow foreign troops in Cambodia.
"Secondly, under ASEAN rules, member countries cannot allow foreign troops on their lands.”
VOA Khmer contacted the Chinese embassies in Phnom Penh and Washington, D.C., for comment on the new construction at the Ream base. Neither responded.
Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Banh confirmed in June that China was helping to build infrastructure at the Ream Naval Base. His remarks came days after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman raised the issue at a meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in Phnom Penh.
At the time, Tea Banh told the government-aligned news site Fresh News that Cambodia needed assistance to expand and modernize the base in Preah Sihanouk province to host large, deep-water vessels. He also said that while China was helping build infrastructure at the base, it came with “no strings attached.”
According to CSIS, “the buildings measure approximately 115 feet long and 20 feet wide. Available imagery indicates that land clearing began sometime after April 17, construction started in early May, and the structures were complete by May 21.” The photos were taken by Maxar and Planet Labs and published by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, according to the report.
Last year, a Cambodian three-star vice-admiral, deputy commander and chief of the navy general staff, Vann Bunlieng, told the Nikkei Asia that Chinese-funded upgrades to Ream would begin soon. The Nikkei said in its October 3, 2020, report that it “seems likely that the new buildings are a part of those expansions, which will reportedly include a newly dredged port and a ship repair facility.”

Cambodia naval personnel walk with journalists during a government organized media tour to the Ream naval base in Preah Sihanouk province on July 26, 2019.
The U.S. has alleged that China will maintain a military presence at Ream Naval Base. The Wall Street Journal in 2019 also reported that China has signed an agreement to have People's Liberation Army officers stationed at the naval base. And the U.S. government has received credible reports of construction activities by the Chinese military at Ream Naval Base.
The Cambodian government says aid and investment from China, which comes without reporting conditions, is needed for social and economic development.
It is notable that the Thursday email from the U.S. embassy spokesperson does not say the Chinese military is carrying out construction on the Ream base. If that were the case, it would be a significant development. Ream faces the Gulf of Thailand, which is adjacent to the South China Sea. Having access to Ream would extend Beijing’s regional naval reach.
But the growing bond between China and Cambodia “has heightened trepidation about China’s actual role in Cambodia,” according to Veasna Var, writing on EastAsiaForm.com in 2016.
China emerged as Cambodia’s largest military aid donor in 2018. Since then, Cambodia has become a proxy for U.S-China geopolitical rivalry, as Chheang Vannarith, president of the Asian Vision Institute (AVI), an independent think tank based in Phnom Penh, suggested to VOA Khmer in 2019. [[

SEE ALSO:US and China's Cambodian Legacy
Today, Beijing’s support of Cambodia helps Hun Sen move past international concerns about his nation’s poor human rights record and any resulting reduction in aid. In turn, Hun Sen said during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi September 12 that Cambodia would continue to “firmly support China’s legitimate position” on issues regarding its core interests such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang. All are areas where China is seeking to exert its authority and mold popular opinion.
At the meeting, Hun Sen said China was providing $272 million in grant aid, according to the Associated Press. When making the announcement, he listed areas where Beijing has assisted Cambodia such as the construction of more than 2,000 kilometers of roads and seven big bridges across the Mekong, Tonle Sap and Bassac rivers.

US Says Cambodia Not Transparent About Chinese Role in Naval Base Construction

Satellite images show new buildings amid long-simmering concerns that Ream base expansion is for Chinese military use, which Cambodian government denies

www.voanews.com

 

[jward]

ArmsControlWonkPod
@ACWPodcast

New Arms Control Wonk ep! The team comes together to discuss China's new alleged and mysterious hypersonic glide vehicle atop a fractional orbital bombardment system. Don't know what any of that means? Tune in to learn way more than you want to know. https://patreon.com/posts/57572739

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1450263316027387904

View: https://twitter.com/ACWPodcast/status/1450263316027387904?s=20

 

[jward]

Critical U.S. Infrastructure Now Needs Surface To Air Missile Protection During A Crisis
Growing threats to the homeland, especially from advanced cruise missiles, have prompted new initiatives aimed at defending key sites.
By Joseph Trevithick October 19, 2021

• The War Zone

Lockheed Martin


A senior officer at the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, says the command is actively engaged in discussions about how to optimize air-defense capabilities, including ground-based surface-to-air missiles, to protect domestic critical infrastructure in a crisis. He said that the growing ability of potential adversaries to launch long-range conventional strikes, especially using advanced air, sea, and submarine-launched cruise missiles, has prompted new concerns about threats to the homeland, which is "not a sanctuary any longer." This is just the latest example of U.S. officials sounding similar alarms bells in recent years — but it is a less common public acknowledgment about the limitations of existing defenses within the continental United States.

U.S. Air Force Colonel Kristopher Struve, the vice director of operations for NORAD, discussed domestic critical infrastructure defense during a virtual roundtable on air and missile defense that the Missile Defense Advocacy Association (MDAA) hosted yesterday. Struve took the place of Air Force Brigadier General Paul Murray, NORAD's Deputy Director of Operations, who had been "called into a four-star meeting," according to MDAA Chairman and Founder Riki Ellison.

DOD

A Patriot Advanced Capability 3 interceptor (PAC-3) at the moment of launch. Patriot surface-to-air missile systems are among those that the US military could deploy to protect critical infrastructure in a crisis, according to NORAD.

With regard to critical infrastructure protection, Struve laid out the current situation in the following way:

Our potential adversaries have created significant capacity to reach us asymmetrically. Our forward layers, our allies, our partners, our forward combatant commands and geographic commands, have largely kept those threats away from the United States. But as we look into threats from cyber actors, space threats, as well as kinetic conventional cruise missiles, which have [seen] significant improvement on the part of China and Russia in recent years, those create avenues that can create havoc in the homeland while we are trying to project our power forward to potentially a regional conflict.

So, the thing that I really want to emphasize here is that the homeland is not a sanctuary any longer. There are opportunities for our adversaries to employ weapons from distances that they could strike critical infrastructure in the United States early in a conflict and create some challenges for us to produce our military power.
And when we look at our deterrence model, we've had a lot of capability since really World War II to have deterrence by punishment. That nuclear deterrent is the underpinning of our entire deterrence model. And it's that ability for us to respond in kind and protect our homeland.
But as our adversaries have built the capability to strike us conventionally, they feel like that they have [an] opportunity below the nuclear threshold to strike us and potentially keep that conflict from going nuclear. And it is this avenue where we really need to work to close gaps and be able to protect the homeland more completely. ...
Something that I haven't really talked about is what are we doing on the risk mitigation front, and that's the ability for us to actually defend. And there's two sides that we think about when we think risk mitigation. It's our ability to deny those threats, and, when we talk about these kinetic conventional weapons, it's hardening, redundancy, resiliency on some of our critical infrastructure. Not every piece of our infrastructure is going to be taken out with one of these conventional-size weapons, but some things are particularly vulnerable. So we view this as a whole-of-government approach on being able to protect that infrastructure.

And then, after that, we would place defenses on key critical infrastructure nodes. It's infeasible that we can place kinetic, you know, surface-to-air missile batteries over the entirety of the United States, Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and Canada. By the time we fielded such a system, it would probably — they would've found a way around it anyways. So we are working closely with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the National Security Council on where are we going to place those limited ground-based air defense assets that we'll have in time of conflict to really change our adversaries' calculus about their efficacy of being able to execute an attack on the U.S. That can be everything from how we're organized today, which would be our fighter aircraft at more than a dozen, a couple dozen locations across the U.S., that can intercept conventional cruise missiles with mixes of AESA and non-AESA fighters, as well as Alaska and Canada. It's our limited area defenses, you know Patriot-type missile systems that we can deploy in time of crisis. But it's also our persistent capability that we currently employ in specific areas, such as the National Capital Region. Those are systems that, based on increasing threats from both the air and sea, that we need to be able to continue to develop, generate, and put in those key critical infrastructure locations so that we can change the calculus of our adversaries.

Struve was correct in saying that it would be a costly and time-consuming endeavor to establish a nationwide surface-to-air missile network that enemies would undoubtedly develop counter-countermeasures against. Unlike some other countries, including many potential adversaries, such as China, the United States does not currently have SAMs strategically deployed on a permanent basis across the country. The U.S. military did have this kind of integrated network of SAM sites for a time during the Cold War but had shut them all down by the end of the 1970s.


At the same time, what is left unsaid here is that the U.S. military simply does not have anywhere near the capacity at present to deploy ground-based air and missile defenses to protect every key piece of infrastructure in the United States. As it stands, the only real "persistent capability" in this regard that the United States does have in place, as Struve noted, is in the National Capital Region (NCR). This air-defense force consists of batteries equipped with the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS), which uses the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and fixed and Humvee-mobile versions of the Avenger system, each armed with Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, as well as a .50-caliber machine gun. Various radars and other sensors systems are positioned in the NCR to detect a variety of different types of threats.

Dutch Ministry of Defense

The US military's NASAMS are notoriously shy. This picture shows a launch unit belonging to a Dutch system firing an AIM-120 missile.

 

[jward]

The photograph in the Tweet below, taken during an incident in 2019, shows a fixed Avenger system in Washington, D.C.

Spotted during the lockdown: a missile battery in position atop a building across the street from the White House pic.twitter.com/IkmjWby2FI
— Sara Cook (@saraecook) November 26, 2019​

Otherwise, the U.S. Army has around 18 Air Defense Artillery Battalions equipped with Patriot, the service's main surface-to-air missile system. Each one of these battalions has between three and five batteries, depending on their exact composition. Last October, elements of the 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, out of Fort Hood in Texas, conducted a training exercise that saw them deploy to a commercial airport. This, in part, demonstrated how Patriot batteries could be sent to protect nonmilitary sites.

READER SUBMISSION

Elements of the Army's 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment at Easterwood Airport in College Station, Texas, in October 2020.


However, not all the Army's Patriot units are available to be deployed inside the United States in a crisis. Five of them are overseas on a permanent basis — two in Germany, two in South Korea, and one in Japan. Two more are dedicated training units.
The Army has some six more batteries of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems designed to engage incoming ballistic missiles, one of which is permanently based on Guam and another of which is forward-deployed to South Korea.

The service just recently established two more batteries with the Israeli-made Iron Dome system, which focuses primarily on cruise missile defense. One of those units is now headed for a temporary experimental deployment to Guam. In September, the Army awarded a contract to defense contractor Dynetics for the purchase of a similar system, known as Enduring Shield, to meet cruise missile defense and other requirements.

US Army

A truck-mounted launcher from one of the U.S. Army's two Iron Dome batteries.


The Army and the Marine Corps have additional units equipped with Avengers, as well as shoulder-fired Stingers, that could provide point defenses around various sites, including against incoming cruise missiles. The Army is also in the process of fielding a new short-range air-defense system based on the Stryker 8x8 wheeled armored vehicle, which has Stingers, as well as Hellfire missiles and a 30mm automatic cannon. Additional systems, including ones equipped with directed-energy weapons, are now in development.






