WAR 08-06-2022-to-08-12-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(261) 06-25-2022-to-07-01-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(262) 07-23-2022-to-07-29-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(263) 07-30-2022-to-08-05-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Another drone fires missiles in Afghanistan days after Al-Qaeda chief’s killing in US mission

ANI
7 August, 2022 12:13 am IST

Ghazni [Afghanistan], August 7 (ANI): Days after a US drone strike killed Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, another drone fired missiles in the Andaro area of Ghazni Province in Afghanistan and it seems that this one is also a HVT (High Value Target).

A High-Value Target (HVT) is a target (a person or resource) that an enemy requires for completion of a mission. The term has been widely used in the media for Osama Bin Laden and high-ranking officers of Al-Qaeda and are considered essential to the completion of enemy operations.

Taliban seems to have no information regarding the same.

In a tweet, Sumaira Khan, a defence analyst of a media outlet wrote, “Reportedly another drone fired missiles aiming at high profile foreign-hailing target at Andaro area of Ghazni Saturday evening. The Taliban said there is no info on the nature of target.”

Another journalist Mushtaq Yusufzai confirmed the incident citing Taliban sources.

“Taliban sources in Afghanistan said a drone fired missiles and hit a target in Andaro area of Afghanistan’s Ghazni province on Saturday evening. Taliban said there is no information about the target but believed to be foreigners,” he wrote.

US President Joe Biden in a televised address on Monday announced that Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in an air strike by the United States stating that “Justice has been delivered.”

al-Zawahiri was one of the world’s most wanted terrorists and a mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks was killed in a drone strike carried out by the US in the Afghan capital Kabul on Saturday.

“On Saturday, at my direction, the United States successfully conducted an airstrike in Kabul, Afghanistan that killed the emir of al-Qa’ida: Ayman al-Zawahiri. Justice has been delivered and this terrorist leader is no more,” Biden said in a video address from the Blue Room Balcony at the White House.

“He will never again, never again, allow Afghanistan to become a terrorist safe haven because he is gone and we’re going to make sure that nothing else happens,” he added.

Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon was deeply involved in the planning of 9/11 and he also acted as Osama Bin Laden’s personal physician.

In a background call to reporters, a senior Biden administration official said Zawahiri had been killed on the balcony of a house in Kabul in a drone strike, and that there had been no US boots on the ground in Afghanistan.

The strike was conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was carried out by an Air Force drone. The official claimed that al-Zawahiri was the only person killed in the strike and that none of his family members was injured.

Senior members of the Taliban and Haqqani Network were aware of al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul before the drone strike, said the senior administration official.

In fact, Haqqani Network members attempted to conceal that al-Zawahiri had been staying at the safehouse in the hours after he was killed.

When asked about Al-Zawahri’s killing and could he have been in the safe house without the direct knowledge of Pakistan’s ISI, the official said: “What we know is that senior Haqqani Taliban were aware of his presence in Kabul and I can’t comment further on other countries involvement.”

Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States who is now with the Hudson Institute, said that this operation shows that the US can still find identified terrorist leaders in Afghanistan.

“The question now would be, whether Taliban enabled Zawahiri’s elimination or the US did it without assistance. His presence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area confirms that the region is still home to international terrorist groups,” Haqqani told ANI.

“We will have to wait to find out whom the Americans believe to have helped keep Zawahiri in business from within the region,” the former ambassador further added.

Zawahiri’s killing comes a year after the US’ military withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s takeover of the country. The official noted that Zawahiri’s presence in the Afghan capital Kabul was a “clear violation” of a deal the Taliban had signed with the US in Doha in 2020 that paved the way for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. (ANI)

This report is auto-generated from ANI news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm....Either they're getting ready to do some creative dao rattling or they're going to do some "subcontracting" for another party.....

Posted for fair use.....

China Has Expanded Its Nuclear Testing Site in Xinjiang – Nikkei
August 7, 2022
Satellite images of an old nuclear testing site in Xinjiang and a range of other evidence suggests China wants to resume testing, security analysts have told Nikkei



China appears to be increasing the size of its nuclear test facilities near Lop Nur, a dried up salt lake in Xinjiang’s Xyghur Autonomous Region in the country’s west, as there is evidence of “sixth tunnel” being built for underground testing, plus power lines “and a facility that could be used for storing high-explosives” being installed recently, according to a report by Nikkei, which sought expert analysis of satellite photos it had obtained.

China has not conducted underground nuclear tests at Lop Nur since 1996, but the satellite images and tenders for protective suits and ‘radiation dose alarms’ by a paramilitary group controlled by the Communist Party in the western province suggests the country’s military wants to resume testing, the report said, which quoted a security professor who said President Xi Jinping may want to “discourage US intervention in the Taiwan Strait by threatening to use small nuclear weapons.”

Read the full report: Nikkei Asia.


ALSO SEE:

China, Russia Dominate Nuclear Reactor Construction, IEA Says

UK to Remove Chinese Investor from Nuclear Project – Telegraph

Japan to Restart Nuclear Reactors to Avoid Russian Gas

China Steps Up Nuclear Buildup as US Conflict Fears Grow – WSJ
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
From the Nikkei Asia....

