WAR 08-13-2022-to-08-19-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(262) 07-23-2022-to-07-29-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(263) 07-30-2022-to-08-05-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(264) 08-06-2022-to-08-12-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Hummm.....

OPINION>NATIONAL SECURITY
Nuclear deterrence: Actions speak louder than words
BY BROOKE TAYLOR, PH.D., AND PETER LAYTON, PH.D., OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 08/12/22 7:00 PM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL

Nuclear threats are back with, a hard-nosed, in-your-face rhetoric. The Cold War had crises, but it was primarily a bi-polar standoff. It is now known Russia and the United States similarly feared an existential war that neither wanted. On both sides, the costs involved were simply too unpalatable for leaders, most of whom had direct experience of major conflict during World War II.

Today is starkly different with proliferation of nuclear weapons to several more states such as North Korea, Pakistan, India and an aspirational atomic Iran to name a few. The leadership of many of these countries have an off-hand attitude to major conflicts and are seemingly unconcerned about the costs in blood and treasure involved. Indeed, some consider making nuclear threats as mere “politics by other means,” unheeding of the possible dire consequences of their rhetoric and suggesting nuclear warfighting as a viable, realistic option.

At the same time, there is an era of “great power proliferation” the West faces with Russia and now China. With Russia, the war in Ukraine pivots around nuclear weapons. The Russians likely would not have invaded Ukraine, a non-NATO country, had Ukraine kept its Soviet Era nuclear forces. Russia has not attempted to physically stop the flow of conventional weapons from NATO countries, presumably because NATO has nuclear weapons. Russia has succeeded in constraining the flow of conventional weapons to Ukraine by making regular nuclear threats.

On the other hand, Ukraine cannot attack Russia directly. Russian strategic doctrine deliberately highlights nuclear weapons first-use if hostile forces invade Russian territory. Russia now looks toward annexing the parts of Ukraine it has captured, so this doctrine also inherently applies to occupied territories. All of this is reinforced by the sheer irrationality of the Russian attack on Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his leadership group do not appear to have the cost-benefit calculus of others, which suggests they may use nuclear weapons with the same scant consideration.

There are parallels in the Pacific where a rising China is turning bellicose while rapidly building up its nuclear triad. China tends to make threats, often verbally lashing out at neighboring countries to defer to China’s wishes, mainly over its desires to gain new territory. In grey zone actions across East Asian waters and deep into the South China Sea, China is shaping the strategic environment in its favor through incremental actions that are trending in an ever more dangerous direction. The extraordinarily intense reaction to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) Taiwan visit indicates that today’s China is imbued with its savage nationalism and could easily chose major war.

Against this, China has not fired a shot in anger since 1979. China’s leadership continually skirts close but stays below the international threshold of war. The leaders prefer predictability with the latest Taiwan crisis appearing pre-planned with its considerable detail and tight script. Apparently, China’s leaders consider others will self-deter as these nations do not want to fight a China convinced of its own military might.

The return of nuclear threats carries implications, three of which are readily apparent.

1) The notion that theories alone are enough to persuade potential adversaries is clearly foolish. Yet, this is how nuclear deterrence is presently referenced — not as a weapon system but as a messaging system that signals resolve. Like all theories these are simply ideas that may or may not be proven true in some future crisis. Nuclear deterrence, as messaging, should describe the weapon systems that can and would be used in response to any perceived or actual threat to the United States and our allies.

As the United States’ nuclear forces have aged, so has the messaging until it is now more of a debate or discussion of future nuclear force aspirations that tries to convince adversaries to maintain the peace. Continuing to accept this style of messaging as the foundational component of nuclear deterrence, when nuclear threats permeate the Ukraine conflict and with China set to repeat this in a possibly near-term Taiwan crisis, is dangerously ignoring reality.

2) It is time for nuclear deterrence to be discussed as an action and not an idea. The world is watching in real-time the deterioration of American nuclear deterrence strategy and policy that will have long-term impact absent of action. Words without action are empty, meaningless and void of power. In comparison, action matched with military ability and weapon systems capability can deter adversaries acting against our national interests. Why are the leaders of Russia, China and North Korea so enthusiastic about parading their weapons? They use a language that stresses projecting national strength and resolve through exhibiting military might, giant missiles, and new weapons.

It is time to use this language that they clearly understand to similarly highlight national power and modernize the triad, warheads, as well as the command, control and communications system while doubling down on public-private investments in nuclear labs and supporting infrastructure.

3) Nuclear deterrence does not hold the luxury to later watch back the tape post-game and gain lessons learned. The post-Cold War status quo was comforting but it no longer exists. Russia and China are building new nuclear forces that feature novel delivery systems, large numbers, ever more automated command and control, as well as unique employment doctrines. Simply returning to the “good, old” Cold War ways will not be enough in an age of tri-polarity at the great power level and multi-polarity at the middle powers and rogue state level.

Unrelenting emphasis on devising new employment strategies should proactively counter these threats, with additional verification occurring through rigorous red teaming and wargaming. This means a renewed focus on military training exercises between the United States and allies, and crucially solving what to do about extended nuclear deterrence in the Pacific in the absence of NATO. The Ukraine war shows what can happen without a NATO and its nuclear sharing posture in place.

Nuclear deterrence is more than simply messaging, “I told you so.” Nuclear deterrence is unmistakably demonstrating, “I can — and will — show you so.”

Rushdie attack reveals — again — true nature of Iranian regimeLiteracy is an economic growth engine – will we seize it?

It is time to take action.
Brooke Taylor, Ph.D., is vice president of wargaming for the Small Business Consulting Corporation. Taylor is the creator and principal investigator for Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) “National Nuclear Strategy and Global Security Workshop for Practitioners.” Taylor was a U.S. Congressional Nuclear Security fellow where she managed the Congressional Nuclear Working Group. Taylor is also a distinguished faculty for Missouri State University Deterrence and Strategic Studies Doctoral Program.

Peter Layton, Ph.D., is a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute at the Griffith University, in Australia and a Royal United Services Institute associate fellow. He was awarded the United Sates Secretary of Defense’s Exceptional Public Service Medal and for work at the Pentagon on force structure. He contributes regularly to the public policy debate on defense and foreign affairs issues and is the author of the book “Grand Strategy.”
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....

PEOPLE WIN WARS: A 2022 REALITY CHECK ON PLA ENLISTED FORCE AND RELATED MATTERS
MARCUS CLAY, DENNIS J. BLASKO, AND RODERICK LEE
AUGUST 12, 2022
COMMENTARY

Editor’s Note: One of the authors of this article is protected with a pseudonym. Regular readers of War on the Rocks know that we allow this in only the rarest of cases. Please see our submissions guidelines to read more about how we make these judgments.

Modeled after the Soviet Red Army at its creation from its name to its first flag, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also long struggled with one of the problems on display in Russia’s war against Ukraine: weaknesses in the enlisted force. The people of the PLA remain the weakest link of China’s defense modernization effort, as we discussed in these pages in 2020, and this may have direct consequences for Chinese Communist Party leaders’ calculations on the use of force — especially their confidence in initiating conflict. Citing Xi Jinping’s key instructions on force building given at a PLA Rocket Force (then-Second Artillery Force) base in 2015, official commentators frequently emphasize the point that “without our grassroots officers and enlisted force, no matter how magnificent the strategy is, it won’t be executed; no matter how advanced the weapon system is, it won’t work.” Those instructions remain operative today.

Xi’s attendance at a Central Military Commission “Talent Work Conference” in late 2021 highlighted that the PLA is engaged in more than just talk. In recent years, the PLA took on a series of ambitious personnel reforms and policy adjustments in the hope of strengthening its enlisted force and boosting its overall readiness level. Have things been going as planned?
Overall, yes. The PLA has made tangible improvements to the readiness of its conscript force in the short term. It has also enacted sensible policies that have the potential to boost quality of new noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and retention rates of experienced NCOs. However, the PLA will not know if this potential payoff will occur until a generation from now.

To understand why this is the case, we provide an updated account of the state of the PLA enlisted force and related force-design matters as of summer 2022. While it may be assessed that the overall readiness level of the PLA has slightly improved now that it brings conscripts on board twice a year instead of once — a change made in 2021 — new challenges have emerged in training as well as in interpersonal relationships between the spring and fall recruits. Corruption in the recruitment process continues to be prevalent. As China’s economic growth stagnates, the Chinese government openly calls on the PLA to create “job opportunities” for college graduates to help alleviate the pressure on the tightening civilian job market. Meanwhile, the PLA continues to adjust its NCO corps, allowing them to serve longer as they assume greater leadership responsibilities and the contingent of non-active-duty civilian personnel continues to be expanded. Yet official assessments of PLA officer and NCO leadership capabilities continue to be lower than expected. As recently as in July 2022, PLA press was referencing a statement made by Xi in late 2015 that reflects his dissatisfaction with the state of the PLA’s human capital:
“What I think most is whether our army can always adhere to the Party’s absolute leadership, whether they can fight victoriously, and whether commanders at all levels can lead troops to fight and command in war when the Party and the people need it.”
Twice a Year, Twice the Problems?
Roughly 700,000 personnel out of the PLA’s 2 million strong active-duty force are conscripts. Although these conscripts are the least trained and capable in the PLA’s human talent pool, they still play a vital role in not only manpower-intensive missions such as ground combat operations, but also in select technical missions. These conscripts serve for two years, so the manner in which the PLA recruits and trains these personnel with a very limited service-period is of the utmost importance.