It's important to remember that, during an actual crisis, demand for these relatively limited ground-based air-defense assets would also come from commanders around the world, who would be faced with a multitude of air and missile threats themselves. Beyond cruise and ballistic missiles, drones (including various tiers of armed types) present very real threats now to troops on battlefields abroad and at home, as well. The drone and missile strikes on oil-related infrastructure in Saudi Arabia back in 2019 provided a particularly notable wake-up call about these issues. The War Zone has, on multiple occasions, specifically highlighted the potential danger that small drones pose to American domestic critical infrastructure, as well as U.S. military activities.
Struve did rightly point out that American fighter jets, as well as their Canadian counterparts, provide the primary layer of air and missile defense, including against incoming cruise missiles. However, one of his fellow panelists at the MDAA roundtable, Air Force Col. Jason Nalepa, the commander of the 173rd Operations Group, part of the Oregon Air National Guard's 173rd Fighter Wing, noted the "tyranny of distance" that limits how quickly fighters can respond to threats after scrambling from their bases around North America. In addition, those jets simply can't be in every place at once and only carry so many missiles, further underscoring the importance of ground-based assets positioned at or near critical sites to provide additional layers of more localized protection.

DOD

Air Force Col. Jason Nalepa, head of the Oregon Air National Guard's 173rd Operations Group, shared this unclassified map during the MDAA virtual roundtable, which shows various NORAD air defense nodes. The green circles indicate bases that host Air Force fighter jets, including those assigned to Air National Guard units, tasked with the homeland defense mission.


All this clearly requires the kinds of discussions that Struve says are happening now about how the U.S. military can best use the assets available to mitigate increasing risks, particularly from conventional long-range cruise missiles that can be launched from aircraft, submarines, and ships, including even potentially non-descript commercial cargo vessels. His comments also raise clear questions about how the United States can and should expand its capacity to provide air and missile defenses domestically going forward.

In addition, NORAD's vice director of operations highlighted the importance of existing integrated sensor networks, such as the North Warning System, along with future ones and other forms of intelligence in detecting potential threats or even helping to prevent crises from turning into full-blown conflicts, to begin with. "What we really need to be able to have is a complete, integrated system of ... sensors, from the sea floor to on orbit, that are going to be able to detect any type of one of those threats, so that we can have that warning capacity to be able to inform our national leadership and take action," he said.

"We're also working heavily in the information dominance phase, and that would be the ability to take data from old sensors that were specifically calibrated [to detect certain threats] and [that] leave about 90% plus of their data on the cutting room floor... [and] being able to put [new] back-end processing on some of those sensors," he added. There is a desire to "integrate that with... 'left-of-launch' intelligence, to be able to give us more time and space ... something that every commander needs to be able to deescalate a conflict," as well.

Since 9/11, NORAD has been working toward fielding new and improved distributed sensor and networking capabilities, as well as additional interception capacity, first under the Homeland Defense Design effort and now under a new overarching initiative known as the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystems for Layered Defense (SHIELD). One of SHIELD's more notably "spiral" developments has been the integration of new AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radars, a new active electronically scanned array type, onto Air Force F-16C/D fighter jets, giving them improved abilities to spot and engage various threats, including low-flying cruise missiles. You can read more about this project here.

The development and fielding of new or improved surface-to-air missile systems are reportedly among SHIELD's goals, as well. "The SHIELD strategy seeks ways to reduce costs by optimizing for defense of domestic locations," according to a story Air Force Magazine published in January. "Patriot surface-to-air missile defense systems, for example, were originally designed to protect Army units while on the move."

"They’re built to travel over rough terrain and hardened to operate through chemical or biological attacks," it continued. "NORAD believes it can cut costs by stripping out some of those features while retaining its advanced fire-control system."
SHIELD would also seem to present increased demand for new, shorter-range systems, such as Dynetics’ Enduring Shield. However, these types of air defense systems would only be able to cover relatively small areas. This, in turn, would require the purchase of a larger number of them to ensure that they would be available in the quantities necessary to provide any sort of robust coverage domestically, as well as meet demands for commanders downrange.

In the meantime, the U.S. military's plan clearly is to prepare to deploy air-defense assets available now to protect critical infrastructure, if necessary. However, as NORAD's Struve notes, the limited number of surface-to-air missile systems means, at least for the foreseeable future, that there will have to be discussions about what sites would get additional protective shields during an actual crisis.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

Please see source for video
Posted For Fair Use

Surface To Air Missiles Now Needed To Protect Critical U.S. Infrastructure During A Crisis

Growing threats to the homeland, especially from advanced cruise missiles, have prompted new initiatives aimed at defending key sites.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

B-1 Bombers Deploy To Diego Garcia For The First Time In Over 15 Years
The swing-wing bombers are back at the remote Indian Ocean outpost at a time of rising tensions in the wider Asia-Pacific region.
By Thomas Newdick October 20, 2021

• The War Zone

U.S. Air Force / Staff Sgt. Hannah Malone

B-1B Lancer strategic bombers from the U.S. Air Force are back at the remote island outpost of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, for the first time since 2006. The ‘Bones’ were sent halfway around the world to the remote airfield for a Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Bomber Task Force (BTF) mission, part of a relatively new strategy of unpredictable bomber deployments the service has implemented. They arrive at a time when tensions in the wider Asia-Pacific region are at a high, including as a result of significant Chinese activity in the Taiwan Strait.
The Pentagon announced the deployment of the B-1s and around 200 airmen to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, part of America’s sprawling military outpost in the British Indian Ocean Territory, yesterday. The bombers and crews are from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota.

U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Hannah Malone

An airman from the 37th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron marshals in a B-1B from Ellsworth Air Force Base, arriving in support of a Bomber Task Force mission at Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, on October 17.

Although the Department of Defense has not cited the number of bombers at the island base, satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone shows three B-1s on the airfield as of October 18 and on October 21st.

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A satellite image of Diego Garcia shows three B-1Bs present as of October 17, 2021.

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

Another image taken on October 21st shows three B-1s and four other aircraft, possibly KC-135s or C-17s.


The B-1s arrived at Diego Garcia a day earlier, October 17, based on captions for the imagery released by the DoD, while supporting flights by C-17A Globemaster III transports were carried out last week, moving 426,000 pounds and 90 items of materiel in the course of five shipments.

U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Hannah Malone

Cargo from Ellsworth Air Force Base is prepared to be unloaded from a C-17 at Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, on October 15. The total cargo for the mission totaled five shipments of 426,000 pounds and 90 pieces of material.

As already noted, the last time that B-1s were at Diego Garcia was in 2006. That deployment included an accident on May 6 of that year, in which one of the bombers, serial number 86-0132, sustained serious damage when it made a wheels-up landing. B-1s, as well as B-52s, and, to a lesser extent, B-2 stealth bombers, all made use of Diego Garcia for strikes in Afghanistan during the first decade of the Global War On Terror, before for bomber operations were moved closer to the action at bases in the Middle East.
“Bomber Task Force missions, in support of [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s] operational and strategic objectives, are extremely valuable to our aircrew because of the multi-country integration opportunities,” said Lieutenant Colonel Ross Hobbs, 37th Bomb Squadron director of operations, in a statement released by the DoD regarding this new B-1 deployment to Diego Garcia. “They also give us the opportunity to showcase the unmatched range, speed, and lethality of the B-1.”

“Global B-1 operations not only provide strategic deterrence to our nation’s adversaries but also strong, palpable assurance to our allies,” added Hobbs.
The planned length of the deployment and the types of missions the B-1s will fly from Diego Garcia have not been revealed, although the Pentagon promises “multiple sorties […] in support of multiple geographic combatant command objectives and training requirements.” Typically, BTF missions are billed as a way of demonstrating U.S. military commitment to its allies and partners in particular regions. Currently, B-1s are also deployed to RAF Fairford in England as part of a BTF mission in the European theater, which has so far involved long-range missions over the Black Sea, an area that’s seen recent tensions between NATO and Russia.

Russian Su-30 fighter jets intercepted 2 USAF B-1B bombers over Black Sea Russian Su-30 fighter jets intercepted 2 USAF B-1B bombers over Black Sea Black Sea - Ukraine Interactive map - Ukraine Latest news on live map - liveuamap.com pic.twitter.com/Qs3kc0aQsR
— Liveuamap (@Liveuamap) October 20, 2021​

The arrival of the B-1s on Diego Garcia does come amid a significant uptick in American and allied activity across the Pacific, including high-profile multinational exercises and the debut operational deployment by the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and its task group, Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21). Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force has been especially active in and around the Taiwan Strait recently, with a record-setting 56 PLA aircraft entering Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, on one day alone earlier this month.

U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Hannah Malone

Airmen from the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, watch as a B-1B lands at Diego Garcia.


While the B-1 has long been absent from Diego Garcia, in the meantime it has hosted other bomber types during BTF missions in recent years that have been related to increased geopolitical friction. In August last year, for example, it was the turn of three B-2s to deploy there, in a mission that seemed to be timed to coincide with a spike in tensions with China. You can read all about that deployment in this previous article.
On that last occasion, the B-2s conducted simultaneous training missions with B-1s, although these latter were flown directly from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, to the Pacific and back without ever touching down in the region. Other B-1s flying from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, which regularly hosts Pacific BTF missions, were involved, as well.

On a separate occasion during that deployment, one of the B-2s also conducted a sortie from Diego Garcia that appeared to take it to the Delamere Air Weapons Range in Australia. Cooperation with Australia may also be a feature of the B-1 deployment, reflecting the broader efforts to integrate more with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to deter China and otherwise respond to regional security challenges. That same thinking has also helped drive the recent AUKUS initiative, which stands for Australia-United Kingdom-United States, and which includes cooperation in areas including nuclear-powered submarines, long-range strike capabilities, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing.
The last time B-2s were at Diego Garcia they made use of a new mobile operations center. This readily deployable command post is an essential component of new expeditionary concepts of operations for the stealth bombers, expanding the number of operating locations available to them. It could also be the case that the command post will benefit the B-1, further enabling the kinds of short-notice deployments to austere locations that are becoming increasingly relevant to the U.S. strategy in the Pacific.

U.S. Air Force

Elements of the new new mobile operations center support B-2 operations at Diego Garcia in August 2020.


Earlier in 2020, Diego Garcia played host to six B-52 Stratofortress bombers. As we observed at the time, the basing decision looked to have been made, at least in part, to put the aircraft beyond the reach of Iran’s ballistic missiles, as tensions with that country flared during the final weeks of the Trump administration.
Although the Air Force is preparing for a future without the B-1, and recently retired 17 examples, the type is still due to receive various upgrades, including the integration of new weapons capabilities, such as the ability to carry conventional standoff missiles and hypersonic weapons on new external pylons. As such, it remains an important strategic asset. Famously, the ‘Bone’ carries the largest conventional weapons payload of any aircraft in the Air Force. Included among this is the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, which provides a potent anti-ship capability that has particular resonance as a counter to the growing PLA Navy in the Pacific.

U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Hannah Malone

U.S Air Force Captain Anthony “NERO” Carbone, 37th Bomb Squadron weapons and tactics officer, descends down the ladder of a B-1B at Diego Garcia, October 17, 2021.


With that in mind, the B-1’s return to the Pacific could be part of a larger effort to not only send a message to the regimes in Beijing and Pyongyang but also assure American allies and partners in the region.