Posted for fair use....(for rest of images please see article source. HC)
Satellite photos show China's new nuclear test site in Xinjiang

THE AGE OF 'GREAT CHINA'
Satellite photos show China's new nuclear test site in Xinjiang
Experts ask whether a nuclear arms race with the U.S. is underway

Nikkei staff writers
AUGUST 1, 2022 02:00 JST
UPDATED ON AUGUST 1, 2022 21:28 JST

TOKYO/NEW YORK -- China is expanding its nuclear test facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, an analysis of satellite photographs obtained by Nikkei suggests.

Beijing halted explosive tests in the area a quarter of a century ago. Nikkei has viewed satellite photographs with a number of experts that appear to confirm China is strengthening its nuclear testing capability.

Extensive coverings have been erected on a mountainside in this arid region, and broken rocks piled up nearby are believed to be evidence of excavation of a new "sixth tunnel" for testing hidden beneath.

Power transmission cables and a facility that could be used for storing high-explosives have recently been installed, while unpaved white roads lead from a command post in various directions.

The evidence of new construction was detected by a satellite 450 kilometers above Lop Nur, a dried up salt lake in the southeast of Western China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Many analysts believe that the secret nuclear testing area is secured by the People's Liberation Army.

"China could conduct nuclear-related tests anytime, especially since the electricity line and road system now connects Lop Nur's western military nuclear test facilities to new possible test areas in the east," an expert at AllSource Analysis, a U.S. private geospatial company, told Nikkei. The researcher spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.
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China aims to become a military power on a par with the U.S. by the middle of the 21st century -- a formidable ambition given the underdeveloped state of some of its forces and materiel.

China has 2.04 million military personnel. Although that is already the largest standing force in the world -- and 1.5 times larger than that of the U.S -- it has been unable to recruit enough troops of late, according to one retired military officer. This is a combination of the old "one-child policy" and a preference among the younger generation for less physically demanding work in the private sector.

President Xi Jinping said the Chinese Communist Party rules "east, west, north, south," and that means it controls the PLA. But China's military system remains corrupt and nepotistic. The PLA is also untested; its last real combat experience was the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

The Xi administration may be contemplating the unification of China, and that would involve taking Taiwan by force. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine has provided a sobering warning about the risks of military adventures, not least for the serious shortcomings in the quality of Russian military equipment. Russia supplies China with over 66% of its imported military hardware.

The issue is where nuclear weapons might fit into all these calculations. China has conducted five underground nuclear tests at Lop Nur, the last in 1996. Evidence that a sixth tunnel has been excavated points to a planned resumption.

There is also some telling evidence to be found in tenders invited from the region. In April, an official Chinese procurement website invited bids for "10 radiation dose alarms," "12 protective suits," and "one detector of wound site taints." This was ostensibly part of "a project for emergency monitoring of nuclear and radiation accidents." The invitations were issued by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organization under the CCP.

Although there are no nuclear power plants in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the XPCC said that it will "make 2022 the starting year for strengthening the capacity to monitor radioactivity." Procurement of related equipment has increased in the region.

Satellites detected new terrain leveling activity at Lop Nur in October 2020. Big trucks came and went in 2021, and the power infrastructure for the sixth tunnel was built in the first half of 2022. In June, the explosive storage facility was completed.

Increased radiation was detected in the vicinity alongside these developments. A new underground facility that could be used to launch nuclear missiles was found nearby.

Time is not on Xi's side. He is maneuvering for a third term that will end in 2027. "Possibly [he] wants to discourage U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait by threatening to use small nuclear weapons," Nobumasa Akiyama, a professor at Hitotsubashi University who studies East Asian security, told Nikkei.
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Chinese transporters bearing hypersonic DF-17 missiles capable of delivering small nuclear warheads on parade in Beijing. © Reuters
If there is an emergency in the Taiwan Strait, maritime control will of course be the key issue. Small nuclear weapons with limited strike capabilities could enable China to hold U.S. aircraft carriers at bay.

Russia has threatened the use of small nuclear weapons on airports and underpopulated areas in Ukraine. The U.S. has so far had no direct involvement in the war there, and some analysts have argued that the possible use of nuclear firepower has made it even more wary of any entanglement. China is certainly aware of this line of thinking.

China's nuclear arsenal has aged since the last tests were conducted, and new data is needed for the latest generation of nuclear weapons before their deployment.

Analysis in mid-July of other satellite intelligence meanwhile appears to show U.S. activity at its U1a Complex in the Nevada National Security Site.

The Nevada work is thought to have started in September 2021, and construction at two locations there has nearly doubled the site. "The U1a Complex Enhancements Project will help underwrite future annual assessments and modernization programs and will ensure confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile without a return to nuclear testing," said Tyler Patterson, a spokesperson for the site.
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Analysis of satellite intelligence in July shows development in the U.S. of the U1a Complex in the Nevada National Security Site. © Planet Labs

Although President Joe Biden has advocated a "nuclear-free world," the U.S. conducted subcritical nuclear tests without reaching a critical mass in June and September 2021. By holding more than a quarter of the world's nuclear warheads, the U.S. continues to compete head-on with China and Russia on nuclear weapons.