The PLA’s two-year service period for conscripts far exceeds Taiwan’s four-month service requirement and Russia’s 12-month requirement. However, the PLA’s once-a-year conscription cycle resulted in wild swings in terms of personnel readiness. In an effort to remedy this issue, the PLA shifted to a twice-a-year cycle in 2021 by distributing the flow of conscripts into and out of the force across two time periods rather than one. This shift to spring and fall recruitment is designed to improve personnel readiness levels by optimizing training schedules rather than increasing the total force size and results in higher average unit-manning levels year-round. While the overall conscription number remains unchanged, the new practice, according to a staff officer working for the mobilization bureau of Anhui Military District, dictates that the spring recruitment meets 45 percent of the annual quota and fall recruitment takes in the rest of 55 percent of the total annual force.

New PLA conscripts must undergo three months of basic training to become minimally trained and likely are not considered experienced until they take part in the PLA’s annual summer training season. Under the old once-a-year system, roughly 50 percent of the PLA’s conscripted force would qualify as “experienced” across the year. Between October and December, newly recruited conscripts were still undergoing basic training and thus could not contribute towards unit readiness. As such, for those three months, 50 percent of conscripts in the PLA were unable to support even basic combat operations. For the remaining nine months, those conscripts met minimum training requirements and only become experienced as the previous batch of conscripts cycled out of the force.

fall-only-graph.png

Under the new twice-a-year system, training schedules ensures that the PLA always has at least 75 percent of its conscripts at a minimally trained level and available.
twice-a-year-graph.png

The PLA seeks to use “precision recruitment (精准征兵)” to fill billets in units with new personnel with the proper education and background. In order to do so, some recruiters in thousands of People’s Armed Forces Departments in townships, commercial enterprises, and schools throughout China have begun to use big data and social media to target specific individuals or their skills. However, there also are reports that “the phenomenon of ‘not being able to use who is recruited, and not being able to receive what is needed’ still exists.” And retaining college students beyond their initial service is a problem because some recruits do not feel their expertise is properly utilized.

The PLA openly acknowledges that the new schedule poses challenges to the existing conscription institutions and the workforce supporting force recruitment is adapting to the new situation. As we noted in 2020, zhuanwu ganbu (专武干部), who are civilian cadres manning People’s Armed Forces Departments, were already notoriously underpaid and overworked prior to the reform. Spring conscription, which takes place around the Chinese New Year, also overlaps with their existing tasks such as militia training and readiness training. Furthering the workload is the expansion of “pre-enlistment training (役前训练)” for new recruits conducted by local People’s Armed Forces Departments before they are shipped off to PLA training bases. During “pre-enlistment training,” new soldiers receive uniforms, learn the basics of drill and ceremony, and undergo political and physical fitness tests, intended to weed out those who might not finish basic training. Despite the moderate expansion of the size of the cadre by assigning a portion of the PLA’s non-active duty, civilian personnel to work in People’s Armed Forces Departments, many, according to PLA Daily, have been thrown into “panic mode (手脚忙乱).”

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

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Continued.....

While the challenges recruiters face were somewhat anticipated, the PLA units on the receiving end appear to be ill-prepared to manage the interpersonal relationships among its “twice-a-year” recruits who now enter service six months apart yet wear the same military rank. For instance, a private who enlisted in fall 2020 and was assigned to an artillery battalion in the 72nd Group Army confessed that he attempted to bully another private in his unit who was a spring 2021 recruit just to demonstrate his “senior” status. Although official PLA accounts seek to depict such topics in a positive light, the fact that such an issue receives official acknowledgement suggests that it is possibly a prevalent issue that warrants high-level attention.

PLA and China’s Youth Problem
While some American analysts believe that the United States is “on the cusp of a recruiting crisis,” China has been taking on sophisticated approaches to address its recruitment and retention problems for years, with mixed results.

It is generally believed that a tightening civilian job market is conducive to military recruitment. However, youth unemployment remains a politically sensitive issue to the Chinese Communist Party. The PLA, by definition, serves as a political tool to safeguard and advance the party’s interest, hence it is likely to be tasked to absorb unemployed workers. China’s National Bureau of Statistics reports that as of June 2022, the estimated youth unemployment rate in urban areas was 19.3 percent compared to 13.5 percent in early 2021. Perhaps in response, in late 2021, China’s Ministry of Education openly called on the PLA to create “job opportunities” for college graduates to help alleviate the pressure on the civilian job market. This makes an interesting contrast to India’s recent military reform known as the “Agnipath Scheme” — recruiting new soldiers for only four years — which fueled violent protests in India’s southern state of Telangana. Chinese news outlets, with or without official affiliations, appear to conclude that youth unemployment concerns and lack of government-provided support may have contributed to such unrest.

The decision to change the conscription cycle from once-a-year to twice-a-year in 2020 (ultimately implemented in 2021 due to COVID-19 lockdowns) was likely based not only on readiness considerations but possibly also on desires to increase the proportion of college graduates recruited into the force. Indeed, various local government and university mobilization websites made it abundantly clear that the spring recruitment was designed to target college graduates. The PLA also intends for the fall induction period to make entering the military more convenient for recent college graduates and students who plan on resuming their studies after their two-year enlistment. In terms of the quality of recruits, Chinese online commentators (with possible PLA affiliations) note that the new approach better accommodates college students’ senior-year schedule to mitigate the adverse effect of “distractions from internship, job hunting, and temporary unemployment.” In 2022, the PLA organized a designated career fair for college student enlistees who completed their two-year conscriptions. Preferential treatment was also given to college-student conscripts who seek to join the PLA’s civilian personnel workforce, which is now managed by a designated bureau nestled within the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, separate from the enlisted force management. This effort may also alleviate the aforementioned youth unemployment issues.

Further complicating the issue, in recent years China’s notorious “996 work culture” and increasingly unbearable living cost has given rise to its own version of a counterculture movement — an increasingly larger Chinese youth population embraces the sentiment of “lying flat (躺平)” and “doing nothing” to reject official preaching for self-realization. Despite the lack of official acknowledgement of this issue, it is almost certainly that such a movement and an overall lack of interest in work among relatively better-educated Chinese youth from middle-class families will have direct impact on the PLA’s recruitment numbers.

The NCO Corps: Head of the Soldiers, Tail of the Officers
Professionalization of any NCO corps is not a binary state, but rather a constantly evolving process. While the PLA is quite forthcoming about perceived deficiencies in its own NCO corps, this does not suggest that the PLA does not trust its NCOs. PLA NCOs fill and succeed in a variety of roles across the force, including master chief and sergeant majors at battalion level and above, staff NCOs on battalion and higher staffs, and squad leaders. Sometimes they serve as acting platoon leaders and in that role sometimes lead Chinese Communist Party organizations, i.e. ad hoc “party small group (党小组).”

Given the importance that NCOs play in providing leadership and technical expertise, the PLA is continually seeking to improve the way in which it manages this portion of the force. In 2022, the PLA announced a series of changes to its NCO corps. It started with a name change in Chinese. NCOs are no longer called shi guan (士官), or “officer of soldiers,” a Chinese translation used for Western NCO systems, but rather jun shi (军士), a more traditional Chinese term for NCO. The names of the two NCO intermediate ranks also were changed in Chinese (to 一级上士 and 二级上士, presumably sergeant first class and sergeant second class), but no official English translation has been provided. The new names now parallel the form of the three senior NCO ranks (一级军士长, 二级军士长, 三级军士长), translated from highest to lowest as master sergeant class one, two, and three, which have been used since 2009. See table below.
Rank-conversion-table.png

PLA conscripts and NCOs “Three Grades and Seven Ranks (三等七衔),” from lowest to highest in rank.

More importantly, interim regulations for NCOs and enlisted personnel were issued in the spring. Though details have not been spelled out publicly, the new regulations broadly aim to improve the quality of new NCOs, modernize NCO development, and strengthen retention incentives.

For example, the new regulations bifurcate NCOs as “management (管理军士),” those presumably in leadership billets, and “skilled (技能军士),” those in technical positions. They establish a system for certain billets to be filled by certain NCO ranks, and in what numbers, creating a codified path for promotion. To help bring new and better-educated NCOs into the ranks faster, the new regulations also allow qualified conscripts to become an NCO before their two-year service commitment is up. There is also the potential for faster promotions and extending time in rank under the new regulations.