We don’t know for how long the B-1s will be operating out of Diego Garcia but it’s likely the Air Force will again seek to demonstrate the aircraft’s long-range capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, Diego Garcia’s strategic location not only gives the ‘Bones’ the option to exercise alongside various friendly regional powers but also places them firmly within reach of various potential hotspots, too.
Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

B-1 Bombers Deploy To Diego Garcia For The First Time In Over 15 Years

The swing-wing bombers are back at the remote Indian Ocean outpost at a time of rising tensions in the wider Asia-Pacific region.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

What Should Really Alarm Us About China’s New “Hypersonic” Missile Test
It’s not the test itself.

By Fred Kaplan
Oct 20, 20219:52 AM

China displays its DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles during a parade in Beijing in 2019. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images



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A new type of Chinese missile is triggering panic among some U.S. defense officials, but the alarms are overblown.

In a test this past August, according to an article in last weekend’s Financial Times, this missile flew at “hypersonic” speeds in a low orbit all the way around the globe. Toward the end of the flight, it released a vehicle (capable of containing a nuclear warhead), which then glided toward its target. Such a missile could approach the United States not just from the north—as normal ballistic missiles would—but from the east, west, or south. It would thus evade our warning radars and, as one official put it, “negate” our missile-defense systems.

Chinese officials have denied the story, saying they were just testing a reusable civilian rocket. Wednesday’s New York Times raises questions about whether the test happened, at least in quite the way, or with the significance, that the FT breathlessly suggests. But let’s say the story is true. Let’s say that this new missile could render the U.S. missile-defense system useless.

Well, our missile-defense system isn’t terribly useful at the moment, with or without China’s exotic efforts. According to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s latest figures (released just this past August), the one system designed to shoot down long-range missiles aimed at the United States—the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system—has successfully shot down a mock warhead in 12 of its 19 tests. Moreover, the system has not been tested at all since March 2019. And three of its last six tests were failures. That’s not exactly a formidable defense system to begin with, especially since the tests were planned well ahead of time, so that the technical crews knew exactly when, and from where, the mock warheads would appear in the sky.

It’s also worth noting (and this is no state secret), the GBMD system has never been tested against more than one mock warhead at a time. If the Chinese wanted to “negate” our missile defenses, a more efficient way of doing this would be simply to fire two warheads (possibly from the same missile) at each of the most high-value targets. If the first warhead got shot down (not a sure thing), the second would very likely get through.

The Chinese might eventually come to this conclusion themselves. The FT quoted an intelligence official as saying that China’s very complicated missile missed its target by about 24 miles. The most modern intercontinental ballistic missiles—those that follow a parabolic path from launch site to target—miss their targets by just one-tenth of one mile.

Let’s clear up one more source of confusion—this talk of “hypersonic” missiles. The term means a missile that travels at five times the speed of sound or more. Regular ICBMs travel at 23 times the speed of sound. In other words, ICBMs, which have been around for 60 years, are also hypersonic missiles.

The United States, Russia, and China are developing genuinely new types of hypersonic missiles. One type would be an ICBM fitted with a non-nuclear warhead. In the U.S. version (which doesn’t yet exist—none of these things yet exist), this would fit into the “Prompt Global Strike” program, which would allow the U.S. to hit targets anywhere on earth, very quickly, without having to resort to nuclear weapons. Another type of hypersonic missile would be a glider, which flies the entire way through the atmosphere (rather than arcing into outer space), thus evading certain kinds of warning radar. However, the Chinese missile in question is neither of these things. In the test, it released a “glide vehicle” only as the missile approached the target. Through most of its flight path, it behaved the same way as a ballistic missile, except that it orbited Earth at a lower altitude. In other words, if the U.S. bought more sensors to detect missiles coming at us from all directions, the GBMD would have no more trouble shooting down this missile than it would have shooting down other kinds of missiles.

So what are the Chinese up to? It’s hard to tell. One possibility is that they’re doing just what some fear they’re doing—they’re trying to undermine the U.S. missile defense system, whose capabilities they are drastically overestimating. Some nuclear strategists have long warned that missile-defense systems only encourage adversaries to build more—or more sophisticated—offensive missiles. This is why the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty in 1972—to preempt an offense-defense arms race. President George W. Bush abrogated that treaty in 2001. Ever since, the U.S. has spent about $10 billion a year developing various types of missile-defense systems, most of them designed to deal with possible threats from the likes of North Korea and Iran. These systems have had little or no ability to deal with a major attack from Russia or China.

But tell that to the Russians and Chinese.

This issue may seem strange from the get-go—but so is the logic of nuclear deterrence, where a good defense can augment a good offense. The worry is that Country A could launch a nuclear first-strike against Country B; then, when Country B retaliates with its surviving weapons, Country A will shoot them down with its missile-defense system. In this scenario, missile defense is the back-up shield that wipes out, or greatly reduces, a country’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack. (This is not fanciful. To many in the U.S. military in the 1950s and ’60s, the whole point of developing missile defenses was to enhance America’s first-strike capability.) The steps that China is now taking in nuclear weapons—this hybrid hypersonic-glide missile, as well as 200 silos that it’s dug, possibly to house 200 new ICBMs—could all be interpreted as steps to neutralize America’s missile-defense system and, therefore, to preserve its own nuclear deterrent.

Should we, therefore, do nothing? John Pike, director of the private research firm GlobalSecurity.org, says that as long as we’re steeped in the bizarre logic of nuclear deterrence, the U.S. “has to address every countermeasure that China demonstrates, even though China does not deploy everything it demonstrates.” (Pike doesn’t necessarily endorse the bizarre logic.) In this sense, China may be playing a diabolical game—pressuring the U.S. to spend tens of billions of dollars on some new technology in order to defuse a demo that China doesn’t plan to turn into a weapon anyway.

Some are taking the bait. Michael Gallagher, a Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, told FT that the Chinese missile test should serve as a “call to action,” warning, “The People’s Liberation Army now has an increasingly credible capability to undermine our missile defenses and threaten the American homeland.” Gallagher seems to believe—as do many, for reasons that aren’t quite clear—that we actually have an effective missile-defense system that protects the United States. He also is wishfully blind to the fact that “the American homeland” and all the world’s homelands have been under threat of destruction since the nuclear age began in 1945—or at least since the missile age began in the early 1960s.

It is a terrifying thought that enough nuclear weapons exist to destroy all life on the planet several times over—and that only a small fraction of these weapons are enough to kill most Americans and wipe out everything we hold dear. It is a fact that we would all like to ignore, to the extent we’re forced to think about it. Hence our fascination with missile-defense systems and the free ride that Congress has given the Missile Defense Agency all these years, despite the pathetic test record of its products. The problem is that a good defense, even if we succeeded in building one, would only prompt our adversaries to step up their offense—which China seems to be doing (as is Russia).
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The MDA will no doubt be answering Gallagher’s “call to action.” Expect requests for much more money to counter China’s hypersonic missile, even if it doesn’t yet exist, even if its sole demonstration missed the target by 24 miles. Speaking about the Chinese threat, Air Force Gen. Christopher Niemi, director of strategy, plans, programs, and requirements for U.S. Pacific Air Forces, told Defense One, “We should look at what is possible from a physics perspective, as opposed to what we think [China is] going to do.” From that view, the sky is the limit on what threats our generals might imagine—and what new weapons they might conceive, at what outlandish cost, to deal with them.

We’ve been down this road before. It ended, in good part, by luck, peacefully. The game seems to be back on, this time with more than two players, in a world that’s far more fragmented and far more technologically advanced. This time it might end badly. We should all figure out a way to call the game of

What Should Really Alarm Us About China’s New “Hypersonic” Missile Test

It’s not the test itself.

slate.com

 

[jward]

This Alaskan Air Base Will Host An Experimental Mini Nuclear Reactor
The military hopes its new mini nuclear reactor will lead to new battlefield energy capabilities and help power its sprawling installations.
By Joseph Trevithick October 20, 2021

• The War Zone

/ Los Alamos National Laboratory
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The U.S. Air Force recently announced that it has picked Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska as the base to host a new small nuclear reactor as part of a pilot program. The U.S. military, as a whole, together with the Department of Energy has been increasingly looking into micro-reactor designs as possible ways to meet ever-growing electricity demands, including for units on the battlefield, as well as to help cut costs and improve general operational efficiency by reducing reliance on fossil fuels.
The Department of Air Force announced the selection of Eielson as the host facility for this pilot reactor on Oct. 18, 2021. The base is situated deep within the interior of Alaska near the city of Fairbanks and is around 110 miles south of the Arctic Circle. It is home to the active-duty 354th Fighter Wing, which flies F-35A Joint Strike Fighters and F-16 Viper aggressor jets, as well as the Alaska Air National Guard's 168th Air Refueling Wing with its KC-135 tankers, among other units.

USAF

F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, F-16 Viper aggressors, and KC-135 tankers on the runway at Eielson during an "Elephant Walk" combat readiness exercise in December 2020.

“Energy is a critical asset to ensure mission continuity at our installations,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Environment, Safety, and Infrastructure Mark Correll said in a statement. “Micro-reactors are a promising technology for ensuring energy resilience and reliability, and are particularly well-suited for powering and heating remote domestic military bases like Eielson AFB.”


It is not clear exactly what the specifications might be for the reactor that is now set to be constructed at Eielson, which will be Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) certified and contractor-owned and operated, or when it might first go critical or reach its full expected power output. The Air Force did say that the project in question had been initiated in response to language in the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2019 Fiscal Year and that the goal is for the micro-reactor to be fully operational by the end of 2027.

This would seem to indicate that this reactor is the one that the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) is leading the development of as part of an effort known as Project Pele. The goal of that project, which started in 2019 and that you can read more about here, is to demonstrate a small reactor capable of producing between one and five megawatts of power. By comparison, typical civilian nuclear power plants generate hundreds or even thousands of megawatts. The microreactor Project Pele is seeking is small in terms of power generation even compared to the compact designs used in nuclear-powered submarines, such as the 40-megawatt class S9G used in the U.S. Navy's Virginia class boats.

The Project Pele reactor will also use Tri-structural Isotopic (TRISO) fuel. "Each TRISO particle is made up of a uranium, carbon and oxygen fuel kernel," an official Department of Energy news item explains. "The kernel is encapsulated by three layers of carbon- and ceramic-based materials that prevent the release of radioactive fission products." TRISO nuclear fuels are typically described as offering higher performance than comparable amounts of traditional fissile material used in power plants, as well as being safer to use and handle. This, in turn, enables the development of more compact, but also more reliable reactors.
In March, the Pentagon awarded contracts for prototype Project Pele reactors to X-Energy and BWX Technologies. These deals cover the continued maturation of the respective designs over the next two years, with the expectation being that a winning design will be selected afterward. The hope is that work on an actual microreactor will begin by the end of the 2022 Fiscal Year.

The Air Force also did not detail the reasons behind why it chose Eielson for this project, but the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and independent organizations have all suggested it as a potential location for microreactor testing in the past. Its location and existing power infrastructure – it has its own coal-fired power plant already – have long made it an attractive option.

USAF

Inside Eielson's existing coal-fired power plant.