Blocks on the use of nuclear weapons may be coming down as the U.S. and China continue developing smaller devices alongside Russia's nuclear saber rattling in Ukraine.

"[A conflagration in the Taiwan Strait increases] the risk of China using small nuclear weapons and the U.S. countering with them," said Michiru Nishida, a professor at Nagasaki University.

In a report in June, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute warned that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is at its highest level since the Cold War in the second half of the 20th century.

The findings come as signatories to the UN's key nuclear non-proliferation agreement meet in New York to begin their regular review of the arrangement.

The Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. declined to comment on the matter.
 

jward

passin' thru
Pentagon eyes broader missile defense amid calls for more advanced countermeasures
Jen Judson

10-13 minutes


WASHINGTON — America’s focus on countering intercontinental ballistic missiles is broadening to cruise and hypersonic missiles, and modest spending might not cut it.
Analysts and experts are hoping the fiscal 2024 budget request will prove the Biden administration is committed to a layered homeland missile defense architecture.
Acknowledging the growing array of missile threats, the Trump administration in 2019 removed “ballistic” from its description of homeland missile defense when it released its Missile Defense Review. The Biden administration has not yet released an unclassified version of its review.

But John Plumb, the first-ever assistant secretary of defense for space policy, testified in May before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s strategic forces panel that while China is the pacing threat in terms of military strategy, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine emphasizes the need for a broader missile defense strategy for the homeland.
“The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine, in which Russia has used and continues to use a broad array of missiles to attack and, in my opinion, terrorize civilian populations, highlights the extent to which our adversaries are prepared to use missiles in a conflict,” Plumb said. “Missile defenses are critical for defending the U.S. homeland and for defending our deployed forces and our allies and partners.”

Plumb noted the FY23 budget request called for “significant investments in homeland missile defense,” including $2.8 billion to develop the Next Generation Interceptor and for the service-life extension of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system as well as $4.7 billion to transition to a “resilient missile warning and missile track satellite architecture.”
It also sought $4.7 billion for the Space Force, $278 million for new over-the-horizon radars to enhance the ability to detect cruise missile attacks on the homeland and nearly $1 billion for missile defense capabilities for Guam.

Development focus
The Missile Defense Agency has several efforts underway to address a wider variety of threats. One priority is ensuring the Ground-Based Interceptors in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system are replaced by the Next Generation Interceptor.
While Ground-Based Interceptors only have one kill vehicle, allowing each to destroy a single intercontinental ballistic missile in flight, the Next Generation Interceptor is undergoing designs to house multiple kill vehicles, making it possible for one interceptor to simultaneously defeat several incoming missiles.
Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Technologies are competing against a team of Lockheed Martin and Aerojet Rocketdyne to design the Next Generation Interceptor. The Missile Defense Agency hopes to place the first future interceptor into a ground-based silo by 2028.

MDA is also using a competitive development strategy to develop a Glide Phase Interceptor capable of defeating a hypersonic weapon. Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman were selected in June to continue developing the interceptors.
The agency will first focus on providing a capability to the Navy and, if successful, move to develop a land-based battery.
Meanwhile, the agency and U.S. Northern Command are working together to test a possible cruise missile defense capability for the homeland. They plan to conduct a capability demonstration in FY23 that integrates an elevated sensor into a so-called joint tactical integrated fire architecture with fire control for a naval long-range surface-to-air interceptor.
A major endeavor for MDA in the coming fiscal year is to kick off construction of a missile defense architecture in Guam.

The agency set an FY26 fielding deadline for the capability and plans to spend $539 million in FY23 to begin the process.
The architecture will be mobile and include Navy SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, the Patriot air defense system, and the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System. The U.S. has operated that latter battery in Guam since 2013.
Those elements are to connect through the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System — command-and-control technology that connects sensors and shooters on the battlefield. The agency will also use the Aegis weapon system’s fire control capability.

Pentagon officials have said the architecture on Guam could serve as a proof of concept or a test bed to contribute to a homeland cruise missile defense architecture.
The Pentagon has said it budgeted roughly $20 billion to develop a “missile defeat” capability. This figure appears to be a big boost, Robert Soofer, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy during the Trump administration, told Defense News.
But only about half of that funding will go toward traditional missile defense, Soofer noted. Some of the funding, for example, is for offensive hypersonic weapons development — an area set to receive about $3.8 billion in the FY23 request.
MDA requested $2.8 billion to continue to sustain and upgrade its Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and $225 million to develop the Glide Phase Interceptor to counter hypersonic threats.


The FY23 budget request called for $2.8 billion to develop the Next Generation Interceptor and for the service-life extension of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. (3d render) (Eoneren/Getty Images)

A total of $89 million would pay for delivering space vehicles for launch vehicle integration as well as complete development of the ground system for the second quarter of FY23, which will see the launch of two prototypes and on-orbit experimentations of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor.
Congress is also moving to increase missile defense development funding in its FY23 defense authorization bills. The Senate Armed Services Committee released its version of the bill in July, which included $50.9 million in additional money for the cruise missile defense for the homeland demonstration.
The committee also doubled the Glide Phase Interceptor weapon account to $518 million.
For its part, the House Armed Services Committee in its version of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act approved $166 million in additional funding — more than double the request — for continued development of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor.