In order to manage the retention of desirable NCO candidates who have not been able to receive promotions or do away with undesirable NCOs, the regulations also establish three types of separation from service. Namely, general separation that meets service requirement (期满退役) based on age or time in rank, controlled separation (调控退役) for intermediate and senior NCOs allowing them to serve longer than four years in one rank, and involuntary separation (强制退役) due to performance issues.

In short, these adjustments likely provide the PLA with greater flexibility to retain and promote higher quality NCOs and do away with those who are less qualified.

Conclusion
The changes to how the PLA manages its enlisted force lead to two noticeable benefits. In the short term, personnel readiness levels, especially in conscript-heavy units like PLA Army combined arms brigades and most marine and airborne units, noticeably improved because of the reforms to the conscription cycle. One potential problem is that this new cycle leaves potential troughs in personnel readiness in late spring, which also happens to be the optimal time of year to conduct amphibious operations in the Taiwan Strait, and late fall. This, however, can be solved by a circumstance-driven extension of service, as has been done in the past at the end of the once-a-year conscription cycle. Furthermore, if the PLA’s efforts to improve its NCO corps management system bear fruit, improvements to the proficiency of its enlisted force will slowly emerge over time.

But such changes also bring short and long-term uncertainties. The revisions to the conscription cycle potentially overloads local military recruitment offices and open the door for more corruption. Potential NCO force-management policies may not pan out, leading to stagnation within the NCO corps. Lastly, long-term economic and social prospects in China could drive the overall quality of new PLA personnel downward by prompting a further loosening standards for induction.

In the next five years leading to the centennial anniversary of the founding of the PLA, the development of military personnel remains a critical benchmark affecting Xi’s key military decisions. Two days before Aug. 1, Xi called on the PLA to “overcome outstanding contradictions and problems restricting the military’s personnel work and for innovation in talent cultivation, including deepening the military academy reform, and innovating military human resource management.” Much remains to be accomplished.

Whether stated explicitly or implicitly, Xi and the senior Chinese military leadership agree that fixing the PLA’s people problems is at the core of increasing the force’s combat readiness and becoming a world-class military. Due in part to social factors beyond their control, the timeline to solve the personnel management challenge is decades or a generation in the future, not years. However, the PLA may not have decades or a generation. There is always the chance that the Chinese Communist Party, possibly reacting to external actors’ behaviors or political messaging, feels the need to use force to reverse perceived threats to national sovereignty or security interests before the PLA fully resolves its personnel management issues. In this case, the PLA will have little choice but to fight with the force it has.

COMMENTARY
 

Housecarl

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The nuclear 3 body problem: STRATCOM ‘furiously’ rewriting deterrence theory in tripolar world
In the near term, STRATCOM Commander Adm. Charles Richard said that missile warning is his top priority, and expressed concern over China's FOBS test.

By THERESA HITCHENS
on August 11, 2022 at 1:03 PM

SMD 2020 — US Strategic Command is “furiously” rewriting its deterrence theory to account for a tripolar nuclear power world — the political equivalent of trying to solve the infamous “three body problem” in physics, according to the command’s top official.

“The global security environment is now today a three-party nuclear peer reality where the PRC [the People’s Republic of China] and Russia are stressing and undermining the rules-based international order,” Strategic Command head Adm. Charles Richard told the annual Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Ala. “I’m not sure what strategic stability looks like in a three-party world.”

Richard explained that today’s deterrence does not look like the Cold War, where both superpowers could rely heavily on “passive” measures to constrain destabilizing actions and maintain the nuclear balance via mutually assured destruction.

“[T]here are many passively stable two body orbital regimes that you can stick stuff in, but there are exactly zero passively stable three body orbital regimes. They all require active stabilization. And I don’t even know what that means when the forces can’t be described by physics but are political, so we have gotten to think through this much harder than we have in the past,” he said.

As Richard indicated, in physics the three body problem refers to the inherent difficulty in predicting the effect three bodies in space will have on each other. (It is also the name of an award-winning sci-fi novel by Chinese writer Liu Cixin that used the problem as a central plot device.)

What is clear, he said, is that traditional concepts such as the nuclear deterrence escalation “ladder” no longer work. Therefore, US leaders need to come up with a much more “dynamic” concept of deterrence, one that takes into account both the nuclear and conventional domains, as well as the use of other tools besides military prowess.

“We can start by rewriting deterrence theory,” Richard said. “I’ll tell you, we’re furiously doing that out of STRATCOM. We’ve got some better two-party stuff — it’s actually working quite well in the current crisis [with Russia] — that is radically different: non-linearity, linkages, chaotic behavior, inability to predict — all attributes, that are just don’t show up in classic deterrence theory.”

But, he said, more effort needs to be made to figure out how to handle the unprecedented “three-party problem” of a tripolar nuclear relationship. “We have never faced two peer nuclear capable opponents at the same time who have to be deterred differently,” he stressed.

Richard applauded Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s “integrated deterrence” concept as going in the right direction, noting it allows the Pentagon “to think about the problem holistically and then integrate across functions, theaters, domains and the spectrum of conflict.”

However, he cautioned that implementing integrated deterrence remains a work in progress for the Defense Department.

“We’re building an operational framework for integrated deterrence. We’ve made some tremendous strides. But there’s a lot more work we have to do. We need an integrated deterrence strategy that adapts our strategic capabilities, capacity and posture to keep changing pace with the evolving global threats,” he stressed.

In the near term, Richard said his top priority is missile warning.

“We need new missile defenses starting with missile warning. That’s the number one thing I need, missile warning, so I know what to do on how to posture and dispose my forces,” he said. “It’s due to these rapidly expanding and evolving threats: hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles potentially with intercontinental range, unmanned aerial systems, proliferation of shorter range ballistic missiles, and several novel weapon systems.”

As an example of the latter, Richard mentioned China’s test last year of a fractional orbital bombardment (FOBS) system using a hypersonic glide vehicle — an emerging capability “never before seen in the world.”

“I am not convinced at all we’ve fully thought through the implications of what that weapon system means,” he added. “You’re gonna get decreased warning timelines, difficulties in attribution, and an increased threat to our traditional space and missile defenses and forces.”

To deal with these new threats, as well as the increasing use of missile in conflict (exemplified by Russia’s use of missiles with dual nuclear and conventional capabilities), Richard called for a revamp of US missile defense posture.

“We’ve got to look harder at dispersal, hardening, redundancy, mobility to complicate opponent attack plans, reduce the confidence of attack success, raise the threshold for potential conflict, and give our senior leaders more decisions faced by limiting damage from attacks,” he said.

Second, he said, DoD needs to move faster to develop new capabilities “left of launch” including better early warning and/or improved understanding of when early warning simply isn’t going to be available.

“We absolutely have to have responsive, persistent, resilient and cost-effective joint integrated missile defense sensor capabilities, integrated command and control, new sensor architecture, and launch impact tracking on these threats,” he explained.

Third, Richard called for “active and passive defenses against regional hypersonics.”

And finally, he said, a new posture must also concentrate more “on missile defeat, not just active missile defense,” and do so in a way that is “based on a top-down architecture that synchronizes US allied and partner country contributions and capabilities.”
 

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Taiwan’s Patriot missiles to get massive US upgrade​

Gabriel Honrada




The US and Taiwan have renewed a missile engineering contract to upgrade the self-governing island’s Patriot missile defense systems against China’s growing missile threats and overflights.
The Taipei Times reports that the contract was announced by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense on August 11, with Focus Taiwan citing a notification regarding the contract on the Taiwan Government e-Procurement System website. Currently, Taiwan operates the Patriot Advanced Capability 2 (PAC-2) and PAC-3 Guided Enhancement Missiles (GEM) systems.
The South China Morning Post reported that the US$83 million contract, signed by Taiwan’s military and the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US embassy on the island, would help to assess and improve the performance of Taiwan’s Patriot missile batteries for the next four and a half years.

Focus Taiwan reported that the missile upgrade program runs from July 20, 2022, to December 31, 2026. Moreover, it notes that Taiwan’s current Patriot missile inventory consists of MIM-104F and GEM missile rounds.
The South China Morning Post report notes that Taiwan will upgrade its PAC 2 missiles to PAC 3 GEM standards with longer-range missiles. The report also notes that the PAC 3 GEM has two types of missiles, with the extended range version capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at 600 kilometers.
In addition to upgrading legacy systems, Focus Taiwan notes that in 2021 Taiwan also purchased PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles, with the first batches to be delivered in 2025 and 2026.
The same news source notes that the MIM-104F can intercept ballistic missiles, while the MSE variant has a longer range than the standard round, covering the middle area between the MIM-104F and terminal high altitude air defense systems with Taiwan receiving this upgrade between 2025 and 2026.

A Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile launcher. Credit: US Army/ commons.wikimedia.org.
The US-Taiwan contract aims to maintain the original combat capability of Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense systems, but does not increase the number of missiles Taiwan possesses, notes Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese Naval Academy at Kaohsiung, as cited by the South China Morning Post.
However, China’s recent military exercises and missile drills over Taiwan in the aftermath of US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to the self-governing island may have exposed holes in Taiwan’s missile defenses.
Despite being advertised as one of the world’s most advanced missile defense systems, the Patriot may be ineffective in certain combat situations. For example, in a 2018 Foreign Policy article, Jeffrey Lewis points out the ineffectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s Patriot missile systems against the ballistic missiles fired by Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Lewis also points out that the US Army may have manipulated figures about the Patriot’s performance during the 1991 Gulf War, initially claiming near-perfect performance intercepting 45 out 47 ballistic missiles but later revising this figure down to 50% and after that expressing “higher confidence” in just a quarter of intercepts.
With questionable reliability in intercepting ballistic missiles, the Patriot system may have limited capabilities against fighter jets as well. While the South China Morning Post noted that Taiwan had used the Patriot’s high-powered radars to track People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activities in the Taiwan Strait, Patriot missile interceptors are not equipped to counter fighter jets, notes defense analyst Kris Osborn in The National Interest.
Osborne mentions that although the Patriot system can track and destroy ballistic missiles and multiple maneuvering targets, its capabilities fall short of shooting down incoming fighter jets. The writer did not mention specifics about the system’s limitations but they most likely stem from the Patriot’s limited capabilities against low-flying targets, as shown by the successful attacks of Iranian drones against Saudi oil facilities, despite Riyadh’s Patriot missile system.
Defense analyst Stephen Bryen notes in Asia Times additional glaring limitations of the Patriot system. First, Bryen mentions that Patriot interceptors are fired when an incoming missile is at its terminal phase when the missile is just a few thousand feet above the ground and near its target. At that phase, the incoming missile can jettison a smaller and harder to intercept warhead or release decoys such as chaff to confuse missile defense radars.

Second, he mentions that the Patriot may have limited target discrimination capabilities. Citing Saudi Arabia’s experience with the system, Bryen notes that the Patriot may have difficulty distinguishing between the main body of ballistic missiles and their separated warheads. Finally, Bryen mentions that even if the Patriot system worked, it would be pointless if the system struck a missile body instead of its lethal warhead.
A so-called highly-lofted trajectory ballistic missile attack by China may blunt the effectiveness of Taiwan’s Patriot missile systems. Indeed, such limitations may have caused Japan to cancel its plans to procure two Aegis Ashore systems in 2020.
The Missile Defense Agency conducts the first intercept flight test of a land-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense weapon system from the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex in Kauai, Hawaii. Photo: US Missile Defense Agency / Handout / Leah Garton

A 2020 article in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs notes that the Aegis Ashore system or ballistic missile defense (BMD) is generally incapable of defending against ballistic missiles fired in a highly-lofted trajectory – although it mentions that software upgrades may help to mitigate this limitation in the future.
The same article mentions that North Korea could fire medium and intermediate-range missiles at higher angles to strike targets such as South Korea and Japan, resulting in an extremely high terminal phase velocity and undermining the effectiveness of any missile defense system. It also notes that the Patriot missile system cannot defend against such an attack and that no current missile defense system is optimized to defend against such.
Moreover, the article notes that in such an attack missile defense radars often lose track of the target when it reaches its apex and regains track of it too late for interceptor missiles to hit their mark.
Furthermore, as interceptor missiles are flying against gravity, it is much harder for them to re-adjust, catch up and hit the target at the right angle, in contrast to the constantly-accelerating hostile missile.
Moreover, the Patriot system may have numerous limitations in the Taiwan Strait operating environment. For example, the Eurasian Times reported on August 7 that the PLA launched 11 Dong Feng missiles into the waters around Taiwan, noting that the island did not use its Patriot interceptors against the incoming missiles.

The report notes multiple reasons for Taiwan’s apparent standing down to China’s ballistic missile launches. First, China’s ballistic missiles flew above the Karman Line, which is 100 kilometers above Earth and is in the airspace limit. Simply put, Taiwan did not intercept China’s missiles since they were not in its airspace but rather in outer space.
Second, the source notes that the boost phase of China’s Dongfeng missiles takes place within China’s territory and is out of range of Taiwan’s defenses. Although the missiles’ mid-course phase is above Taiwan, it is outside Taiwan’s airspace while in outer space.
While Taiwan can intercept China’s ballistic missiles in their terminal phase, such an interception has a short window of time considering the Patriot’s potentially mediocre performance as shown in Saudi service and the possibility of a highly-lofted trajectory attack.
Third, the Eurasian Times mentions the cost of Patriot missile interceptors may have prevented Taiwan from using its limited stock of rounds. The source notes that one Patriot interceptor costs US$16 million, compared to one of China’s Dongfeng missiles, which costs around $660,000.

A formation of Dongfeng-17 missiles takes part in a military parade during the celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China at Tian’anmen Square in Beijing. The Ukraine war may be fixing PLA leaders’ eyes on more basic capabilities – like mobile infantry. Photo: Xinhua / Mao Siqian
The high cost of Patriot interceptors could be a limitation in acquiring more missiles to counter multiple ballistic missiles, which may have penetration aids and decoys that force Taiwan to waste its missiles in preparation for subsequent air and missile strikes.
Finally, the advent of China’s hypersonic weapons may also render Taiwan’s Patriot system obsolete. On July 31, China’s state-run media outlet Global Times reported that China conducted a test firing of its DF-17 hypersonic missile in a veiled warning to Pelosi’s anticipated visit to Taiwan on August 2.

As no current missile defense system is effective against hypersonic weapons, Taiwan’s Patriot missiles, given their various limitations, may give a false sense of security and encourage military planners on both sides to take even more escalatory actions.
In future, China may ramp up missile tests and combat aircraft overflights to expose vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defenses, prompting the latter to respond with military drills and further stoking already tense cross-strait relations.

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Taiwan’s Patriot missiles to get massive US upgrade
 

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A K-ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY? SOUTH KOREA AND U.S. ALLIED DEFENSE PROCUREMENT​

PETER K. LEE AND TOM CORBEN
AUGUST 15, 2022
COMMENTARY

In 1940, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously declared that the United States must become “the great arsenal of democracy.” Today, that label might also apply to South Korea. As U.S. allies and partners around the world build up their defense capabilities in the face of Russian and Chinese military threats, a growing number are turning to South Korean defense firms to fulfil their procurement needs. After years of incremental growth in South Korean defense exports to states in Asia and the Middle East, South Korea is emerging as a major global defense industry player. In 2022, South Korea’s defense exports are expected to surpass $10 billion, representing a 177 percent increase over the last five-year period, making it the eighth-largest arms exporter in the world. South Korea is now offering and fulfilling the defense procurement needs of frontline U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

The emergence of what might be called the K-arsenal is a development that the United States should support. Commercial logic would posit South Korean defense companies as competitors to U.S. industry. But cast in a strategic light, Seoul’s growing ability and willingness to supply advanced capabilities to other U.S. allies should be welcomed, particularly as the Biden administration grapples with the parallel challenges of resourcing military strategies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific while shoring up America’s own defense industrial capacity. Even if questions remain over the true extent of South Korea’s strategic alignment with the United States, Seoul is nevertheless generating strategic effects by arming states facing Chinese and Russian coercion.

South Korea Joins the Defense Major League

As we have closely tracked, South Korea’s entry into the Australian defense industry market is a case in point. Earlier this year, the two countries broke ground on an AU$1 billion deal with Hanwha Defense to build 30 self-propelled artillery howitzers and 15 armored ammunition resupply vehicles in Australia, making it Australia’s first defense deal with an Asian country and South Korea’s first with a member of the inner circle of U.S. allies. The project is seen as a prelude to a massive AU$27 billion contract to build up to 450 infantry fighting vehicles, for which Hanwha Defense is also a finalist, that will be announced later this year.

According to Breaking Defense, a South Korean defense delegation also recently offered to provide Australia with its latest KSS-III conventionally-powered submarines, built by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering and Hyundai Heavy Industries. At “seven years from signature to delivery” these would provide an interim capability while Australia awaits the arrival of its AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. The final decision will be determined by the new Labor government’s Force Posture Review and the recommendations of the AUKUS Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce in March next year. But the offer suggests South Korean defense firms see potential for closer cooperation with Australia beyond armored vehicles.