All told, the facility is a good representation of remote power generation challenges, broadly, as well as logistical and other impacts as a result of the continued reliance on fossil fuels. With regards to the latter issue, the U.S. military has increasingly highlighted the potential security risks presented by global climate change in recent years and there have been numerous initiatives to reduce fossil fuel use across the services. Global climate change has also been a major factor in opening up access to new resources and trade routes in the Arctic, which has led to increased competition and growing concerns about the potential for conflict in the region. That, in turn, has increased the strategic significance of U.S. military bases in Alaska, including Eielson.

For Eielson, specifically, the use of coal presents environmental and cost issues due to the base's power plant itself and the infrastructure necessary to support it. For instance, the Air Force owns a fleet of diesel locomotives that are dedicated to bringing in trainloads of coal, as well as other supplies, to the base on a regular basis.

USAF

One of the Air Force's EMD GP40-2 diesel locomotives that support operations at Eielson.


"The winter sees the highest level of sustained power, about 13 to 15 MWe [megwatts of electric capacity], using up to 800 tons of coal per day," according to a 2018 report from the independent Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). "The base maintains a 90 day supply of coal on site, and the plant has a thaw shed to de-freeze the coal prior to use."

USAF

Coal stored in outdoor piles at Eielson.


Eielson's location, combined with the fact that it is a major Air Force base, presents certain benefits with regards to security and regulatory concerns, as well. "It should also be noted that numerous stakeholders have recommended that the first microreactor project in Alaska should be at a military base, possibly Eielson Air Force Base" where "DOD is not required to comply with State law," a report from the Alaska Center for Energy and Power (ACEP) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, which was released in January, notes.

It is important to remember that Project Pele's goal is not just to develop a small reactor to help power established facilities, but also one that could be readily deployable, including to forward locations on an actual battlefield. The idea is that this could streamline logistics and reduce costs for operations that currently rely on large, regular deliveries of gasoline, diesel, and other fuels.

DOD

A graphic depicting a notional concept of operation involving the deployment and use of a mobile nuclear reactor in a battlefield context.


Though advocates point to the increased reliability offered by modern TRISO-fueled micro-reactor designs, there remain various other safety and security concerns, including what might happen if such a reactor is hit by incoming fire or captured by hostile actors. TRISO fuel is also touted as offering benefits when it comes to general environmental concerns, including the matter of waste byproducts.

At the same time, it is worth pointing out that 19,780 acres associated with Eielson are already designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a so-called "Superfund site," due to existing toxic chemical contamination related to "closed and active unlined landfills, shallow trenches where weathered tank sludge was buried, a drum storage area, and other disposal and spill areas." More recently, the base has been identified as one that also suffers from contamination as a result of the use of firefighting foams containing perfluorinated compounds.
"Public sentiment might affect potential decisions" when it comes to where to test micro-reactors, the January 2021 ACEP report notes.

The actual establishment of the micro-reactor plant at Eielson is still likely years away, in which time public sentiment and other factors could well impact the plan and its schedule. At the same time, the U.S. military, as a whole, is very interested in the potential that small reactors hold for providing large amounts of cost-effective power to support future battlefield operations and more routine day-to-day activities.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
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This Alaskan Air Base Will Host An Experimental Mini Nuclear Reactor

The military hopes its new mini nuclear reactor will lead to new battlefield energy capabilities and help power its sprawling installations.

www.thedrive.com

 

[danielboon]

NATO to agree master plan to deter growing Russian threat
By Robin Emmott
posted for fair use

• Summary

• Prepares for simultaneous attacks including nuclear and cyber
• Officials and diplomats say no such attack is imminent
• Russia denies any war-like intentions

BRUSSELS, Oct 21 (Reuters) - NATO defence ministers are set to agree a new master plan on Thursday to defend against any potential Russian attack on multiple fronts, reaffirming the alliance's core goal of deterring Moscow despite a growing focus on China.
The confidential strategy aims to prepare for any simultaneous attack in the Baltic and Black Sea regions that could include nuclear weapons, hacking of computer networks and assaults from space.
"It recognises a more 21st century threat and how to deal with it," British defence minister Ben Wallace told reporters.
Officials stress that they do not believe any Russian attack is imminent. Moscow denies any aggressive intentions and says it is NATO that risks destabilising Europe with such preparations.

But diplomats say the "Concept for Deterrence and Defence in the Euro-Atlantic Area" - and its strategic implementation plan - is needed as Russia develops advanced weapon systems and deploys troops and equipment closer to the allies' borders.
"This is the way of deterrence," German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said of the plan.
"And this is being adapted to the current behaviour of Russia – and we are seeing violations particularly of the air space over the Baltic states, but also increasing incursions over the Black Sea," she told German radio Deutschlandfunk.
Approval will allow for more detailed regional plans by the end of 2022, a U.S. official said, allowing NATO to decide what additional weapons it needs and how to position its forces.

1/3
A NATO flag is seen ahead of a summit in Brussels, Belgium, July 10, 2018. REUTERS/Reinhard Krause/File Photo

FLASHPOINTS
In May, Russia amassed some 100,000 troops on its border with Ukraine, the highest number since Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014, Western officials say. In September, Russia used new combat robots in large military drills with its ex-Soviet ally Belarus that have alarmed Baltic allies.
With Russia upgrading or replacing Soviet military space systems to potentially attack satellites in orbit, developing artificial intelligence-based technologies to disrupt allied command systems, Moscow is also developing "super weapons".
Unveiled in 2018, they include nuclear-capable hypersonic cruise missiles that could evade early-warning systems.

Retired U.S. General Ben Hodges, who commanded U.S. army forces in Europe from 2014 until 2017, said he hoped the plan would foster greater coherence in NATO's collective defence, meaning more resources for the Black Sea region.
"To me, this is the more likely flashpoint than the Baltics," Hodges told Reuters, noting fewer big allies such as Britain and France have a strong presence in the Black Sea, and Turkey is more focused on conflict in Syria.
Jamie Shea, a former senior NATO official now at the Friends of Europe think-tank in Brussels, said the plan might also help to cement a focus on Russia at a time when major allies are seeking to boost their presence in the Indo-Pacific and counter China's rising military power.
"The assumption up until now has been that Russia is a nuisance but not an imminent threat. But the Russians are doing some worrying things. They're practising with robotics, and hypersonic cruise missiles could be very disruptive indeed," Shea said.

NATO agrees master plan to deter growing Russian threat

NATO defence ministers agreed a new master plan on Thursday to defend against any potential Russian attack on multiple fronts, reaffirming the alliance's core goal of deterring Moscow despite a growing focus on China.

www.reuters.com

 

[danielboon]

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#BREAKING Blast cuts power to Afghan capital Kabul, according to power company

 

[jward]

U.S. Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon Test Fails
The test appeared set to loft a hypersonic weapon beyond the range of any existing known U.S. boost-glide vehicle-based weapon in development.
By Joseph Trevithick October 21, 2021

• The War Zone

USN
Joseph Trevithick View Joseph Trevithick's Articles
@FranticGoat


Details are still limited, but the Pentagon has confirmed that a U.S. military test today of a long-range hypersonic weapon from Alaska has failed. There are reports that the system being tested was the missile design that will be used in the U.S. Army's Dark Eagle and the U.S. Navy's Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike weapon systems. But it is uncertain that is the case considering where this test took place, and an entirely separate booster stack or even different hypersonic payload may have been used. This all follows an earlier official statement about three successful tests yesterday related to the development of that common Army-Navy weapon.
Reuters was first to report on this failed test, which was conducted from the Pacific Spaceport Complex-Alaska on Kodiak Island in that state. Other outlets are now reporting many of the same basic details, but exactly what was being tested and how it failed remain unclear.

Confirming Reuters report that a DoD test of a hypersonic missile in Alaska failed earlier today, a day after successful Army/Navy hypersonic test in Virginia.
— Paul McLeary (@paulmcleary) October 21, 2021​

"A booster rocket with a hypersonic glide body attached failed to launch today during a launch test at Kodiak, Alaska says a U.S. official," ABC News' Luis Martinez wrote on Twitter. This raises questions about whether the missile even left the pad during this test.

A booster rocket with a hypersonic glide body attached failed to launch today during a launch test at Kodiak, Alaska says a U.S. official.
— luis martinez (@LMartinezABC) October 21, 2021​

The Army and Navy have been working together on a hypersonic weapon since 2017, with the services, respectively, planning to fire it from ground-based launchers and ships and submarines. Aviation Week's Steve Trimble has reported that this failed test was the first attempt to test a prototype of this common missile, which consists of a two-stage booster with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle on top. Both services have previously conducted tests of the vehicle itself using other boosters.

Confirmed: Failed Joint Flight Campaign (JFC-1) test at Kodiak today. Was intended to be first test of Block 0 Common Hypersonic Glide Body on the two-stage common booster. All previous LHRW/CPS/AHW tests involved glide bodies launched on other boosters, such as STARS. https://t.co/y9OGn9v187
— Steve Trimble (@TheDEWLine) October 21, 2021​

The Army and Navy had previously said that they intended to begin flight testing their common hypersonic weapon in the 2022 Fiscal Year, which began on Oct. 1. The Army had also said earlier this year that at least some of this testing would be carried out from Kodiak.
The Pentagon had earlier confirmed to Reuters that it had conducted three successful tests of "advanced hypersonic technologies, capabilities, and prototype systems" related to Dark Eagle and the Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) weapon system "in a realistic operating environment." Sandia National Laboratories, which designed the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle that the Army and Navy are using on their common missile, led those tests, which took place at NASA's Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia.

Indications of an impending test from Kodiak, which has also been used for missile defense-related testing in the past, had arisen earlier this week in the form of alerts to civilian pilots and mariners about the potential hazards. Those notices had indicated that Kodiak was the launch point and that the impact area would be near or within the boundary of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, a U.S. Army-managed test range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Navigational Warnings have appeared from which it looks like the USA is conducting a Missile Defense Test from Kodiak (Alaska) and Kwajalein today or the coming days.
Areas are similar to those earlier issued for 21 June this year@nukestrat @wslafoy @planet4589 @mhanham pic.twitter.com/8Sis3WLazR
— Dr Marco Langbroek x2 #Vaccinate (@Marco_Langbroek) October 19, 2021​

The distance between these launch and impact points is significantly longer than the stated range of the common Army-Navy hypersonic missile. The Army has only said in the past that Dark Eagle will be able to hit targets out to a distance of "greater than" 1,725 miles away. The distance between Kodiak and Kwajalein is around 4,000 miles.
This failed test also notably comes after reports that China has tested a new fractional orbital bombard weapon system that uses a hypersonic glide vehicle. News of those tests first broke on Sunday, with a second report coming out yesterday that said the Chinese had conducted two tests of this weapon system earlier this year, not one as had been initially reported. You can read more about what we know of this Chinese development here.

Rough translation from Xi Jinping's May speech:
"Defense science and technology innovation has made significant achievements..aircraft carrier...J-20...DF-17... and China is in the forefront of hypersonic weapons." https://t.co/ZnkkyliboZ
— M. Taylor Fravel (@fravel) October 18, 2021​

U.S. President Joe Biden also said yesterday that he was concerned by China's new hypersonic weapon developments.
We will continue to update this story as more information becomes available.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

U.S. Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon Test Fails (Updated)

The test appeared set to loft a hypersonic craft beyond the range of any existing known U.S. boost-glide vehicle-based weapon in development.

www.thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

The photograph in the Tweet below, taken during an incident in 2019, shows a fixed Avenger system in Washington, D.C.