Capitol demands
Both chambers’ versions of the FY23 authorization bill indicate Congress wants increased oversight and a better sense of who will manage missile defense programs.
The Senate version of the bill calls for a “rapid and complete modernization of legacy nuclear capabilities of the United States and the timely development of a range of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic boost glide missiles.”
Senators ask for increased notification and reports, should the Pentagon run into issues that could delay or prevent the fielding of those critical capabilities. The legislation also requires Pentagon officials brief Congress twice a year on missile defense policies, operations and technology development.

Additionally, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee want the defense secretary to designate a senior Defense Department official to oversee the missile defense of Guam within 90 days of the bill’s passage.
The House version of the bill acknowledges the White House’s FY22 and FY23 budgets make “a needed and significant shift” to address missile tracking and warning architecture. The legislation also notes the Pentagon should continue to fund and deliver the capability from low Earth orbit in the mid-2020s.
Lawmakers also require the defense secretary and MDA to submit a comprehensive layered strategy to use “asymmetric capabilities” to defeat hypersonic missile threats.
Members of Congress appear to be backing off from a push to fund a homeland missile defense radar in Hawaii. MDA has not included funding for the radar for several years, but Congress had added funding the last several budget cycles to move forward on the program.


The second of two THAAD interceptors is launched during a successful intercept test. (Ralph Scott/U.S. Defense Department)

However, in the latest House Armed Services Committee bill, lawmakers noted they will wait to determine what’s needed in Hawaii until learning more about a review currently in the works by the Pentagon on the integrated air and missile defense sensor architecture of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
House lawmakers have also been pressuring the Pentagon to designate a department or agency to lead its homeland cruise missile defense efforts. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks in late July gave the Air Force lead acquisition authority over homeland cruise missile defense.
A memo from Hicks gives the Air Force 180 days to deliver a plan and proposed architecture that addresses meeting homeland cruise missile defense capability gaps “projected in Fiscal Year 2026 and 2030.”

‘We don’t really get a choice’
But some analysts and experts say the shift toward thinking about missile threats more broadly is inevitable.
“We don’t really get a choice about whether or not we go after this,” Tom Karako, a missile defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Defense News. “We have to counter all of these different pieces of the air-and-missile threat spectrum in some way, be it passive defense, be it active defense, be it distributed ops or what have you. That’s just the reality.”
The architecture at Guam will give the Pentagon an opportunity to look at what’s possible, Karako added.
He said he’ll be watching the president’s FY24 budget request for proof the White House is committed to a more robust defense of the homeland. “Will it go after homeland cruise missile defense like we mean it?” he wondered.

If the White House and the Defense Department don’t commit more money to solving the homeland cruise missile defense mission in FY24, “it sends a signal that there are [other], higher priorities,” Soofer said.
North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, in consultation with the Missile Defense Agency and the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, are closing in on a design framework for the mission, Brig. Gen. Paul Murray, NORAD deputy director of operations, said last month. The next step is to show decision-makers it will work, he explained.

Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Defense News that “you can tell if an administration is serious by scrutinizing whether they produce well-formulated missile defense acquisition strategies in a timely manner and request the necessary funding to field capabilities as quickly as possible.”
“Too often, we have seen a dissonance between words and actions,” he added. “I worry we will pay a steeper price for that dissonance in the future.”

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

The Case Against a New Arms Race
Nuclear Weapons Are Not the Future
By Rose Gottemoeller
August 9, 2022

As Russian President Vladimir Putin marched his army into Ukraine on February 24, he issued dire warnings to the West. Any state that sent its troops to fight Russia, he said, would face “ominous consequences”—the likes of which the world has “never seen in [its] entire history.” His country was ready to act and had made “the necessary decisions” to respond if attacked. “I hope that my words will be heard,” he declared.

Putin didn’t explicitly state what those consequences would be, or what attacks he had in mind. But to anyone listening, the message was clear enough. If the West directly intervened in Ukraine, Russia would use its nuclear arsenal.

Putin’s invocation of nuclear war has reignited debates about deterrence and the utility of nuclear weapons. It has led Admiral Charles Richard, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command responsible for nuclear deterrence, to argue that the United States may need more nuclear weapons to deter and defend against Russia and also China, which are both modernizing their nuclear forces. “We do not necessarily have to match weapon for weapon,” he said in March. “But it is clear what we have today is the absolute minimum.” Proponents of a nuclear buildup point out that in the coming years, China could rapidly acquire more nuclear weapons, or that Iran, a newcomer, could develop and deploy them for the first time. The United States, the argument runs, risks weakening its own security if it doesn’t amass a larger nuclear arsenal to maintain its advantage over rivals.