More broadly, this offer signals South Korea’s emergence as a source of high-end military kit to other U.S. allies and partners on the frontlines against China and Russia. Indeed, on the other side of the world, three South Korean defense firms recently signed deals with the Polish government for 980 tanks from Hyundai Rotem, 48 light attack fighters from Korea Aerospace Industries, and 648 self-propelled howitzers from Hanwha Defense in a deal estimated to be worth in excess of $15 billion over its lifetime. The deal was especially notable given Poland’s recent efforts to replace its Soviet-era systems with advanced U.S. platforms, such as F-35 fighter jets, Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries, Abrams tanks, and most recently High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.

South Korea’s willingness to sell to Poland helps to offset its refusal to directly provide Ukraine with military equipment in addition to the humanitarian and non-lethal aid that it is already sending. Indeed, the deal could well benefit Ukraine. Poland provided Ukraine with 18 of its 155mm Krabs self-propelled howitzers in March. The Krabs are manufactured in Poland in a technology-sharing agreement with Korea’s Hanwha Defense that utilizes Hanwha’s K9 Thunder howitzer chassis with British turrets. Poland has reportedly promised to sell Ukraine a further 60 Krabs by the end of next year. This could set a precedent for other European militaries that also field the K9, such as Norway, Estonia, Finland, and Turkey as they replenish and upgrade their inventories. In any case, the key takeaway here is that in both the Australian and Polish cases, South Korea has moved to outfit key U.S. allies on the frontlines of coercion.

A Long Time Coming, But the Right Time to Arrive

South Korea’s ambitious approach to defense industry partnerships is the continuation of a longstanding quest for defense industrial self-reliance, something it has pursued while also being one of the biggest purchasers of U.S. defense equipment. South Korea’s export success has been made possible by a combination of factors, including a robust domestic civil manufacturing base, competitive pricing, rapid delivery schedules, inclusive local industry participation, customization, and technology transfer arrangements to allow for subsequent production by partners themselves. The “K-arsenal” of K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, K21 infantry fighting vehicles, K2 tanks, KM-SAM missiles, and more are poised to equip U.S. allies and partners with new high-end warfighting capabilities. These are only the tip of an even more ambitious domestic defense modernization program in motion, including KDX naval guided-missile destroyers, KSS-III attack submarines, KF-21 fighter jets, a future light aircraft carrier, and ballistic missiles, all being developed with an eye to future exports.

Continued.....
 

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South Korea is arriving as a major global provider of modern military kit just as the United States grapples with how to resource both its own strategies and the requirements of its allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In its efforts to arm Ukraine, the Biden administration has made nine successive drawdowns from U.S. stockpiles of weapons systems and munitions, amounting to a significant drain on America’s reserve of critical warfighting tools. An industrial base that was already suffering from a capacity-demand mismatch and single-source supplier bottlenecks has struggled to keep pace with surging demand from what is ultimately a proxy conflict. To make matters worse, growing demands from Ukraine and frontline European partners for advanced U.S. weapons systems are in direct competition with similar demands in Asia. While it is important not to overstate the true extent of the problem, it is increasingly clear that the United States alone cannot arm its global suite of allies and partners the way it once did.

“We Go Together” or We Go Around

U.S. armaments are still the global gold standard, but there are not enough to go around, nor, if you ask many allies, are they sufficiently affordable. As captured by the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s motto, “we go together,” this requires leaning on a wider pool of suppliers to help it to fill the gaps in allied defense capabilities. The fact is that in today’s world of global supply chains and multinational companies there are few truly autarkic national defense enterprises. South Korean defense firms partner closely with U.S. firms in components such as jet engines. They have also worked with companies in NATO countries such as Italy, Turkey, and Germany. Nonetheless, government customers want to build domestic expertise, workforces, and infrastructure to produce and sustain critical defense capabilities on their own, even if self-sufficiency is not a realistic outcome.

But the U.S. government has historically controlled the pace and scale at which this can happen in allied nations. In fact, in some ways such impediments are factors that have propelled South Korea’s emergence as a serious defense industry player. In recent years, U.S. officials were expressing concern that South Korea was a competitor stealing U.S. technology and making cheap imitations. Such was the level of distrust that in 2015 the U.S. Congress banned four aircraft communications and tracking technologies from being shared with South Korea, including the Advanced Electronic Scanner Array. This was due to concerns that they would be used in the development of South Korea’s indigenous KF-21 fighter jet program. Despite the setback, within seven years a South Korean defense firm eventually built a domestic array and is now poised to export it.

Reconciling the commercial and strategic logics that underpin defense industry matters is no easy thing, but it is increasingly necessary. Rather than being perceived solely as a commercial competitor, the United States ought to view South Korean defense firms as having a complementary role to play in fulfilling the defense acquisition needs of key allies and partners. For example, Australia is doubling down on off-the-shelf purchases of U.S. maritime helicopters, tanks, and potentially nuclear-powered submarines, and seeking deeper integration in a joint industrial base with the United States. At the same time, successive Australian governments are committed to building sovereign industrial capabilities for domestic production and sustainment of priority systems like precision guided missiles. This is why Australia is building the facilities to assemble the AS9 Huntsman self-propelled howitzer in Australia rather than just buying 30 K9 Thunder howitzers directly from South Korea.

Defense Industry and Strategic Alignment

When major purchasers of Russian military platforms such as India and Vietnam were reluctant to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was a reminder of the complex relationship between defense procurement sources and strategic alignment. Defense contracts often generate powerful, and sometimes unforeseen, linkages between countries over time, as Australia’s falling out with France over its cancelled submarine contract clearly illustrated. At the same time, the cases of Sweden and Germany are reminders that states can foster strong defense export industries without changing their foreign policy or security relationships with recipient states. A Swedish firm designed Australia’s Collins-class submarines and a German firm designed South Korea’s Jang Bogo-class submarines, but neither deal transformed bilateral relations.

South Korea, it seems, is walking a fine line between these two poles. Given that South Korea is not a military superpower, its defense sales have attracted less attention about the potential strategic signals they may be broadcasting. In fact, South Korea’s rise as a defense industry power is likely quite appealing to many countries that perceive significant political costs to investing in American, Russian, or even Chinese military platforms but still desire high-end military kit. And amid persistent debate around South Korea’s apparent “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to U.S. goals, it is also worth pointing out that buttressing the deterrence capabilities of other frontline allies and partners is a useful contribution to collective regional balancing. In this way, South Korea is generating strategic effects in the region even short of clear statements of strategic intent.

That said, there may yet be real geopolitical costs to South Korea’s shift towards enhanced defense industrial partnerships with U.S. allies on the front lines of high-end strategic competition. This is a different from arming distant partners in the Middle East against rivals like Iran. Even as successive South Korean administrations demur when asked to provide strategic clarity on various military contingencies, policymakers in Beijing and Moscow will not be blind to the fact that Seoul is nevertheless supporting the provision of weapons that U.S. allies could use against them. While the costs might be unclear at this stage, the possibility of retaliation should nevertheless trigger serious debates about how South Korea can prepare for and manage any potential fallout.

Conclusion

Roosevelt’s call to arms came a year before the United States formally entered World War II. Yet he presciently recognized that the power of American industry would tilt the scales of the war. That expectation has been revived in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Biden administration’s commitment to provide advanced weapons systems to Kiev for “as long as it takes.” But this endeavor, like many others, is one that the United States can no longer fulfill alone. The K-arsenal can help.

BECOME A MEMBER
Peter K. Lee is a research fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and a Korea Foundation fellow at the University of Melbourne. His Ph.D. thesis was the first study of the Australia-South Korea security relationship and he previously worked at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, Korea.

Tom Corben is a research associate at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. He was previously a Lloyd and Lilian Vasey Fellow with Pacific Forum, where he worked extensively on Japanese and South Korean defense and foreign policies.


COMMENTARY
 

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US Air Force conducts nuclear missile test delayed amid China tension​

Stephen Losey





An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during an Air Force Global Strike Command test early Tuesday morning at Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif. The test had been delayed 12 days in an effort to avoid worsening tensions with China. (Airman 1st Class Ryan Quijas/Air Force)

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force early on Tuesday carried out a test of an unarmed intercontinental ballistic missile, which was already delayed 12 days to avoid inflaming tension with China.
Air Force Global Strike Command said in a release that the Minuteman III missile was launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California by the 576th Flight Test Squadron a little before 1 a.m. Pacific Standard Time.
The ICBM was equipped with a test reentry vehicle, the release said, which splashed down about 4,200 miles from its original launch point in the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the command said. The command added the test verified the Minuteman III is accurate and reliable, and produced data that will help ensure the nation’s nuclear deterrent is safe, secure and effective.