Otherwise, the U.S. Army has around 18 Air Defense Artillery Battalions equipped with Patriot, the service's main surface-to-air missile system. Each one of these battalions has between three and five batteries, depending on their exact composition. Last October, elements of the 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, out of Fort Hood in Texas, conducted a training exercise that saw them deploy to a commercial airport. This, in part, demonstrated how Patriot batteries could be sent to protect nonmilitary sites.

READER SUBMISSION

Elements of the Army's 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment at Easterwood Airport in College Station, Texas, in October 2020.


However, not all the Army's Patriot units are available to be deployed inside the United States in a crisis. Five of them are overseas on a permanent basis — two in Germany, two in South Korea, and one in Japan. Two more are dedicated training units.
The Army has some six more batteries of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems designed to engage incoming ballistic missiles, one of which is permanently based on Guam and another of which is forward-deployed to South Korea.

The service just recently established two more batteries with the Israeli-made Iron Dome system, which focuses primarily on cruise missile defense. One of those units is now headed for a temporary experimental deployment to Guam. In September, the Army awarded a contract to defense contractor Dynetics for the purchase of a similar system, known as Enduring Shield, to meet cruise missile defense and other requirements.

US Army

A truck-mounted launcher from one of the U.S. Army's two Iron Dome batteries.


The Army and the Marine Corps have additional units equipped with Avengers, as well as shoulder-fired Stingers, that could provide point defenses around various sites, including against incoming cruise missiles. The Army is also in the process of fielding a new short-range air-defense system based on the Stryker 8x8 wheeled armored vehicle, which has Stingers, as well as Hellfire missiles and a 30mm automatic cannon. Additional systems, including ones equipped with directed-energy weapons, are now in development.






It's important to remember that, during an actual crisis, demand for these relatively limited ground-based air-defense assets would also come from commanders around the world, who would be faced with a multitude of air and missile threats themselves. Beyond cruise and ballistic missiles, drones (including various tiers of armed types) present very real threats now to troops on battlefields abroad and at home, as well. The drone and missile strikes on oil-related infrastructure in Saudi Arabia back in 2019 provided a particularly notable wake-up call about these issues. The War Zone has, on multiple occasions, specifically highlighted the potential danger that small drones pose to American domestic critical infrastructure, as well as U.S. military activities.
Struve did rightly point out that American fighter jets, as well as their Canadian counterparts, provide the primary layer of air and missile defense, including against incoming cruise missiles. However, one of his fellow panelists at the MDAA roundtable, Air Force Col. Jason Nalepa, the commander of the 173rd Operations Group, part of the Oregon Air National Guard's 173rd Fighter Wing, noted the "tyranny of distance" that limits how quickly fighters can respond to threats after scrambling from their bases around North America. In addition, those jets simply can't be in every place at once and only carry so many missiles, further underscoring the importance of ground-based assets positioned at or near critical sites to provide additional layers of more localized protection.

DOD

Air Force Col. Jason Nalepa, head of the Oregon Air National Guard's 173rd Operations Group, shared this unclassified map during the MDAA virtual roundtable, which shows various NORAD air defense nodes. The green circles indicate bases that host Air Force fighter jets, including those assigned to Air National Guard units, tasked with the homeland defense mission.


All this clearly requires the kinds of discussions that Struve says are happening now about how the U.S. military can best use the assets available to mitigate increasing risks, particularly from conventional long-range cruise missiles that can be launched from aircraft, submarines, and ships, including even potentially non-descript commercial cargo vessels. His comments also raise clear questions about how the United States can and should expand its capacity to provide air and missile defenses domestically going forward.

In addition, NORAD's vice director of operations highlighted the importance of existing integrated sensor networks, such as the North Warning System, along with future ones and other forms of intelligence in detecting potential threats or even helping to prevent crises from turning into full-blown conflicts, to begin with. "What we really need to be able to have is a complete, integrated system of ... sensors, from the sea floor to on orbit, that are going to be able to detect any type of one of those threats, so that we can have that warning capacity to be able to inform our national leadership and take action," he said.

"We're also working heavily in the information dominance phase, and that would be the ability to take data from old sensors that were specifically calibrated [to detect certain threats] and [that] leave about 90% plus of their data on the cutting room floor... [and] being able to put [new] back-end processing on some of those sensors," he added. There is a desire to "integrate that with... 'left-of-launch' intelligence, to be able to give us more time and space ... something that every commander needs to be able to deescalate a conflict," as well.

Since 9/11, NORAD has been working toward fielding new and improved distributed sensor and networking capabilities, as well as additional interception capacity, first under the Homeland Defense Design effort and now under a new overarching initiative known as the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystems for Layered Defense (SHIELD). One of SHIELD's more notably "spiral" developments has been the integration of new AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radars, a new active electronically scanned array type, onto Air Force F-16C/D fighter jets, giving them improved abilities to spot and engage various threats, including low-flying cruise missiles. You can read more about this project here.

The development and fielding of new or improved surface-to-air missile systems are reportedly among SHIELD's goals, as well. "The SHIELD strategy seeks ways to reduce costs by optimizing for defense of domestic locations," according to a story Air Force Magazine published in January. "Patriot surface-to-air missile defense systems, for example, were originally designed to protect Army units while on the move."

"They’re built to travel over rough terrain and hardened to operate through chemical or biological attacks," it continued. "NORAD believes it can cut costs by stripping out some of those features while retaining its advanced fire-control system."
SHIELD would also seem to present increased demand for new, shorter-range systems, such as Dynetics’ Enduring Shield. However, these types of air defense systems would only be able to cover relatively small areas. This, in turn, would require the purchase of a larger number of them to ensure that they would be available in the quantities necessary to provide any sort of robust coverage domestically, as well as meet demands for commanders downrange.

In the meantime, the U.S. military's plan clearly is to prepare to deploy air-defense assets available now to protect critical infrastructure, if necessary. However, as NORAD's Struve notes, the limited number of surface-to-air missile systems means, at least for the foreseeable future, that there will have to be discussions about what sites would get additional protective shields during an actual crisis.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

Please see source for video
Posted For Fair Use

Surface To Air Missiles Now Needed To Protect Critical U.S. Infrastructure During A Crisis

Growing threats to the homeland, especially from advanced cruise missiles, have prompted new initiatives aimed at defending key sites.

www.thedrive.com

Back at the height of the Cold War, Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM), had 265 SAM batteries around the US. That's probably the minimum needed now for the kind of coverage they'd need. What that would work out in terms of cost, both for sites, radars, missiles, personnel and other infrastructure definitely won't be cheap. And that doesn't even get into how much time it would take to get it all in place.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

India among select few developing hypersonic weapons technology, says US report

China had recently tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circled the globe before moving towards its target

www.asianage.com

India among select few developing hypersonic weapons technology, says US report

THE ASIAN AGE. | PAWAN BALI
Published : Oct 23, 2021, 6:36 am IST
Updated : Oct 23, 2021, 6:36 am IST

China had recently tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circled the globe before moving towards its target

While the Chinese missile is said to have missed its target, it showed that the country had the capability to develop such weapons. This took the US by surprise as it had expected China to take much longer to reach this stage. — Representational image/AP

New Delhi: India is among the select few countries worldwide that are developing “hypersonic weapons technology” which threaten to bypass most of the current missile defence systems to deliver nuclear bombs, the quasi- independent US Congressional Research Service said in its latest report.

This comes amid concern in the US over a report that China had recently tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circled the globe before moving towards its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability and further reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.


While the Chinese missile is said to have missed its target, it showed that the country had the capability to develop such weapons. This took the US by surprise as it had expected China to take much longer to reach this stage. Moreover, experts believe that in case of nuclear weapons, even if the bomb misses its target by a few kilometres, it is still very dangerous.

Hypersonic missiles fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) but are more manoeuvrable than ballistic missiles. “Although the United States, Russia and China have the most advanced hypersonic weapons programmes, a number of other countries -- Australia, India, France, Germany and Japan -- are also developing hypersonic weapons technology,” said the report to presented to the US Congress.


It said India had collaborated with Russia on the development of the BrahMos-II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile. “Although BrahMos-II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the programme faces significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028,” said the report. It said India was reportedly also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle programme and successfully tested a Mach 6 “Scramjet” in June 2019 and September 2020.

It said India operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13. The report said hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defence due to their speed, manoeuvrability and low altitude of flight. “For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic weapons until late in the weapon’s flight. This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decision-makers assessing their response options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon -- potentially permitting only a single intercept attempt,” it said.


The report quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin to put forth the point that Russia and China were developing hypersonic weapons as they fear that the US is increasingly deploying more anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality and creating new missile launching areas. “If we don’t do something, eventually this will result in the total devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. This means that all our missiles could simply
be intercepted,” the report quoted Mr Putin as saying. It noted Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can manoeuvre as they approach their targets, as an assured means of penetrating the US missile defences and restoring its sense of strategic stability.


“China’s pursuit of hypersonic weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that US hypersonic weapons could enable the United States to conduct a pre-emptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure. US missile defence deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a retaliatory strike against the United States,” said the report.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Issue of Seoul pursuing nuclear armament re-ignited

The years-long subject of South Korea possessing its own nuclear weapons is being rekindled in response to North Korea's rapid expansion of its nuclear program. The South Korean and U.S. governments have made clear their objections to the idea, but given Pyongyang's meaningful progress in the...

www.koreatimes.co.kr

Issue of Seoul pursuing nuclear armament re-ignited

Posted : 2021-10-23 08:59
Updated : 2021-10-23 08:59

Experts see possessing nuclear weapons 'impossible'

By Kang Seung-woo

The years-long subject of South Korea possessing its own nuclear weapons is being rekindled in response to North Korea's rapid expansion of its nuclear program.

The South Korean and U.S. governments have made clear their objections to the idea, but given Pyongyang's meaningful progress in the development of nuclear weapons, it is likely to remain a debatable topic in the foreseeable future.

In the past, there have often been calls here for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, but to no avail due to a possible violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would be followed by sanctions and the disapproval of Washington that is wary of the spread of nuclear weapons.

Joseph DeTrani, a former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, was the latest to revisit the dormant issue.

"North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and continues to reprocess spent fuel rods for plutonium for nuclear weapons. They are assessed to have between 40 and 60 nuclear weapons," DeTrani said in a contribution to the Hill, a U.S. political website, Oct. 17.

"There is appropriate current concern that other nation-states will try to acquire nuclear weapons capability, usually for deterrence purposes. Indeed, if North Korea is permitted to retain its nuclear weapons, South Korea, Japan and others in the region may decide that, despite U.S. nuclear deterrence commitments, they need their own nuclear weapons."

His assessment is in line with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

According to the DIA's Oct. 15 report on North Korea's military power, unless it agrees to full denuclearization, including the scrapping of delivery systems, it will likely grow and advance in many sectors, including nuclear weapons, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and land-based ballistic missiles

"Kim Jong-un has placed a priority on the development and demonstration of weapons that provide North Korea the means to strike distant adversaries ― including the United States ― with nuclear weapons. … It is possible we could see a test of a long range missile over the next year," the report said, adding the country has become a critical security challenge for the U.S.