But it would be a mistake for the United States, or any state, to embark on a nuclear arms race during this time, when a revolution is afoot in other types of military technology. New defense innovations promise not just to transform warfare but also to undermine the logic and utility of nuclear weapons. With advances in sensing technology, states may soon be able to track and target their adversaries’ nuclear missiles, making the weapons easier to eliminate. And with nuclear weapons more vulnerable, innovations such as drone swarms—large numbers of small automated weapons that collectively execute a coordinated attack—will increasingly define war. A fixation on building more nuclear weapons will only distract from this technological revolution, making it harder for the United States to master the advances that will shape the battlefield of the future.

NOWHERE TO HIDE
Although the Soviet Union considered using nuclear weapons for warfighting, for decades, nuclear weapons primarily have been seen as instruments of deterrence. These bombs, the thinking goes, are so destructive and invite such uncompromising retaliation that their use in wartime imperils the very existence of the human race. U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev captured this idea at a 1985 summit when they declared that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But the development of lower-yield warheads and higher-accuracy missiles in the 1980s encouraged some experts to believe that nuclear weapons could become practical tools of war. The debate at that time around so-called neutron weapons stemmed from the notion that such a bomb, accurately delivered, could wipe out an entire tank battalion without killing tens of thousands of civilians.

In the wake of Russia’s invasion, some foreign policy commentators, including New York Times columnist Bret Stephens, have called for the United States to build its own such stockpile—as China and Russia have done. Proponents of the weapons argue that if the United States does not deter these weapons with lower-yield bombs of its own, then China and Russia will take advantage of a “deterrence gap,” using such weapons on the battlefield and then daring Washington to escalate by launching its big strategic missiles against Beijing or Moscow. As the argument goes, the United States will never attack Moscow in response to a small nuclear attack against a German military base. In order to deter the Russians, Washington has to be able to strike them with the same low-yield weapons that they might use in Europe.

The technology revolution is passing nuclear weapons by.

In the 1980s, however, Western publics recoiled against the notion that low-yield strikes were somehow cleaner than larger nuclear weapons. The fact that they would produce little physical damage but would efficiently kill people brought protesters into the streets across Europe and the United States. Faced with this stark reaction, the United States embarked on a long campaign to develop highly accurate conventional weapons, which could effectively retaliate against nuclear attack.

The case for low-yield nuclear weapons will be no easier to make today than in the 1980s, especially since the technology revolution is passing the weapons by. There are limits to further innovation in new nuclear weapons development since one can split the atom in only so many ways. Dialing nuclear yield up or down, increasing or decreasing destructive power—these are all well-understood phenomena that will not change the deterrent balance or make the public more accepting of nuclear use. The same is true of missiles that will deliver nuclear weapons. Since the 1980s, they have become steadily faster and more accurate, and have acquired greater range and maneuverability. Hypersonic weapons are the latest expression of these trends.

These are not the innovations that count today. The most consequential innovations happening now are those that change the environment in which traditional nuclear missile systems must operate. Today, sensor systems on satellites and other platforms are providing ever-sharper imagery and location information for military facilities, weapons, and equipment—day and night, in cloud cover or clear weather. As big data analysis begins to quickly make sense of myriad images and predict changes in them, forces will eventually be able to conduct real-time targeting. Even mobile nuclear missiles and submarines may become subject to such tracking and targeting in the future, as quantum computing and sensing take hold.

The implications for nuclear deterrence are stark. All nuclear weapons states have depended on the ability to hide and protect some nuclear missiles so that they would be available to retaliate if somehow an adversary carried out a successful first strike. Such “second-strike retaliatory forces” have been the essential insurance policy that enabled all the nuclear weapons states to feel confident that, even if their adversary surprised them, they would retain the means to respond with nuclear weapons. This retaliatory option is a strong factor in the stability of nuclear deterrence.

With the technology revolution driving in the direction of real-time targeting, however, even the stealthiest or most well-protected mobile weapons will become vulnerable in the future. The day may come when the nuclear weapons states must question the viability of their retaliatory forces because of their vulnerability to attack.

SMART MODERNIZATION
This future threat argues not for abandoning nuclear weapons but for carrying forward a careful modernization of them. As President Barack Obama first said in his Prague speech in April 2009, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. The modernization program for the nuclear forces of the United States is very much underway and is receiving the funding that it requires. Replacing the submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bombers will take well over a decade, but the process is vital to ensure that the United States remains secure from nuclear attack during a fraught period of global competition.

In particular, the United States must watch China. China has gone from a nuclear posture depending on a small force of missiles intended for second-strike retaliation to something else. For the past several years, Beijing has been building silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles in its western and northern desert while also building up its warhead numbers. Still, there is no need to panic. Even if it quintuples its stockpile, as some experts are predicting, China’s number of warheads will still be well below the numbers in the U.S. arsenal in 2030.

Washington must remain alert, as well, to what Russia is doing. The country is a highly capable and experienced military nuclear power with a leader whose belligerence is breathtaking. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling is unlike anything seen in the seven decades since nuclear weapons were last used to attack Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the close of World War II.

The United States will not be the one to launch a nuclear arms race.