Squadron commander Col. Chris Cruise said in the release that the test shows the nuclear triad — which also includes the ability to launch nuclear weapons from submarines and drop them from nuclear-capable bombers such as the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber — is the “cornerstone” of national security for the U.S. and its allies.
“This scheduled test launch is demonstrative of how our nation’s ICBM fleet illustrates our readiness and reliability of the weapon system,” Cruise said. “It is also a great platform to show the skill sets and expertise of our strategic weapons maintenance personnel and of our missile crews who maintain an unwavering vigilance to defend the homeland.”
The test launch was originally intended to take place Aug. 4. But on that day, the White House announced the delay amid a controversial visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. China objected to Pelosi’s visit, and on Aug. 4 had launched roughly 11 missile strikes near the coast of Taiwan, which China considers a rogue province and has threatened to take back control by force if necessary.
White House national security spokesman John Kirby said at the time that delaying the test launch was “the responsible thing to do” and condemned China’s missile launches as irresponsible and provocative.
“A strong, confident, capable nuclear power can afford to wait a couple of weeks for a test to make it clear — not just in word but in deed — how serious we are when we say we have no interest in escalating the tensions,” Kirby said in an Aug. 4 press briefing at the White House.
It was the second time this year a Minuteman III test had been delayed. The first came in March, when Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin postponed another test to avoid further ratcheting up tension with Russia in the early days of its invasion of Ukraine.
The most recent delay drew objections from some Republicans, such as Rep. Mike Rogers of Alabama, the ranking GOP member on the House Armed Services Committee.
“These weak-kneed pearl-clutching attempts at appeasement hurt our readiness and will only invite further aggression by our adversaries,” Rogers said in a statement at the time.
Global Strike Command said the test launch involved months of preparation. Airmen from the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming and the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota also assisted with the launch as part of a task force.
The 576th typically tests four Minuteman III ICBMs from Vandenberg each year, and Global Strike Command said more than 300 of these tests were previously carried out.

Maj. Armand Wong, commander of the task force, said test launches are scheduled well in advance and are not carried out in response to recent world events.
Stephen Losey covers leadership and personnel issues as the senior reporter for Air Force Times. He comes from an Air Force family, and his investigative reports have won awards from the Society of Professional Journalists. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover Air Force operations against the Islamic State.
 

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U.S. Indo-Pacific commander warns about Chinese nuclear buildup​

Defends U.S.-UK-Australia deterrence and sub deal

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Updated: 5:08 p.m. on Tuesday, August 16, 2022

The commander of American military forces in the Pacific is pushing back against Chinese government claims that a three-nation pact to build nuclear submarines for Australia poses a danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Adm. John Aquilino, who heads U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told reporters in Indonesia after a recent round of U.S.-led military exercises in the region that the sole country creating nuclear weapons fears is China.


“We’re watching the largest military buildup in history since WWII by the PRC,” he said in reference to Pentagon assessments on increasingly aggressive armed forces expansion efforts by China, formally the People’s Republic of China.

Adm. Aquilino commented more broadly on Chinese government opposition to the effort by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to build nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian navy under a security arrangement called AUKUS.

“This program has nothing to do with nuclear weapons,” the admiral said at a joint press conference Friday with Indonesian military chief Gen. Andika Perkasa in that country’s South Sumatra province.

“If you’d like to talk about nuclear weapons and the concern for a nuclear arms race, all you have to do is look into the PRC,” Adm. Aquilino said. He added that he has read reports of Chinese complaints about the AUKUS submarine program.


SEE ALSO: Taliban seized more than $7B in U.S.-provided weapons when Afghan government fell


“The only nation increasing the nuclear arsenal right now is the PRC,” the four-star admiral said. China has “300 nuclear silos going in as we sit here today.

“So let’s look at actions, and let’s not talk about words,” he said.

‘Strategic breakout’

China’s nuclear buildup has alarmed the Pentagon at a moment when the U.S. military is modernizing all of its nuclear forces to meet the challenge of deterring both China and Russia.

In the past, nuclear deterrence was geared toward countering Soviet and then Russian nuclear forces. However, China’s government is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces with the construction of missile silos in western China. Satellite photos have shown as many as 350 silo sites.

In recent congressional testimony, Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, described China’s nuclear buildup as a “strategic breakout” comparable to the Soviet Union’s nuclear buildup in the 1960s.

The most visible portion of the current Chinese buildup is the expansion from zero to 360 silos for solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles in western China in a few years, Adm. Richard testified in May.

The hundreds of silos are expected to house a new DF-41 multiwarhead missile, defense officials have said. The number of warheads carried by each DF-41 is not known. Intelligence estimates put the number of multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, at four to 10 warheads.

China is believed to have obtained multiwarhead technology from the United States during U.S.-Chinese space cooperation during the Clinton administration.

Other Chinese nuclear developments of concern include a rapid expansion of road-mobile ICBMs, nuclear-armed H-6N bombers equipped with air-launched ballistic missiles, and new nuclear-tipped missile submarines.

Another major worry centers on China’s testing of an orbiting hypersonic missile that can attack from multiple angles and is difficult to detect with current missile warning systems.

China’s defense minister, Wei Fenghe, has dismissed concerns about the ICBM silos in western China as “moderate and appropriate.”

“That means being able to protect our nation’s security so that we can avoid the catastrophe of a war, especially the catastrophe of a nuclear war,” Mr. Wei told reporters during a visit to Singapore in June.

Disinformation on AUKUS

Chinese state media in July launched what U.S. analysts say is a disinformation campaign to persuade regional states to oppose the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal.

Two Chinese government nuclear research agencies, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy, issued a report in July urging the international community to stand against the nuclear submarine program.

The report said the program must be halted to “safeguard the integrity, authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.”

After the report’s circulation, Chinese engineer Zhao Xuelin, with the China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy, claimed that weapons-grade nuclear material sent to Australia could produce 64 to 80 nuclear weapons.

Mr. Zhao said the program will violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The State Department has said China’s refusal to conduct arms control talks on its nuclear forces is a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Taiwan in crosshairs

Adm. Aquilino responded to the Chinese accusations during multinational military exercises in Indonesia called Garuda Shield. It involved about 5,000 troops.

The exercises are held annually with Indonesian and U.S. military forces. This year’s drills also included forces from Australia, Singapore and Japan, along with observers from nine other nations.

“Our forces, operating together, delivers a deterrent effect against any destabilizing effort in the region,” said Adm. Aquilino, who cited recent Chinese military provocations around Taiwan as an example.

“The destabilizing actions by the PRC as it applied to the threatening activities and actions against Taiwan is exactly what we are trying to avoid,” he said. “I can tell you from my seat, I spend every waking minute doing everything to ensure we are preventing conflict in the region. Every day, we try to prevent war.

“We’ll continue to help deliver a free and open Indo-Pacific and be ready when we need to respond to any contingency,” the admiral said.

Multiple news outlets in Asia, including The Associated Press, reported on his remarks.

A spokesman for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command told The Washington Times that a transcript of Adm. Aquilino’s remarks was being prepared. Later, however, Navy Cmdr. Tiffani Walker, a spokeswoman for the command, said no transcript or audio of the admiral’s press conference would be made public.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.
 

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US says airstrike in Somalia kills 13 members of al-Shabaab terror group​


Oren Liebermann, CNN



The US carried out the strike on Sunday in support of the Somali military, which was under attack near Teedaan, Somalia. According to an initial assessment, no civilians were injured or killed in the strike.

Last week, the US carried out three airstrikes against al-Shabaab just west of where the weekend strikes took place. Four members of al-Shabaab were killed in those strikes, according to a statement from Africa Command.
In May, President Joe Biden decided to redeploy US troops to Somalia in support of the government and to counter al-Shabaab. The move reversed a decision by former President Donald Trump to withdraw all US troops from the country.


A US airstrike in in mid-July killed two members of al-Shabaab, while another in June killed five members of the terror organization, Africa Command said.
 

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US Coast Guard cutter tests lethal capabilities at RIMPAC​



COAST GUARD BASE HONOLULU — For the first time, a U.S. Coast Guard national security cutter oversaw American and foreign navy ships during high-end military drills, including an anti-submarine warfare scenario.
The service’s cutters stationed in Hawaii have used naval exercises and deployments over the last year to show how it can punch above its weight while the U.S. Navy implements its distributed maritime operations vision.
During the recent Rim of the Pacific exercise, which ran from June 29 to Aug. 4, the Coast Guard cutter Midgett commanded an international task force overseeing maritime interdiction operations, while also providing its deck to a U.S. Navy helicopter in a display of joint service collaboration.