In addition, another op-ed published in the Washington Post, Oct. 7, insisted that the U.S. support South Korea if the latter decides to pursue its own nuclear weapons, an argument against the U.S. government's nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

"In the event of war, leaders in Pyongyang would have powerful incentives to use nuclear weapons to stalemate South Korea's conventional military superiority. Should the United States retaliate, the American homeland would become a target," Dartmouth College professors Jennifer Lind and Daryl Press, wrote.

They said, if war breaks out, South Korea can't be sure that its U.S. ally would rush to aid Seoul when its own survival is threatened.

"A South Korean nuclear arsenal is not what Washington prefers ― indeed, it goes against a core U.S. policy of preventing nuclear spread. But it might be the best course given the weakened foundation of the alliance. If Seoul decides to take this step, the United States should focus blame where it belongs ― on Pyongyang's illegal nuclear program ― and render political support to a valued ally," they concluded.

Rep. Kim Tae-ho of the main opposition People Power Party said, Oct. 18, South Korea arming itself with nuclear weapons could be a measure to bring North Korea back to denuclearization talks.

"There are opinions in the U.S. as to whether it is necessary to develop independent nuclear weapons in order to maintain our sovereign independence from the threat of North Korea," Kim said during a National Assembly audit.

"We should boldly try a new approach."

However, Unification Minister Lee In-young rejected the idea as unwise.

"It is not a wise solution because it gives mutual justification for the nuclear domino effect and North Korea's nuclear armament, and will bring about fallout such as international sanctions related to the NPT," Lee said.

Shin Beom-chul, director of the Center for Diplomacy and Security at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, said the South Korean government needs to use this opportunity to check on how its own nuclear deterrence can operate rather than seeking to go nuclear.

"The U.S. would not support South Korea building its own nuclear weapons, but comments from the U.S. mean the South Korean government, which has been negligent in enhancing its nuclear deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threat, needs to take the issue seriously and take relevant actions."

Park Won-gon, a professor of Ewha Womans University, said it would be impossible for the U.S. to buy into the theory of allowing its key allies to possess their own nuclear arsenals, or "offensive realism" that has been advocated since the 1980s.

"U.S. offensive realists have contended that their government should encourage key allies to acquire nuclear weapons as an absolute security guarantor given that it is viewed as nearly impossible to completely denuclearize North Korea; and the Washington Post article is in line with the theory," he said.

"However, it is not a feasible scenario for the U.S. government to allow South Korea to pursue nuclear armament as the five official nuclear-weapon states ― China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the U.S. ― would have to abandon their vested interests."

Park added: "In particular, China does not support the theory as it will assure that Taiwan will go nuclear."

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

A Counterfactual Look at the Afghan War: the “SOF-only” COA and its Implications for the Future | Small Wars Journal

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan began as a war to combat transnational terrorism but quickly evolved into something deeper and more profound. To combat terror emanating from a foreign country the U.S. sought a cooperative Afghan government, and thus the war became an exercise in first toppling...

smallwarsjournal.com

Fri, 10/22/2021 - 12:41am
A Counterfactual Look at the Afghan War: the “SOF-only” COA and its Implications for the Future
by Michael Perry

Introduction
The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan began as a war to combat transnational terrorism but quickly evolved into something deeper and more profound. To combat terror emanating from a foreign country the U.S. sought a cooperative Afghan government, and thus the war became an exercise in first toppling an uncooperative regime in the Taliban, and second establishing an effective government with a monopoly on force. The first step proved easy, while the second led to a revival of counterinsurgent theory and doctrine in the U.S. military, as the deposed Taliban fought to undermine the newly established government. With President Biden’s announcement all U.S. troops will be withdrawn after 20 years of engagement, it’s natural to take stock of what’s been achieved. Most now recognize the error in the strategy of deploying large numbers of U.S. and Coalition troops to augment the Afghan defense forces. Economically, through 2017 the combined efforts of the Afghan War had cost $877 billion, a price tag few would argue is justified by the realized returns.https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/a...of-only-coa-and-its-implications-future#_edn1 Many have even argued the large deployments of U.S. troops to Afghanistan have been counterproductive. Micro-level studies of popular sentiment in Afghanistan have shown the Taliban is more popular in many regions than the Coalition,[ii] and macro-level studies have shown an approximate threefold increase in global terrorist manpower.[iii] Throughout the war an alternative course of action (COA) that was often floated, but never materialized, was a light-footprint approach made primarily of special operations forces (SOF), who would continue to train the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) that was created after the 2001 disposal of the Taliban regime, coordinate air support, and provide direct assistance on the ground when necessary. It’s unclear whether such a COA is presently feasible given the terms of U.S.-Taliban negotiations and uncertainty surrounding what level of support the global community will provide Afghanistan moving forward, but this essay asks not whether this SOF-only COA is feasible now, but whether it was feasible from the outset. In particular, I'll describe the initial stage of the Afghan War which was, in fact, prosecuted using only U.S. SOF and local Afghan militias, describe the state of Afghanistan immediately following the Taliban ouster, and argue that a continuation of the SOF-only COA could have achieved the U.S.' strategic objective in Afghanistan. Comments will be made on the relevance of this analysis to the future of Afghanistan as well as to future U.S. engagements in counterinsurgencies.

Methodology
The case for the SOF-only COA will be made almost exclusively using historical evidence predating the arrival of conventional U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The operations involving U.S. SOF teamed with Afghan militias in late 2001 will be used to illustrate the combat effectiveness of this combined force. A comprehensive review of insurgencies since World War II will be used to assess the risks of regime collapse during an insurgency. As the U.S.’ strategic objective in Afghanistan was to combat terrorism, irrespective of an ongoing insurgency, historical evidence of successful counterterror (CT) missions will be presented to assess whether CT can be performed in the midst of a chaotic insurgency. Regarding this last point, some evidence will be drawn from sources that postdate the arrival of conventional U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as CT missions conducted by SOF in this environment are a valuable source of information.

Findings and Analysis
Part of the appeal of a SOF-only COA for Afghanistan stems from the incredible success U.S. SOF had in the first three months following 11 September 2001. Due to a combination of senior officials’ reluctance to employ large amounts of U.S. troops and the logistical challenges of deploying a large force quickly,[iv] the first US soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan were a small contingent of U.S. Army SOF supported by conventional air power. Operating under the name Task Force Dagger, on 19 October 2001, two 12-man Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) linked up with militias from the Afghan Northern Alliance (the primary adversary of the Taliban in Afghanistan) and within a month a total of 10 ODAs were on the ground working with militias, including one led by eventual Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Collectively, this combination of ODAs, air power, and Afghan militias cut through the Taliban with incredible speed, culminating in the capture of Kandahar on 7 December 2001, and the disposal of the Taliban from power.[v] In total, the Taliban suffered approximately 3,500 casualties compared to 52 for the U.S./Afghan alliance.[vi]

What Dagger in essence showed was the new Afghan regime that was to be formed had a powerful army at its disposal: U.S. SOF working with local militias, a fraction of which could have been reconstituted into an army dedicated to defending the new regime. The militiamen involved in Dagger all had their own loyalties, but a good approximation of how many of these were dedicated to the defense of the new Afghan regime is 22,500.[vii] In contrast, the Taliban had approximately 40,000 personnel, composed of native Afghans, al-Qaeda fighters, and Pakistanis, but with the casualty rates cited above manpower comparisons are not germane. The combat effectiveness of Dagger made clear that if the Taliban were to fight back, they would either need to receive vastly enhanced conventional military support or fight as guerrillas. Even the Taliban’s main backer at the outset of the war, Pakistan, surely would not have provided such conventional support; this would have been easily traceable and invited international backlash given the circumstances following 9/11. Thus, the Taliban’s only option would be to launch a guerrilla campaign, which of course they did in the years following their ouster.

In evaluating the SOF-only COA, the question then begs as to how a regime with conventional military superiority can be defeated in an insurgency. A RAND Corporation study titled “Paths to Victory” analyzed all major insurgencies post-WWII and attempted to identify causal factors for victory and defeat.[viii],[ix] One factor included in their analysis was a binary indicator for the following statement: “COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (or to prevail in the preponderance of conventional engagements, should overmatched insurgents choose to give battle).” By analyzing the insurgencies RAND coded as a COIN loss, I looked for losses where this indicator was true and assessed whether the cause of defeat translates to a legitimate risk in the hypothetical Afghan War, where the new regime is supported only by U.S. SOF and air power. I also filtered COIN losses down to those that did not end due to the withdrawal of a foreign occupying force, on the conceit that U.S. presence is small in the SOF-only COA, sustainable, and that forces could even be redeployed quickly were the Afghan regime to experience trouble following a withdrawal of U.S. SOF. This left only eight COIN losses, for which I identified three general causes of defeat.

First, counterinsurgencies were observed to fail despite vast military superiority when the regime in power became so unpopular the military refused to follow the orders of their leader. For example, in Colombia (1948 – 1958) opposing liberal and conservative factions organized a political settlement that would unseat the current president, Rojas Pinilla, who then ordered the arrest of the organizers. Top military officials defected and deposed Pinilla.[x] Similar examples include Nicaragua (1981 – 1990), Nepal (1996 – 2006), and Papua New Guinea (1988 – 1998). In the context of the Afghan War, a similar situation could occur if powerful individuals capable of influencing the militiamen dedicated to defending the Karzai presidency (or any of his successors) called for his disposal. If this occurred because Karzai was widely unpopular it wouldn’t be an inherently bad thing, but the U.S. nonetheless wouldn’t want anyone to be capable of utilizing the Afghan defense force to advance their own self-interest. Mitigations for this risk will be discussed after reviewing other causes of COIN defeat.

A second cause of defeat occurred when a foreign power intervened in an ongoing insurgency. For example, in the brief counterinsurgent campaign Pakistan launched to try to prevent Bangladesh from becoming independent (1971), India intervened to stop the genocidal nature of the counterinsurgency.[xi] This scenario is unlikely in Afghanistan: the U.S. can use her influence to prevent any blatantly genocidal behavior from the Afghan regime, and no foreign power is likely to militarily challenge U.S. interests in any case.