But under the New START treaty, both the United States and Russian Federation cannot deploy more than 700 delivery vehicles—missiles and bombers alike—or more than 1,550 warheads. New START remains in force until February 2026. As long as both parties adhere to the treaty, which they have continued to do even during the Ukraine war, the United States will be able to carry out its nuclear modernization in a stable and predictable environment. This predictability is the key reason to replace the treaty before it ends in February 2026: Russia cannot race to build up its strategic nuclear forces while New START limits are in place, as long as the treaty contains a regime that can verify Russia is sticking to its obligations.

China is well below the New START limits today, but if it tries to build up to 700 delivery vehicles and 1,550 deployed warheads, Washington will see it coming with enough time to do something about it. The United States will not be the one to launch a nuclear arms race, but it will respond to others who do.

Secure on the nuclear modernization front, the United States must turn its attention to the technological revolution. China’s intention is to dominate the new technology space. It has the clear goal of being the world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, and it is putting substantial resources into achieving that objective. Beijing has already put artificial intelligence to work in tightening the security bubble around China’s society and economy, gaining an enormous amount of experience with the technology in the process. If the United States is not careful, China will outrun U.S. artificial intelligence innovation, leading to a dangerous gap in military capabilities. And artificial intelligence is only one arena where China is seeking dominance. The Chinese also have biotechnology, quantum computing, and other sectors in their sights.

Choosing to focus on this technological competition is not easy at a time when the Russian Federation is pounding Ukraine in an unprovoked and unwarranted military invasion. The security of the United States, however, depends on its ability to stay in this race, to compete, and to succeed. The last thing the United States needs, as it is trying to prevail in new technologies, is a nuclear arms race. The wisest choice for Washington, then, is to modernize its nuclear force posture as planned while putting its main emphasis on developing and acquiring new technologies for military applications. A nuclear arms race is a sidetrack that is not in the U.S. national security interest.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm....

Posted for fair use.....

Pakistan ‘certainly’ thinks of nuclear weapons as leverage, says strategic expert Ashley Tellis

Discussing his new book at ThePrint's 'Off the Cuff', Tellis spoke to Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta about divergence in nuclear policies of China, Pakistan and India in the 21st century.

THEPRINT TEAM
12 August, 2022 11:53 am IST

New Delhi: Pakistan views nuclear weapons as a “form of leverage”, with the weapons having utility not only for deterrence but also as a “licence for underwriting provocative behaviours”, according to senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Ashley J. Tellis.
In conversation with ThePrint’s Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta during a virtual session of ‘Off The Cuff’, Tellis talked about his new book, ‘Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in South Asia,’ the divergence in nuclear policies of China, Pakistan and India in the 21st century and much more.

Elaborating on his view about Pakistani nukes and the importance of leverage, the Mumbai-born strategic expert predicted that Pakistan would not threaten to use its arsenal in order to get its way, but could exploit it to “wage low-intensity conflicts” against India and support terrorism.

“The nuclear weapons then act as any deterrence against any Indian reaction that takes the form of conventional military operations … nuclear weapons provide you cover. They give you a certain immunity and that is utilised to support low-intensity warfare against India on the calculation that the warfare will bleed India, but if India ever chooses to react then the nuclear weapons really come into their own as they are the best deterrence against that response,” Tellis said.

Pakistan’s diversified nuclear weapons
At the outset of the discussion, Tellis explained his reasoning behind writing his new book by laying out his observations on the “dramatic divergences” undertaken by Pakistan, China and India in terms of nuclear policy in the last 20 years.

While India is the only nation among the three that apparently “hewed” the vision articulated in 1998 and China transformed from a “weak” nuclear power to one that will soon rival the United States and Russia, Tellis expressed particular interest in the diverse expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

“In 1998, the Pakistani ambition seemed to have been an inventory of 60-70 nuclear weapons, the initial requirement Pakistan had deemed adequate for their security in the aftermath of the [Pokhran] nuclear tests. Today, the Pakistani arsenal has gone way beyond those numbers and obviously there’s still no end in sight,” Tellis remarked.

He delved into the challenges of determining Pakistan’s current nuclear arsenal strength and stated that the country has evolved from an aircraft-delivered force to being a developer of a range of tactical nukes – the most prominent being nuclear artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions and nuclear-tipped rocket artillery.

‘Frosty’ India-China relationship
Speaking on the current situation between India and China, Tellis labelled the relationship as “frosty”. Stopping short of calling it “combustible”, he argued that it is a far cry from the kind of ties the two countries would have aspired to back in 1987.

“[The India-China standoff] forcing India to expand enormous resources in maintaining forces along a border at force levels that historically have simply not been sustained and the costs of maintaining these large numbers of forces is not trivial and the same is also true for the Chinese,” Tellis said, referring to the standoff as “not desirable”.