Another RIMPAC participant, the fast response cutter William Hart, last fall deployed to American Samoa for a mission with a 10-day transit time that well exceeded the typical range of that ship class. During last year’s Large Scale Exercise, the vessel embarked with Marines to establish a joint force communications node — showing across the two events how small cutters can play a pivotal role as the eyes and ears of the military in places the Navy visits less frequently.
The Navy envisions a network of joint and coalition assets scattered around the Pacific to contribute to an overall common operating picture of the region. The more of these assets that are lethal, the better, the thinking goes: given a single adversary couldn’t target all the coalition assets that pose a threat, these distributed lethality and distributed maritime operations concepts could provide a deterrent effect.
But the Navy can only keep so many ships sailing around the Pacific at any given time, which means partners and allies are key, as are Coast Guard ships and aircraft, something that was highlighted in the 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy. The document specifically asks the Coast Guard to conduct freedom of navigation operations to challenge excessive maritime claims; conduct law enforcement operations against terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime and piracy; and enforce sanctions through maritime interdiction operations.
Vice Adm. Andrew Tiongson, who commands Coast Guard Pacific Area, told Defense News the service implemented that strategy by deploying Coast Guard liaisons on Navy ships as well as training with and operating the Navy’s equipment to bolster interoperability.
A U.S. Navy sailor displays post-flight signals to an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter crew during flight operations aboard Coast Guard cutter Midgett during Rim of the Pacific 2022. (Petty Officer 3rd Class Taylor Bacon/U.S. Coast Guard)
“As we prepare for high-end joint operations in the maritime domain, we will support naval efforts with complementary capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific with port security units, strategic asset escorts and other unique strengths to augment capacity. The more intertwined our services are prior to conflict, the easier we will adapt when needed,” Tiongson said.
Commanding a task force
Midgett and William Hart, along with other cutters based in Honolulu, are going beyond requirements of the tri-service strategy.


This task force oversaw maritime interdiction operations for the combined maritime force at RIMPAC, and it also conducted anti-submarine warfare drills — something a Coast Guard cutter cannot do, but that Midgett was able to oversee through advanced Link 16 network connectivity.
“These national security cutters are built to interface with — from the technology, and the command and control, and the communication links — to fall right in line with the Navy and [Defense Department] counterparts. So these RIMPACs are awesome opportunities to exercise that,” Chief Matt Masaschi, a spokesman for Coast Guard Pacific Area, told reporters during a tour of Midgett.
U.S. Marine Sgt. Anthony Garcia Ballard establishes communications with Coast Guard cutter William Hart during Large Scale Exercise on Aug. 5, 2021. (Cpl. Juan Carpanzano/U.S. Marine Corps)
Carmichael said during the tour that he spent nearly four weeks preparing to take command of the task force, which involved hosting Navy subject matter experts on the ship ahead of RIMPAC “to help us integrate more at a higher level for those higher-warfare areas.”

Midgett will soon depart Hawaii for a Western Pacific patrol under the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, highlighting the importance of that service interoperability.
Hunting submarines
Midgett also carried a Navy MH-60R helicopter for predeployment training, and then for the whole duration of RIMPAC. This was the first time that helicopter type embarked on a Coast Guard ship.
Carmichael said the MH-60 can fit in a national security cutter’s hangar if it folds up its blades and tail. The capability and range of the MH-60 could be of great value to the ship during law enforcement missions. And the Navy could benefit from this experience by conducting MH-60 anti-submarine operations from a cutter’s deck.
This experiment was partly meant to determine how to “sustain that particular airframe, how do you support it for a long-range, two-month or three-month deployment,” Carmichael said.
Midgett also showed off its lethal traits, taking what it learned from the MH-60 and Link 16 system to serve as an adversary in another at-sea scenario of RIMPAC.

The cutter collaborated with other opposing force ships to track and hunt vessels, earning nine “constructive kills,” which involved providing targeting data to allied assets that resulted in immediate simulated strikes.
Midgett also participated in a shooting competition among RIMPAC participants. Though a cutter would typically employ its weapons for self-defense or in a law enforcement context, this shoot-off gave participants a GPS coordinate for a simulated island and asked them to conduct a land-attack mission.
“That’s not typical for us, island targets,” said the ship’s weapons officer, Ensign Matthew Pindell, adding that the ship used its 57mm MK 110 cannon with an 8-mile range to go after the target.
Pindell said the crew recently used its Phalanx close-in weapon system to shoot at a missile target towed by a Learjet, noting that this type of experience is important for the upcoming deployment to 7th Fleet’s area of responsibility.
‘Filling a gap’
As Midgett pushes the boundaries of what a Legend-class national security cutter can do, the service has found areas that require improvement, Carmichael said. For example, the ship and its crew lack “the ability to plan and execute long-range planning efforts that are very complex in a maritime environment. So we’re learning some of those lessons from our Navy counterparts as well and their best practices. We actually brought some of their subject matter experts onboard” so the crew could learn and then share those lessons with the other ships in the class.

The Coast Guard’s fast response cutters in Honolulu — roughly a third of the length of national security cutters — have taken on presence missions in Oceania that were once conducted by much larger vessels.
Cmdr. Cynthia Travers, the commanding officer of William Hart, said her ship and crew of 24 — along with the two other fast response cutters based in Honolulu — have had an outsized impact on American presence in Oceania.
Though the ship class is usually called for law enforcement, search and rescue, and environmental protection missions around the Hawaiian Islands, “last fall we operated between Oahu and American Samoa. It’s about a 10-day transit for us, so it’s sort of doing a larger-ship mission with a small Coast Guard cutter,” she said.
That transit was uncomfortable for the crew, she acknowledged, and the cutter had to sail at just 10 knots (12 mph) to conserve fuel and ensure it could make it to American Samoa without refueling at sea, given no assets were available to sail with William Hart or link up midway.

Fast response cutters out of Hawaii and Guam are more likely taken on these longer-range transits.
During William Hart’s trip to Oceania last fall, it operated alongside ships from the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and France to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Though the mission itself wasn’t high end, it put the cutter in a location in which U.S. Navy ships were unlikely to operate, creating an opportunity for the joint force.
And during Large Scale Exercise 2021, William Hart and a team of Marines combined their sensors into a single, common-operating picture of the battlespace. Ships and aircraft the Coast Guard saw with its sensors were shared to the Marine Corps network, using both the Coast Guard’s Rescue 21 system and the Marines’ satellite communications technology, building a clearer picture for maritime domain awareness.
“We’re sort of filling a gap that exists right now. There are some larger cutters that are under construction that we’re hoping will be able to take on this mission in the years to come, but for right now the fast response cutter is the tool that we have here that can respond to that need,” Travers said.
 

Housecarl

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News|Nuclear Energy

Iran nuclear deal ‘imminent’ with crippling sanctions removed​

Sources tell Al Jazeera Arabic an agreement to revive the landmark accord abandoned by the US is soon to be announced.

By Al Jazeera Staff
Published On 19 Aug 2022
19 Aug 2022

A European proposal to revive the nuclear agreement between Western countries and Iran is imminent and includes the release of billions of dollars in frozen Iranian funds and oil exports in return for the scaling back of its nuclear programme.

The new deal will be carried out in four phases over two 60-day periods, sources with knowledge of the proposed agreement told Al Jazeera Arabic.

KEEP READING​

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How US blacklisting of IRGC is stalling Iran nuclear deal revival

list 2 of 4

Nuclear talks positive but expectations not fully met, Iran says

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‘Right direction’: Iran nuclear officials optimistic on deal

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Iran nuclear deal could be near as EU circulates ‘final text’

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Iran recently voiced optimism about an agreement on a renewed version of the 2015 nuclear deal with the United States and other foreign powers, formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Iran’s negotiating team adviser Mohammad Marandi said earlier this week “we’re closer than we’ve been before” to securing a deal and the “remaining issues are not very difficult to resolve”.

The European Union’s “final text” proposal for the accord, submitted last week, was approved by the US, which says it is ready to quickly seal the agreement if Iran accepts it.

According to sources with knowledge of the matter, the proposal stipulates on the day after the agreement is signed, sanctions on 17 Iranian banks as well as 150 economic institutions will be lifted.

It also says Tehran will immediately begin to reverse the steps it took to advance its nuclear technology, which is now beyond the scope of what the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the 2015 deal’s original signatories say is acceptable.

Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is now at 60 percent enrichment, its highest ever and a jump from the 3.67 percent limit set out by the 2015 deal. Enrichment at 90 percent is needed to build a nuclear bomb.

View: https://youtu.be/9D6e_dGjGIM


Within 120 days of signing the agreement, Iran will be permitted to export 50 million barrels of oil per day. The deal also includes the release of $7bn of Iran’s funds, which are currently being held in South Korea, the sources said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

The US will have to pay a fine in the event it withdraws from the nuclear agreement again, as it did under the administration of former President Donald Trump in 2018, according to the sources.

With a revived nuclear deal, the US and the deal’s other signatories – France, the United Kingdom, Germany, China and Russia, known collectively as the P5+1 – aim to contain the nuclear programme and prevent what many warn could be a nuclear weapons crisis in the Middle East.

Iran maintains its aims are peaceful and its actions fall within the country’s sovereign rights to a civilian nuclear programme.

Obstacles to overcome

One of the main sticking points to reviving a deal appears to be a safeguards inquiry into Iran’s nuclear programme by the IAEA, which Tehran wants closed for good before the JCPOA is restored.