The final cause of defeat found in the historical case studies occurred when a counterinsurgent with de jure governmental authority in a region tried to regain control from an insurgent with de facto control, such as Russia’s war with Chechnya from 1994 – 1996. Despite generally sound COIN practices, Russia failed to gain control of Chechnya, illustrating that counterinsurgencies are hard to win when the population you’re trying to gain control over doesn’t desire a change in de facto governance. Afghanistan is historically tribal in nature and resistant to any form of central governance,[xii] and post-9/11 history has shown that while neither the Taliban nor the U.S.-backed regime is welcome in many districts, the Taliban is often preferred.[xiii] In our counterfactual scenario (and in fact in any future counterinsurgencies, the U.S. must remain cognizant that no matter how well COIN tactics are applied they may fail in generating support in many parts of Afghanistan, and careful thought should be given to how much control is truly necessary to achieve the strategic objective.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Of the three causes of defeat identified above only two appear pertinent to the U.S.' situation following the fall of the Taliban regime: a disloyal military turning against the central government, and attempting to overextend the control of the central government. Given the SOF-only COA relies initially on militiamen hastily constituted into an army to defend the newly found regime, disloyalty is a major concern. Militias are loyal to individual leaders, not a conceptual elected office, and the initial militiamen who were tasked with the defense of Afghanistan in 2002 were largely loyal to the former Northern Alliance leaders rather than the elected President Karzai.[xiv] The long-term implication of this is that Afghanistan would need to transition towards a defense force designed to be unambiguously loyal to elected officials rather than specific individuals. Such a force would be composed of tribally diverse, highly-vetted individuals, roughly equal in size to the initial militiamen employed in 2002 (22,500). In addition, so that U.S. SOF wouldn’t need to support the Afghans in perpetuity, an indigenous group of elite special forces personnel must be trained and equipped with the advanced weapons systems that allowed Task Force Dagger to be so effective. Task Force Dagger was, to a good approximation, composed of one U.S. Army Special Forces Group (SFG) and accompanying personnel to provide additional air power;[xv] this force could be conservatively replaced with 3,000 additional highly trained personnel. While training both the regular and special Afghan forces would take time, the goal of training some 25,500 forces is very reasonable. The actual COA employed by the U.S. of training a large ANSF on the scale of 300,000 personnel has been fraught with issues, ranging from a lack of motivation to a lack of ability on the part of recruits,[xvi] but the U.S. has successfully trained an elite group of soldiers with proven combat effectiveness called the Afghan National Army Command Corps (ANACC) which was 21,000 strong in 2017, with plans of expansion.[xvii] The ANACC was only founded in 2007, and presumably the training timeline could have been sped up had the training of a small, elite force been the COA from day one. A force structure of 25,500 also would have been sustainable given the state of the Afghan economy in 2002, which could support an estimated 30,000 personnel.[xviii]

It’s worth saying a few words about why, in reality, the U.S. sought to develop a large ANSF that currently stands about 300,000 strong, even though this was never sustainable without the U.S.’ financial support.[xix],[xx],[xxi] This figure, coupled with U.S. and other foreign troop support, is most likely informed by COIN doctrine that recommends large amounts of troops for every 1,000 inhabitants of a region, and a hesitancy to rely on local, autonomous militias in the defense of Afghanistan. Most of the literature on the use of local militias in the Afghan War is negative or at best mildly supportive, but these critiques are almost always written within the framework of the large ANSF COA and view militias are a stop-gap solution while the ANSF is in development.[xxii],[xxiii],[xxiv] They cite legitimate issues such as the shifting loyalties of militias, human rights abuses, and fighting amongst militias, but they fail to acknowledge most of the benefits militias provide. Not only are militias a financially feasible solution for national defense, but Afghanistan has historically been resistant to centralized governance and thus a more realistic national defense strategy may involve influencing militias to act in the national interest.[xxv] In fact, before the group-think set in regarding the primacy of a large ANSF, a model for the ANSF was proposed by Anja Manuel and Peter Singer that called for a small, centralized force of 30,000 troops (similar to the SOF-only COA), while utilizing local militias in what was described as “a ‘national guard’ that incorporates tribal and warlord militias into formal units responsible to provincial governments.” [xxvi] While these militias would remain relatively autonomous, the central Afghan government could influence their behavior via economic agreements and by giving them a seat at the political decision-making table. What Manuel and Singer don’t mention, which creates further incentive for the militias to act favorably towards the government, is the extraordinary combat capability of a small ANSF modeled on Task Force Dagger; not only does this provide a “stick” with which to threaten militias hostile to the central government, but it’s also a “carrot” that can be offered to aid local militias under threat from a resurgent Taliban.

The second of the two concerns found through examining historic cases of COIN failure was that expanding territorial control of the central government is often difficult. Part of the logic behind the use of local militias in a national guard framework of defense is to create regions that are autonomous yet cooperative with the central government, thus avoiding the risk of defeat in insurgent warfare all together. Yet, the U.S. still would need to plan for the eventuality that many of these autonomous regions will be poorly governed and policed, and become subject to attack from a resurgent Taliban, a safe haven for terrorists, or both. Given the U.S.’ objective in Afghanistan was to combat terrorism, to evaluate the SOF-only COA it must be assessed whether effective CT can be performed within such an environment. Under the SOF-only COA, while the U.S. doesn’t seek to lock-down the entire country of Afghanistan with a conventional COIN campaign, it does gain a base of support from which it can launch CT missions; this is precisely what was lacking under the Taliban regime and necessitated Task Force Dagger. It should be noted that Dagger was launched out of the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase in Uzbekistan, but diplomatic U.S.-Uzbek relations have since soured, highlighting the need to establish a solid base in Afghanistan.

One source of evidence for the U.S.’ ability to conduct CT in a hostile environment is the U.S.’ own experiences in Afghanistan thus far. While this is somewhat at odds with a counterfactual analysis of the SOF-only COA, the reality is that even under the current COA, the Afghan government only has uncontested control of approximately 53.8% of the country,[xxvii] and U.S. SOF have performed many CT missions within this environment. Navy SEALs famously raided Osama bin Laden’s compound near the Pakistani border and killed the al-Qaeda leader, but this is only one of many successful direct action (DA) missions by SOF. In 2010, for example, SOF conducted an average of five raids per day with about half capturing the intended target, and the remaining missions often generating valuable intelligence.[xxviii] In addition to DA, SOF have led hunter-killer teams through ungoverned territory in Afghanistan to capture al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in hiding and seize weapons caches. A successful example of this occurred in 2003 when teams discovered Taliban forces were coalescing in the mountains near Kandahar; SOF then led a team of indigenous forces and air power to attack the Taliban, destroying most and forcing the remainder to flee.[xxix]

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

The U.S.’ experiences in Afghanistan provide confidence CT missions can be equally successful under the SOF-only COA, but no discussion of CT in a hostile environment is complete without talking about Israel’s historical record on this issue. Israel has conducted successful CT missions throughout the Middle East and North Africa, all originating out of its home territory. Israel has conducted elaborate, long-range DA missions in areas as distant as Iraq and Tunisia;[xxx] emulating this capability would allow U.S. SOF to perform DA anywhere in Afghanistan, utilizing a solid base of support in Kabul. Israel has also performed larger scale CT operations in hostile territory. For example, during the Lebanese Civil War (1975 – 1990), Israel successfully expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon in 1982 by way of Operation Peace for Galilee, in which the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) maneuvered from their occupied territory in southern Lebanon to Beirut to attack the PLO, causing them to relocate to Tunisia.[xxxi] The expulsion of the PLO by no means ended the Lebanese Civil War, which was a messy, multi-player war not unlike the current war in Afghanistan, but Israel’s CT objective was achieved. The lesson for the U.S. in Afghanistan is that under the SOF-only COA, al-Qaeda strongholds could have been pursued in attempts to eliminate Afghanistan as a terrorist safe haven. The U.S. needn’t have lost sight of the objective of combating terrorism by becoming too engaged in the civil war against the Taliban. Larger CT missions such as Operation Peace for Galilee would require Afghan troops to work with U.S. SOF. Assuming an ongoing insurgency, the Afghan regime’s focus would be on fighting the Taliban rather than al-Qaeda and other terrorists; a natural quid pro quo is that in exchange for U.S. assistance in defending the central regime around Kabul, the regime in turn assists the U.S. in combating terrorism.

To conclude the discussion on the risk of defeat in a counterinsurgency brought on by trying to overextend the control of the central government, I’ve argued that exerting influence on local militias lessons the need to extend government control and that effective CT can be performed as long as the U.S. has a solid base of support in country. Under the SOF-only COA, in addition to teaming with local Afghan forces to ensure the regime is protected, U.S. SOF would have performed both DA and more sustained CT missions to combat al-Qaeda. As the ANSF develops and U.S. forces departs, turning over the mission of protecting the regime to the ANSF wouldn’t cause an agency problem, but the CT mission may lag in quality. Maintaining basing rights to in Afghanistan is therefore important to deploy small numbers of SOF, such as a SEAL Team or an ODA, to execute high-priority CT missions based on actionable intelligence. In fact, being able to execute such small deployments anywhere in the world should be considered a core competency if the U.S. truly intends to fight terror on a “global” level.

Conclusion
This essay has argued the U.S.’ strategic objective to combat terrorism in Afghanistan could have been achieved using only U.S. SOF, air power, and a modestly sized force of indigenous ground troops. The justification of the actual COA employed of using a large deployment of conventional U.S. troops and a large ANSF was that by deploying the doctrinally recommended number of troops to achieve victory in a counterinsurgency, the U.S. would in turn be victorious in combatting terrorism. The SOF-only COA, on the other hand, maintains that effective CT can be performed in the midst of an insurgency. This is possible by establishing a strong base of support in Afghanistan from which long-range CT missions can be launched. The historical record of Task Force Dagger provides confidence that neither the Taliban nor any other insurgent group would be capable of toppling a regime backed by U.S. SOF, and successful long-range CT missions into hostile territory by the U.S. and Israel provide confidence the U.S. could make Afghanistan inhospitable for al-Qaeda without attaining complete control of Afghanistan. Further advantages of the SOF-only COA are that it’s economically feasible, and relies on building mutually beneficial relations with local militias.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

While this essay was counterfactual and provides lessons for how the U.S. ought to think about future counterinsurgencies, the discussion can’t be complete without considering how the analysis presented here relates to the current situation in Afghanistan, where the government has collapsed with the removal of U.S. military support. Recall the three crucial factors identified for the SOF-only COA to succeed. Most fundamentally, the indigenous forces coupled with U.S. SOF and air power must be able to prevail in the preponderance of conventional battles. Second, the indigenous military must be willing to follow the orders of the regime in power. Third, it was observed that counterinsurgencies are hard to win where the counterinsurgent attempts to extend its influence into communities where lacks popularity relative to a local de facto government. While it’s premature to draw conclusions regarding the collapse of the Afghan government upon the U.S.’ withdrawal, all three factors could have raised concerns. The open-source reporting has not indicated U.S.-SOF were fighting alongside Afghan partners as they surrendered, and it’s been speculated air power wasn’t provided with the same regularity during the drawdown.[xxxii] A lack of U.S. involvement during the Taliban’s offensive would have put enormous pressure on the ANACC to act as a vanguard, and perhaps overwhelmed their capacity. The ANSF often surrendered without a fight; while this may indicate Afghan commanders believed they couldn’t win individual battles, it’s more likely an indication they weren’t willing to fight for the government. Corruption and competency within the Afghan central government have long been concerns, while the Taliban, on the other hand, are at least perceived as an organized movement. Commanders may have rationally been positioning themselves on the right side of history with their surrender. Regarding the third factor, polls indicated very low popular support for the U.S.-backed central government in many regions of Afghanistan.[xxxiii] While the central government wasn’t in direct conflict with local, de facto government bodies, they couldn’t marshal support from local militias to resist the Taliban’s offensive.[xxxiv] The U.S.-backed regime’s engagement with local leaders as part of their strategy for governing Afghanistan has experience fits and starts over the 20-year war, but has not been prioritized in recent years. A key program to empower local militias (the Afghan Local Police) was completely defunded during this critical time. In short, none of the prerequisites for the SOF-only COA appear to have been in place during the U.S. withdrawal, and the Afghan government’s collapse is in fact aligned with the historical record of counterinsurgency failures.