Tellis also speculated on China’s political calculations and diplomatic perspective, stating that Beijing seeks clarity over India’s strategic direction, believing that New Delhi is more closely aligned with Washington, DC than China would like, and fearing that this relationship forms part of a “containment strategy” against it.
Also read: The West could have been braver in its approach to Russia-Ukraine war, says IISS’s Dr Chipman
 

jward

passin' thru
US points new-gen missile defense radar at China, Russia
Gabriel Honrada




The United States is wrapping up tests of its new Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) as part of a significant upgrade of its missile defense systems amid renewed great power competition and a renewed nuclear arms race, defense website Breaking News reports.
“We are literally months away from being able to plug in the Long-Range Discrimination Radar, LRDR, in the missile defense operational architecture. From the testing so far, we are seeing positive results for what this radar can do for us, discriminating threats to the continental US to make ground-based interceptor engagements more lethal,” said General Joey Lestorti of the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), as cited by Breaking News.
Lestorti noted that domain awareness is NORTHCOM Commander General Glen VanHerck’s top priority, adding that the LRDR will substantially contribute to that goal.

The US Department of Defense describes the LRDR as a two-in-one system, combining lower-frequency and high-frequency radars. The former can track multiple space objects but cannot distinguish which ones are a threat, while the latter has a limited field of view but can discriminate and identify specific threats.
This capability is crucial in defeating evolving ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile threats, which may be volley fired with deployed penetration aids to defeat current US missile defenses.
In addition to improving the US missile defense posture, Lestorti notes that the LRDR can also discriminate between space junk and satellites, supporting the US Space Command in its space domain awareness mission, Breaking Defense notes.
At the same time, Lestorti mentions that, despite the LRDR’s capabilities, data sharing regarding unknown tracks is still an open issue.

He asks, “If a sensor like LRDR acquires a track that isn’t a ballistic missile or satellite, where does that data go? Should the radar drop it, or could that data be passed to the architecture and increase awareness in air domain?”
In addition, Lestorti emphasized the importance of expanded domain awareness in hypersonic tracking, data fusion, and information-sharing to joint forces and select partners.
The near completion of LRDR testing comes amid mounting that US missile defense spending is not enough to counter emerging threats from China and Russia.

A 2022 Defense News article notes that US analysts and experts are hoping that the 2024 missile defense budget will demonstrate the Biden administration’s commitment, as the previous budget under the former Trump administration removed the term “ballistic” from its description of homeland missile defense.
US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb stated that the pacing threat China poses and Russia’s use of its missile arsenal in Ukraine underscores the need for a broader US missile defense strategy covering hypersonic and cruise missiles.
Plumb noted that the 2023 US missile defense budget request called for significant increases in missile defense spending, including US$2.8 billion for the New Generation Interceptor and service life extension of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD).

A Ground-Based Interceptor is lowered into its missile silo in Alaska. The Next Generation Interceptor is intended to offer improved performance over the aging GBI. Image: Lockheed Martin
He also notes a $4.7 billion allocation to transition into a “resilient missile warning and missile track satellite architecture.” The 2023 budget also allots $4.7 billion for the US Space Force, $278 million for new radars capable of detecting cruise missile attacks against the US homeland and $1 billion for Guam’s ballistic missile defense capabilities.
But despite the LRDR’s very capable sensor, there is still very little the US can do to defend against incoming missile threats without effective interceptor missiles.
The GMD is the US’ only system to defend the US homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The system has a limited number of interceptor missiles, with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation noting in 2021 that the GMD currently has 44 missiles, with the US planning to increase that number to 64 rounds.
Apart from a limited stockpile of interceptors, the GBD has a dismal success rate and has technical problems with its Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV).

Missile Threat notes that there have been 30 GBD tests since 1999, with 17 of 30 tests involving a target missile. Of those 17 tests, there were nine successful intercepts, amounting to a low success rate of just 53%. The source notes that inconsistencies in kill vehicle manufacturing and anomalies in test-only equipment contributed to this low rate.
In a 2011 article, Spacenews mentioned that a GBD test in December that year failed due to issues with the EKV’s guidance system, causing it to fail seconds before it hit its target. The source states that the failure was likely caused by the vibration of the small rocket boosters that steer the EKV towards the target, prompting modifications to the kill vehicle’s design.
Persistent problems with the GBD’s EKV have resulted in efforts to replace it with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) program. But The RKV program hit a dead end in 2019 when the US Department of Defense (DOD) terminated the program in August due to technical design problems, as reported by Defense News.

This situation places the US in an awkward position where it has a capable missile defense radar but no effective interceptors.

Near-peer competitors China and Russia have also upgraded their missile defense systems in response to the US’ rapidly-modernizing nuclear arsenal.
This April, Defense News reported China built a new type of Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) on a mountaintop in Yiyuan County, Shandong Province, to detect incoming ballistic missiles from thousands of kilometers, most likely covering all of Japan.
While the source notes that the capabilities of China’s LPAR system are unknown, it is likely similar to the AN/FPS-115 radar used by the US Pave Paws early warning network. Defense News notes that although the official range of the Pave Paws has never been published, it is estimated to detect a target with a 10-meter radar cross-section (RCS) at 5,600 kilometers.
China’s Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) on a mountaintop in Yiyuan County, Shandong Province. Image: Google Maps
In addition to upgrading its missile defense early warning radars, China has also upgraded its interceptor missiles. This June, Asia Times reported on China’s successful test of a land-based midcourse interception test, demonstrating the reliability of China’s missile shield against US missiles.