The nuclear watchdog has demanded more cooperation on traces of man-made nuclear particles found at several Iranian sites years ago, saying that is the only way the inquiry could be terminated.

Another factor is the US designation of Iran’s elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as a “foreign terrorist organisation”. The US appears reluctant to meet Tehran’s demand to remove the IRGC from the blacklist to seal the deal.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has suggested the IRGC’s “terror” designation falls outside the purview of the nuclear deal and, therefore, requires separate concessions from Iran.

Right-wing US politicians and Israel, the arch-rival of Iran, have warned Washington against lifting sanctions on the IRGC. Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid spoke to German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Thursday, pressing Israel’s position that efforts to revive a nuclear deal with Iran should end.

Tehran, meanwhile, has said it will never shelve plans for revenge after the killing of the Revolutionary Guard’s top general, Qassem Soleimani.

Soleimani, who headed the elite Quds Force, the foreign operations arm of the IRGC, was killed in an American drone strike in Iraq’s capital, Baghdad, in January 2020.

Trump ordered Soleimani killed saying he was planning an “imminent” attack on American personnel in the Iraqi capital.

Iran responded to his assassination by firing missiles a few days later at Iraqi bases housing US troops, causing injuries. The attacks and retaliatory strikes brought the Middle East region to the brink of war.

“This is a tougher deal to sell than the 2015 deal in that this time around there are no illusions that it will serve to moderate Iranian behaviour or lead to greater US-Iran cooperation,” said Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“The Iranian government stands to get tens of billions in sanctions relief and the organising principle of the regime will continue to be opposition to the United States and violence against its critics, both at home and abroad,” he said.

View: https://youtu.be/isguMZ0GZDI


SOURCE: AL JAZEERA
 

Housecarl

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LA Times

Plots to kill Rushdie and Bolton are new hurdles for tantalizingly close Iran nuclear deal​

MATTHEW LEE
Fri, August 19, 2022 at 3:09 AM·6 min read

Last week’s attack on author Salman Rushdie and the indictment of an Iranian national for allegedly plotting to kill former national security advisor John Bolton have given the Biden administration new headaches as it attempts to negotiate a return to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

A resolution may be tantalizingly close. But as the U.S. and the European Union weigh Iran’s latest response to an EU proposal described as the West’s final offer, the administration faces new and potentially insurmountable domestic political hurdles to forging a lasting agreement.

Critics in Congress who have long vowed to reject any pact have upped their opposition to negotiations with a country whose leadership has refused to rescind the death threats against Rushdie or Bolton. Iran also vows to avenge the Trump administration’s 2020 assassination of a top Iranian general by killing former Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Iran envoy Brian Hook, both of whom remain under round-the-clock taxpayer-paid security protection.

Although such threats are not covered by the deal, which relates solely to Iran’s nuclear program, they underscore opponents’ arguments that Iran cannot be trusted with the billions of dollars in sanctions relief it will receive if Tehran and Washington return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. That deal was a signature foreign policy accomplishment of the Obama administration, but then-President Trump unilaterally withdrew from it in 2018.

“This is a tougher deal to sell than the 2015 deal in that this time around there are no illusions that it will serve to moderate Iranian behavior or lead to greater U.S.-Iran cooperation,” said Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“The Iranian government stands to get tens of billions in sanctions relief, and the organizing principle of the regime will continue to be opposition to the United States and violence against its critics, both at home and abroad,” he said.

Iran has denied any link to Rushdie’s alleged attacker, a U.S. citizen who was indicted on charges of attempted murder in the stabbing at a literary event last week in New York state. But official Iranian media have celebrated Tehran’s long-standing antipathy toward Rushdie since the 1988 publication of his book “The Satanic Verses,” which some believe is insulting to Islam.

Media linked to Iran’s leadership have lauded the attacker for following through on a 1989 decree by then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini calling for Rushdie to be killed.

And the man who was charged with plotting to murder Bolton is a member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Justice Department alleges that the IRGC tried to pay $300,000 to people in the U.S. to avenge the death of Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the head of its elite Quds Force, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike in Iraq in 2020.

“I think it’s delusional to believe that a regime that you’re about to enter into a significant arms-control agreement with can be depended on to comply with its obligations or is even serious about the negotiation when it’s plotting the assassination of high-level former government officials and current government officials,” Bolton told reporters Wednesday.

“It certainly looks like the attack on Salman Rushdie had a Revolutionary Guard component,” Bolton said. “We’ve got to stop this artificial division when dealing with the government of Iran between its nuclear activities on the one hand and its terrorist activities on the other.”

Others with hawkish views on Iran agree.

“Granting terrorism sanctions relief amid ongoing terror plots on U.S. soil is somewhere between outrageous and lunacy,” said Rich Goldberg, a former Trump administration national security council staffer and longtime deal critic who is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which has also lobbied against a return to the JCPOA.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the plots, Biden administration officials contend that they are unrelated to the nuclear issue and do nothing to change their long-held belief that an Iran with a nuclear weapon would be more dangerous and less constrained than an Iran without one.

“The JCPOA is about the single, central challenge we face with Iran,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said this week. “There is no doubt that a nuclear-armed Iran would feel an even greater degree of impunity, and would pose an even greater threat ... to countries in the region and potentially well beyond.

“Every challenge we face with Iran, whether it is its support for proxies, its support for terrorist groups, its ballistic missiles program, its malign cyber-activities — every single one of those — would be more difficult to confront were Iran to have a nuclear weapons program,” he said.

That argument will be challenged in Congress by lawmakers who opposed the 2015 deal, saying it gave Iran a path to develop nuclear weapons by time-limiting the most onerous restrictions on its nuclear activities. They say there's now even more tangible evidence that Iran’s malign behavior makes it impossible to deal with.

Two of the most outspoken critics of the deal, Republican Sens. Ted Cruz of Texas and Tom Cotton of Arkansas, have weighed in on what the Rushdie attack should mean for the administration.

“The ayatollahs have been trying to murder Salman Rushdie for decades,” Cruz said. “Their incitement and their contacts with this terrorist resulted in an attack. This vicious terrorist attack needs to be completely condemned. The Biden administration must finally cease appeasing the Iranian regime.”

Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must submit any agreement with Iran for congressional review within five days of it being sealed. That begins a 30-day review period during which lawmakers may weigh in and no sanctions relief can be offered.

The timeline means that even if a deal is reached within the next week, the administration will not be able to start moving on sanctions relief until the end of September, just a month from crucial congressional midterm elections. And it would take additional time for Iran to begin seeing the benefits of such relief because of logistical constraints.

While deal critics in the current Congress are unlikely to be able to kill a deal, if Republicans win back control of Congress in the midterms, they may be able to nullify any sanctions relief.

“Even if Iran accepts President Biden’s full capitulation and agrees to reenter the Iran nuclear deal, Congress will never vote to remove sanctions,” the GOP minority on the House Armed Services Committee said in a tweet on Wednesday. “In fact, Republicans in Congress will work to strengthen sanctions against Iran.”

This story originally appeared in Los Angeles Times.
 

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passin' thru

Russia, US working on ways to resume inspections under new START treaty​



Washington [US], August 21 (ANI): Moscow and Washington are working on removing obstacles to resuming inspections under the New START arms control treaty, with some issues already resolved, the Russian Embassy in the United States said on Saturday.


“The inspection activities under the New START Treaty have indeed been suspended since early 2020 by mutual agreement due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We are working closely with our American colleagues within the framework of the New START Bilateral Consultative Commission to remove organizational and technical obstacles to resume inspections,” the embassy said in a comment to the Newsweek media outlet on the current situation on arms control.


The Russian embassy said some issues have been resolved but by no means all of them. It also said that the treaty expires in 3.5 years and that the remaining time to work out an agreement is “extremely short.”


“Any interaction on arms control matters must be conducted on an equal basis, with due consideration for mutual concerns and interests,” the embassy added.


The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty, enhances U.S. national security by placing verifiable limits on all Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons.


The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Under the treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation had seven years to meet the treaty’s central limits on strategic offensive arms (by February 5, 2018) and are then obligated to maintain those limits for as long as the treaty remains in force, according to US State Department.


Both the United States and the Russian Federation met the central limits of the New START Treaty by February 5, 2018, and have stayed at or below them ever since. It is expected to last until February 5, 2026, having been extended in 2021.


Those limits are: 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted as one warhead toward this limit).


It also restricts 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments.


New START limits all Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, including every Russian nuclear warhead that is loaded onto an intercontinental-range ballistic missile that can reach the United States in approximately 30 minutes.


It also limits the deployed Avangard and the under development Sarmat, the two most operationally available of the Russian Federation’s new long-range nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. (ANI)

Source: WORLD

https://www.illustrateddailynews.com/russia-us-working-on-ways-to-resume-inspections-under-new-start-treaty/
 
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