References

Akmam, Wardatul. “Atrocities against Humanity during the Liberation War in Bangladesh: A Case of Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 4 (December 2002): 543–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/146235022000000463.
Asia Foundation. “A Survey of the Afghan People,” n.d. http://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/resources/#archive.
Celeski, Joseph D. Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens. Hurlburt Field, Fla.: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2010.
Chan, Samuel. “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army.” Military Review, February 2009, 25–40.
Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics. Cambridge Middle East Library. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Cooper, Helene. “Afghan Forces Are Praised, Despite Still Relying Heavily on U.S. Help.” New York Times, August 20, 2017.
Crawford, Neta. “United States Budgetary Costs of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2018: A Summary of the $5.6 Trillion in Costs for the US Wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Post-‐‑9/11 Veterans Care and Homeland Security.” Brown University, Costs of War, 2017.
Feickert, Andrew. “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, July 16, 2010.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Hurray for Militias? Not so Fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police Experience.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 258–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt. “Departure of U.S. Contractors Poses Myriad Problems for Afghan Military.” New York Times, June 20, 2021.
Grenier, Robert. 88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary. First Simon&Schuster Paperbacks trade paperback edition. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2016.
Henriksen, Thomas H. The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the United States. Hurlburt Field, Fla.: JSOU Press, 2007.
Iqbal, Anwar. “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months without US Help: Ghani.” Dawn.Com, January 18, 2018.
“Joint Special Operations Task Force - North (JSOTF-N) (Afghanistan) ‘Task Force Dagger.’” GlobalSecurity.Org, n.d. Joint Special Operations Task Force - North (JSOTF-N) / "Task Force Dagger".
King, Marvin L., III. “Optimizing Counterinsurgency Operations.” Colorado School of Mines, 2014.
“Leave Them in No Peace: America’s Afghan Exit.” The Economist Radio, July 5, 2021.
Lefevre, Mathieu. “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2010.
Livingston, Ian S., and Michael O’Hanlon. “Brookings: Afghanistan Index.” Brookings Institute, September 29, 2017.
Long, Austin G., ed. Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond. Santa Monica, CA: RAND/National Defense Research Institute, 2012.
Lyall, Jason, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai. “Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 04 (November 2013): 679–705. Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core.
Manuel, Anja, and P. W. Singer. “A New Model Afghan Army.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 44. https://doi.org/10.2307/20033239.
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013.
———. Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013.
Peltier, Isaac J. “Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 26, 2005. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA436109.
Rempe, Dennis M. The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66. Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002. http://books.google.com/books?id=0ndsAAAAMAAJ.
Roggio, Bill. “Analysis: US Military Downplays District Control as Taliban Gains Ground in Afghanistan.” Long War Journal, January 31, 2019. https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...ol-as-taliban-gains-ground-in-afghanistan.php.
“The Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan.” Middle East Focus. Middle East Institute, August 18, 2021.
Thrall, A. Trevor, and Erik Goepner. “Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror.” Policy Analysis, the Cato Institute, no. 814 (June 26, 2017): 26.


About the Author
Michael Perry is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy, currently serving in the Reserves. He deployed to Afghanistan in 2020 as the lead logistics advisor for the Special Mission Wing (SMW) Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG). He holds a master’s in defense and strategic studies from the Naval War College with a specialization in irregular warfare, and currently works for George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia.

Endnotes

​

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/a...only-coa-and-its-implications-future#_ednref1 Neta Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2018: A Summary of the $5.6 Trillion in Costs for the US Wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Post-‐‑9/11 Veterans Care and Homeland Security,” Brown University, Costs of War, 2017.
[ii] Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai, “Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 04 (November 2013): 679–705, Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core.
[iii] A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, “Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror,” Policy Analysis, the Cato Institute, no. 814 (June 26, 2017): 26.
[iv] Robert Grenier, 88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary, First Simon&Schuster Paperbacks trade paperback edition (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2016).
[v] “Joint Special Operations Task Force - North (JSOTF-N) (Afghanistan) ‘Task Force Dagger,’” GlobalSecurity.Org, n.d., Joint Special Operations Task Force - North (JSOTF-N) / "Task Force Dagger".
[vi] Marvin L. King III, “Optimizing Counterinsurgency Operations” (Colorado School of Mines, 2014).
[vii] King.
[viii] Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).
[ix] Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).
[x] Dennis M Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), http://books.google.com/books?id=0ndsAAAAMAAJ.
[xi] Wardatul Akmam, “Atrocities against Humanity during the Liberation War in Bangladesh: A Case of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 4 (December 2002): 543–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/146235022000000463.
[xii] Anja Manuel and P. W. Singer, “A New Model Afghan Army,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 44, https://doi.org/10.2307/20033239.
[xiii] Lyall, Blair, and Imai, “Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime.”
[xiv] Manuel and Singer, “A New Model Afghan Army.”
[xv] Isaac J. Peltier, “Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 26, 2005), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA436109.
[xvi] Samuel Chan, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army,” Military Review, February 2009, 25–40.
[xvii] Helene Cooper, “Afghan Forces Are Praised, Despite Still Relying Heavily on U.S. Help,” New York Times, August 20, 2017.
[xviii] Manuel and Singer, “A New Model Afghan Army.”
[xix] Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Brookings: Afghanistan Index” (Brookings Institute, September 29, 2017).
[xx] Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn.Com, January 18, 2018.
[xxi] Chan, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army.”
[xxii] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for Militias? Not so Fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police Experience,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 258–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.
[xxiii] Austin G. Long, ed., Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond (Santa Monica, CA: RAND/National Defense Research Institute, 2012).
[xxiv] Mathieu Lefevre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives” (Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2010).
[xxv] Manuel and Singer, “A New Model Afghan Army.”
[xxvi] Manuel and Singer.
[xxvii] Bill Roggio, “Analysis: US Military Downplays District Control as Taliban Gains Ground in Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, January 31, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...ol-as-taliban-gains-ground-in-afghanistan.php.
[xxviii] Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, July 16, 2010).
[xxix] Joseph D Celeski, Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens (Hurlburt Field, Fla.: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2010).
[xxx] Thomas H Henriksen, The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the United States (Hurlburt Field, Fla.: JSOU Press, 2007).
[xxxi] Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics, Cambridge Middle East Library (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
[xxxii] “The Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan,” Middle East Focus (Middle East Institute, August 18, 2021).
[xxxiii] Asia Foundation, “A Survey of the Afghan People,” n.d., http://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/resources/#archive.
[xxxiv] “Leave Them in No Peace: America’s Afghan Exit.”

About the Author(s)

Michael Perry
Michael Perry is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy, currently serving in the Reserves. He deployed to Afghanistan in 2020 as the lead logistics advisor for the Special Mission Wing (SMW) Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG). He holds a master’s in defense and strategic studies from the Naval War College with a specialization in irregular warfare, and currently works for George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia.

 

[jward]

This Is Our First Look At The USS Connecticut After Its Underwater Collision
The Navy remains tight-lipped as to what the nuclear submarine hit in the South China Sea and the damage that was done.
By Tyler Rogoway October 22, 2021

One of the Navy's prized Seawolf class nuclear fast attack submarines, the USS Connecticut (SSN-22), slammed into a 'submerged object' on October 2nd, 2021. After it was clear that the submarine was stable and its reactor was safe to operate, it limped from the South China Sea, where the collision reportedly occurred, back to America's sprawling naval facility in Guam, where the damage would be assessed and the accident investigated. The Navy has remained very tight-lipped about what it thinks Connecticut collided with, or if it has any idea what it was at all.

You can read about some of the possibilities here. As of today, no pictures of the stricken submarine have surfaced, which is somewhat remarkable, although there have been plenty of misrepresented images floating around social media that claim to show the damage. Now, The War Zone has obtained satellite imagery that shows Connecticut tied up to the pier in Guam—this is the first public image of the submarine since the incident.

The high-resolution satellite imagery was taken on October 20th, 2021. It shows two submarines in port in Guam. One, which is moored on the western pier near the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) appears to be undergoing some maintenance. The white tarp-like object on its bow is not an uncommon sight for submarines in port. While it is tough to tell, compared to the other submarine moored direct across the harbor to the east, its beam looks smaller and it does not appear to have a pumpjet propulsion system. These factors, and its general shape, indicate that this is most likely an improved Los Angeles class (688i) boat. The Seawolf class, with its 40-foot beam, is wider than America's other two fast attack submarines—the Los Angeles class being 34-feet wide and the Virginia class being 36-feet wide. Also, this submarine features a pumpjet instead of a propeller. The Virginia class also is also equipped with a pumpjet.

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

The placement of the two submarines currently moored at the U.S. Naval base in Guam.

In addition, we confirmed with the Navy's Pacific Fleet that the USS Connecticut is indeed still in port in Guam. With this in mind, one of the two submarines must be Connecticut, and the one on the eastern pier is almost certainly the boat in question.

What's most interesting about this image is that, while the resolution is limited, there doesn't appear to be absolutely massive damage to the Connecticut (or the other submarine, for that matter), nor is there any type of unique support infrastructure around an area of the submarine that may be damaged. We can see nothing on the sail or the top of the bow and sonar dome that would indicate a major impact. Based on the limited information that the satellite photo provides, it seems more likely that the collision occurred well below the submarine's surfaced waterline, such as on the bottom of its hull. This may preclude the possibility of a full head-on collision, or one from above, in which the sail bore the brunt of the impact.

USN

USS Connecticut underway on the surface.

Once again, these are superficial observations based on very little information at this time. So take them as such. Light damage to topside areas would not be visible in the photo. Regardless, it's good news that the entire front of the submarine is not pulverized as we have seen in past underwater collisions.
As for the status of the Navy's response to the mishap, Commander Cindy Fields, a spokesperson for the Submarine Force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, told The War Zone the following:

“Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is the lead for assessing damage of the submarine. NAVSEA is providing an assessment team responsible for coordination of the damage assessment and development of repair recommendations, which is forwarded to the Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and NAVSEA for approval. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard is designated as Naval Supervising Authority for assessment and subsequent repairs. USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) is the lead maintenance activity in Guam.”

In the meantime, what exactly the submarine hit remains a major mystery. China has even capitalized on the event to demand answers as to the circumstances surrounding the incident, outright calling the Navy's response to the event a coverup, something the Pentagon has denied.
USS Seawolf was also seen heading out to sea from its home in Washington State on October 11, 2021. Some believe this was to replace Connecticut in the Indo-Pacific region.

USS Seawolf enroute from Bremerton to Indian Island October 11th. SEEN OFF WEST SEATTLE: Sailboat's close encounter with submarine pic.twitter.com/3XQddQye0w
— SeaWaves Magazine (@seawaves_mag) October 12, 2021​

The Navy only has three Seawolf class submarines, so getting Connecticut repaired as soon as possible will quickly become a major initiative. Hopefully, we will hear soon from the Navy on the extent of the damage and what caused it. For now, we have a lone satellite image that is, at least taken at face value, encouraging.

This Is Our First Look At The USS Connecticut After Its Underwater Collision

The Navy remains tight-lipped as to what the nuclear submarine hit in the South China Sea and the damage that was done.

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