Although China did not identify its missile defense system, it is most likely the Mid-Course Interceptor, claimed to be effective against intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and analogous to the US GBD system. The system is expected to achieve initial operating capability before the late 2020s.
China conducted successful midcourse intercept tests in 2010, 2013, 2018, and 2021, according to reports. But since the number of failed Chinese tests are unknown, it is impossible to assign a success rate to China’s Mid-Course Interceptor.
In contrast to the fixed interceptor launch sites deployed by the US and possibly China, Russia has emphasized the development of mobile interceptor missiles.
In February, Asia Times reported on Russia’s fielding of the S-550 missile defense system, which it claims to be able to hit satellites, ballistic missiles and hypersonic targets at tens of thousands of kilometers.
Asia Times has pointed out that Russia’s claims to develop a formidable system such as the S-550 may be doubtful, claiming that having one system to defend against space-based and hypersonic threats is a tall order in light of current limitations in missile defense technology.

However, if Russia’s claims are true, the S-550 increases the operational flexibility and survivability of Russia’s missile defense capabilities compared to fixed systems. This mobile system could exploit Russia’s large territory to conceal potential missile defense sites, preventing interceptor missiles from being targeted and destroyed.
Fixed systems such as the GMD have known launch locations, making them vulnerable to attack, while space-based missile defense systems cannot be easily repaired or replaced when damaged or destroyed.


 

jward

passin' thru
Russia, China and Iran challenge the US with large military maneuvers in Venezuela
By: The Global Frontier

2-3 minutes


The armies of Russia, Iran and China will hold joint military maneuvers in Venezuela, specifically, in the city of Barquisimiento, in the state of Lara, from this Saturday until August 27. As reported ABCit is the first time that this war drills event with drones and sniper commands led by Russia, and it does so one day after the end of the annual military operations organized by the US Southern Command, baptized as “Panamax 2022”, in which the armed forces of twenty countries in the region participate.

The Kremlin intends to make a show of force in the Caribbean – an area considered Washington’s backyard – and, in these military exercises, some 270 teams from 37 countries, among which, in addition to those mentioned, are Algeria, Belarus, Vietnam, India, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or Myanmar. They all have in common their hatred of the US and the fact that they have suffered sanctions.

as collected Clarion, the Center for a Secure Free Society –SFS, for its acronym in English– defined these exercises as “a strategic movement that seeks to preposition (sic) military assets deployed in Latin America and the Caribbean.” The text quoted statements by Putin, who assured that in the US “they have not realized that new powerful centers have emerged and are becoming stronger and stronger“. “A year and a half ago –said the Russian president in June, in Saint Petersburg–, speaking at the Davos forum, I once again emphasized that the era of the unipolar world order is over. Despite all attempts to save it, to preserve it by all possible means. When they won the Cold War, the USA declared themselves God’s own representatives on earthpeople who have no responsibilities, only interests”.

Russia, China and Iran have made at least three joint military exercises in Asia since 2019. Now, they move the exercises to America. The fact demonstrates the growing influence of US rivals on the continent, as indicated by Javier Ansorena in ABC: China boosts its economic presence, the presidents of Argentina and Brazil appear to support Putin in the hemisphere and Maduro strengthens its relations with Iran.
 

jward

passin' thru
For the U.S., Just Showing Up in Africa Isn’t Enough
Judah GrunsteinAug 12, 2022August 12, 2022


U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in Africa this week for a three-country tour that saw him visit South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. While there, he took the opportunity to unveil the Biden administration’s new approach for deepening U.S. ties with African nations.

The strategy document serves as a welcome acknowledgement that Africa as a continent and the nations it comprises have become a more vocal and active force in global politics. For now, this trend has bumped up against the limits of existing power relations, meaning that from climate diplomacy to the distribution of coronavirus vaccines, African governments are often excluded from decision-making processes that have enormous consequences for their economic development and the well-being of their populations.

But in seeking to redefine Washington’s relationships with African nations as mutually beneficial partnerships in which both sides’ needs must be reflected, the Biden team’s approach represents at least an improvement in messaging from even a few months ago, when Washington resorted to browbeating African governments that refused to vote for a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Now the message is that the U.S. simply wants to offer African countries a choice, not force them to make one.

But in that, it is also an acknowledgement that whether governments and populations in Africa like it or not, the continent has become a central arena for great power competition, both diplomatic and economic. It is also a long-overdue corrective to Washington’s recent history of watching from the sidelines as outside powers, ranging from China and Russia to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, make inroads on investment, trade and security ties with governments across Africa, as well as cultural ties and people-to-people contacts with their populations.

The new U.S. approach seems to hit all the right notes, but to implement it, Washington will have to break long-established habits in its relations with African governments of prioritizing stability and the veneer of democracy over investment and institutional capacity-building that improves governance and consolidates democratic norms.
Here are some recent WPR articles for more context on the U.S. approach to relations with African nations:
 
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